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PREFACE
God, according to Christianity, Islam and Judaism, is a Being
who is all-powerful, all-knowing and all-loving. Such a God is
knowingly responsible for all human suffering and death brought
about by natural causes (and even brought about by people since
natural causes are always implicated). How can such a God be all-
loving? In order to solve this problem, I argue, we need to sever
the God-of-Cosmic-Power from the God-of-Cosmic-Value. The
former is Einstein’s God, the underlying unity in the physical
universe responsible for all that occurs. Because it is impersonal,
it can be forgiven the terrible things it does. The latter is what is of
most value associated with conscious human life – and sentient life
more generally.
Having cut God in half in this way, the problem then becomes to
put the two halves together again – to see how the God-of-Cosmic-
Value can exist and flourish embedded in the God-of-Cosmic-
Power. This, I argue, is our fundamental problem – our
fundamental philosophical problem, our fundamental theoretical
problem of knowledge and understanding, and our fundamental
practical problem of living (personal, social and global). It is, at
root, a religious problem, and ought to be the central concern of
academic inquiry and education, and indeed of all of life.
Unfortunately, at present, it is not, in part because of our long-
standing failure to cut God decisively in half, and thus appreciate
the fundamental character of the problem that results.
I go on to indicate how, in outline, this fundamental religious
problem can be solved. Theoretical physics, properly understood,
seeks to depict the nature of the God-of-Cosmic-Power. But
physics depicts only a highly selected aspect of all that exists. It
leaves out of account the world we see, hear, touch and are a part
of, the experiential world imbued with meaning and value – the
God-of-Cosmic-Value, in other words. We can, in this way, see
how the God-of-Cosmic-Value can exist embedded in the physical
universe, the God-of-Cosmic-Power. Furthermore, we can see
how we can exist, conscious beings of value, embedded in the
physical universe. We can see how we can act with some measure
of free will embedded as we are in the physical universe.
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Darwinian evolution can be re-interpreted to make intelligible the
process of the gradual evolution of life of value in the impersonal
physical universe.
But if we are to do better than at present at helping the God-of-
Cosmic-Value to flourish within the God-of-Cosmic-Power, we
need to learn how to do it, which means in turn that we have in our
possession institutions of inquiry and learning rationally devoted to
this task. It is just this that we do not have at present. For both
intellectual and humanitarian reasons, we need to bring about a
revolution in science, and in academic inquiry more generally, so
that the basic task becomes to help life of value to flourish in the
physical universe. The basic intellectual aim of academia needs to
be, not knowledge, but rather wisdom – wisdom being the capacity
to realize what is of value in life for oneself and others, thus
including knowledge and technological know-how, but much else
besides. I spell out arguments in support of this much needed
revolution, and indicate what its implications would be, for natural
science, for social inquiry, for the humanities, and for the structure
and character of academia as a whole.
I go on to explain how this new kind of “wisdom-inquiry” would
help us tackle our immense current global problems in rather more
effective and cooperatively rational ways than we do at present.
The argument I develop has, in short, profound implications for
science, for academic inquiry more generally, for education, for
philosophy – indeed for our whole culture and way of life, the way
we think about our problems, the world and our place in it.
In this book my concern is to indicate the path along which
believers, especially believers in Christianity, Islam and Judaism,
need to travel if they are to acquire a little more intellectual and
moral integrity – religious integrity one might say. But even more
important, perhaps, I seek to show how non-believers, agnostics
and atheists, need to retrace the steps along the path that has led to
their current position, to recover and develop much of value
discarded by too hasty a past jettisoning of belief in God. This is
not a book about the death of God. It is a book about how to
improve our ideas about the nature of God. Believers and non-
believers alike ought to pay attention. Both Richard Dawkins
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(author of The God Delusion) and Alister McGrath (co-author of
The Dawkins Delusion?) should take note.
European culture – and thus, in a sense, world culture – has
suffered a past gigantic rupture. Once upon a time everyone
believed in God. Then we had, in succession, the Renaissance, the
seventeenth century scientific revolution, the eighteenth century
Enlightenment, the industrial revolution and the Darwinian
revolution. Belief in God decayed; ceremonies associated with
belief in God dwindled. The rupture took the form: “Once we
believed in God; now we don’t, but in some circumstances we
observe ancient rituals and pretend that we do”. Many, of course,
resist this general decay of belief in God. Religious
fundamentalists even try to turn their back on the modern secular
world. But for many others, especially in those parts of the world
most influenced by European culture, belief in God has been
replaced by belief in science, in humanism, in liberalism, in
democracy, socialism, freedom, progress, or the market – although,
it has to be said, these latter beliefs are all looking, these days, a bit
tarnished.
This rupture in European and world culture – from a God-
dominated to a multi-faceted secular world (containing pockets of
religious fanaticism) – vital and tremendous as it is in all sorts of
ways, has nevertheless failed to develop ideas and values in the
best possible way. As a result of rejecting God, instead of
performing the surgical operation recommended here of cutting
God in half, we have failed to develop properly what we have
inherited from the rupture, and this inheritance has failed to come
to full fruition. Science, education, humanism, liberalism,
democracy, the arts, the market: all these suffer. Our culture, our
whole modern world, is damaged. Above all, we fail to get into
proper focus our fundamental problem: How to put the pieces
together again once God has been sliced into two. How to help
that which is of most value to flourish embedded as it is in the
physical universe.
What we need to do, in short, is not lose our faith, but improve
our faith, develop a rational faith, and above all try to put our
rational faith into that which does really exist or can exist, and is
genuinely of value. When we discover that God, in the traditional
xsense, does not and cannot exist, we need to work out carefully and
delicately how our deepest aspirations, previously associated with
the non-existent traditional God, can be developed in the best
possible way, doing justice to the new universe we find ourselves
in, and the new possibilities for what is of most value in that
universe. The discovery of the non-existence of the traditional
God impacts on our deepest, most personal desires, hopes and
fears; and it impacts on the broadest, most public aspects and
structures of our culture and society. Great care and sensitivity are
needed to keep these threads in touch with one another, so that we
may see how the deeply personal and the objectively social may be
kept in touch with one another, so that both can develop in the best
ways possible.
If our current ideals – science, humanism, liberalism,
democracy, socialism, freedom, progress and the market – all seem
these days somewhat tarnished, here is the reason: we have failed
to perform the delicate operation of cutting God into two halves
properly, and consequently have failed to get into focus properly
what needs to be done to try to put the two halves together again.
The secular “gods” that we have acquired as a result of the great
rupture – science, humanism, etc. – have all emerged in crippled,
distorted forms, in forms which fail to help what is of most value
in life to flourish.
We need a religious revival – a religious revolution. We need to
acknowledge and do justice to a religious dimension inherent in all
our endeavours – political, educational, scientific, academic, even
agricultural, industrial and commercial. But this needs to take the
form of religious faith which meets elementary requirements of
intellectual integrity and rationality, religious faith which sees the
need to cut God in half, and which seeks to come to grips with the
fundamental problem that results of putting the pieces together
again, so that the God-of-Cosmic-Value is helped to flourish
within the God-of-Cosmic-Power. Traditional religions and our
current secular world fail to meet this challenge.
That is the line of argument I seek to trace out in this book.
1CHAPTER ONE 1
CUTTING GOD IN HALF
There is an urgent need to cut God in half.
To make such a pronouncement, these days, is a risky business.
One risks having a fatwa declared against one. Or one risks being
arrested for causing offence to the religious. So, let me explain as
quickly as I can what I mean by this outrageous pronouncement, in
the hope that this will keep such disasters at bay.
Consider the thesis: The ultimate reality is God, a Being who
created the world and everything in it, a Being who is all-powerful,
all-knowing, and all-loving, the source of all value, a Being who
cares, profoundly, for the salvation of our souls.
This is, I take it, a central tenet of Christianity, Judaism and Islam.
It is not upheld by all religions; it is not, for example, a part of
Buddhism. But it is believed to be true by millions, possibly billions,
of people alive today. Many more pay lip service to the doctrine. Its
influence is felt in many contexts: educational, political, legal,
ceremonial. It even has a certain impact on war and terrorism.
Given all this, the thesis deserves to be taken seriously
intellectually. We need to ask: What would it be to treat this doctrine
in an intellectually responsible fashion, with a measure of intellectual
honesty? This question has especial relevance to education. For in
so far as there are religious schools which take the thesis seriously,
educational authorities responsible for educational standards need to
be sure that these schools treat the God-doctrine in an educationally
responsible way, in a way that promotes education rather than mere
indoctrination. But we can only know what it means for a school to
treat the God-doctrine in an educationally responsible way if we
know what it means to treat it in an intellectually responsible way.
In what follows I spell out a few elementary steps that need to be
taken if one is to uphold the God-thesis with a modicum of
intellectual honesty. These are steps that all theistic religions need to
1 This chapter is a modified version of Maxwell (2002a).
2take if they are to avoid charges of dogmatism, charlatanism,
disreputably and immorally misleading the public.
The first step towards intellectual honesty that one needs to take is
to note that this creed, like other substantial theses about the nature of
things, needs to be treated as a conjecture, a hypothesis, which may,
or may not, be true.
Two points deserve to be noted about this first, minimal step.
First, even here, many religious traditions paralyse rational thought
by making it a sin to doubt the existence of God. The sin, on the
contrary, is to make doubt a sin.
Second, it is important that one does not exaggerate the power of
reason, and claim that, in order to be rational, a belief must be proven
or justified. As Karl Popper tirelessly argued, even our best scientific
theories cannot be verified or justified; they remain, for ever,
conjectures which, at best, can be empirically falsified.2 The result
of giving exaggerated powers to reason is that it becomes reasonable
to hold that reason has its limits, and all sorts of beliefs, including
religious ones, are beyond the scope of reason, defy reason, and are
legitimately held as articles of irrational faith. Interpret the powers of
reason more modestly, as helping us to choose, fallibly, between
rival conjectures, and no thesis, not even a religious one concerning
the existence of God, lies beyond the reach of reason.
The next step, then, is to ask: Are there good grounds for
preferring the God conjecture to rival conjectures – such as, for
example, that no such Being as God exists? What problems does the
God-thesis solve, what phenomena does it explain? Can it be
refuted?
There can be no doubt at all that the conjecture that an all-
powerful, all-knowing, all-loving God exists does solve problems,
and does make many things intelligible. The dreadful, apparently
unsolvable problem of death is solved at a stroke: such a God would
arrange for us to survive death. The dreadful problem of the
unspeakable suffering of this world, the awful waste of human
potential, the numbing injustice of human life: all this will be put
right after death, if an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-loving God
exists. And if such a God exists, we have an immediate explanation
2 See Popper (1963) or, at a more technical level, Popper (1959).
3for the fact that our environment, here on earth seems, in many ways
(if not in all ways) especially designed to nourish us and support our
existence. We can even understand why the universe is knowable to
us, by means of science: God created both the universe, and human
beings; being benevolent, He would naturally arrange things in such
a way that there is a sufficient match between the nature of the
universe and the nature of our minds for us to be able to improve our
knowledge of the universe. God explains why science works.
How Can God's Evil Deeds be Excused?
But there is a dreadful snag. If God is all-knowing and all-
powerful, then God must be knowingly in charge of natural
phenomena, in particular those natural phenomena that cause human
suffering and death as a result of earthquakes, drought, disease,
accident. Even when people torture and kill other people, God is
always a co-torturer and co-murderer, in that He decides the knife
will not, at the last minute, turn into rubber, the bullet will not
evaporate before it hits its target, the virus will not die or become
abruptly harmless. Day after day, hour after hour, God knowingly
tortures and murders innocent children (children dying of painful
diseases) – to put the point at its most emotionally inflammatory, but
correctly.
The obvious conclusion to draw is that the hypothesis that an all-
powerful, all-knowing, all-loving God exists is refuted by the most
elementary tragic facts of human existence.3 This conclusion is
3 Strangely enough, Richard Dawkins (2006) is rather dismissive of this
decisive reason for rejecting the hypothesis that the traditional God
exists. “it is” Dawkins remarks “an argument only against the existence
of a good God. Goodness is no part of the definition of the God
hypothesis, merely a desirable add-on.” And he goes on to remark “it is
childishly easy to overcome the problem of evil. Simply postulate a
nasty God” (Dawkins, 2006, p. 135). But no Christian or Muslim who
believes in the traditional God can conceivably calmly acknowledge that
God may not be so good after all, and carry on as before, as Christian or
Muslim, believing in a nasty God. Goodness is not an optional add-on: it
is an absolutely essential ingredient of the traditional God. The manifest
monstrosity, on a cosmic scale, of an all-powerful, all-knowing God
(should He exist) is a devastating and lethal objection to the traditional
4inescapable once one child has suffered and died as a result of injury
or disease – suffered and died as a result of the knowing actions of
God (if He exists). A loving God would take care of His children in
at least as humane a fashion as, let us say, a petty thief. No run-of-
the-mill petty thief would torture his child to death over a period of
days or months, a commonplace action for God (if He exists). God
tortures and murders billions of people; indeed none of us escapes.
Nothing can excuse God for killing one child, let alone all of
humanity, one after the other. And yet, over the centuries
theologians, instead of emphasizing that the God conjecture is
decisively refuted, have instead struggled to invent excuses for God's
criminal acts. The excuses are dreadful, utterly immoral and
hopeless, and yet they continue to be taken seriously today.4
"God must allow us to suffer and die, because He must allow us
our freedom" runs one excuse. So, should we equally demand of
human parents that if their child runs onto the road in front of an
incoming lorry, they should not interfere, so that the child may have
his freedom? "God is unknowable, and we human beings cannot
know why God performs these monstrous acts" runs another. But
nothing can excuse God murdering a child slowly and agonizingly
by means of cancer, let us say. People living in the Soviet Union
under Stalin are on record as endlessly excusing the frightful crimes
of Stalin; these excuses are morally and intellectually dreadful
God conjecture. As Stendhal said “The only excuse for God is that he
does not exist” (quoted in Hicks, 1985, p. xi).
4 The endeavour of attempting to excuse God’s criminality even has a
name, coined by Leibniz: Theodicy. Rarely does one even find the
problem stated correctly. It is usually stated as the problem of
understanding how God, being infinitely good, can allow evil to occur,
and not as the problem of how an infinitely good God could himself
perform endlessly many monstrously evil acts, torturing and maiming
millions (if not billions in that we all suffer to a greater or lesser extent
from natural causes during our lives) and murdering billions, in that we
all die from natural causes, even those killed by their fellow human
beings. For exercises in Theodicy see: Hicks (1985); McCord (1999);
van Inwagen (2006); Swinburne (2003). For a compilation of writings
on “the problem of evil”, from Plato via Medieval times to the 20th
century see Larrimore (2001).
5(however excusable in the circumstances): how can any excuse,
whatever it might be, be any better for God's far more dreadful
crimes? "God lets us suffer so that we may grow spiritually" runs a
third excuse. Are child molesters to be excused on similar grounds?
Can we be so sure that suffering ennobles? Would not this argument
imply that we do a person a favour if we hurt him? "It is not God
who does these dreadful things, but the Devil". If God is all-
powerful and all-knowing, God has the power to stop the Devil; if
He decides not to, then He is in part responsible for what goes on.
"People suffer and die because of the sins of their ancestors." What
an appallingly immoral argument! "God does not murder people; he
acts as a surgeon, causing pain in order to cure: those who die live on
in Heaven (at least those who deserve it do)." But a surgeon who
caused unspeakable pain in a patient over weeks or months, without
adequate explanation, and without anaesthetics, would be struck off
the medical register, and would doubtless be prosecuted for assault to
an extreme degree: even if God does cause us to suffer so that we
may be released into the after-life, this might mean that God does not
murder, but it does not remotely excuse His actions. (On these
grounds, no true believer could be accused of murder either, of
course!)
Religious communities should hang their heads in shame at
producing such appalling, immoral arguments. Taking such
arguments seriously, even if only to set about refuting them, is in
itself to take part in a corporate dance of insanity.
Why, why has humanity, or so much of humanity, allowed itself to
be so bamboozled? Because the need for God is so potent, the fear
of His non-existence so terrible. God's criminality is excused for the
same reason, essentially, that Stalin's criminality was excused: the
consequences of acknowledging that the crimes are real are too
dreadful to contemplate. And this is backed up, in both cases, by a
system of "education" which prompts one to believe that it is not
God's (or Stalin's) criminality that is at issue, but one's own - any
hint of a suspicion that God (or Stalin) is a monster instantly
demonstrating one's own dreadful disposition for sin. How justified
God (or Stalin) would be in punishing such suspicion, and how
merciful God (or Stalin) so often proves to be in not bringing down
instant punishment on those who so sin.
6Granted that the conjecture that an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-
loving God exists has been refuted,5 what do we put in its place?
This is the really important question!
In order to answer it, the first point we need to note is that, as we
have discovered that God in the orthodox sense does not, and cannot
exist, we need to be more open-minded about what sort of entity God
may be. The question of whether God exists or not can always be
converted into a question, not about God's existence, but rather about
what sort of entity God is. If we mean something very specific and
5 It may be held that my very brief, cavalier discussion of “the problem
of evil” hardly does justice to the issue, and can hardly be said to amount
to a refutation of the God conjecture. I think exactly the opposite is the
case. It is quite impossible for there to be a God who is all-powerful, all-
knowing, and all-loving, and attempts to argue that this is possible are
intellectually and morally disreputable. State clearly that the problem is
the appalling, billionfold criminality of God, far outdoing the actions of a
mere Hitler or Stalin, and it is quite clear that there can be no excuse, no
justification. The suffering and death of one child from cancer, caused
by God – not merely permitted to happen by God – is enough to
demolish the idea that there could be an omnipotent, omniscient, all-
loving God. It does not matter who does it: torture and murder is not
compatible with loving.
I might add that my concern in this book is not so much to
demonstrate decisively that the traditional God cannot exist, which
strikes me as utterly obvious, but to show how the traditional God
conjecture, suffering from this dreadful defect, can be improved so as to
overcome the defect, become intellectually and morally acceptable, and
even become genuinely fruitful for intellectual and practical purposes. It
is a commonplace, in science, that theories can be improved. Einstein’s
theory of gravitation is a considerable improvement over Newton’s. The
quantum theory of the electromagnetic field is, in many respects, an
improvement over James Clerk Maxwell’s classical theory of the
electromagnetic field. And so on. But in the field of humanities,
philosophy, politics and religion, we do not seem yet to have developed
an analogous tradition of improving theses and ideas. It is this that I am
attempting to do in this book in the field of religion (and philosophy).
This attempt is intimately connected with a general methodology for
improving aspects of life, which I call aim-oriented rationality, and
which I shall expound and argue for in chapter 6.
7highly problematic by "God", then it is all too likely that God, in this
sense, does not exist. But if we mean something highly unspecific
and unproblematic by "God", it becomes much more likely that
"God", in this sense, does exist. One way of posing the question is:
What is the nature of that Entity which (a) preserves as much as
possible about what is best in the orthodox notion of God, and (b)
exists? Reformulated in this way, the question becomes, not "Does
God exist?", but rather "What is the nature of God?" where God, in
this sense, exists by definition as it were.
The next step, in answering the above question, is to track down
what it is in the orthodox conception of "God" that we have been
discussing that makes it so impossible for "God" in this sense, to
exist. We then need to broaden our conception of "God"
appropriately, so that "God", in this sense, becomes at least a viable
possibility, the "God"-thesis a viable conjecture.
It is not difficult to track down what it is about the orthodox
conception of God that creates the difficulties we have been
considering. These all come from the supposition that God is both
all-powerful, and all-loving. This is what we need, of course, an all-
powerful being who is also all-loving, so that everything that is most
precious in existence will be effectively, lovingly taken care of. But
in our world, this leads to the awful consequences that we have been
considering.
One possibility, of course, is that God, far from being loving, is
thoroughly evil. But this does not seem to do justice to all the
wonderful things that there are in existence. What is so confusing is
that life is such a mixture of joy and horror, the extraordinary, the
prosaic and the unspeakable.
Perhaps God is confused, schizophrenic even, a dreadful mixture
of love and hate? But this does not seem to do justice to the majesty
of the universe, its intricate splendour. Could this have been created
by a neurotic?
One might take the thing further, by postulating two equally
powerful gods, God and the Devil, one good, the other evil, locked in
terrible combat, humanity somehow the field of battle.6 But if this
6 This seems to have been the view of Georges Bernanos, the novelist:
see, for example, Bernanos (1948).
8really were the case, there would be, one feels, more disruptive
explosions in the natural world, as the two cosmic Beings fought out
their mighty, eternal battle.
Another possibility, of course, is that God is all-loving, but lacks
power. He sees the terrible things that go on, but is powerless to
intervene. It is a version of this hypothesis that I wish to defend. As
it stands, however, it is incomplete: nothing is said about the nature
of that which does have power, which is the cause of natural
phenomena, and thus the cause of so much of our suffering.
Bisecting the Deity
Here is how, in my view, the problem is to be solved. God must
be cut in two. (At last I come to the proposition with which I began.)
The God of power must be severed from the God of love, the God
that is the source of all value. Or, if it seems just a little too brutal,
too grandiose, to speak of cutting God in half, let us say, rather, that
we need to cut the concept of God in half – a much more modest
surgical deed.
The God of cosmic power is utterly impersonal. It is that
impersonal something, whatever It may be, that exists everywhere,
eternally and unchanging, throughout all phenomena, and determines
(perhaps probabilistically) the way phenomena unfold. It is what
theoretical physics seeks to discover. It is Einstein's "God", eternal,
omnipresent, all-powerful, but utterly impersonal, an It, not a
conscious Being. 7 It is that physical property of the fundamental
physical entity, the fundamental physical field or whatever, that
determines the way in which that which changes does change. It is
what corresponds physically to the true unified theory of everything
that physicists seek to discover.8
It is this cosmic It that is responsible for all our suffering. And
precisely because It is an It, incapable of knowing and feeling, It can
be forgiven the terrible things that It does. If It knew that the laws of
7 See A. Einstein (1973, pp. 36-52).
8 Strictly speaking, it is what corresponds physically to the true unified
theory of everything (the God-of-Cosmic-Power) plus variable physical
states of affairs which, together, at any instant, determine (perhaps
probabilistically) subsequent physical states of affairs.
9nature, working themselves out as usual, meant, in this particular
case, horrible suffering and death from cancer for this child,
agonizing burns for this person, burial in rubble for that person, the It
would at once bend a law of nature here and there, so that these
ghastly tragedies can be avoided. But this cosmic It has no mind, no
understanding, no awareness: it goes blindly on Its way, incapable of
knowing anything, and therefore can be forgiven.
But what of the other half of the traditional God, the God of value?
This, I suggest, is what is best in us. It is that potentially or actually
aware and loving self within us that sees, feels, knows and
understands, at least partially, and either does intervene to prevent
disaster, or is powerless to do so. The God of value is the soul of
humanity, embedded in the physical universe, striving to protect, to
care for, to love, but all too often, alas, powerless to prevent human
suffering. (More generally, the God of value is that which is of most
value, actually and potentially, in sentient life.)
What is usually characterized as belief in science and humanism is
actually, when properly interpreted, what emerges as a result of a
rational evolution of belief in God. The scientific view of the
universe, and the humanistic faith that it is individual human beings
that are of supreme value in existence amount, when taken together,
to a profoundly religious view, one which does not have the awful
intellectual and moral defects of orthodox Theism (whether
Christian, Judaic or Islamic). Science + Humanism only denies the
existence of God in a thoroughly disreputable sense of "God";
granted a somewhat more reputable sense of "God", Science +
Humanism is a passionate affirmation of the existence of God. But,
as we shall see, reinterpreting Science + Humanism in this religious
way has consequences for the nature of both science and humanism –
and a range of other aspects of our culture as well.
Cutting God in half may solve problems that haunt orthodox
Theism, but it does so at the expense of creating an immense new
problem. Having chopped God into two, into the God-of-Cosmic-
Power and the God-of-Cosmic-Value, we are at once confronted by
the problem: How are the two halves to be put together again? How
is it possible for the God-of-Cosmic-Value to exist embedded in the
God-of-Cosmic-Power – the physically comprehensible universe?
How can we understand our human world, embedded as it is within
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the physical universe, in such a way that justice is done to both the
richness, meaning and value of human life on the one hand, and what
modern science tells us about the physical universe on the other
hand?
This problem (created by cutting God in half) is, quite simply, the
most general and fundamental problem confronting humanity. It is a
philosophical problem – indeed, the fundamental problem of
philosophy: How is it possible for our human world, imbued with
sensory qualities, consciousness, free will, art, science, and much
else of value, to exist embedded in the physical universe? (This
embraces, as subordinate issues, the mind-body problem, the
problem of free will, problems of knowledge, of perception, of the
philosophy of science, of biology and evolution, even problems of
moral and political philosophy, problems of language, culture,
history, abstract entities, time, space and causation.) The above is
also a fundamental problem of knowledge and understanding much
more generally – the basic problem of science: What is the nature of
the physical universe? How precisely do features of our human
world, such as perceptual qualities, consciousness, and life more
generally, fit into the physical universe? The problem can also be
regarded as a fundamental problem of living, of action: How can we
help what is of value in existence, actually and potentially, to
flourish? What do we need to do, as individuals, so that what is of
value to us may flourish? And what do we need to do, collectively,
socially and politically, so that what is of value to people
everywhere, to humanity, may flourish? The problem of fitting the
God-of-Value into the God-of-Cosmic-Power (the underlying unified
It of the physical universe) is not only a conceptual problem, a
problem of knowledge and understanding; it is also a practical
problem, the most general, fundamental practical problem that there
is: to help the God-of-Value, what is of most value in us, to exist in
the physical universe in ways that are less painful and constrained,
more exuberant and joyful, more just, peaceful and noble, than at
present. Once we recognize that the God-of-Value is what is of most
value, actually and potentially, in us, it becomes our most profound
religious obligation to help what is of value in us to flourish in the
real world.
11
The outcome of treating the initial God-thesis with a modicum of
intellectual honesty is that we are led straight to the most
fundamental problems of knowledge, understanding and living that
there are. The character of these fundamental problems of thought
and life is brought sharply into focus. And as a result, much is
changed. Academic inquiry is transformed. It becomes a
fundamentally religious enterprise: to improve our knowledge and
understanding of how the cosmic God-of-Value fits into the cosmic
God-of-Power and, above all, to help the former to flourish within
the tight embrace of the latter. Education is transformed. All
education becomes religious in character. It has, as a basic task, to
explore aspects of the fundamental problem: How can the God-of-
Value fit into, and flourish within, the God-of-Power? Politics is
transformed. It too becomes religious, in that it seeks to implement
policies which help the God-of-Value to flourish inside the God-of-
Power. Our lives are transformed. Personal life too becomes
religious in that a basic task is to discover how we can help that part
of the God-of-Value associated with our life to flourish in the cosmic
God-of-Power. The task, of course, is somehow to get the God-of-
Power so to act that the God-of-Value flourishes. Even theoretical
physics is transformed, in that it becomes a religious quest, that part
of science devoted to discovering the precise nature of the cosmic
God-of-Power. The traditional division between the religious and
the secular is annihilated. The secular is entirely engulfed by the
religious.
These, at least, are some of the changes that would be brought
about were we to take seriously and act on the implications of the
simple idea that putting the two halves of God together again is
indeed our fundamental problem of thought and life. Much is lost if
we merely discard the God conjecture altogether. Believers have
much to learn from bringing some intellectual integrity to religion
and to ideas of God – and non-believers have much to learn from this
as well. In the rest of this book I tackle the problems created by
cutting God in half, and do my best to show just how fruitful,
potentially, it is for both thought and life, to take these problems
seriously, as urgent and fundamental – truly religious in character.9
9 It may be objected that there is nothing unique about my proposed
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At this point it may be objected: But why continue to talk of God
at all? Is it not far better to get rid of God altogether, and put our
faith, straightforwardly, in science and humanism unadorned with
irrelevant theological trappings? And in any case is not all this stuff
about chopping God in half very old news? Did not Friederich
Nietzsche declare God to be dead long ago in the 19th century?10 In
cutting God in half, am I not merely repeating what Nietzsche and
others did long ago, in killing God off? How, in any case, could God
survive being brutally cut into two pieces in the way I have
recommended?
God is too important a notion to discard. It is a focus for
fundamental issues. What, ultimately, is the explanation for
everything? What is the ultimate purpose of life? What is ultimately
of value in existence? These are among the questions the God-
hypothesis seeks to answer. And this answer – the idea of God – has
had a profound, long-standing impact on our culture and social
world. We should not merely discard the notion, declare the whole
idea to be defunct, or God to be dead. Rather, in the face of the
devastating objections to the traditional God-hypothesis, we should
do what I have indicated: improve the thesis so that it overcomes
these devastating objections (while retaining as much of what is of
solution to the so-called “problem of evil”. I have already acknowledged
this to be the case. One could imagine God is an all-powerful, all-
knowing Being who is utterly monstrous. Or one could imagine God is
an all-knowing, all-loving being who has lost control of his creation – the
universe – and is thus very far from being omnipotent. What I claim for
my proposed solution – the Bisected God – is that it uniquely (a)
preserves more of what is of value in the traditional God than any rival
solution, (b) is an intellectually and morally worthy notion, a religiously
worthy notion – unlike the traditional notion, (c) is such that there are
good grounds for holding that God, in this sense, the Bisected God, does
exist, and (d) the thesis that God, in this sense, does exist, is potentially
extraordinarily fruitful, for both thought and life. Much of the rest of this
book is devoted to arguing for (c) and (d). A religious view based on
accepting the Bisected God is, on these grounds, far more worthy,
intellectually, morally and religiously, than the really very disreputable
views of traditional Christianity, Islam or Judaism.
10 Nietzsche (2006), section 125.
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value in the traditional thesis as possible). This serves at least two
purposes (there are others as we shall see).
First, it holds out the hope of keeping alive an awareness of ideas
and problems at a fundamental level in our culture. As I have
already indicated, and as I will argue in some detail throughout the
book, abandoning – instead of improving – the God-hypothesis has
had damaging consequences for a range of endeavours and
institutions, from science and the humanities to education, ideas
about what is of value in existence, and our capacity to solve global
problems intelligently, humanely and effectively. If God had been
cut decisively in half in the way I am recommending long ago in the
17th century, let us say, this might not automatically have cured these
ills, but it would have helped.
Secondly, improving rather than abandoning the God-thesis
provides believers with an open road along which they may travel,
rather than leaving them stuck in a cul-de-sac. If, in our culture,
there are clear indications as to how the God-hypothesis can be
improved so that it overcomes the devastating objections it faces, and
becomes intellectually and morally acceptable – even fruitful – this is
something individuals and groups can avail themselves of to learn, to
improve their religious ideas and lives. But if our culture does no
more than confront one with the stark choice, “hold onto an
intellectually and morally bankrupt idea of God, or abandon the
whole idea of God altogether”, the chances are that believers will opt
for the former choice, since otherwise they must simply abandon
their fundamental beliefs. As I have said, the believer is left stuck in
a cul-de-sac.
There is another option. It is to cease to take God seriously, soften
and sentimentalize Him, shroud Him in metaphor and double-speak,
so that nothing that is said is to be taken at face value. As a result,
religious belief is turned into something subjective and intangible,
beyond the scope of reason and criticism. But this option is perhaps
even more intellectually and morally disreputable than that of
holding on to traditional Theism. Ultimate questions about the
nature of the world and the purpose of life deserve to be treated with
clarity and intellectual integrity. Doing that enhances the possibility
of learning, of improving our ideas and even, perhaps, our lives.
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This is sabotaged when clarity and transparent content are converted
into metaphor and double-speak 11
11 For a devastating critique of this way of defending traditional religion
by retreating into metaphor and doublespeak, see Bartley (1962).
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CHAPTER TWO
FUNDAMENTALISM WITH A
VENGEANCE
So, we have dared to take the terrible sword of reason to God,
and with two or three swift strokes have sliced God into two
halves: the God-of-Cosmic-Power, and the God-of-Cosmic-Value.
The God-of-Cosmic-Power is that impersonal something, present
everywhere at all times in an unchanging form, inherent in all
phenomena, which determines (perhaps probabilistically) the way
all events unfold. It is what physics seeks to discover in hunting for
“the true physical theory of everything”. The God-of-Cosmic-
Value is what is of value in us, in our human world, and in the
world of conscious and sentient life more generally, actually and
potentially. It is suffused throughout the world that we experience,
inherent in woods, fields and estuaries, our homes and
neighbourhoods, the laughter of a child, kindness to strangers,
times of happiness, friendship, intimacy and love.
And now we are confronted by the appalling problem: Having
cut God into two, how do we put the two halves together again?
How can the God-of-Cosmic-Value be inside the God-of-Cosmic-
Power? How can our human world as we experience it, full of
sound, colour, feel, taste and smell, imbued with sentience,
consciousness, free will, meaning and value, containing everything
we love and care for, this whole experienced world in which we
live, somehow be embedded in, or be an integral part of, the
physical universe? How can the God-of-Value exist and flourish
within the God-of-Cosmic-Power?
The God-of-Cosmic-Value and the God-of-Cosmic-Power
intersect in us. On the one hand, the God-of-Value exists
primarily, but not exclusively, in us and through us – through our
miraculous experiencing, conscious life here on earth. And on the
other hand, we are utterly miniscule, even though complex and
intricate, fragments of the vast God-of-Cosmic-Power. With the
miniscule snippet of Cosmic Power apportioned to us, to our
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physical bodies and brains, we must somehow help the God-of-
Value to exist and grow inside the God-of-Cosmic-Power. We are
burdened with the appalling responsibility of trying to help the
God-of-Value to flourish inside the God-of-Cosmic-Power. This is
our fundamental religious problem – the fundamental problem,
indeed, that confronts us in life. It is, first, our fundamental
practical problem of living – confronting each one of us
individually as we live, and confronting humanity as a whole.
How can we realize what is of most value to us, actually and
potentially, in the real world, as we live? It is, second, our
fundamental intellectual problem of knowledge and understanding:
How does the God-of-Value in fact fit into the God-of-Power?
How does our human world in fact fit into the physical universe?
And it is, third, our fundamental philosophical or conceptual
problem: How is it possible for the God-of-Value to exist in the
God-of-Cosmic-Power? How can consciousness, free will, our
experienced world, everything of value possibly exist embedded in
the physical universe?
All our other problems – philosophical, intellectual, scientific,
artistic, technological, personal, social, political, economic,
educational and moral – are, in one way or another, subordinate or
specialized parts of these three fundamental, religious problems.
This is fundamentalism with a vengeance!
Unfortunately, our dishonestly semi-religious and secular world
does not see things in this way. Having failed to cut God in half,
cleanly and bravely, our world fails to appreciate that the task of
trying to put the two halves together again is our fundamental
problem, underpinning all our other problems, everything else that
we do. As we shall see, this failure has damaging consequences
for science, for intellectual inquiry more generally, for education,
for art, for politics, for the richness of our lives, for everything we
strive for and do, for our whole human world, for life on the planet.
Because we fail to grasp our fundamental need to help the God-of-
Cosmic-Value to flourish inside the God-of-Cosmic-Power, not
surprisingly we fail to realize – to apprehend and create – in
reality, what is of most value, actually and potentially, in the
circumstances of our lives.
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In this chapter I indicate how our failure to appreciate that our
fundamental problem is to help the God-of-Value to flourish
within the God-of-Cosmic-Power has resulted in a kind of
academic inquiry that is damagingly irrational when judged from
the standpoint of the best interests of humanity. Subsequent
chapters will fill in details, and will spell out other, related
damaging consequences, for natural science, for social inquiry, for
politics, for our ideas about what is of value, for ideas about
rationality, for education, for philosophy, for our understanding of
how our human world fits in to the physical universe.
In the next chapter I show how our experiential world (the God-
of-Cosmic-Value) can exist embedded in the physical universe (the
God-of-Cosmic-Power). In chapter four I put forward a conjecture
about the nature of the God-of-Cosmic-Value – the nature of what
is ultimately of value in existence – and discuss problems that this
conjecture faces. Chapter five explores questions about the nature
and existence of the God-of-Cosmic-Power. I argue that a proper
understanding of science reveals that science has already
established that the God-of-Cosmic-Power exists in so far, that is,
that science is able to establish anything theoretical at all.
In chapter six I argue for “wisdom-inquiry” – a kind of academic
inquiry rationally designed to help us realize what is genuinely of
value in life embedded as we are in the physical universe (a kind of
inquiry designed to help the God-of-Cosmic-Value to flourish
within the God-of-Cosmic-Power, in other words).1 This develops
further, and supplements, the account of, and arguments for,
1 What is wisdom? There can be no such thing as the correct definition
of “wisdom”, as Popper in effect established long ago: see Popper
(1962), vol. 2, Chapter 11, section ii. “Wisdom” may quite legitimately
mean a variety of things, depending on context, and the aim we have in
mind. Here – as I indicate in chapter 6 – by wisdom I mean the capacity,
and active desire, to realize what is of value in life, for oneself and
others, wisdom thus including knowledge, technological know-how and
understanding, but much else besides. Given this notion of wisdom, we
can say that the basic intellectual aim of inquiry, according to wisdom-
inquiry, is not knowledge merely, but rather wisdom. For a slightly more
elaborate characterization of wisdom along these lines see my (1984),
p.66, or (2007a), p. 79.
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wisdom-inquiry I give below, in the present chapter. In chapter
seven I tackle the key problem of how we can exist and act, with
some degree of free will, granted we are an integral part of the
physical universe, and thus subject, in all that we think and do, to
iron physical law – the all-embracing diktats of the God-of-
Cosmic-Power. In chapter eight I indicate how Darwin’s theory of
evolution needs to be reinterpreted so that it helps explain how life
of value has gradually emerged in the physical universe –
Darwinian evolution, thus understood, seamlessly merging into
history. In chapter nine I indicate how wisdom-inquiry would help
us resolve our global problems in wiser, more cooperatively
rational ways.
Elementary Moral Implications
What ought you to do in your life in order best to help the God-
of-Value to flourish? No one can know you as intimately as you
know yourself. No one is able to animate you, guide you, divine
your best interests, your deepest longings, as perceptively and
effectively as you yourself are. Therefore, your prime religious
duty, in helping the God-of-Value to flourish inside the God-of-
Cosmic-Power must be to devote yourself to the flourishing of that
bit of the God-of-Value that is you – that is what is best in you.
Your prime religious duty must be to devote yourself to the
flourishing of your own best interests. Shockingly, when viewed
from the perspective of traditional religions, selfishness not
selflessness is our first religious duty.
But this stark primary religious duty of selfishness needs to be
qualified in various ways.
First, not everything we desire is desirable. To put it at its most
extreme, the drug addict may fiercely desire a fix, but this may not
be desirable. Our primary obligation must be to try to discover and
pursue, not just what we desire, but that which is most desirable in
the circumstances of our life.
Second, we will fail miserably to realize what is genuinely
desirable if we ignore what others desire. Without friendship and
love, life would scarcely be worth living. Much that is of value in
life arises when we collaborate with others. Almost everything of
value in our lives we owe to others. Our very identity, even our
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consciousness, we owe to others – to those who brought us up,
taught us to speak and, more distantly, to those, long ago, who
created language and human culture. Psychopaths are alone in this
world – but even psychopaths who achieve social success, discover
how to play by the rules and conceal their cold and absolute
indifference to the interests of others. Mere selfishness defeats self
interest.
Third, even enlightened self-interest is not enough. Others are
of intrinsic value, just as I am, or you are. Another person is
another me, another you. A stranger may mean nothing to me
personally, and may in no way enrich my life, and yet the interests
and concerns of that other person deserve my consideration. I
ought not to ride roughshod over the interests of others even when
I gain nothing for myself thereby. We may not all be of equal
value: is Hitler or Stalin equal in value to Mozart, Gandhi or
Einstein? But it is vital that we are all equal before the law. And if
we genuinely value ourselves, the chances are that we will neither
belittle nor inflate our own value in the general scheme of things.
And fourth, it is of course, not always true that we are best able
to care for ourselves. This is not true of babies and young
children, the ill, the severely handicapped, the mad, the very old.
These must be cared for by others. In fact, whoever we are,
circumstances are almost bound to arise in which others know
where our best interests lie better than we do ourselves.
Having the interests of the God-of-Cosmic-Value to heart
demands that we have our own best interests to heart, but also the
interests of others, those we love, our friends and acquaintances,
those who depend on us, and even strangers in so far as we are
able, the ideal being to realize what is of value freely and
cooperatively with others.
The poles of morality are not selflessness and selfishness, as
some traditional religions teach, but rather free cooperation with
others, and its opposite, the subversion and violation of free, equal
cooperation.
Irrational Institutions of Learning
Our fundamental religious task in life, then, is to help the God-
of-Value to flourish within the God-of-Cosmic-Power, this task
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radiating out from concern for ourselves and those close to us. At
present, however, our ability to perform this fundamental life task
is adversely affected by our general failure to appreciate the need
to cut God in half, and think through the implications of that act.
In order to achieve what is of value in life we need to learn how to
do it. And for that, in turn, we need schools and universities
devoted to the task. It is this that we do not at present have.
Judged from this perspective, academic inquiry, as I have already
indicated, is damagingly irrational. As we shall see, three of the
four most elementary rules of reason conceivable are violated.
And this is a direct consequence of the historical failure to cut God
cleanly in half and then work out how to reassemble the pieces as
best we can.
This irrationality of our institutions of learning is no mere formal
matter. It has had devastating consequences for humanity. It is the
underlying cause of a great swathe of unnecessary human suffering
and death. For it has prevented us from developing what we so
urgently need, institutions of learning rationally devoted to helping
us nourish and promote what is of value, actually and potentially,
in our lives. In order to avoid the horrors experienced by so many
throughout the 20th century – the unimaginable horrors of modern
warfare, millions dying as a result of war, death camps, mass
starvation, oppression, exploitation and enslavement – we would
have needed to learn how to do it. We would have needed to learn
how to resolve our problems and conflicts in more cooperatively
rational ways than we have in the past, and than we still do at
present. And for that, we would have needed traditions and
institutions of learning, schools and universities, well-designed and
rationally devoted to promoting such learning. It is this that we
have not had, and still do not have. The irrationality of inquiry has
prevented its development. And this in turn stems from our long-
standing failure to cut God neatly in half, grasp that our
fundamental problem is to learn how to help that which is of value
to flourish in the physical universe, and create institutions of
learning well-designed to achieve that end.
We have, it is true, created a kind of inquiry extraordinarily
successful in improving our knowledge and understanding of the
universe – namely modern science. But this has, in some respects,
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served to intensify the danger, the suffering and death. The
immense success of modern scientific and technological research
has vastly increased our power to act. It has led to modern
industry, agriculture and medicine, and to a multitude of products
of great human value. Those of us who live in the wealthy,
industrially advanced nations lead lives incomparably richer and
freer than those who lived a couple of centuries ago thanks, in
large measure, to the success of modern science and technology.
But the vast increase in the power to act, engendered by science
and technology, makes possible action that causes harm, suffering
and death just as readily as action designed to do good. In the
absence of institutions of learning designed to help us acquire
wisdom, it is inevitable that we will fail to learn how to use our
unprecedented new powers wisely and well. Just this is what the
record of the 20th century reveals. The new, terrible technology of
war – whether conventional, chemical, biological or nuclear –
leads to the death of millions. Industrialization leads to global
warming. Modern agriculture, allied to population growth, leads to
destruction of tropical rain forests and other natural habitats, and to
the mass extinction of species. Vast discrepancies in wealth
develop across the globe because some regions have long benefited
from modern science and technology, while others have not. At
the same time, traditional ways of life, languages and cultures are
swept aside and crushed as an incidental consequence of the
remorseless spread of the modern world. It is hardly too much to
say that all our current global problems are the result of the
exercise of our new, unprecedented powers, made possible by
modern science and technology, in the absence of a more
fundamental concern to learn how to use these powers wisely and
well, for the benefit of all people, now and in the future.
The extraordinary success of modern science and technology
puts humanity into a position of unprecedented peril. Professor
Martin Rees, President of the Royal Society, even thinks that this
may be “our final century” (the title of a book of his2). There is
hardly any more urgent task, as far as the long-term welfare of
humanity is concerned, than to develop traditions and institutions
2 Rees (2003).
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of learning, schools and universities, rationally devoted to helping
us tackle our conflicts and problems of living in wiser, more
cooperative ways.
One can put the point quite simply like this. Our only hope of
tackling our immense global problems in humane and successful
ways is to tackle them democratically. But this in turn requires
that electorates of democracies have a good understanding of what
our global problems are, and what needs to be done to resolve
them humanely and successfully. We cannot expect
democratically elected political leaders to do – or to be able to do –
what needs to be done to resolve (or help resolve) global problems
if those who elected them are, by and large, ignorant about what
the problems are, and what needs to be done in response to them.
Widespread understanding about our problems is a prerequisite for
tackling these problems successfully. But this in turn requires that
democracies possess substantial programmes of public, adult
education about what our problems are, and what we need to do in
response to them. This cannot come from politicians, the media,
the priesthood, or private individuals (although all these can play a
part). It must come from universities. Universities need to take
up, as a primary task, public education about what needs to be
done in response to our immense problems of living. And “public
education” means, not “instruction from on high”, but rather
debate, argument, learning and teaching in both directions, good
ideas for action being seized upon and publicized wherever they
may come from, universities stirring up informed and intelligent
debate in the public arena. But this is hardly what universities set
out to do today. Their primary task, rather, is to accumulate
expert, specialized knowledge – thus making, in some respects, our
situation even worse. Judged from the highly traditional
standpoint of helping to promote human welfare, universities today
fail to do what they most need to do. They are, as we shall see in
detail below, damagingly and dangerously irrational. Universities
fail dreadfully to help humanity learn how to enable the God-of-
Cosmic-Value to flourish within the God-of-Cosmic-Power.3
3 There are some recent signs, however, that changes are underway in
universities, the task of tackling problems of living being given greater
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Remarks concerning Intellectual History
How did this disaster come about? How did our institutions of
learning in fact develop, and how ought they to have developed?
Once upon a time, in medieval Europe, science and scholarly
inquiry, in so far as it existed, in schools, monasteries and rare
universities, had an overall Christian ethos and purpose. Christian
theology reigned supreme, and other branches of inquiry had to
find a place within that overall framework. A basic task for
philosophy was to discover how to reconcile the thought of the
ancients with Christian thought, the emphasis being first on Plato,
then Aristotle.
Free thought was severely curtailed by religious authorities.
Cutting God in half was simply not an option. Men were put to
death for expressing far less challenging ideas. Giordano Bruno
was burned at the stake in 1600 for suggesting that the universe is
infinite.4 About the same time, Domenico Scandella, known as
Menocchio, an obscure peasant, a miller, from northern Italy, was
put to death for heresy. Menocchio held that once “all was chaos,
that is, earth, air, water and fire were mixed together; and out of
that bulk a mass formed – just as cheese is made of milk – and
worms appeared in it, and these were the angels”.5 Galileo was
forced to recant his support for the Copernican view that the earth
goes round the sun (and not the sun round the earth).6 Scholarly
inquiry was firmly in the grip of the Church, and those who
deviated from Christian doctrine were punished.
emphasis, as we shall see in chapter 9.
4 For accounts of Giordano Bruno’s thought, life and death see: White
(2006); Gatti (1999). There is some doubt as to whether Bruno was
burnt at the stake for his theological or cosmological views, but it would
seem that the latter did have a role to play.
5 For a wonderful account of Menocchio’s beliefs, life and death see
Ginzburg (1980). See pp. 5-6 for a more detailed statement of
Menocchio’s beliefs, from which the quotation in the text is taken.
6 See Shea and Arigas (2003); McMullin (2005); White (2007). Not
everyone agrees that Galileo was accused of heresy because of his
advocacy of Copernicanism. Pietro Redondi claims that Galileo’s heresy
was his espousal of atomism which contradicted the doctrine of the
Eucharist: see Redoni (1988).
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Those responsible for the birth of modern science in the 16th and
17th centuries – Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, Descartes, Huygens,
Boyle, Hooke, Newton, Leibniz and others – had to exercise great
care not to offend secular and religious authorities. Galileo argued
that the Bible and the Church had authority to pronounce on the
moral and spiritual realm, but not on the realm of Nature, which
natural philosophy should be free to study, unencumbered by
outside interference. But Galileo failed dramatically to convince
the ecclesiastical authorities of his case, and subsequently natural
philosophers had to proceed diplomatically, and with caution, in
order to avoid suffering Galileo’s fate – let alone the far worse fate
of Bruno.
It would be wrong, however, to think that modern science was
born in opposition to Christianity. All those who played a major
role in the creation of modern science were sincere Christians,
Catholic or Protestant. The Catholic Church itself supported
scientific research. Jesuits in Rome, in particular, engaged in
scientific enquiry. Major contributors to the birth of modern
science, from Galileo to Descartes and Newton, thought long and
hard about the relationship between the new science, and
Christianity. Christianity even provided something like a rationale,
a justification, for the new science. First, there was the idea that
God, being good, and having the best interests of humanity to
heart, would have ensured that the natural world is comprehensible
to man, so that he can, by his own efforts, improve knowledge and
understanding of nature. Christianity promised that science – or
natural philosophy as it was then called – could meet with success.
Second, there was the idea that pursuing natural philosophy could
be justified on the basis of the Christian virtue of charity: new
knowledge would result in new medicines, new technology, which
would relieve human suffering and be of great benefit to humanity
in other ways. Modern science was born and grew up within the
framework of Christianity.7 The break with religion, in so far as it
has happened, came later.
Gradually, modern science established its independence from
religion, along the lines anticipated by Galileo. Laplace, around
7 See Hooykaas (1977).
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1800, when taken to task by Napoleon for not mentioning God in
his great Newtonian treatise Mécaniqu Céleste, replied that he had
no need of that hypothesis.8 In the 19th century it had become
possible for T. H. Huxley, Darwin’s bulldog, openly to express
agnosticism (a term Huxley invented) – although Darwin’s theory
of evolution, with its suggestion that humanity is descended from
apes, provoked an outcry from religious quarters. But neither
Darwin nor Huxley were burned at the stake.
A major step towards the development of a secular academic
inquiry, free from religious influence or interference, happened in
the 18th century with the rise of the Enlightenment. It was during
the Enlightenment that the idea began to spread that all ideas
should be open to criticism, and not just ideas about the physical
universe. Nothing should be decided merely on the basis of
authority and tradition, whether religious or secular: everything
should be open to assessment by means of experience and reason.
The philosophes of the French Enlightenment in particular –
Voltaire, Diderot, Condorcet and others – had the profound and
magnificent idea that humanity should seek to learn from scientific
progress how to achieve social progress towards an enlightened
world.9 As we shall see, implemented properly, this would have
resulted in a kind of inquiry rationally designed to help humanity
learn how to achieve what is of most value in life (thus helping the
God-of-Value to flourish within the God-of-Cosmic-Power). But
the philosophes, despite having their hearts in the right place,
botched the job of putting their basic idea properly into practice.
Impressed by the progressive success of natural science, they
thought, mistakenly, that the task was to develop the social
sciences alongside the natural sciences. This idea was developed
further throughout the 19th century, and put into institutional
practice in the first half of the 20th century with the creation of
departments of social sciences in universities throughout the
developed world – departments of economics, anthropology,
sociology, psychology, political science, international affairs,
8 See Dampier (1971), p. 181.
9 The best account known to me of the Enlightenment – especially the
French Enlightenment – is Gay (1973).
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linguistics. Theology shrank from being the dominant branch of
inquiry to becoming a kind of intellectual fossil, tolerated as a
token gesture to the past, in occasional university departments. (It
has, today, a more prominent role, perhaps, in the USA than it does
in Europe.) By the early 20th century, academic inquiry had
become wholly secular in character, free of Christian influence.
The outcome of all this is what, by and large, we have today: a
kind of inquiry that may be called knowledge-inquiry. The
fundamental humanitarian aim of knowledge-inquiry is to help
promote human welfare. Academic inquiry does this by pursuing
the intellectual goals of knowledge, understanding and
technological know-how. First, knowledge is to be acquired; once
acquired, it can be applied to help solve social problems. Thus,
throughout academic inquiry there runs the distinction between
“pure” and “applied” inquiry. (There is even “applied”
philosophy.) The primary task of academic inquiry is to solve
problems of knowledge; once knowledge has been acquired, this
can be applied to help solve social problems, problems of living.10
10 How, then, did the failure to cut God in half distort the development of
academic inquiry? I tackle this question towards the end of this chapter.
In summary, my answer goes like this. Academic inquiry in Europe
began within the framework of Christianity, informed and constrained by
Christian doctrine. When modern science began, in the 16th and 17th
centuries, it was difficult enough for natural philosophers to establish the
right to explore factual question concerning the nature of the universe
freely, unconstrained by the Church. It would have been quite
impossible to advocate cutting God in half – quite impossible to explore
openly questions about what is of value in life and how it should be
achieved in a way which challenged Christian doctrine, ecclesiastical and
secular authority. Only in the 18th century, with the Enlightenment, did
this begin to be possible. But by then, secular “rationality” had become
identified with science and the pursuit of knowledge. The philosophes of
the French Enlightenment took their task to be to create social science
alongside natural science. Thus was academic inquiry developed as the
pursuit of knowledge. Thus did the long-standing failure to cut God in
half lead to a mode of inquiry which failed to give intellectual priority to
the task of helping humanity learn to live wisely – so as to realize what is
genuinely of value in life.
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Knowledge-inquiry is, however, severely and damagingly
irrational when judged from the standpoint of helping to promote
human welfare. As I have already indicated it violates three of the
four most elementary rules of rational problem-solving one can
think of. Modify knowledge-inquiry just sufficiently to ensure that
all four rules are built into the intellectual/institutional structure of
universities, and a dramatically different kind of inquiry emerges,
which I shall call wisdom-inquiry. During the first decade of the
21st century, some changes have taken place in universities which
have nudged things a bit towards wisdom-inquiry, largely in
response to the perceived urgency of environmental problems, as
we shall see in chapter nine. These changes have, however, been
ad hoc, piecemeal, marginal, and have been undermined by other
developments which have tied academia even closer to
government, industry and commerce. Overwhelmingly,
knowledge-inquiry still dominates academia. 11 It is still widely
thought to constitute rational inquiry (despite being nothing of the
kind). At the time of writing, there is no general awareness of the
magnitude and urgency of the changes that are required. If ever
the transition from knowledge-inquiry to wisdom-inquiry occurs,
this will be an intellectual revolution comparable in significance
and impact to the Renaissance, the scientific revolution of the 17th
century, or the Enlightenment of the 18th century.
Knowledge-inquiry imposes severe constraints, a kind of harsh
censorship system, on academic inquiry.12 Only that which is
11 See Maxwell (1984) ch. 6; or better, Maxwell (2007a), ch. 6. In the
second edition of this book, published in 2007, I look at six aspects of
academic inquiry, and compare what I found in 1983 with what I found
twenty years later, in 2003. Even in 2003, knowledge-inquiry is
dominant in academic practice, although some changes have nudged
things a bit, perhaps, towards wisdom-inquiry.
12 An internal system of intellectual censorship takes over from external
ecclesiastical and secular censorship. I should add, however, that even a
genuinely rational conception of inquiry, put into practice, would amount
to a system of censorship (in excluding irrational “bad” potential
contributions). We have here an indication of why it is so important to
ensure that intellectual standards that govern academic life are genuinely
rational, and of the best. If this is not the case, good potential
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relevant to the pursuit of knowledge can be permitted to enter the
intellectual domain of inquiry: claims to knowledge, theories,
reports of observations and experiments, logic, mathematics,
arguments designed to establish or to criticize claims to
knowledge. Feelings, desires, values, works of art, political
programmes, philosophies of life, proposals for action, views about
what our problems of living are and how we should go about
solving them: all such things as these, not being directly relevant to
the acquisition of knowledge must, according to knowledge-
inquiry, be ruthlessly excluded from the intellectual domain of
inquiry – although of course factual knowledge about such things
can be included. All these personal, social, political and evaluative
factors must be excluded from inquiry so that authentic, objective
factual knowledge is acquired, and the pursuit of knowledge does
not degenerate into the promulgation of mere propaganda and
ideology. In order to serve the interests of humanity, inquiry must
strive to procure authentic factual knowledge, and must forego the
task tackling problems of living directly – the tasks of articulating
problems of living and proposing and critically assessing possible
solutions, possible human actions – as this involves invoking all
those personal, social and evaluative issues which would subvert
the acquisition of knowledge. Paradoxically, in order to help
humanity solve its problems of living in the best possible way,
inquiry must forego trying to solve these problems directly, and
must concentrate instead on trying to solve problems of knowledge.
(Once knowledge is acquired it can of course be made available to
help solve social problems.)
Science, according to knowledge-inquiry, employs an even more
severe system of censorship. Only empirically testable claims to
knowledge can be allowed to enter the intellectual domain of
science – scientific journals, texts, lecture courses, seminars. Not
only must expressions of feelings, desires and values be excluded
from science, according to knowledge-inquiry: metaphysical
propositions must be excluded as well – propositions like “all
contributions will be excluded, and potentially good research will be
discouraged or blocked.
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events have a cause” which can neither be verified nor falsified by
means of observation or experiment. 13
The Enlightenment was not alone in influencing the way
academic inquiry developed. The Enlightenment provoked
Romanticism, as a kind of backlash, that great movement of ideas
and feeling inspired by such figures as Blake, Beethoven,
Schubert, the young Goethe, Schiller, Rousseau, Wordsworth,
Keats, Hazlitt, Coleridge. Whereas the Enlightenment valued
science, knowledge, fact, reason, method, logic, experience,
Romanticism found all this oppressive, and prized instead art,
imagination, passion, inspiration, originality, genius, spontaneity,
self-realization. This too had an impact on some parts of academic
inquiry, primarily in the humanities: literary and culture studies,
feminist studies, philosophy, history, psychology and sociology. It
led to various anti-scientific and anti-rationalist movements, such
as existentialism, post-structuralism and post-modernism, and to
academic work dedicated to political causes, whether of left or
right.14
Academic inquiry today is thus a sort of mixture of
Enlightenment and Romantic influences, more or less at odds with
each other. But Romanticism has exercised only a marginal
influence. Knowledge-inquiry is still the dominant conception of
inquiry, and, as I have mentioned, the only influential idea as to
what constitutes rational inquiry.15 Schools of thought influenced
by Romanticism tend to be anti-rationalist.
Damaging Irrationality of Knowledge-Inquiry
But knowledge-inquiry, when judged from the standpoint of
helping us to realize what is genuinely of value in life is, as I have
said, so grossly irrational that it violates three of the four most
basic rules of reason conceivable.
13 For a much more detailed exposition of knowledge-inquiry (or “the
philosophy of knowledge” as I have called it) and standard empiricism,
see my (1984), ch. 2, second edition (2007a).
14 See Berlin (1979), ch. 1; Berlin (1999).
15 For grounds for holding knowledge-inquiry is dominant in universities,
see work referred to in note 11.
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What do I mean by “reason”? As I use the term, reason appeals
to the idea that there is some no doubt rather ill-defined set of
rules, methods or strategies which, if put into practice, give us our
best chance of solving our problems, realizing our aims, other
things being equal. The methods of reason do not guarantee
success; nor do they determine what we should do. They help us
to discover and decide what to do, and do not decide for us.
Four absolutely basic rules of reason are the following:-
(1) Articulate, and try to improve the articulation of, the problem
to be solved.
(2) Propose and critically assess possible solutions.16
(3) When necessary, break recalcitrant problems into easier-to-
solve preliminary, subordinate, specialized problems.
(4) Interconnect basic and specialized problem-solving so that
each may guide the other. 17
Any problem-solving enterprise which persistently violates any
one of these basic rules must be seriously irrational, and must be
damaged as a result. Knowledge-inquiry – and academic inquiry
as it exists today – violates three of these four most basic rules of
reason.
16 Karl Popper devoted much of his working life to establishing the
fundamental importance of the first two of these four rules of rational
problem-solving. His philosophy of science is a particular application of
these two rules to the special case of science. In one place he formulates
them like this: “the one method of all rational discussion, and therefore of
the natural sciences as well as philosophy … is that of stating one’s
problem clearly and of examining its various proposed solutions
critically”: Popper (1959), p. 16. Popper was, however, too vehemently
opposed to specialization to appreciate that it is (when problems are
intractable) a vital component of rationality – it being possible to
counteract potentially harmful effects of rule (3) by implementing rule (4)
as well. Popper’s critical rationalism thus consists of (1) and (2), but
omits rules (3) and (4). For Popper’s anti-specialism see his (1963), p.
136, or his remark that “If the many, the specialists, gain the day, it will be
the end of science as we know it – of great science. It will be a spiritual
catastrophe comparable in its consequences to nuclear armament” Popper
(1994), p. 72.
17 The fundamental importance of interconnecting specialized and
fundamental problem-solving is argued for in some detail in my (1980).
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Granted that the basic aim of inquiry is to help promote human
welfare, help humanity achieve what is of value, then the basic
problems that need to be solved are problems of living, problems
of action, not problems of knowledge. It is always what we do, or
refrain from doing, that enables us to achieve what is of value, and
not new knowledge (except when knowledge is sought for itself, as
being itself of value). Even when new knowledge and technology
are needed to achieve what is of value – as they are in connection
with medicine, for example – it is always what the knowledge and
technology enables us to do that achieves what is of value – health
– and not the knowledge and technology in themselves. Thus, if
academic inquiry is to accord with the most elementary
requirements of reason conceivable, it must give absolute
intellectual priority to the two tasks of:-
(1) Articulating, and trying to improve the articulation of, our
problems of living, our problems of action;
(2) Proposing and critically assessing possible solutions –
possible actions, policies, strategies, plans, political programmes,
legislation, institutions, religious views, philosophies of life.
But it is just this which knowledge-inquiry, as we have seen,
cannot do. Knowledge-inquiry gives intellectual priority to
tackling problems of knowledge, not problems of living. Strictly
speaking, it is even worse than this: knowledge-inquiry is actually
restricted to tackling problems of knowledge: as we have seen, it is
prohibited from articulating and trying to solve problems of living.
Knowledge-inquiry violates the two most elementary rules of
reason imaginable.18
18 Things are, at the time of writing, not quite as bad in universities as
this might suggest. Once upon a time, in the 1980s for example,
knowledge-inquiry was much more strictly adhered to. Increasingly,
during the last decade or so, universities have created departments,
institutes and centres devoted to policy studies, devoted to tackling major
social and global problems, research being organized in response to
policy issues, social and environmental problems. Increasingly, in other
words, universities have moved away from implementing knowledge-
inquiry in a strict, rigorous, thoroughgoing fashion, as I have already
indicated, and as I shall discuss at greater length in chapter 9.
Nevertheless, knowledge-inquiry still exercises a pervasive influence
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Knowledge-inquiry, as pursued in universities today, does,
however, put rule (3) into practice to a quite extraordinary extent.
The outcome is the maze of specialized disciplines that is such a
striking feature of academic inquiry – each discipline containing a
multitude of sub-disciplines, each in turn containing a multitude of
sub-sub-disciplines, and so on.
But, having failed to implement rules (1) and (2), knowledge-
inquiry cannot implement rule (4). It cannot interconnect tackling
of specialized problems of knowledge and technology with
tackling of basic problems of living because consideration of the
latter is excluded from the intellectual domain of inquiry.
In short, when judged from the standpoint of helping to promote
human welfare – of helping us realize what is of value in life – by
intellectual and educational means, knowledge-inquiry is so
profoundly irrational that it violates three of the four most
elementary rules of reason one can think of. And this violation of
reason is no minor matter: it is wholesale and structural, and has
immense, long-term damaging consequences.
The failure to implement rule (4) means that specialized research
develops in ways unrelated to, and not influenced by, active
tackling of more fundamental problems of living, which means, of
course, that priorities of scientific research will tend to come to
reflect the interests of scientists themselves, and of governments
and industry (who pay for the research), rather than reflecting the
priorities of real human need. Thus medical research comes to
reflect the interests of drug companies and perhaps the health
interests of people living in wealthy countries, and not the health
interests of the poor of the world. Vast sums are devoted to
over much academic research and teaching. Policy studies, the direct
tackling of problems of living, still tend to be pushed to the fringes.
Knowledge-inquiry is still the only agreed conception of rational
inquiry. Its damaging irrationality has still not been generally
appreciated and understood. There is at present no active campaign to
abolish knowledge-inquiry and transform universities so that they come
to take, as their primary task, to help us tackle our problems of living in
increasingly cooperatively rational ways – above all, our major global
problems of climate change, war, poverty, destruction of natural habitats
and extinction of species.
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military research, as if our war torn planet really needs ever more
lethal means for delivering death.19
But far worse is the failure to implement rules (1) and (2). This
means academia fails to give intellectual priority to the tasks of
articulating our conflicts and problems of living and proposing and
critically assessing increasingly cooperative, just and peaceful
resolutions - resolutions which, if enacted, lead to the realization
of what is of value in life. Instead the resources of research are
devoted to increasing knowledge and technological know-how
which, as I have already said, increases our power to act, thus
leading to much good but also much harm. In the absence of the
sustained endeavour to discover how we can resolve our conflicts
and problems of living in more cooperatively rational, just and
peaceful ways than we have done in the past, it is inevitable that
the vast increase in the power to act, acquired by some from
modern science and technology, will result in such things as rapid
population growth, ever more lethal war and the means to engage
in such war, global warming, vast inequalities of wealth and power
across the globe, destruction of natural habitats and rapid
extinction of species, depletion of finite natural resources,
destruction of traditional ways of life, cultures and languages, and
even epidemics such as that of aids (aids being spread by modern
methods of travel). These modern crises, so characteristic of our
age, are all the product of giving priority, in the long term, to
tackling problems of knowledge over problems of living. They are
the product of the long-standing, almost universally overlooked
wholesale irrationality of academic inquiry – of our most
intelligent and influential public thought.20
The key to creating a better world is to create better thinking
about how to do it. We need to bring about a revolution in
academic inquiry so that it devotes elementary rules of reason to
the task of helping humanity solve its problems in more
cooperative, just and peaceful ways. Thinking intelligently about
19 See Smith (2003); Langley (2005).
20 For a more detailed demonstration of the damaging irrationality of
knowledge-inquiry when judged from the standpoint of helping to
promote human welfare, see my (1984) or (2007a), ch. 3.
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how to solve our problems is clearly not sufficient to solve them,
but it is, I maintain, necessary. We cannot hope to do it employing
grossly irrational, malformed modes of thought.
Wisdom-Inquiry
But if knowledge-inquiry is ill-equipped to help us solve our
problems of living, realize what is of value in life, what kind of
inquiry would be well-equipped to do this? The answer:
knowledge-inquiry modified just sufficiently to ensure that all four
of the above rules of reason are put into practice. I shall call
inquiry that does this wisdom-inquiry. It is depicted in diagrams 1
and 2. Its main features are as follows.
First, as a matter of absolute intellectual priority, wisdom-
inquiry puts the first two rules of reason into practice. The
fundamental intellectual activity is to:
(1) Articulate, and seek to improve the articulation of, those
personal, social and global conflicts and problems of living we
need to resolve in order to realize what is of value in life;
(2) Propose and critically assess possible increasingly
cooperative actions designed, if performed, to enable us to solve
our problems, realize what is of value in life.
The fundamental intellectual task of wisdom-inquiry, in other
words, is to explore, imaginatively and critically, what we might
do in order to help the God-of-Cosmic-Value to flourish within the
God-of-Cosmic-Power. It is to devote reason to the task of solving
our fundamental religious problem in life. This task, at the heart of
the academic enterprise, is undertaken by social inquiry and the
humanities.
Next, wisdom-inquiry puts rule (3) into practice. Two
profoundly recalcitrant problems that confront us are (a) the
scientific problem of acquiring knowledge and understanding of
the universe, and ourselves as a part of the universe, and (b) the
socio-economic-political problem of creating a better world. In
seeking to solve, or help solve, these two basic, recalcitrant
problems, wisdom-inquiry:
(3) Tackles a host of subordinate, specialized problems – thus
creating specialized disciplines of the natural, technological and
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formal sciences, social inquiry and the humanities (see diagrams 1
and 2).
But, in order to try to ensure that specialized problem-solving is
pursued in such a way as to help solve fundamental problems such
as (a) and (b), wisdom-inquiry also puts rule (4) into practice as
well. That is, wisdom-inquiry:
(4) Interconnects basic and specialized problem-solving so that
each may guide the other (indicated by two-headed arrows in the
diagrams 1 and 2).
What, then, are the main differences between knowledge-inquiry
and wisdom-inquiry?
One big difference has to do with problems – what they are, and
how they are tackled. Knowledge-inquiry restricts itself, in the
first instance, to tackling problems of knowledge. The tackling of
problems of living is very much a secondary matter, and tends to
be restricted to developing and providing relevant knowledge and
technological know-how. Furthermore, knowledge-inquiry, as
implemented in academic practice in universities, tends to exclude
the vital task of articulating, and improving the articulation of,
problems of knowledge from the intellectual domain of inquiry
(which tends to be restricted to contributions to knowledge). In
addition, knowledge-inquiry tends in academic practice to result in
the tackling of a maze of specialized problems of knowledge, with
little discussion of broad, fundamental problems. There is a
tendency to violate rules (1), (2) and (4), in other words, even
within the domain of knowledge.
By contrast, wisdom-inquiry emphasizes the intellectually
fundamental character of problems of living, and stresses the vital
need to articulate, and improve the articulation of, problems to be
tackled (whether problems of living, of knowledge, or of
technological know-how). It stresses, too, the vital importance of
tackling broad, fundamental problems in addition to the maze of
specialized problems, and the importance of allowing work on
these two kinds of problems to influence each other, in accordance
with rule (4). At the most fundamental level of all, there is the
problem: How can the God-of-Value exist and best flourish in the
God-of-Cosmic-Power? How can we best help that which is of
value associated with our human world to flourish in the real
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Diagram 2
Wisdom-Inquiry Implementing Four Rules of
Rational Problem Solving
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world? All this needs to be built into the institutional structure of
academic inquiry and the university: see diagram 1.
Another big difference has to do with the nature of social
inquiry. Given knowledge-inquiry, social inquiry is primarily
social science. Economics, psychology, sociology, anthropology,
political science, linguistics are all pursued primarily as sciences,
or at least as disciplines concerned to improve knowledge and
understanding of aspects of the human world. Concern with policy
is subordinate and secondary. Given wisdom-inquiry, social
inquiry is not primarily science, or the pursuit of knowledge.
Instead of being concerned to solve problems of knowledge, social
inquiry has, as its basic task, to help humanity solve those
problems of living that need to be solved in order that what is of
value may be realized. Social inquiry proposes and assesses, not
claims to knowledge, but rather proposals for action. How can
democratic world government be formed? What can be done to
create sustainable world industry and agriculture? How can
poverty be eliminated? These are the kind of problems at the heart
of social inquiry. Of course emerging out of, and feeding back
into, the fundamental intellectual activity of exploring
imaginatively and critically possible personal, social, institutional
and global actions, there will be a concern to acquire relevant
factual knowledge about the human world, in order to assess
critically, and in order to discover how to implement, proposals for
action. This pursuit of knowledge about social phenomena would,
however, be subordinate and secondary to the primary activity of
tackling problems of living.21
21 It would of course be vital to ensure that knowledge of social
phenomena is developed to assess critically proposals for action, and not
to provide spurious support for policies already decided upon. Policy
may legitimately influence what social research is conducted, but cannot
influence the outcome of such research. And, more generally, values
inevitably, and quite properly, influence what we choose to acquire
knowledge about, but must not be allowed to influence the content of
knowledge, questions of fact, truth and falsity. (Any such influence must
go in a negative direction. A new, highly desirable item of technology
which will endanger life if not safe and reliable, must be especially
severely tested.)
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A third big difference between the two modes of inquiry has to
do with the status and position of social inquiry, and its
relationship to natural science. Within knowledge-inquiry, the
different disciplines fall into a natural hierarchy. At the base there
is theoretical physics (and perhaps cosmology); then there are
various applications of physics and more phenomenological or
practical parts of physics, such as astrophysics and solid state
physics; then chemistry, and rather more observational physical
sciences such as astronomy and geology; then the biological
sciences, ranging from molecular biology, physiology, botany,
evolutionary theory, to the study of animal behaviour; then come
the social sciences, from anthropology to sociology, psychology,
economics and political science, with philosophy, perhaps, at the
top of the hierarchy. The idea is that any science at a given level,
physiology say, may use discoveries at a lower level, such as
molecular biology, chemistry, and even, perhaps, physics, but will
not use discoveries made at a higher level, such as anthropology or
psychology. Academic status tends to be associated with this
hierarchy. The nearer the base a discipline is so the “harder”, the
more scientific, exacting and rigorous, the discipline tends to be
judged to be, whereas the nearer the top a discipline is so the
“softer”, the more unscientific, woolly, and unrigorous it tends to
be judged to be. Whereas physics is intellectually fundamental,
hard, and fiercely scientific, a social science such as psychology or
sociology is not remotely fundamental, and is soft and of
questionable scientific status.
Wisdom-inquiry transforms all this entirely. Within wisdom-
inquiry, it is social inquiry, as we have seen, that is intellectually
fundamental – in that it tackles our fundamental problems of
living, of action. All of the natural and technological sciences –
including physics – are intellectually subordinate in that they
tackle subordinate problems of knowledge, explanation,
understanding and know-how. (It is just this that is depicted in
diagram 2.) The hierarchy of knowledge-inquiry is turned upside
down.
A fourth big difference between the two modes of inquiry has to
do with the relationship that each demands should exist between
academic inquiry as a whole and the rest of the social world.
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According to knowledge-inquiry, the proper, basic intellectual
relationship is that of academia studying the social world and
acquiring knowledge of it. In order to do this properly, academia
must take care that the act of studying does not affect what is
studied – or the knowledge acquired will be out of date. In
addition, as I have already mentioned, academic inquiry must
shield itself from the corrupting influence of the social world so
that genuine knowledge of factual truth may be acquired. The
influences of public opinion, politics, religion, emotion, values,
must all be kept at bay, so that the search for knowledge does not
degenerate into the promulgation of mere propaganda or ideology.
Those who contribute to inquiry must be properly qualified
insiders possessing at least a Ph.D. Apart from financial support
and appreciation, academia requires primarily its independence
from the rest of the social world. Everything is dramatically
different given wisdom-inquiry. The basic task of academia
becomes to help humanity tackle problems of living in increasingly
cooperatively rational ways so that what is of value in life may be
realized. Far from studying the rest of the human world and, apart
from that, remaining somewhat aloof, academia needs to be
engaged in lively two-way communication and argument, both
teaching and learning, doing everything to promote more
cooperatively rational tackling of conflicts and problems of living.
Good ideas as to how to solve problems of living need to be
published and promoted wherever they come from, whether their
authors have professional academic qualifications or not. A major
part of the job of academia is to extract ideas, whether being
implemented in practice or not, from the rest of the social world,
and filter out those that are good from those not so good. The
whole of academia can be seen as a form of specialized thought,
arising from non-specialized thinking we engage in as we live as a
result of the implementation of rule (3). But in order to counteract
the dangers of specialization, rule (4) needs to be put into practice
as well: the specialized thought of academia needs both to guide,
and be guided by, the non-academic thought we engage in as we
live. As I have said elsewhere, academia needs to function as a
kind of people's civil service, doing openly for the public what
actual civil services are supposed to do in secret for governments.
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Academia needs just enough power to preserve its independence
from government, industry, the media, public opinion, but no
more. Its task is to learn from, argue with and teach the rest of the
world, but not to order, to enforce obedience.
A fifth major difference has to do with the content of inquiry.
Given knowledge-inquiry, the content of academic journals, books,
lectures and seminars all has to do with the pursuit of knowledge:
claims to knowledge, reports of observations, experimental results
and historical documents, proofs, arguments and criticisms
designed to establish the truth. Emotion, values, politics, religion,
art are all excluded as subverting, rather than contributing to,
knowledge - although claims to factual knowledge about these
things are of course included within the intellectual domain of
inquiry. Given wisdom-inquiry, it is all the other way round.
Emotion, values, politics, religion and art all need to be included
within the intellectual domain of inquiry. The basic intellectual aim
is to help us realize - apprehend or make real - what is of value.
Emotion needs to be included, since we can only make value
discoveries of our own, as opposed to parrot the value discoveries
of others, if we do attend to our own emotional responses to things.
Of course not everything that feels good is good; emotion needs to
be subjected to critical scrutiny if it is to indicate what is of value.
Emotion is an essential but fallible ingredient of what is needed to
discover what is of value. Again, values need to be included; we
can hardly discover what is of value if all consideration of values is
forbidden. But value-claims need critical scrutiny, just as
knowledge-claims do. Yet again, politics needs to be included - or
at least political issues, policies, programmes and philosophies,
since these are possible solutions to our problems of living.
Religion needs to be included, since religions make claims about
what is of most value in existence and how it is to be attained or
realized. All religious doctrines need, however, critical scrutiny:
traditional religions, as we have seen, include all sorts of
absurdities. Wisdom-inquiry is itself, of course, a supremely
religious endeavour, in that it seeks to discover what is genuinely
of value in existence and how it is to be realized. It differs from
traditional religions in subjecting all knowledge and value claims
to critical scrutiny, including the test of experience. Art needs to
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be included, as revelations of value, and as criticism of false values
in comedy and satire. Literature, too, has a role to play in
enhancing our capacity to understand our fellow human beings,
and perhaps ourselves, as a result of identifying imaginatively with
the fictional characters of novels, plays and films. Quite generally,
whereas the intellectual domain of knowledge-inquiry is restricted
to that which is relevant to the acquisition of knowledge, wisdom-
inquiry includes, and gives an intellectually fundamental place to,
ideas relevant to the discovery of what is of value, and it is this
difference which accounts for the radically different contents of the
two kinds of inquiry.
Both modes of inquiry appeal to experience, and are empirical,
when possible; they differ radically, however, as to what
"experience" means, and what it is that experience decides or
assesses. For knowledge-inquiry, "experience" means observation
and experiment as this arises in science, and what is established or
assessed by its means are claims to knowledge. For wisdom-
inquiry, "experience" is what we acquire as we live, as we strive to
achieve our ends, enjoy and suffer. And what is assessed by its
means are not, primarily, claims to knowledge but rather proposals
for action, plans, policies, political programmes, philosophies of
life. The well-known empirical method of science of putting
forward theories which are then tested by means of observation
and experiment is extended, within wisdom-inquiry, to include
proposing possible actions which are then assessed in terms of
what we enjoy or suffer when these actions are executed, either in
actuality or preferably, at least initially, in imagination. (Trying to
learn from actions performed in imagination rather than in reality
suffers from the disadvantage that what is learned is less reliable,
but has the advantage that blunders are less costly - suffering in
imagination being more bearable than suffering in reality, and
mistakes in imagination being easier to rectify than mistakes in
reality.)
Enough has been said, I trust, to establish that knowledge-
inquiry and wisdom-inquiry differ dramatically, in wholesale,
structural ways. Every branch and aspect of inquiry is affected by
these major differences. It is important to appreciate, nevertheless,
that these differences all stem from the simple demand that
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inquiry, in seeking to help us realize what is of value in life, should
observe elementary rules of reason. The differences all come from
modifying knowledge-inquiry just sufficiently so that the four most
elementary rules of reason conceivable are observed in the pursuit
of what is of value in life.
Our extraordinarily successful pursuit of knowledge-inquiry
(successful in its own terms), and our failure to develop wisdom-
inquiry, one or two centuries ago, has had dire consequences, as I
have already in effect indicated. It is this that has permitted
scientific and technological research to develop unchecked by a
more fundamental concern with our problems of living. It is this
which has resulted in a kind of academic inquiry which fails to
give priority to the task of discovering how we can resolve those
conflicts and problems of living we need to resolve in order to
realize what is of genuine value in life. It is hardly too much to say
that the crisis behind all the others – global warming, rapid
population growth, destruction of natural habitats and mass
extinction of species, the lethal character of modern war and the
threat posed by modern armaments, conventional, chemical,
biological and nuclear – is our energetic pursuit of knowledge-
inquiry and our failure to implement wisdom-inquiry. We have
put all our efforts into increasing our power to act, via increasing
our knowledge and technological know-how, and have failed to
give priority to learning how to live wisely.
What we have failed to do, in short, is to develop institutions and
traditions of learning rationally devoted to helping us solve our
fundamental problem of how to help the God-of-Cosmic-Value to
flourish within the God-of-Cosmic-Power. It is just this which
wisdom-inquiry would be; and it is just this that we have failed so
far to create.
Reasons for Failure to Develop Wisdom-Inquiry
How did this monumental failure come about? A part of the
answer is contained in the brief history already indicated. Suppose
long ago, in the 15th or 16th century, a great religious movement
had emerged which emphasized the points made in chapter one. In
our world of suffering it is quite impossible that there should be an
all-powerful and all-knowing God who is also all-loving; the God
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of Power must be split off from the God of Value; the former is
impersonal, cannot know what it does, and therefore can be
forgiven the terrible things that it does; the latter is suffering
humanity; we feel and see suffering, we struggle to combat it, but
our efforts are only partly successful, and our fundamental
religious task in life is to relieve suffering and help what is
genuinely of value in life to flourish. Somehow, let us suppose,
the Church gave way before the passionate sincerity of the
disciples of this movement, and the blazing cogency of their
arguments, and throughout Europe churches and religious services
were devoted to celebrating the supreme value of human life, and
to discovering how what is of value may realised – in this life, and
not in a mythical next one. Mighty landowners, the wealthy and
powerful, Princes and Kings, like Bishops and the Pope, could no
longer take their power, possessions and offices for granted. What
is of supreme value is a mystery; it is in us and around us, in what
we do, feel and think, in how we are with each other. It is for each
one of us to discover, and to live, as best we can, and not for the
high and mighty, the Kings and Popes, to decide for us. If such a
religious, political and intellectual revolution had occurred, it
would have been recognized, long ago, that our fundamental
problem is to discover how to help the God-of-Cosmic-Value to
flourish within the God-of-Cosmic-Power. Wisdom-inquiry,
rationally designed to help us solve this problem as we live, might
well have been the outcome.
But no such religious convulsion occurred in the 15th or 16th
century. Those who founded modern science, in the 16th and 17th
centuries, found it quite difficult and perilous enough to establish
the principle that science – or natural philosophy as it was then
known as – should be free to explore ideas about nature without
hindrance from religious or secular authority. Bruno, Scandella
and Galileo, as we have seen, were put to death or imprisoned for
doing just that. Those who developed modern science after
Galileo – Descartes, Newton, Huygens, Hooke, Boyle and others –
took care, by and large, to restrict their inquiry to matters of fact
and steered clear of moral, political and, above all, religious issues
that would have provoked secular and religious authorities.
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Not till the 18th century, with the rise of the Enlightenment, did
the idea that everything should be open to critical scrutiny gain
widespread currency. But by then critical, rational inquiry had
come to mean the scientific pursuit of knowledge. Newton had
achieved unprecedented success in predicting and explaining a
multitude of terrestrial and astronomical phenomena by means of
one theory – his laws of motion and law of gravitation. An assured
method had it seemed been discovered which, for the first time in
history, enabled man to acquire profound new knowledge of nature
– the famous empirical method of science. The Philosophes of the
French Enlightenment in particular – Voltaire, Diderot, D’Almbert
and the rest – were immensely impressed by Francis Bacon’s idea
that acquiring genuine knowledge of nature would make it possible
to transform the human condition, and by Newton’s achievements
in acquiring such knowledge and demonstrating (it seemed) what
methods need to be employed to acquire knowledge.22 The
philosophes concluded, understandably enough, that if knowledge
of nature is important if we are to create a better world, knowledge
of the human world, of society, is even more vital. In order to
transform the social world, knowledge of the laws of the social
world must, surely, be absolutely essential. So they set about
creating the social sciences alongside the natural sciences:
economics, psychology, anthropology, sociology and the rest.23
This idea was further pursued throughout the 19th century, and
built into the institutional structure of academia in the early 20th
century with the creation of departments of social science all over
the world.24 The outcome is what we have today, knowledge-
inquiry, natural and social science devoted to the pursuit of
knowledge, damagingly irrational when judged from the standpoint
of helping humanity learn how to realize what is of value in life –
learn how to help the God-of-Cosmic-Value flourish within the
God-of-Cosmic-Power.
22 For Newton’s influence on the French Enlightenment see P. Gay
(1973), vol. 2, ‘The Science of Freedom’, ch. 3.
23 See Ibid.
24 For an excellent, brief account of the origins and development of the
social sciences along these lines, see Fargaus (1993), Introduction. See
also Hayek (1979).
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The philosophes of the Enlightenment nearly got it right. They
had the profoundly important idea that it might be possible to learn
from scientific progress how to make social progress towards an
enlightened world. This might indeed be said to be the basic idea
of the Enlightenment. Not just in science, but in social and
political life too, ideas (in particular, ideas for living) should be
decided, not by mere tradition and authority, but by critical
rationality and experience. Instinctively, in their lives, the
philosophes sought to put this creed into practice. But in
developing the creed, they blundered. Instead of seeking to apply
progress-achieving methods – arrived at by appropriately
generalizing the progress-achieving methods of science – directly
to social life, to the problems of social life, the philosophes applied
these methods to social science, to the task of acquiring knowledge
of social life. They applied reason, not to the task of making social
progress towards an enlightened world, but rather to making
progress in knowledge about the social world. The outcome was
that social inquiry was subsequently developed as social science,
and not as the endeavour to get rational methods of problem
solving into social life. As a result, the Enlightenment failed to
create wisdom-inquiry, and bequeathed knowledge-inquiry to us
instead.25
Creating a kind of inquiry devoted, in an effective and genuinely
rational way, to helping humanity learn how to create a better
world, is almost more difficult to do today than it would have been
to do in the past. In earlier times one would have been burnt at the
stake or thrown into prison – as one still would today, as it
happens, in some parts of the world. But in liberal democracies
today, it is not death, torture or imprisonment that one will suffer,
but rather sheer indifference and disbelief. How could the still,
small voice of reason have an impact on the mighty industry of
academia today, confident in its fundamental rectitude, a massive,
complex institutional reality no more amenable to rational control
25 In chapter 6 I give a more detailed discussion of what the mistakes of
the philosophes were in developing and applying their basic
Enlightenment idea that we should learn from scientific progress how to
achieve social progress towards an enlightened world.
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than history, or the motion of the earth? A mere argument,
however valid, seems powerless against such an institutional
juggernaut.
This at least has been my personal experience. For over thirty
years I have spelled out the argument sketched above, in and out of
print, for the urgent need to bring about a revolution in the aims
and methods of academia. Critics have praised and savaged my
work. But hardly anything has happened (although very recently
things have begun to stir, as we shall see below, briefly, and in
more detail in chapter 6). 26 It is not just that the argument has had
no discernible effect on academic practice. The argument has not
entered the public arena. Even specialists in the field know
nothing of it. In so far as they have some vague awareness of it,
they know it is of no account precisely because it has been
generally ignored. Just as nothing succeeds like success, so too
nothing fails like failure.
Despite this, the case for creating wisdom-inquiry has never
been so urgent and decisive. The combination of population
growth, modern agriculture and industry, and modern armaments,
all made possible by the immense technical success of science and
technological research, has generated unprecedented global crises.
Humanity needs to learn how to overcome these crises, but the
learning that is involved is the kind provided by wisdom-inquiry,
not knowledge-inquiry. Wisdom is no longer a luxury; it is a
necessity.
Global Warming and Terrorism
An example is global warming. This is caused by the consump-
tion of coal and oil for energy and travel, all made possible by
modern science and technology. There are some who, even at the
time of writing (2008) doubt that global warming is caused by
humanity. But this is hardly the point. It has been known for one
and a half centuries that carbon dioxide is a greenhouse gas. For
decades, there has been no doubt whatsoever that the amount of
CO2 in the atmosphere is increasing, and an increase in CO2 will
lead to global warming. Even if the sceptics were right – which
26 See also note 18.
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they are not – and recent increase in global temperatures are due to
natural causes, all the more does it make it a vital matter to cut
back on CO2 emissions so as not to intensify global warming.27
We have known for decades that industrial development will
lead to global warming. Science has made it possible for us to
cause global warming, and science has also, of course, made it
possible for us to find out that we are the cause. What science
cannot do is solve the immense political, economic, industrial and
social problems that need to be solved if we human beings are to
cut back sufficiently on our global emissions of CO2. Knowledge-
inquiry is simply not designed to help solve these immense
problems of living. But wisdom-inquiry is so designed. It puts
problems of living at the heart of the academic enterprise.
Wisdom-inquiry would be centrally and fundamentally concerned
to propose and critically assess ideas about what should be done to
cut back on CO2 emissions. It would energetically hunt for the
best ideas for action around, wherever they may be found, and
would energetically publicize these ideas in relevant circles of
influence – political, industrial, commercial, educational, and in
the media. All this would be done in a way which links up with
the multitude of scientific and technological issues that need to be
tackled to develop new sources of power and less consumption of
it, and new modes of transport.28
Another example is terrorism. 9/11 is, of course, a terrible
illustration of the way in which modern technology can be
exploited to cause havoc. Even though the terrorist themselves
were armed with nothing more sophisticated than knives, they
were able to exploit aeroplanes and modern buildings to kill some
three thousand people. In the future, no doubt, terrorists will be
able to get their hands on more lethal weapons – biological or
27 For an excellent history of the discovery of global warming see Weart
(2003).
28 For an excellent recent non-technical discussion of global warming,
what needs to be done, and what is being done, see Walker and King
(2008). For a grimmer picture, see Orr (2009). For a list of recent books
on global warming see:
http://www.kings.cam.ac.uk/sites/default/files/library/global-warming-
bibliography.doc.
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nuclear. One imagines efforts in this direction are even now
underway. It is thus a matter of some considerable importance that
the threat of terrorism is combated intelligently, in such a way as to
give some hope that the threat will decrease. Elsewhere,29 I have
argued that, in combating international terrorism, eight basic
principles ought to be observed:-
1. International law must be complied with.
2. Terrorism must be combated as a police operation, not a war.
3. Civil liberties must not be undermined.
4. Nations suspected of harbouring or supporting terrorists must
be engaged with both by means of diplomacy, and in such a way
that intelligence is sought by stealth.
5. If terrorists’ acts are motivated by long-standing conflict –
as in the Palestine/Israeli conflict – every effort should be made by
the international community of nations to resolve the conflict that
fuels the terrorism.
6. As far as possible, terrorism must not be combated in such a
way as to recruit terrorists.
7. International treatises designed to curtail the spread of
terrorist materials must be maintained and strengthened.
8. Democratic nations combating terrorism must exercise care
that, in combating terrorism, they do not thereby act as terrorists.
Unfortunately, the “war against terrorism”, fought by George
Bush, Tony Blair and others after 9/11, has violated all of these
eight principles. As a result, the very opposite of what was
intended – or at least ostensibly intended – has been achieved. The
threat of terrorism has increased. Failure to resolve the
Israel/Palestine conflict, unjust imprisonment, torture, the rhetoric
of war and conflict of civilizations, and above all, perhaps, the Iraq
war, have provoked young Islamic men all over the world to
become sympathetic to bin Laden’s cause. The response to
29 See my ‘The Disastrous War against Terrorism: Violence versus
Enlightenment’, Ch. 3 of Terrorism Issues: Threat Assessment,
Consequences and Prevention, ed. A. W. Merkidze, Nova Science
Publishers, New York, 2007, pp. 111-133 (available on my website
www.nick-maxwell.demon.co.uk).
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terrorism may indeed be judged to be more dreadful than the
terrorism itself – especially when one takes into account that, at the
time of writing, something like 1.2 million people have died as a
result of the Iraq war, according to one estimate.
One has to remember that both Bush and Blair were re-elected
after it had become apparent what a disaster the Iraq war had been.
Bush and Blair would not have been able to conduct their
disastrous war against terrorism without considerable popular
support. A prerequisite, for dealing with terrorism intelligently
and effectively, in other words, is a public with enlightened ideas
about what kind of strategies are most likely to meet with success.
Solving the problem of terrorism – in so far as it can be solved –
requires public education.
Wisdom-inquiry is designed to provide just such an education,
whereas knowledge-inquiry is not. What is needed is enlightened
public debate about what needs to be done to combat terrorism
successfully. It is just this which wisdom-inquiry would seek to
provoke. Academics working in accordance with the edicts of
knowledge-inquiry may well set about acquiring expert knowledge
about terrorist groups, but it is not a part of their professional brief
to provoke public debate about anti-terrorist policy.3010
Global warming and terrorism illustrate the general point. As I
have already remarked, our only hope of tackling our global
problems successfully is to tackle them democratically. This in
turn requires that electorates understand what these problems are,
and what needs to be done in response to them. And this in turn
requires that we possess institutions of learning rationally
designed, well designed, to help the public discover what our
3010For an excellent discussion of how to combat terrorism see: L.
Richardson, 2006, What Terrorists Want, John Murray, London. This
seems to me exactly the kind of work that academics today should be
writing: intelligent, informative, wise, highly readable and well-written,
it provides genuine insight into the motives and character of terrorism,
and comes up with sensible proposals as to how the problem should be
tackled. It is clearly intended to contribute to public education. It is an
exemplary contribution to wisdom-inquiry. Some wisdom-inquiry work
does go on in universities today despite the dominance of knowledge-
inquiry intellectual standards.
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problems are, and what needs to be done in response to them.
Wisdom-inquiry is designed to provide this vital kind of education
about our problems of living, while knowledge-inquiry is not.
Wisdom-inquiry is designed to help humanity come to grips with
the fundamental problem of enabling the God-of-Cosmic-Value to
flourish within the God-of-Cosmic-Power in all its detailed,
multitudinous aspects. Knowledge-inquiry violates three of the
four most elementary rules of reason when judged from this
standpoint.
In subsequent chapters, I will strengthen the argument that has,
so far, only been lightly sketched; and I will indicate just how
widespread are the damaging repercussions of failing to develop
institutions of learning well designed from the standpoint of
helping the God-of-Value to flourish within the God-of-Power.
A New Approach to Philosophy?
The subtitle of this book requires, perhaps, a few words of
explanation. For the last fifty years, academic philosophy has been
divided into two schools: analytic philosophy, based primarily in
the USA and UK, and continental philosophy, based in Europe but
to be found in the USA and UK as well. Analytic philosophy is
based on the idea that the proper task of philosophy is to analyse
concepts and solve puzzles. It seeks to clarify such key notions as
knowledge, mind, justice, the good, reason, truth. Analytic
philosophers strive for clarity, respect science and logic, and seek
to support philosophical views with valid argument. Continental
philosophy is an admixture of such schools as phenomenalism,
existentialism, structuralism and Marxist critical theory. Science
and valid argument are not high on the agenda. It tends to be
bombastic and obscure.
Both, in my view, miss the point. Both fail to do philosophy in
the way in which it most needs to be done. Philosophy ought to be
the enterprise of tackling our most general, fundamental, urgent
problems. The basic task of philosophy is to articulate, and try to
improve the articulation of, our most fundamental problems and, if
possible, propose and critically assess possible solutions. This
should be done in as simple and non-technical a way as possible.
A major task for philosophy is to keep alive an awareness of what
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our fundamental problems are, the relative inadequacy of our
attempted solutions, and the impact that the answers we give or
assume can have on diverse aspects of life – politics, science, art,
education, religion, international affairs, the law, personal life,
even survival.
It is philosophy in this sense that I attempt in this book.3111
3111It could be said that this is not a new approach to philosophy,
but rather a return to a very old approach – philosophy as pursued
by those who invented it, the ancient Greeks. Thales,
Anaximander, Parmenides, Heraclitus, Xenophanes, Democritus,
Socrates, Plato and Aristotle all did philosophy in the sense I have
indicated.
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CHAPTER THREE
HOW IS IT POSSIBLE FOR THE
GOD-OF-VALUE TO EXIST INSIDE
THE GOD-OF-POWER?
How is it possible for the God-of-Cosmic-Value to be inside the
God-of-Cosmic-Power? How can our human world as we
experience it, full of sound, colour, feel, taste and smell, imbued
with sentience, consciousness, free will, meaning and value,
containing everything we love and care for, this whole experienced
world in which we live, somehow be embedded in, or be an
integral part of, the physical universe?
I sit in my garden with a friend. Behind me, honeysuckle
tumbles over the garden wall, and fills the air with its sweet scent.
Bumble bees buzz and blunder among the honeysuckle flowers. A
gentle breeze sifts through the tree above, and sunlight filters
through the leaves. It is summer. The sky is dark blue. I stretch
and say “This is heaven,” and my friend replies “How right it is to
take the garden as an image of Paradise”.
Put all this into the physical universe and what do we have?
Both I and my friend seem to disappear altogether. I am made up
entirely of billions of cells, which are in turn made up of billions of
highly complex molecules, in turn made up of atoms, in turn made
up of electrons, protons and neutrons, the protons and neutrons in
turn made up of quarks. Everything I am, everything I do, think,
experience, see, feel, imagine, decide, understand is just billions of
electrons and quarks interacting with each other in accordance with
the laws of physics. And likewise for my friend. I see the blue sky,
the green leaves, flowers and ferns; I smell the honeysuckle, and
hear bees buzzing, and say “This is heaven.” But what has really
happened? Light of various wavelengths, reflected from various
surfaces, enters my eyes where it causes molecular processes to
occur in my optic nerves; this in turn causes more such molecular
processes to occur in the back of my brain, which lead to more
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such processes which, in turn, lead to muscles being contracted, air
being expelled, vocal chords vibrating, vibrations of molecules in
the air, which cause my friend’s eardrums to vibrate, in turn
causing tiny bones in her middle ear to vibrate, leading to complex
molecular processes in her brain. Ultimately, all that has occurred
is that billions upon billions of electrons and quarks interacting
with one another have produced light of such and such frequency
which, after travelling short distances, have affected the way
further billions of electrons and quarks interacted. Colours
disappear; sounds and smells disappear; perceptions, experiences,
sensations, feelings, consciousness, intentions, decisions and
actions disappear, and there remains merely electrons and quarks
interacting, these interactions being mediated by forces such as
electromagnetism, the weak and strong force, and gravitation,
vibrations in the electromagnetic force travelling from one vast
conglomeration of electrons and quarks to another. All meaning
and value, everything necessary to have anything meaningful or of
value, have vanished, leaving only cold physics behind. The God-
of-Cosmic-Value vanishes in the cold embrace of the God-of-
Cosmic-Power.
How is our precious human world to be rescued from this
insidious and terrifying assault from physics? The essential step is
to recognize that physics covers everything, but only a highly
selected aspect of everything. Physics, and that part of science in
principle reducible to physics, is concerned only with what may be
called the “causally efficacious” aspect of things, that aspect
which, ultimately, everything has in common with everything else,
and which determines (perhaps probabilistically) the way events
unfold.1 In its almost dementedly single-minded determination to
specify precisely the causally efficacious aspect of things, physics
ignores entirely all other aspects - the look of things, the feel, the
smell, the sound, the sense, and what it is to be such and such a
complex mass of cells, of interacting molecules. Physics fastens
1 The thesis that physics seeks to specify the causally efficacious aspect
of things is expounded and defended in my (1968a), reprinted in
Swinburne (1974), pp. 149-74. See also my (1998), especially pp. 141-
55.
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onto the wavelength of light and ignores its colour; it specifies
vibrations in the air and ignores the sound of the human voice, and
ignores, too, what the person says. Physics might cover all the
incredibly complex physical processes going on inside my head,2
but it says nothing about what it is to be me, what it is I
experience, feel, think, see, hear, imagine, understand, desire, fear,
intend, decide. Given my utterance “This is heaven”, physics
covers comprehensively the causally efficacious aspect of what
goes on – neurons firing in my brain, muscles contracting, vocal
chords vibrating, vibrating molecules of the air, vibrating bones in
the middle ear, more neurons firing in my friend’s brain. In its
almost monomaniacal concentration on the causally efficacious,
however, physics leaves out entirely what the utterance sounds
2 It is important to appreciate that physics can, in practice, predict the
evolution of only the very simplest of systems. This is partly because the
instantaneous initial state of the system – the so-called “initial
conditions” – can only be specified for the very simplest of systems (and
inevitably with some imprecision). It is also because it is in practice only
possible to solve the equations of the physical theory – quantum theory,
for example – for the very simplest of systems. Quantum theory can be
applied with some precision to an isolated hydrogen atom, the very
simplest atom in existence consisting of one proton and one electron.
But when it comes to giving a precise quantum mechanical description of
the next simplest atom, a helium atom, consisting of a central nucleus of
two protons and two neutrons encircled by two electrons, it turns out to
be impossible to give precise solutions to the equations of the theory.
The best that can be done is give approximate solutions, and thus an
approximate quantum mechanical description of the physical state of the
atom. More complex isolated molecules would pose even more severe,
if not insuperable problems. Giving a quantum mechanical description
of a single neuron will, for ever, be beyond the scope of physics. A
precise quantum mechanical description of a living, conscious brain is
absolutely out the question. But these are practical obstacles. The
physical state of a conscious brain and its environment at an instant, plus
the yet-to-be-discovered true physical theory of everything (assuming it
exists), does determine (perhaps probabilistically) the next physical state
of affairs, even if human physicists are unable to carry out the
calculations and derivations.
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like, what it means, what I intend it to mean, what my friend hears
and understands.
The Two Aspect View
This solution to the problem of how the God-of-Value can fit
inside the God-of-Cosmic-Power is a new version of an old idea,
which goes back at least to Spinoza, and is sometimes called the
two-aspect theory. According to this view, there are two aspects to
what exists, the physical on the one hand, and the mental,
experiential, evaluative or human on the other. Everything that
exists has a physical aspect. Some things also have experiential or
human aspects. Thus flowers have colours and smells. People
have thoughts, feelings, inner experiences; they have personalities
imbued with features of value, such as courage, meanness or
kindness, and live lives more or less meaningful and of value.
Books contain sentences that make sense, and tell stories or
expound ideas; and works of art are imbued with aesthetic features.
None of these experiential or human features is reducible to the
physical.
A simple argument, usually attributed to Thomas Nagel3 and
Frank Jackson4 (but actually first spelled out by me several years
earlier5) establishes that an elementary experiential property, such
as redness, cannot be reduced to the physical. Being blind from
birth does not debar one from understanding the whole of physics.
A person blind from birth may well be able to understand the
physical theory of light as well as the next person. Physical
concepts such as wavelength, mass, charge, force, momentum, are
such that no special kind of experience is necessary for their
meaning to be understood. But when it comes to sensory qualities,
such as colours, sounds and smells, the situation is quite different.
3 Nagel (1974).
4 See Jackson (1982) and (1986).
5 See my (1966), especially pp. 303-308; and my (1968b), especially p.
127, pp. 134-137 and 140-141. When I drew Thomas Nagel's attention
to these publications, he remarked in a letter, with great generosity:
"There is no justice. No, I was unaware of your papers, which made the
central point before anyone else". Frank Jackson acknowledged,
however, that he had read my 1968b paper.
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Here, it is necessary to have experienced these sensory qualities
oneself, at some time in one’s life, to know what they are. Being
blind from birth does debar one from knowing what redness is, the
colour we see and experience. In short, being congenitally blind
does not debar you from knowing and understanding everything
that can be predicted by physics, but it does debar you from
knowing or understanding what it is for a poppy to be red; hence
the redness of the poppy cannot be predicted by physics. Colours,
sounds, smells, tactile qualities, sensations, feelings, thoughts, and
a multitude of other experiential, human features of things and
people, lie irredeemably beyond the scope of physics.
But might not some future development of current physics
successfully predict and explain colours, sounds and smells as we
experience them? The answer is No. Suppose physics one day
completes its task of discovering the true "theory of everything"
which, in principle, predicts and explains all physical phenomena.
Given any isolated system, this theory, together with a precise
specification of the instantaneous physical state of the system,
would (in principle) predict all future states of the system, as long
as the system remains isolated.6 Such a theory would clearly be
complete and comprehensive in a dramatic and extraordinary way.
But, despite this, the theory might well not predict all facts about
a system. It predicts only those facts that need to be specified (at
any given instant) for further predictions to be made. All facts and
properties which do not need to be referred to for the above kind of
predictive task to go ahead, are ruthlessly excluded from physical
descriptions.
Thus, suppose the isolated system is a space capsule with you
inside. The physical state of the capsule, and the physical state of
your brain and body, are included in any complete specification of
the physical state of the system, used to predict future states,
described in similar terms. But colours and sounds that you
experience, your inner sensations and thoughts, the meaning of
6 There are, however, severe restrictions on what physics can predict in
practice as I pointed out in note 2. In the text, for simplicity, I assume
determinism. The true physical “theory of everything” may, however, be
probabilistic, in which case probabilistic predictions only would be
forthcoming, even in principle.
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what you say or write down in your diary, are all excluded from
the physical description because these are not required for the
predictive task of physics to go ahead. Physical aspects of these
experiential, human features are, of course, specified: light of such
and such a range of wavelengths, sound waves in the air,
neurological processes in the your brain, ink marks in your diary –
all are specified in terms of the instantaneous states of fundamental
physical entities. But the experiential, human aspects of these
physical processes receive no mention, because they are not
required for the predictive task of physics to succeed.
But could one not develop an even more comprehensive theory
than the physical "theory of everything", by adding on additional
postulates which correlate physical states of affairs with
experiential features – redness, the sensation of redness, and so on?
This new theory would be really complete and comprehensive: it
would predict everything, the physical and the experiential.
But a terrible price would be paid. The new theory would not be
explanatory. In turning the physical "theory of everything" into a
real theory of everything, one would have to add on endlessly
many postulates linking the physical and the experiential, each one
of which would be incredibly complex. Even the postulate linking
physical states of affairs to a particular hue of red would be
extraordinarily complex. The number of such incredibly complex
additional postulates is endless, as becomes apparent when one
considers the diversity and richness of our human experiential
world, and adds on to that the experiences of other sentient
creatures, actual and possible. The physical theory of everything
will be explanatory because, like existing physical theories, it will
have an extraordinarily simple, unified basic structure. The real
theory of everything will, by contrast, have billions, possibly even
infinitely many, distinct postulates, each one of horrendous
complexity. Such a theory might predict, but it would be
hopelessly non-explanatory.
Two crucial points emerge from these considerations.
First, physics does, in a very important sense, seek to be
comprehensive and complete. It seeks to develop that unique true,
unified “theory of everything” which, in principle, applies to all
possible phenomena and which, in principle, predicts future states
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of any isolated system when specified in terms of the vocabulary of
the theory, in those terms required in order to predict further states
of the system. Physics is, in other words, as I have said,
exclusively concerned with the causally efficacious aspect of
things, that aspect which, ultimately, everything has in common
with everything else, and which must be specified if physics is to
succeed with its predictive task. All those aspects of things which
do not need to be specified for the predictive task of physics to
succeed are not specified. They are ruthlessly excluded from
physics. The look of things, the feel, sound and smell of things,
what it is to be such and such brain and body, the meaning and
value of things: all these experiential and human features of things
are excluded from physics because no mention of them need be
made in order to fulfil the predictive task of physics.
Second, there is an explanation as to why physics must be silent
about the experiential. Leaving out the experiential from physics
is the price that must be paid if the beautifully explanatory theories
of physics are to be developed. Physics must be silent about the
experiential, not because it does not exist, but because bringing in
the experiential destroys utterly the explanatory character of
physics.
In short, physics omits all references to colours, sounds and
smells as we experience them, not because they do not exist, but
because (1) physics can omit all reference to them without this
sabotaging its basic predictive task, and (2) physics must omit all
reference to them if physical theory is to be explanatory.
A key point in all this is that the silence of physics about sensory
qualities, inner experiences, meaning and value, our whole
experienced human world (the God-of-Cosmic-Value) provides no
grounds whatsoever for holding that these features of things do not
exist. A comprehensive physical specification of the God-of-
Cosmic-Power says nothing about the God-of-Cosmic-Value, not
because the latter does not exist, but because prediction does not
require it, and explanation demands that it be omitted.
The Orthodox Scientific View
Almost all scientists, however, have reached the opposite
conclusion. They take it for granted that the silence of physics
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about the experiential means that sensory qualities do not exist,
objectively, out there in the world and, at best, exist only in us, as
sensations. According to this view, the whole world as we
experience it is nothing more than a persistent illusion. The blue
of the sky, the green of leaves and grass, the yellow of honeysuckle
flowers, the buzzing of bumble bees, the sounds of conversation,
all this is illusory. Out there, there is just physics: invisible
fundamental physical entities, electrons, quarks, photons and so on,
interacting with incredible rapidity in accordance with the laws of
quantum theory (or, more precisely, the laws of the true “theory of
everything”). We have no experience of this physical world
whatsoever. Everything we do experience – everything we see,
hear, touch, smell – is in us, not out there in the world. The world
outside us causes us to have the experiences we do have, but we
never directly experience these external causes, and what we do
experience provides us with a vivid but almost wholly misleading
impression of what these external causes are.
This view goes all the way back to Democritus, over two
thousand years ago, one of the first to conceive of the world in
purely physical terms. Democritus held that the universe is made
up exclusively of indestructible atoms which move through the
void. And he declared:
Colour exists by convention; sweet and sour exist by
convention: atoms and the void alone exist in reality.7
Two thousand years later, in 1632, Galileo expresses the same
view:
these tastes, odours, colours, etc., so far as their objective
existence is concerned, are nothing but mere names for
something which resides exclusively in our sensitive
body, so that if the perceiving creatures were removed, all
of these qualities would be annihilated and abolished from
existence.8
7 A slightly different translation is quoted in Guthrie (1978), p. 440.
8 Galileo, The Assayer, quoted in Matthews (1989), pp. 56-7.
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Galileo goes on to point out that if a feather tickles us we hold
that the tickling is in us, not in the feather. In a similar way,
colours, sounds and smells are a kind of tickling in us, and are not
objective features of things external to us.
And Newton agrees. He writes:
if at any time I speak of light and rays as coloured or
endued with colours, I would be understood to speak not
philosophically and properly, but grossly, and accordingly
to such conceptions as vulgar people in seeing all these
experiments would be apt to frame. For the rays to speak
properly are not coloured. In them there is nothing else
than a certain power and disposition to stir up a sensation
of this or that colour. For as sound in a bell or musical
string, or other sounding body, is nothing but a trembling
motion, and in the air nothing but that motion propagated
from the object, and in the sensorium ‘tis a sense of that
motion under the form of sound; so colours in the object
are nothing but a disposition to reflect this or that sort of
rays more copiously than the rest; in the rays they are
nothing but their dispositions to propagate this or that
motion into the sensorium, and in the sensorium they are
sensations of those motions under the forms of colours.9
Almost all scientists today would agree. Thus Semir Zeki, a
present day neuroscientist who has done much to unravel the
neurology of colour perception, writes “Ever since the time of
Newton, physicists have emphasized that light itself, consisting of
electromagnetic radiation, has no colour”; and Zeki goes on to
quote a part of the above passage from Newton with approval.10
If the only reason for holding that sensory qualities, as we
perceive them, do not exist out there in the world is that physics is
silent about them, one might dismiss the views of these scientists
as being based on nothing more than the unconscious assumption
that nothing can in principle elude the grasp of physics. They
9 Newton (1932), pp. 124-5.
10 Zeki (1993), p. 238.
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assume that the silence of physics about colour as we experience it
must mean that colour does not objectively exist, ignoring the
possibility that physics is silent about colour because it is not
needed for prediction, and it cannot be included if physics is to be
explanatory.
But there is another reason for believing sensory qualities do not
exist out there in the world – a reason that may well seem decisive.
It might be thought somewhat paradoxical that scientists, of all
people, should deny the objective existence of colour, sound,
smell, tactile qualities, as perceived by us. For consider the theory
that the material world is made up of physical entities that are
devoid of colour, sound and smell. Is not this theory refuted by
experience the moment we open our eyes, our ears, sniff and put
out a hand and touch? The world around us, as most of us
experience it, is full of colour and sound, smells and tactile
qualities. Scientists above all claim to base their science on
experience, on evidence, on observation and experiment. They
above all, surely, should acknowledge that the theory of the
sensory-depleted world is refuted by every trivial observation that
we make.
But there is an immediate and apparently devastating reply to
this objection, this claimed refutation. Take the sensory-depleted
physical conception of the universe, as a working hypothesis, and
apply it to what goes on when we see, hear, smell, feel. I see
before me the glistening bank of golden honeysuckle flowers in my
garden. Sunlight containing a range of wavelengths strikes the
molecules of which the honeysuckle flowers are composed: some
wavelengths are absorbed, others are reflected. Some of this
reflected light enters my eyes. It is focused onto the retinas of my
eyes, where it causes complex chemical processes to occur in the
receptor cells of my eyes, which in turn cause ripples of
neurological activity to travel along the optic nerves to the back of
my brain. This neurological activity takes the form of a rapid
exchange of sodium and potassium ions across the semi-permeable
membrane of the neurons that make up my optic nerve, this
exchange travelling as a wave of activity from the retina to my
brain. Further such neurological activity goes on at the back of my
brain – and then the miracle occurs: I have the experience of seeing
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the yellow honeysuckles. What I know about, here, is the last
event in this long chain of events: the experience of seeing
apparently golden honeysuckle flowers. But this experience is
inside me, and is utterly different from its external cause. Indeed,
science tells us that my inner experience of seeing is the outcome
of a series of dramatic transformations: reflected light becomes
chemical processes in the receptor cells of my retinas, which in
turn become neuronal impulses travelling along my optic nerve, in
turn transformed to the transmission of particles at synaptic
junctions, all this brain activity being transformed into my private
experience of seeing. This final occurrence, which is all I really
know about in seeing, is wholly different from what has gone
before – brain activity, chemical activity in my retinas,
electromagnetic radiation absorbed and reflected by molecules that
make up the physical honeysuckle flowers. Thus perception
provides me with no reason whatsoever to suppose that things
external to me really do have the perceptual properties that they
appear to have. On the contrary, the above sketchy scientific
account of what goes on during perception provides us with every
reason to suppose that things external to us are utterly different
from the way they appear to be to us when we see them.
Similar considerations arise in connection with hearing,
smelling, and touching. And the conclusion is that the scientific,
sensory-depleted theory of the universe is not refuted at all by our
ordinary perception of colour, sound, smell and tactile qualities.
Quite to the contrary, science provides us with every reason to hold
that things out there, the world around us, is utterly different from
the way it seems to be when we see, listen, sniff, touch. Galileo
was right. These sensory qualities are in us, not in things around
us.
Cartesian Dualism
We have arrived at an immensely influential attempted solution
to our problem, formulated very clearly by Rene Descartes11
around 1656, and known ever since as "Cartesian dualism".
According to Cartesian dualism, there are two universes – the
11 Descartes (1949).
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physical universe on the one hand, and the universe of conscious
minds on the other. Each living human brain has associated with it
a conscious mind, and everything we see, hear, feel, experience is
confined to our conscious mind. The God-of-Cosmic-Power is the
physical universe; the God-of-Cosmic-Value is to be associated
with distinct conscious minds, linked to but distinct from our
physical brains. The strongest argument in support of Cartesian
dualism is the one just given above, from physics and the complex
processes associated with perception.
Persuasive as this argument for Cartesian dualism may seem, it
can nevertheless be challenged. There are grounds for doubting
that it really is valid.
First, one should note that the conclusion of the argument has
some awkward consequences. If what I really see when I perceive
the honeysuckle – if what I really know about – is my inner
experience of seeing, and not the honeysuckle at all, then this must
mean that there is this inner mental representation of the
honeysuckle, just as it appears to me, associated somehow with
neurological processes going on in my brain. In so far as I know
anything about anything, I know that this inner mental
representation of honeysuckle exists, and I know – I see – what its
properties are: the honeysuckle shape, colour and arrangement, but
somehow in my private mental space, and not in ordinary physical
space. But this inner mental honeysuckle representation is a very
peculiar sort of entity indeed. Only I am aware of it; no one else
can detect the faintest hint of its existence, however exhaustively
my conscious brain might be examined. It is an entity with
properties that differ radically from anything known to be going on
in my brain. It is utterly obscure how neurological processes
occurring in my brain manage to create this weird mental entity –
manage to cause it to occur. And furthermore, if all I ever know
about, when I see, hear, smell and touch, are my inner mental
representations, how can I ever know anything else? How can I
know anything about the world around me? All these awkward
consequences flow from the conclusion that what I really see, what
I really know about, when I look at honeysuckle, is my inner visual
experience, and not the external honeysuckle. We may well hold
that Cartesian dualism creates more problems than it solves.
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But how valid is the above argument that, given the long chain
of events stretching from external object to internal representation,
what we really see and know about is the inner representation and
not the external object? What prevents us from taking exactly the
opposite view: what we really see and know about is the external
object, and not our inner representation at all?
Internalism versus Externalism
We have here two radically different theories about what it is
that we really see and know about in perception. The “internal”
theory – as we may call it – associated with Cartesian dualism,
says that what we really see and know about is our inner
experiences, our inner representations of external objects.
Whatever we know about external objects is inferred from our
primary knowledge of our inner experiences, our inner
representations. The “external” theory says exactly the opposite.
What we really see and know about is what we ordinarily take
ourselves to see and know about: things external to us, flowers,
people, houses, trees. We never see our inner experiences at all.
All our knowledge of our inner experiential representations is
inferred from our knowledge of things external to us. The
“internal” theory says we know everything about our inner
perceptual experiences and hardly anything at all – at least in
ordinary perception – about things external to us. The “external”
theory says the exact opposite: in so far as we know anything when
we perceive, what we know about is things external to us; we
hardly know anything at all about the real nature of our inner
perceptual experiences, and what we do know is derived from our
knowledge of things external to us.
The “external” theory12 acknowledges the existence of the
12 The distinction being drawn here, between the “internal” and
“external” views, should not be identified with distinctions that have
been drawn by other philosophers between “internalist” and “externalist”
views. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has 73 items under the
heading “Externalism”, involving many different distinctions between
“internal” and “external” views, some of which are associated with inner
experiences: see http://plato.stanford.edu/search/searcher.py?query=
externalism. The distinction I draw here should be understood in the
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causal chain of events from perceived external object to inner
perceptual experience, and declares that the existence of this chain
of events provides no grounds whatsoever for holding that what we
really see and know about is the last event in this chain – our inner
perceptual experience. And when put baldly like that, the
declaration seems valid. Why should the existence of the chain of
events imply that we only really see the last event in the chain?
This only becomes plausible if additional assumptions are made.
We may assume, for example, that we only really see and know
about what we are in direct contact with. Naively, before we learn
some science, we may think that we really see objects external to
us because our eyes send out our gaze to touch and be intimately in
contact with these external objects. Then we learn that there is no
such thing as a “gaze” emitted from our eyes. On the contrary, it is
all the other way round: light, reflected from the external object,
enters our eyes and is focused onto our retinas. What we really
see, then, is the image on our retina (which, rather confusingly, is
upside down!). But then it occurs to us that we are not in direct
contact with our retinas either: chemical processes going on there
cause neurological processes to occur in our optic nerve and brain,
which in turn lead to the occurrence of our inner visual experience,
and it is only this that we are in direct contact with, this alone
being what we really see.
But what needs to be challenged about this argument – this
remorseless process of driving the seen object into the eye and
through the eye socket into the brain and into the mind – is the
driving assumption that we only really see and know about what
we are in direct contact with. This is just false. It is based on a
very primitive and false theory of perception – the “gaze” theory –
which is in turn based on the analogy with touching. According to
this primitive view, we only really get to know things external to
us by reaching out and getting hold of things with our hands
(perhaps even putting them into our mouths, as babies do). Seeing
– gazing on things – is a kind of invisible touching which, from
way I indicate, and should not be interpreted in terms of the views of
other philosophers. In so far as it owes anything to another philosopher,
it comes from J. J. C. Smart, as I indicate in the next note.
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pressure from science, is driven to accept that we only touch, and
hence only really see, not external objects, not images on our
retinas, but our inner perceptual experiences. But all this is
nonsense. Seeing is not any kind of touching. In order to see
something, we don’t have to be in direct contact with that thing.
(And this “touching” theory of seeing doesn’t even work for
touching itself. For, of course, when we touch and feel something
with our finger tips, sensory cells cause neurons to fire, which in
turn cause neuronal activity to occur in our brain which in turn
leads to our experience of feeling something. We are never in
direct contact with what we touch.)
Reject the false assumption that we only really see and know
about what we are in direct contact with, and the argument from
the causal chain associated with perception collapses. The
argument provides no grounds whatsoever for holding that we
really see, not external objects, but internal representations of
them.
But there is another assumption that we may make which, if true,
would render the causal chain argument convincing. We may
assume that what we really see is something about which we
cannot be mistaken. If we really see something, then we know we
are seeing it, and we know what sort of thing it is. It follows that I
cannot really see the honeysuckle in my garden. There is always
the possibility that I am hallucinating. It is for me just as if I am in
my garden: I hear the buzzing bumble bees, I see the honeysuckle
and smell their sweet scent. But actually I am in a laboratory:
fiendish neurologists have stuck electric probes into my brain and
are stimulating it to produce just the neurological processes that
would occur in my brain were I to be in my garden. The result is
that I seem to see the honeysuckle and hear the bees; but actually I
see and hear nothing of the kind. From the standpoint of what I
experience there is no difference whatsoever between being in the
garden, and being in the fiendish neurologists’ laboratory with the
probes stuck into my brain. What I really see must be the same in
both cases. Hence what I really see is my inner representation of
the garden, the honeysuckle and the bees, and not these things
themselves. Even when I am in my garden, I really see, not the
garden, but my inner representation of it.
68
But the key assumption, here – that what we really see is
something about which we cannot be mistaken – is false, and
deserves to be rejected. All perception has a conjectural element to
it. There is always the possibility – however remote – that we are
mistaken about what we are seeing. There is always the possibility
that we seem to be seeing something, and it does not exist at all.
What do I see, then, if I hallucinate that I am seeing
honeysuckle, and nothing out there corresponds to what I seem to
be seeing? In these circumstances I see nothing. If I am to see
honeysuckle, (1) the honeysuckle must exist before me, (2) light
reflected from the honeysuckle must enter my eyes and lead to me
(3) having the experience of seeing the honeysuckle. If (1) and (2)
are absent and only (3) remains, I see nothing.
But if this is the case, (3) alone holds, and I experience a
hallucination, and know it is a hallucination, do I not know
something as a result of my experience? The answer is that I do
know something, but what I know is very little. What I know can
be put like this: “Something is going on inside me which is just the
sort of thing that would go on if I was really seeing
honeysuckle”.13 In other words, I ordinarily know very little about
the perceptual experiences I have; what I do know is derived from
my knowledge of things external to me – what these perceptual
experiences are experiences of. Far from my knowledge of things
external to me being inferred from my knowledge of my inner
experiences, it is all the other way round: all that I know of my
inner perceptual experiences is inferred from my knowledge of
things external to me. Even though I am in intimate contact with
my inner perceptual experiences, my knowledge of their nature is
sparse indeed.
This feature of the “external” theory means that this theory is
free of the serious problems that confront the “internal” theory,
indicated above. According to the “internal” theory, when I am in
my garden I directly see and know about, not the flowers, the trees,
the sunshine, the sky, but my inner perceptual experiences of these
things. What I know about these inner experiences tells me that
13 This way of putting it is due to J. J. C. Smart: see his (1963),
p.94.
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they are utterly unlike anything going on in my brain. Nothing like
the fluttering green leaves, the sunshine, the blue sky, as seen by
me to be features of my private inner perceptual experience, exists
in my brain. At once the problem of what can be the relationship
between my inner experience and my brain takes on a particularly
severe form, as we saw above. Adopt the “external” theory,
however, which declares that it is the flowers, trees, sunshine and
sky that I really see, my knowledge of my inner perceptual
experiences being very sparse – being limited to “what is going
inside me is just the sort of thing that would go on given I am in
my garden seeing trees, sunshine, sky” – and the horrendous
problem of the relationship between inner experience and brain all
but disappears. All that I do know about my inner experiences –
which is very little, and couched in terms of what I know of things
external to me – is entirely compatible with the conjecture that my
inner experiences are brain processes. Everything I know about
my inner experiences, such as the circumstances when they occur,
what they are of, fits in with this conjecture, and nothing that I
know about them conflicts with this conjecture. Of course, in
declaring inner experiences to be brain processes I am not saying
that inner experiences are nothing but physical processes going on
in my physical brain – any more than in declaring the tree in my
garden to be a physical object (or persisting physical process) I am
saying it is nothing more than a physical object (or process). Just
as the tree has extra-physical sensory qualities associated with it –
the greenness of the leaves, the sounds it makes when the leaves
swish against each other in the breeze, even a faint leafy scent
associated with the tree – so too brain processes have experiential
features associated with them – what I experience and am aware of
when these processes occur in my brain. (There will be more
about this in chapter seven.)
There is a third consideration which may make the existence of
the causal chain of events associated with perception seem
powerful grounds for holding that what we really see are our inner
perceptual experiences and not things external to us. Invoke the
causal chain of events involved in perception – from light absorbed
and reflected at the surface of an external object, via chemical
processes occurring in the retina, to neurological processes going
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on in the brain – and one thereby automatically invokes physics,
since physics is what is required to describe and explain this causal
chain in full generality. As an immediate consequence, all sensory
qualities, such as colours, disappear from the external world. We
have, however, only limited scientific knowledge and
understanding of our incredibly complex brains; inevitably, there is
the temptation to suppose that in this region of our ignorance
something as yet not understood and mysterious happens, and
brain processes cause our inner perceptual experiences to occur,
we experience colours and sounds which we, mistakenly, project
outwards onto things in the world around us.
But there is a double fallacy here. First, as we have seen, the
silence of physics about colours and sounds in the world around us
provides no reasons whatsoever for thinking that these sensory
qualities don’t exist. If they do exist, physics would not mention
them (since they are not required for physical prediction, and
cannot be included if we are to have physical explanation).
Second, the reasons for physics to be silent about experiential
qualities in the world around us, are precisely also reasons for
physics to be silent about the experiential aspects of our inner
experiences. Once we enter into the world of physical descriptions
and explanations, we will never encounter either the greenness of
leaves or the inner perceptual experience of seeing green leaves:
instead we encounter electromagnetic waves of various
wavelengths being absorbed and reflected by the molecules that go
to make up the leaves’ surfaces, and neurological processes going
on in our brains described as physical processes. If we hold that
colours and sounds don’t really exist in the world around us, then
we should also hold that the extra-physical, experiential aspects of
our brain processes, our states of awareness, don’t really exist
either. The arguments for the non-existence of the one are as good
– or as bad – as the non-existence of the other. The complexity of
the brain does not provide an honourable shelter to resist the
import of this argument.
Do Sensory Qualities Exist Objectively?
But still – it may be protested – surely colours, sounds and
smells as (most of us) experience them do not exist objectively out
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there in the world around us. These sensory qualities are surely
subjective, dependent upon us: and to this extent Galileo was right
when he said that they exist in us, so that if all sentient creatures
are removed, all sensory qualities would vanish from the world.
It all depends on what you mean by “objective” and
“subjective”.
You may mean that if something exists it is “objective” whereas
if it only appears to exist but actually does not exist then it is
subjective. My claim is that colours, sounds and smells really do
exist out there in the world: in terms of this first distinction, then,
colours, sounds and smells are objective (except when, as in
illusions, after-images and hallucinations, they are subjective).
On the other hand you may mean that a property is independent
of and unrelated to us, then it is objective, whereas if it is
dependent on or specially related to us, then it is subjective. In so
far as physical terms such as mass, electric charge, momentum,
refer to real physical properties whose existence has nothing to do
with human beings at all, then these properties are, in this second
sense, objective. But a property like poisonous, which does relate
quite specifically to us, to our physiology, is subjective. Colours,
sounds and smells as we experience them are also subjective, since
these properties relate quite specifically to our idiosyncratic
physiology, our particular sense organs and brains. I assume here
that in order to experience colours, sounds and smells as we
experience them a conscious being, an alien perhaps, has to have
sense organs and brains sufficiently similar to ours; there is simply
no other way in which these qualities can be known about.
In one sense, then, colours are objective. In another sense, they
are subjective. The crucial point, however, is that in declaring
colours to be subjective in this second sense, one is not declaring
that they don’t really exist out there in the world, any more than
that, in declaring the poisonousness of arsenic to be subjective in
this second sense, one is declaring that this poisonousness does not
really exist out there in the world. Being subjective, in the second
sense, means that the property in question relates specifically to us
human beings: aliens may well not find leaves green, or arsenic
poisonous. But that does not mean that these subjective properties,
in the second sense, do not really objectively exist, out there in the
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world around us – in the first sense of objective. Colours, sounds
and smells (as we experience them), and poisons, are objective in
the first sense (in that they exist out there in the world), but
subjective in the second sense (in that they relate specifically to us,
and may be indiscernible and unknowable to aliens with
physiologies different from ours).
Failure to distinguish these two kinds of meaning that can be
given to objective and subjective is perhaps responsible, more than
any other factor, for the view that out there physics reigns
supreme, and colours, sounds and smells, and the whole of the
God-of-Cosmic-Value, have no kind of objective existence in the
world. The sensible conclusion is reached that colours, sounds and
smells are subjective in the second sense; failure to distinguish the
two senses then forces one to conclude that colours, etc., must also
be subjective in the first sense. One is thus forced to conclude that
colours don’t exist out there in the world at all.
One implication of this whole line of thought is that the world is
likely to be a much richer and stranger place than we might at first
imagine. It is reasonable to suppose that sentient creatures can
exist with sense organs and brains different from ours. Indeed,
such creatures exist here on earth. Bats see – or rather hear – the
world in a way that is quite different from the way we see it.
Sentient and conscious creatures on other planets, if they exist, are
likely to see perceptual qualities as unimaginable to us as colours
are to those blind from birth. Even if such aliens do not exist, it
may nevertheless be possible for them to exist, which is all that is
required for alien perceptual qualities to exist (which would be
perceived if these aliens did exist). All around us, then, there are
alien perceptual qualities of which we can have no inkling –
perceptual qualities that are objective in the first sense, but
subjective in the second sense.
A final argument for the non-existence of these perceptual
qualities (objective in the first sense, subjective in the second
sense) deserves to be mentioned. If these perceptual qualities
really do exist in the world around us, then there is here an
impenetrable mystery for science. For these properties lie forever
beyond the scope of scientific explanation. Rather than admit such
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inherently scientifically inexplicable properties, surely we should
grant that they are illusory and do not really exist.
There are two points to note about this argument. First, it
applies just as much to extra-physical features of our inner
experiences as it does to sensory qualities of things in the world
around us. If the argument provides good reasons for not believing
in the existence of colours, sounds and smells in the world around
us, then it also provides good reasons for not believing in the
existence of extra-physical features of our inner experiences. But
second, the argument does not provide good reasons for not
believing in the existence of colours, etc. in the world around us.
Physics is concerned exclusively with the causally efficacious
aspect of things, that aspect which, ultimately, everything has in
common with everything else and which determines (perhaps
probabilistically) how events unfold. Other aspects, such as what
things look like, sound like, smell like, feel like, what it is like to
be the physical processes in question, what uttered sounds or typed
script mean, the content of a novel, picture or symphony: all these
aspects, having no causal import, are ignored by physics, do not
need to be specified by physics and, incidentally, cannot be
specified if physical theory is to retain its explanatory power. As
we saw above, there is an explanation as to why physics does not,
and cannot, encompass the experiential aspects of things. It is not
as if there is a mystery here, which physics ought to be able to
comprehend, and cannot. The false impression that there is a
mystery here (or would be if colours, etc., existed) arises from an
exaggerated idea of what physics seeks to achieve. It arises from
taking too literally the aim of physics to provide a complete and
comprehensive account of the features of things in the world.
Physics is concerned to cover everything that exists: but it is
concerned to capture only the causally efficacious aspect of
everything that exists. All other aspects are outside its sphere of
interest. That physics says nothing about these other aspects is not
a failing of physics. It does not mean that these other aspects are
inherently inexplicable. It just means that they are not required for
physical prediction, and need to be ignored for the purposes of
physical explanation.
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What Do We Really See?
It should be noted that throughout the above somewhat intricate
arguments I have not argued positively that colours, etc., as we
experience them, really do exist out there in the world around us.
Rather, I have demolished a series of arguments designed to
establish that colours do not exist out there. Superficially it looks
as if physics establishes the non-existence of colours. But this is a
mistake. Physics establishes nothing of the kind.
There are two rival theories about what we really see in
perception before us: the “internal” and “external” theories.
Physics seems to favour the “internal” theory, but actually it does
not. How, then, are we to decide between these two theories?
What in general determines what we see? We have considered the
chain of events that stretches from honeysuckle to my brain when I
see, or seem to see, the honeysuckle. But the chain of events goes
further back than this. It goes back, in part, to the surface of the
sun, and further back, for millions of years into the past, into the
interior of the sun. What is it that picks out a specific link, a
specific place, in this long chain of events, to be that which I really
see?
The answer is that we see what we ordinarily know most about
as a result of a perceptual experience. In looking at the
honeysuckle I don’t see the interior of the sun because I know
nothing about the interior of the sun as a result of the perceptual
experience.
This answer, unfortunately, does not help much in deciding
between the “internal” and “external” theories, because it is just on
this matter of what we do know most about when we perceive that
the two theories differ. How then are we to decide? There are four
relevant considerations: all four favour the “external” theory.
First, as we have seen, the “internal” theory, as a result of
holding that it is our internal perceptual experiences that we really
know about when we see, hear, etc., thereby creates an enormous
problem when it comes to understanding how these “internal
perceptual experiences” are to be related to brain processes. As a
result of insisting that we do really see, and thus know about, these
internal perceptual experiences, the “internal” theory is committed
to the existence of mental entities or processes with known mental
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features utterly unlike anything going on in our brains. It is utterly
obscure what the relationship can be between brain processes and
these mental processes. It is utterly obscure how brain processes
can cause these mental processes to occur. And if what we know
in perception is restricted to knowing about these internal mental
representations of unperceived external causes, it becomes wholly
obscure as to how we can know anything at all about the world
external to our bodies around us.
The “external” theory faces none of these problems. For,
according to this theory, we ordinarily know hardly anything about
our inner perceptual experiences, and what we do know is inferred
from our knowledge of things around us. We do not know enough
about our inner experiences for this knowledge to go against the
hypothesis that these experiences are brain processes, and what
little we do know thoroughly fits in with this hypothesis (as long as
it is recognized that brain processes have non-physical features or
aspects). This difference strongly favours the “external” theory.
Second, the “internal” theory faces the severe problem of how
we can ever know anything about anything other than our inner
experiences. If what we directly perceive and know about in
perception is our inner experiences, and all our knowledge of
everything else is inferred from our knowledge of our inner
experiences, what possible basis can there be for any knowledge at
all of things external to us? We can never compare our inner
representation of honeysuckle, let us say, and the honeysuckle
itself, because we can never experience the external honeysuckle;
we only know about our inner representations of it. All we can
ever do is compare our own inner experiences, one with another,
never the inner experience and what it is supposed to represent.
Granted the “internal” theory it seems, in fact, that we cannot
know anything about the external world, and cannot even know
that it exists. Just this conclusion was reached long ago in 1709 by
Bishop Berkeley.14 Earlier, in 1690, John Locke defended what is
usually called “the representational theory of perception”15 – what
I have called here the “internal” theory. Berkeley, taking this as
14 Berkeley (1957).
15 See Locke (1961), Book II.
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his starting point, arrived at the conclusion that we only have
knowledge of our inner experiences and can have no knowledge
whatsoever of things external to us.
The “external” theory entirely avoids the problem. For,
according to this view, what we really know about in perception is
the external perceived object; our knowledge of our inner
experiences is inferred from our knowledge of things external to us
(the exact reverse of the “internalist” viewpoint). Berkeley’s
arguments do not establish idealism. Rather they amount to a
reductio ad absurdum of the “internal” theory – Locke’s
representational theory of perception.
Third, one would think that evolution would arrange for animals
(and for us) to get to know about relevant aspects of the
environment in perception, aspects relevant to survival and
reproduction, rather than arrange for animals (and us) to get to
know about their (our) internal states and processes. Animals that
find out about inner perceptual experiences, and not about the
world around them, are not likely to survive for very long. They
are not likely to evade predators, find food and mates, and care for
offspring. And this consideration is reinforced by common sense:
if we know everything about our inner experiences and hardly
anything at all about the world around us, how can it be that we
manage to act and survive as well as we do in the world? It is
surely the basic biological function of perception to inform us
about relevant aspects of the world around us. All this favours the
“external” theory.
Fourth, there is the following consideration. Ordinarily it never
occurs to us to doubt that we directly perceive things around us,
and these things possess the perceptual properties we see them as
having. (Occasionally we may suffer from illusions or
hallucinations, but let’s ignore these infrequent occurrences.)
Along comes physics and seems to tell us that all this is a gigantic,
persistent illusion. If the arguments from physics are valid, we
must clearly revise our ideas about what we ordinarily see. But we
only need to do this if the arguments from physics really are valid.
If these arguments are all invalid, and provide not an iota of reason
for abandoning our customary, common sense views, then we
should hold onto these views, at least until something serious crops
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up to challenge them. But we have seen that all the arguments
from physics are invalid. The most that they do is to revise our
ideas about the objectivity of perceptual qualities to the extent of
establishing that they are objective only in the first sense, and
subjective in the second sense. Hence we should hold onto our
common sense views about what it is that we see, hear, smell,
touch.
The real reason for believing in the existence of sensory qualities
as a part of the world around us – once the arguments from physics
have been seen to be invalid – comes from our direct experience.
We see the colours of the rainbow, we hear birds sing and the roar
of traffic, we smell the sweet scent of honeysuckle and feel the
smooth, hard surface of marble. We experience the God-of-
Cosmic-Value, and that is our reason for believing It exists. It may
seem that the God-of-Cosmic-Value, our rich, experienced world,
withers and dies when put into the all-encompassing embrace of
the physical universe, the God-of-Cosmic-Power. But this is a
mistake. The God-of-Cosmic-Value and the God-of-Cosmic-
Power can coexist.
The Mystery of Consciousness Solved?
The above considerations go a long way towards solving a major
philosophical problem concerning the relationship between the
mind and the brain. Ordinarily there may not seem to be anything
very mysterious about our inner experiences – our perceptions,
thoughts, imaginings, feelings, states of awareness. Invoke science
to improve our understanding of these inner experiences, and the
very opposite of what we may hope for occurs. Far from
becoming more comprehensible, they vanish! View what goes on
inside our heads through the lens of science, and instead of inner
experiences, states of awareness, we see only the squashy brain,
neurological processes, impulses travelling down millions of
neurons and being transmitted across millions of synaptic
junctions. Our thoughts, feelings, imaginings, states of
consciousness, far from becoming more comprehensible, have
disappeared altogether. And what seems so disturbing about this
annihilation of our inner being is that it occurs when we invoke our
very best means for explaining and understanding things – namely
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science. Far from rendering consciousness comprehensible,
science annihilates it. The net effect is to make consciousness
seem something that is utterly mysterious – so mysterious, indeed,
that invoking our very best mode of explanation causes
consciousness to evaporate, as if a mere will-o-the-wisp. All this
prompts one to ask: What is consciousness? What are these
mysterious inner experiences of ours? Why are they so elusive?
What makes them disappear when one seeks to explain and
understand them by means of science? And what is their
relationship to that which science does reveal to us, namely the
neurological processes going on in our brains?
These philosophical problems about consciousness have been
solved by the considerations developed above. Consciousness
evades scientific explanation because everything experiential
evades science – or, at least, evades that part of science that is, in
principle, reducible to physics. This, as we have seen, is the price
that must be paid for physical theories to be explanatory. That
consciousness seems to vanish when scientific explanation is
invoked does not mean that there is something inherently
mysterious or inexplicable about consciousness – any more than
that colours (as we see them) seem to vanish when science is
invoked means that there is something inherently mysterious about
colour. The relationship between consciousness, our inner
experiences, on the one hand, and brain processes, on the other, is
somewhat similar to the relationship between yellow honeysuckle
as perceived by us, on the one hand, and the physical entities and
processes that are the honeysuckle, on the other hand. Just as a
particular honeysuckle blossom has a perceptual or experiential
aspect, and a physical aspect, so too my inner experience of seeing
the honeysuckle has an experiential aspect and a physical aspect.
All processes going on inside our heads – “head processes” as we
may call them, to use a neutral phrase – have a neurological or
physical aspect. Some of these head processes also have an
experiential or mental aspect: they are our conscious inner
experiences, our thoughts, feelings, desires, decisions to act,
sensory experiences, imaginings – all the contents of our rich inner
life.
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But what precisely is the colour of a honeysuckle blossom? And
what precisely is the mental or experiential aspect of the visual
sensation of seeing yellow honeysuckle?
The perceived yellow of the honeysuckle is just what a normally
sighted person sees in normal conditions of illumination, and
nothing more. The way – and the only way – to detect the
yellowness of honeysuckle (as perceived) is to be a normally
sighted person yourself, and look at the honeysuckle in normal
conditions of illumination. (Well, a colour photograph or film of
the honeysuckle might do the job as well as the presence of
honeysuckle itself.) Colour, as perceived, cannot be detected in
any other way. There is no physical instrument that can detect
colour as we perceive it. Physical instruments can, of course,
detect physical aspects of colour, the capacity of an object to
absorb and reflect light of various wavelengths, but that is another
matter.
In a somewhat analogous way, the mental or experiential aspect
of a brain process is what we detect, or become aware of, when we
have that brain process occur in our own brain, and nothing more.
The only way to detect the mental aspect of a particular brain
process is to have that brain process occur in your own brain.
There is no physical instrument that could detect the mental aspect
of a brain process. The mental aspect of the visual sensation of
seeing yellow, for example, is known about by all those who have
normal vision: it is just what is experienced every time one sees
yellow, and nothing more. What we do not at present know, of
course, is precisely what the neurological aspects are of this
sensation. The neurosciences proceed apace, much has been
discovered about the neurological processes undergoing colour
perception in the last few decades, and before long we may know
what the neurological character of the visual sensation of yellow is.
(Knowing what normally occurs in the brain when we see yellow
is not the same as knowing what the sensation of yellow is,
neurologically speaking.)
The relationship between the perceptual and physical properties
of things (such as honeysuckle blossoms) is, then, in important
respects, similar to the relationship between the mental and
physical properties of head processes. But there are also important
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differences. Any number of people can see the same yellow
honeysuckle blossom, but only one person can experience the
mental aspect of the visual sensations I have as I look at the
blossom. Only I can experience this, because only I can have this
particular head process occur in my head. In order for two people
to experience the same mental aspect of a head process one would
have to imagine a science fiction scenario, in which Siamese twins
share a part of their brains. One would have to imagine that the
visual sensation of yellowness occurs in that part of the brain that
is common to the two twins, and both twins experience the same
mental aspect of the same head process. (And it might well be, of
course, that such a neurological fantasy is not even possible in
principle.)
Even though I alone can experience the mental aspects of those
of my head processes that are visual sensations, we may
nevertheless suppose that others can have experiences that are, in
all relevant respects the same as my experiences. If another person
is to experience what I experience when I see yellow, then that
other person must have occur in his brain a brain process
sufficiently similar to the one that occurs in my brain when I see
yellow and is my visual sensation of yellow. We require,
furthermore, that our two brains are, structurally and functionally,
sufficiently similar, and the two brain processes in question occur
in the two brains in ways that are related to the rest of the
respective brain in a sufficiently similar way. Each brain process
must occur in that part of the brain associated with perception, and
with colour perception.
What does “sufficiently similar” mean here? The truth is that we
don’t at present know enough about the brain to be able to answer
this question. As we grow, and grow old, our brains change; what
occurs in our brains when we see yellow changes. And yet, over
time, we seem to see colours in the same way (unless we become
colour blind, or blind). It is reasonable to suppose that the same
sensation of yellow corresponds to a vast number of brain
processes different in detail: different number of neurons involved,
firing in somewhat different ways. No two human brains are
exactly alike – not even the brains of identical twins. But despite
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these neurological differences, we may, nevertheless, be able to
experience exactly the same kind of sensations.
We may take the view that what matters, from the standpoint of
what is experienced, is not what stuff a brain is made of, but rather
the structural and functional features of the brain, its control
aspects as I would prefer to say. If it is physically possible to have
a brain in a body that functions like a human brain but which is
made of transistors rather than neurons, then we should take the
view that the transistor person has essentially similar inner
experiences and states of consciousness of any human being.
It deserves to be noted that this is not the same thing as
behaviourism – the view that a being is conscious if it behaves as if
conscious. One could imagine a vast computer which has, in it, a
model of a conscious brain, and is able to calculate, in real time,
processes going on inside the brain – if it existed. There is also a
robot with eyes and ears, in radio communication with the
computer. The computer receives signals from the robot reporting
on what the senses of the robot detect. The computer then, very
rapidly, works out how the brain of the robot would respond – if
such a brain existed – and sends radio signals to the robot which
prompt the robot to act as if in response to what the robot has
perceived. The robot behaves, we may suppose, exactly as if it is a
conscious being. Nevertheless, the robot is not conscious. No
head processes occur anywhere required for consciousness. In
particular, consciousness is not located in the computer. The
computer calculates what processes would go on inside the robot’s
brain if the brain existed, but no such brain does exist, not even
inside the computer. Processes going on inside the computer
involved in calculating what the brain would do, what brain
processes would occur, if the brain existed, are very different from
the brain processes themselves, if they existed. A model of a brain
is not a brain. A computer that calculates how a hypothetical brain
would act is not thereby exhibiting brain activity. It is thus
possible, in principle, to have a robot behaving as if conscious and
yet not being conscious. And that suffices to establish that the
“head process theory” – as we may call the account of the
relationship between consciousness and the brain that has just been
expounded – is not the same thing as behaviourism.
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According to this head process theory, sentient brains are unique
among objects in the universe in alone having these three aspects:
physical, perceptual, and mental. There are the physical aspects of
my head processes – the neurological processes going on in my
brain. There are the perceptual aspects – normally hidden from
view, but which would become visible if my skull were to be
cracked open. And there are the mental aspects of some of the
head processes going on inside my head – aspects I alone
experience as I see, feel, imagine, think, become aware.
We know that head processes going on in human brains are
sentient and conscious. We suspect that mammals are sentient –
and chimpanzees (and perhaps other apes) may be all-but
conscious in addition to being sentient, like us. Insects, on the
other hand, are almost certainly not sentient – not able to
experience even rudimentary sensations, visual, tactile, olfactory,
or of pain or pleasure. An important, open question, difficult to
answer, is just how complex and sophisticated a brain needs to be
to have sentience associated with it. In chapter eight I suggest that
sentience may arise when animals are led to act as they do in
response to feelings and desires of a rather general character –
feelings of fear or hunger, for example, which prompt, in general
terms, the kind of action that needs to be done but do not specify a
precise sequence of actions of the kind performed by a spider when
it builds a web. Tigers, I suspect, are prompted to hunt by hunger,
but hunger does not prompt the spider to build her web. If this
conjecture is correct, then sentience is to be associated with brains
sufficiently sophisticated to guide their owners to act by means of
rather general feelings and desires – feelings and desires that leave
a great deal of scope for learning. As Tolstoy once suggested,
Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am” needs to be revised to read “I
desire, therefore I am”.16
This concludes my first stab at solving the problem of how the
God-of-Cosmic-Value can exist within the God-of-Cosmic-
Power.17 It may be judged inadequate for at least three reasons.
16 See Troyat (1970), p. 73.
17 For earlier expositions of this two-aspect view see my (1966), (1968a)
and (1968b) already mentioned in notes 1 and 5 above, and my (1984),
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First, much more needs to be said about the nature of the God-
of-Cosmic-Value. What exactly is of supreme value, actually and
potentially, and what are our reasons for believing it exists?
Second, much more needs to be said about the nature of the
God-of-Cosmic-Power. What exactly is it, and what are our
reasons for believing it exists?
Third, in order to show the God-of-Cosmic-Value can exist
embedded within the God-of-Cosmic-Power it is not enough to
show that the experiential can exist embedded within the physical
universe. In addition, it is essential to show that we, as beings of
value, with some measure of free will, can exist embedded in the
physical universe. But if everything occurs for purely physical
reasons, in accordance with the predictions of the yet-to-be-
discovered true physical “theory of everything”, how can we be
responsible for our actions, or even our thoughts? How can we
exist at all?
Chapter four tackles the first of these question, chapter five the
second, and chapter seven the third question.
pp. 174-181 and Ch. 10 (2nd ed. 2007, pp. 197-205 and Ch. 10). See also
my (2000); and (2001), chs. 1 and 5.
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CHAPTER FOUR
WHAT IS THE GOD-OF-COSMIC-
VALUE? HOW DO WE KNOW IT
EXISTS?
The God-of-Cosmic-Value is the experiential world – the world
we see, hear, touch and are a part of. It is above all ourselves. It is
associated with conscious life, or with sentient life more generally.
The God-of-Cosmic-Value flourishes when we live life lovingly,
with courage, joy, laughter, imagination, creativity, generosity and
integrity, cherishing and enjoying what deserves to be (or should be)
cherished and enjoyed, clear sighted about the world around us and
the world within us. We are the miracle upon miracle, the holy of
holies, the supreme mystery and majesty in existence, each one of us
more precious by far than any work of art, cathedral, or aspect of
nature. We are, as far as we know, the source of all value;
everything else of value in existence is of value because of our
presence in the world.1 What is of supreme value in existence is not
far away, beyond the stars, far into the past or the future, remote and
inaccessible. It is, for each one of us, here and now, in the particular
circumstances of our life. It is what gives pleasure, joy, happiness.
Sunlight slanting through trees, a child skipping along a pavement, a
gesture of friendship gratefully received, a joke, a great work of art,
bird song, a worthwhile project completed: any of these might be a
part of the God-of-Cosmic-Value.
“Yes, yes, yes” may be the response to this, “that is all very well,
but it raises more questions than it answers. What exactly is the
God-of-Cosmic-Value? What exactly is of supreme value in
existence, actually and potentially? How do we choose between
rival views about what is of supreme value? How do we know it
really exists? How can life have any value given that it all ends in
death? Are all individuals of equal value? How can justice be done
1 Some of what is of value is associated with other sentient animals.
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to conflicting values? Are not all value judgements irredeemably
subjective, there being no such thing as what is of value objectively,
or in reality? Does it even make sense to talk of what is of value,
dissociated from what individual persons value? How can we make
discoveries in this domain of value, learn about what is of value? Is
there a realm of higher, spiritual values, glimpsed by some in rare
moments of mystical inspiration, and experienced by seers and
mystics? How can we go about enhancing our capacity to realize
what is of value, actually and potentially, in our life, as we live,
whatever exactly may be of value, and however it may be
conceived?”
In what follows I do what I can to answer these questions. Our
concern is with what is of value intrinsically, for its own sake as it
were, and not just of value as a means to something else of value.
We may hold a medicine to be of value, not in itself, but because it
is a means to health. Health in turn might be regarded as a means
to other things in life of intrinsic value. Or it might perhaps be
regarded as itself of intrinsic value. (Some things may, of course,
be of value in both ways.)
What Exactly is the God-of-Cosmic-Value?
I give my answer to this question in the form of fourteen
conjectures, each adding to what has gone before, the sum total
thus becoming more substantial and specific, and therefore more
doubtful, as we proceed.
(1) Everything of value in existence (i.e. the God-of-Cosmic-
Value) is associated with sentient life – more particularly, with
conscious life and, for us especially, with human life.
(2) It is above all individual conscious persons who are of value.
What is of most value in one person's life is inherent in the rich
pattern of particularities of the person's life, the extraordinarily
intricate pattern of environment, deeds, perceptions, feelings,
thoughts, desires, imaginings, relationships with others. The greatest
poets, novelists and dramatists can only hint at the rich diversity of
value inherent in a person's life. In order to come to see and to
understand something of what is of value in another person's life we
need the empathetic, imaginative and creative resources of a great
artist so that we may enter into the person's world and, in
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imagination, see, feel, experience, desire, fear, love and suffer
what he or she does. We need to acquire deep personal
understanding of the other. We need to be an intimate friend at least.
A casual perception, a fleeting thought or feeling, of any person in
life has a beauty and profundity greater by far than that of even the
greatest works of art.
(3) Persons, and what is of value about them, cannot be
dissociated, however, from their context and environment. Things
in the environment – works of art, buildings and other artefacts,
aspects of the natural world, institutions and social arrangements,
may also be of (intrinsic) value – their value arising, however, as a
result of their relationship with conscious persons (or at least
sentient animals). Value features are not physical, but nevertheless
exist objectively, as an aspect of the real world.
(4) In order to discover what is of value, we need to attend to our
desires and feelings. But this does not mean that value features of
things are irredeemably subjective, and do not exist objectively, in
the real world. In this respect, value features are like perceptual
features such as colours, sounds and tactile properties of things. In
order to perceive these features, we need to experience certain
sorts of sensations – visual, auditory, tactile. But that does not
make these perceptual features purely subjective. As we saw in
chapter 3, it is entirely reasonable to hold that colours, sounds and
tactile properties really do exist out there in the world around us
even though you need to have special sorts of sensations in order to
perceive them. So it is with value features – and disvalue features,
as we may call them – features such as kindness, brutality,
generosity, grace, ugliness, tenderness, cruelty. It is entirely
reasonable to hold that features such as these really do exist out
there in the world around us, associated with people, actions and
even things, even though you need to have special sorts of
motivational and emotional responses to things to perceive them.
But not everything that we desire is desirable, and not everything
that feels good is good. In order to discover what is genuinely of
value we need to be prepared to subject our instinctive
motivational and emotional responses to things to critical scrutiny,
in an attempt to ensure that we respond to what actually exists, and
not merely to value illusions and hallucinations. In this respect,
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again, perception of value is analogous to perception of colours
and sounds. In both cases we can suffer from illusions and
hallucinations, and need to subject our experiences to critical
scrutiny in an attempt to detect and guard against them. The big
difference is that illusions and hallucinations are far more
widespread and undetected in the realm of value than in the realm
of perceptual qualities.
Not only may we hold things to be of value when they are not.
We may also fail to see what is genuinely of value. A piece of
music may be objectively beautiful even though no one happens to
experience its beauty. A human action may be objectively noble or
cruel even though no one happens to experience or perceive the
action in this way – possibly not even the person who performs the
action. A person dies. Something infinitely precious has ceased to
exist. Almost certainly, however, no one is aware of the full
significance of the person's life. Even an intimate friend, a lover, can
only know of aspects of the value of the person's life. Even the
person herself probably failed to appreciate adequately her own
value. The full significance and value of the life is something that
eludes us all: and yet it is something that did objectively exist in the
world, in the realm of actuality.
Just as we have to learn to see aspects of the world around us –
stones, people, trees, sky – so, likewise, we have to learn to see
meaning and value in the world around us, in our environment, in
events, in human actions and lives. (The question of how we can
best learn to realize what is of value in life will be taken up again
in much more detail in chapter six.)
(5) That which is of value, for each one of us, arises in the
particular circumstances of our lives. Generalities about the nature
of value, such as the present ones, fail to capture the essence of
what is of value just because value is specific and particular to this
person, this couple, these friends, and evaporates at the level of
generalities.
(6) That which is of value is incredibly diverse in character. But
this does not mean that any one person's view about what is of
value is as good as any other person's. Diversity of value does not
imply subjectivism of value, or relativism (a point to be discussed
in more detail below).
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(7) Each one of us can hope to know, to be aware of, only a
minute fragment of all that is of value in existence. As I have
already remarked, in order to know and appreciate the value of
another person we need all our powers of empathy, intelligence,
imagination, perception. We need to know the other person from
within, as it were, so that we have an imaginative experience of the
other person’s hopes and fears, joys and sufferings, relationships,
struggles, feelings and desires, their life, history and world. We
can only hope to have such an intimate understanding of a very
few others. Most of the people we encounter are known to us only
in terms of external appearances: of the inner life, where the value
of the person primarily resides, we may know next to nothing.
And the vast majority of the six billion or so people alive today
are, of course, for each one of us, complete strangers. We can
have experience of only a fragment of all that is of value, and we
may even be blind to this extreme limitation of our capacity to
know what is of value in existence. Our world is far, far more
richly and diversely charged with value than we tend ordinarily to
appreciate.
(8) Furthermore, our capacity to achieve what is of value is
inevitably limited. Some suffering, failure, injustice is intrinsic to
life and cannot be avoided. However fortunate and wise we may
be, we will inevitably encounter limitations, failure and misfortune.
And there will always be those less fortunate or wise than ourselves.
The tragic dimension to life is unavoidable.
(9) Our responsibility for what is of value is also limited. Much
that is of value has come into existence unforeseen and unintended.
We are not exclusively responsible for all that is of value. We are not
even wholly responsible for what is of value in ourselves. Even when
we consciously create something of value, we do so only in so far as
Nature, that which is not us, conspires with us to bring about what we
intend. The creation and development of human life – the supreme
source of value – is almost entirely out of our hands. Our continuing
existence, our simplest deeds and thoughts, require the cooperation of
Nature in a multitude of ways of which we are ordinarily quite
unaware, and even do not understand (in that we are unaware of, and
do not understand, the workings of our brains). There is even a
sense in which Nature is wholly responsible for all that is of value
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in existence; when we create something of value, our actions are
also natural processes since we are a part of Nature and thus, in a
sense, it is Nature that produces what we produce.
(10) The ability to experience, participate in and help create
what is of value does not arise abruptly, inexplicably, out of
nothing; rather it evolves gradually in time. Sudden flowerings of
value owe their existence to long periods of prior germination and
growth. We owe our present ability to participate in what is of value
to the actions and efforts of millions of people who have gone before
us. Almost everything of value is inherited from the past. Creation is
the modification of what already exists. Our present ability to speak,
to think, to be conscious and self-aware – our humanity, our self
identity as persons – is, as it were, acquired from others: these things
develop for us because they have already developed for others. Our
existence today depends on a long process of past social and
cultural evolution – and on a long process of natural evolution as a
result of random variation and natural selection during millions upon
millions of years. It is above all the consideration that we are a part of
Nature which compels us to recognize that what is of value evolves
gradually in time: abrupt creation of value out of nothing would be
inexplicable, a miracle, a violation of natural law.
In seeking to discover and achieve what is of value, our task then
is to develop that which is of value which already exists and has been
inherited from the past. All attempts to create what is of value by
means of abrupt revolutions or conversions which wholly repudiate
the past are doomed to failure.
At first sight unprecedented, revolutionary achievements in the arts
and sciences – achievements such as those of Shakespeare, Mozart,
Beethoven, Newton or Einstein – may seem to tell against the point
just made. Closer examination reveals that this is not the case.
Shakespeare's plays required the prior existence of Elizabethan
society, culture and language, and an already developing tradition
of poetry and theatre. And most of Shakespeare's plays are based on
traditional or historical themes, and modify pre-existing literature.
Mozart and Beethoven both required for their work pre-existing
musical traditions. Newton himself correctly declared: 'If I have
seen further than others, it is because I have stood on the shoulders
of giants'. Newton achieved a grand synthesis of the work of
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Kepler, Galileo, Descartes and many others. Einstein's great
contributions to science not only presuppose the whole framework
of classical physics, the product of cooperative labour of many
people over centuries but also his contributions owe much of their
importance to the fact that they resolve problems buried deep in
traditional classical physics and mathematics.
(11) The opposite poles of value are life and love on the one hand,
suffering and death on the other hand. The supreme good in
existence is living life lovingly, actively loving that which is lovable
in existence and being loved; the supreme evils are suffering and
death. Everything else of value in existence is organized around these
two poles of good and evil.
We can help our capacity to live life lovingly to grow, or to wither
and die, by what we do, what we attend to, what we strive for and
value. We cannot, however, authentically command ourselves to love
X, or decide to love Y at will, since real love is too dependent on
spontaneous feeling and desire, out of our immediate control. We
cannot therefore sensibly demand of ourselves, and of each other, that
we should indiscriminately love our fellow human beings. We can
however sensibly strive to create a world in which people, on the
whole, treat each other, and do things together, in ways which are in
accordance with certain necessary conditions for love to exist. Thus
we can strive to create justice, democracy, individual freedom,
tolerance, cooperative rather than hierarchical social structures,
traditions of resolving conflicts based on mutual understanding,
good will and cooperation rather than on bargaining, manipulation,
threat or violence. In this way, love can be held to be the supreme
positive value, from which all others are, as it were, derived. Justice,
peace, cooperativeness, democracy, health, prosperity, enjoyment,
knowledge and understanding, reason, creativity, skill, imagination,
courage, beauty, sensitivity, compassion, cherishing, active concern
for one's own welfare and for the welfare of others, generosity,
friendliness, freedom, passion, life itself: these are all of value in so
far as they are necessary conditions for the supreme thing, love.
But in addition we may hold that suffering and death are evils in
their own right, as it were, and not evil only in so far as they negate the
possibility of love. We do not need to appeal to the value of love in
order to provide a rationale for striving to avoid unnecessary
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suffering and death: these endeavours carry with them their own
rationale. Attempts to cure and prevent disease, to end war,
totalitarianism, torture, exploitation, poverty require no further raison
d'etre than that of bringing avoidable suffering and death to an end.
(12) No prophet, religion, revelation, book, tradition or institution
is an infallible guide to what is of value – any more than our feelings
and desires are such guides. Our attitudes to traditional judgements
concerning what is of value ought to be analogous to attitudes to
traditional scientific judgements concerning truth encapsulated in
our best scientific theories: these traditional judgements, even if the
best we have, nevertheless are no more than fallible, imperfect
conjectures, always open to development and improvement.
(13) In addition – it almost goes without saying – there are no
infallible methods or recipes for the achievement or creation of that
which is of value. We cannot infallibly achieve value or know we have
achieved it – even when the achievement has actually been made.
(14) The inevitability of doubt about the meaning and value of our
lives ought not to be the cause of despair – any more than the
inevitability of doubt in science ought to be the cause of scientific
despair. Acknowledging calmly the inevitability of doubt about the
meaning and value of our lives makes learning and growth
possible, just as in science. Repudiation of doubt, out of fear,
obstructs learning and growth. We should not seek to rebut
scepticism about value: rather we should seek to exploit it in an
endeavour to help increase value. As in science, so in life: we need to
be so unrestrictedly sceptical, in our endeavour to realize what is
genuinely of value, that we become sceptical even of the capacity
of unlimited scepticism to promote the realization of value. As in
science, so in life: total scepticism is to be rejected on pragmatic
grounds; it cannot help. We are rationally entitled to assume that our
lives here on earth are genuinely meaningful and of value, even
though this cannot be verified or proved, just as we are rationally
entitled to assume that the universe is, in some way, comprehensible
even though this cannot be verified or proved.
92
How do we choose between rival views about what is of supreme
value?
All too often it is assumed that judgements about what is of value
must be based on some bedrock of authority or validation – the
pronouncements of a prophet, the contents of a book, human nature,
evolution, tradition, society, an institution (such as the Catholic
Church), a body of experts (priests, gurus, artists, saints), experience,
reason, intuition, inspiration, even, perhaps, moral philosophy. This
whole approach is a mistake. As I have already indicated, we should
treat all judgements about what is of value as conjectures, all too
likely to be more or less inadequate, and in need of improvement.
We should begin with what we value, here and now, and in trying to
improve our ideas about what is of value we should (a) consult our
desires, feelings and experiences, (b) consider the ideas of others, (c)
consider what seem to be the best ideas in our culture and traditions,
(d) learn from what transpires when we, and others, try to put ideas
about what is of value into practice in life, and (e) subject all this to
critical scrutiny. In particular, we should subject our aims, ideals and
values to critical scrutiny when they seem problematic – when they
seem to conflict with other aims, ideals or values, or when they seem
to be unrealizable. We should ask why we have the aims and ideals
that we do have, both in the rationalistic sense of what further aims
or ideals they are for, and in the historical sense of how we came to
have them in the first place. Above all, we should be especially
critical of those groups, traditions and movements, religious or
otherwise, that claim to know, with certainty and authority, what is of
value in life – especially if doubt is held to be a sin.
I have done my best to arrive at the conjectures, expressed above,
as to what is of value by myself putting something like (a) to (e) into
practice. But the fourteen points above are all, of course, fallible
conjectures, likely to be more or less defective in various ways, and
standing in need of improvement. What criticisms are most likely to
be levelled against my fourteen points?
One kind of criticism I shall not consider: the above is to be
rejected because it ignores that what is of supreme value stems from
God. This was dealt with in chapter one.
The claim that what is of supreme value is associated with loving
and being loved is likely to be criticized on a number of grounds.
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It may be argued, first, that love cannot be the supreme value from
which all others stem. What about all those valuable activities we
engage in that do not amount to expressions of love – commercial,
professional, recreational? For example, how can soldiers, defending
civilians from being killed, be regarded as acting lovingly as they
shoot at those trying to kill the civilians? How can a judge,
condemning a criminal to a long prison sentence, be regarded as
acting lovingly? How can shopkeepers, bus drivers, lawyers,
builders, pursuing their necessary trades or professions, be regarded
as acting lovingly? Are there not countless situations in life which
require us to act in ways which cannot conceivably be regarded as
loving? And what about all those for whom other things are more
important in life than love, such as: career, adventure, fame, wealth,
pleasure, achievement in science, art, or sport, sex, comfort, security,
power, the party, the movement, the nation, or pursuit of a craft or
some passionate interest? Are all these people simply wrong? How
can placing love on the pinnacle of value do justice to the immense
variety of what is of value in life?
I tried to indicate, above, how I would respond to these criticisms.
Loving, at its supreme best, involves intimacy, mutuality, a
passionate sexual relationship, the giving and receiving of pleasure
and joy, and care for the other. In all sorts of circumstances in life,
love in this full-blooded sense is impossible, or inappropriate, even
appallingly inappropriate. However, certain essential ingredients of
this full-blooded sense of love are not inappropriate: some are never
inappropriate. I have in mind such ingredients as concern for the
welfare of others, justice, friendliness, freedom, cooperative
rationality, honesty. Love can be thought of as being multi-layered:
some layers, such as rationality or justice, are applicable in all
situations, and ought never to be jettisoned. Others, such as
intimacy, or a passionate sexual relationship, arise only in rather
special circumstances, when love in the full-blooded sense is
possible. Elements of love are possible and desirable in all our
dealings with our fellow human beings but full-blooded love may
only be possible, if we are fortunate, with one other person. On this
view, to act morally is to act lovingly to the extent that the
circumstances permit. I must add that living life lovingly does not,
in my view, in general, involve sacrificing oneself for others. As I
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emphasized in chapter two, we should above all care for ourselves,
our own welfare (as long as this does not involve trampling unjustly
over the welfare of others). Loving does not require self-sacrifice;
but it does not prohibit it either. A parent is not unloving in
sacrificing a career to look after children.
What about the objection that placing love on the pinnacle of value
cannot do justice to the immense variety of what people hold to be of
value, or of what is genuinely of value in life? There are two very
different objections here. Not doing justice to the immense variety of
what people hold to be of value can only be a virtue (unless, of
course, by some miracle, no one is mistaken in what they hold to be
of supreme value in life). The objection that love cannot do justice to
the rich variety of what really is of value is more serious. My reply
is that living life lovingly has to be understood to include a wide
variety of pursuits and ways of life. A craftsman can be acting
lovingly in the way he pursues his craft. A scientist or scholar can
pursue science or scholarship lovingly. Even a politician, perhaps,
might pursue politics lovingly, in so far as the welfare of his or her
constituents – and of humanity – is a primary concern. Basic
ingredients of acting lovingly, in a wide variety of contexts, are
caring for and enjoying what deserves to be cared for and enjoyed.
At this point it might be objected that, as a result of having been
assigned this key role in the realm of value and morality, “love” has
become something like a technical term, endowed with an especially
rich meaning remote from the ordinary meaning. There may,
perhaps, be something in this objection. If so, it is not fatal to the
view I have been arguing for. If “living life lovingly” has been
given an enriched meaning here, to overcome objections to the view
I have been arguing for, still “loving” in this sense overlaps strongly
with the ordinary meaning of the word.
Above I suggested that we should regard concern for the welfare
of others, justice, friendliness, freedom, cooperative rationality,
honesty as all being essential elements of loving. Notoriously,
however, it is just when people are in love that they can be blind to
the welfare of the beloved, careless of treating the beloved justly, far
too jealous to urge freedom upon the person loved, and so swept up
by passion to become, in some circumstances, unfriendly,
uncooperative, irrational and dishonest. And yet a person who treats
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the beloved in all these ways might still be regarded, by many, as
being in love, or loving the beloved. Here, then, are a number of
ways in which the notion of “loving” I have been appealing to here
may differ dramatically from what is ordinarily meant by “loving”.
None of this discredits the notion I have been appealing to, or the
view I have been arguing for. We should conclude, rather, that some
popular notions of “love” are defective in various ways.
With these qualifications and reservations understood, it becomes
possible to declare that a good world, a civilized world, is a loving
world. A loving world, in this sense, is not one in which everyone
loves everyone else. It is rather one in which most individuals have
loving relationships, the capacity to live life lovingly is widely
distributed, there is a culture of loving, and in the public domain the
appropriate essential ingredients of loving hold sway – ingredients
such as individual freedom, justice, and cooperative rationality.
What is to be said about attempts to put this philosophy of loving
into practice in life? There is perhaps far more loving going on in the
world than we may realize. What gets attention in the media is not
loving, or the products of loving (unless it is scandalous), but the
opposite: acts of violence, crime, war, natural disasters, corruption,
the heartless aspects of the modern world. (I speak here of media in
democracies: media in dictatorial nations tend to heap praise upon
the Leader, his administration, and the brave forward march of the
nation.) We take the view, perhaps, that living life lovingly, as best
we can, is the normal state of affairs; it is the gross departures from
this normal state of affairs that needs reporting. Be that as it may, I
have here just three remarks to make about living a life of loving.
First, it is probably correct to say that those who live life lovingly
most successfully do so instinctively, from the heart, and not because
they have decided, intellectually, that this is the best philosophy of
life to put into practice. I don’t mean successful loving is all a matter
of instinct, and does not involve thought, care, perceptive attention to
others. On the contrary, these seem to me to be essential to loving.
What I mean, rather, is that those who live lovingly are most likely to
do so, not because of an intellectual decision, but because of
temperament, upbringing, fortunate circumstances conducive to such
a way of life. (But all such sociological theses are wildly conjectural,
at best only true on average, there being endless exceptions.)
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Second, a peculiar danger awaits those of us who consciously seek
to put this loving philosophy into practice in our life. The danger is
hypocrisy. If we pride ourselves on being loving, so that much of
our sense of self-worth is bound up with our idea of ourselves as
being loving, we may be especially reluctant to acknowledge to
ourselves those occasions when we have acted in distinctly unloving
ways. This is a general point. Whatever we pride ourselves on being
– good, wise, selfless, charismatic, etc. – there will be a tendency to
blind ourselves to those occasions when we are nothing of the kind.
This said, it would be wrong to conclude that adopting a
philosophy of loving, and making the intellectual decision to live it,
can have no positive effects in one’s life. We can decide to modify
our aims and actions, and choose circumstances, that tend to be
conducive to living a loving life.
Third, the thesis of this book is, of course, that our fundamental
task in life is to live life lovingly. This includes contributing, with
others, to the great world-wide task of making progress towards a
loving world. This, as I see it, is the religious task of helping the
God-of-Cosmic-Value to flourish within the God-of-Cosmic-Power.
A glance at the world stage indicates that we have a long way to go.
It is above all here, in the public domain of politics, business,
international relations, agriculture and industry, that adoption and
implementation of a philosophy of loving might make some
difference – as I shall argue in chapters six and nine.
These, then, are the kind of considerations that can be brought
forward in support of, or in criticism of, a particular conjecture as to
what is of supreme value in existence. I do not suppose that the
above sketchy remarks will convince many of the correctness of my
view (unless, perhaps, already convinced). But let us, for the sake of
what follows, take this as a token view, an exemplar of what a
conjecture about the nature of the God-of-Cosmic-Value may be
taken to be. What matters of course is what really is of value,
actually and potentially, in existence. Conjectures about the matter
deserve to be taken that more seriously as they come to reflect the
reality of what is of value that more accurately and faithfully.
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How do we know that that which is of value really exists?
If you are happy, if you are engaged in what seem to be
worthwhile and enriching enterprises, and if you are among friends
and loved ones, it may well seem absurd to raise questions about the
value of life. What could be more blatant, more solidly known and
experienced, more an integral part of one’s existence, the very stuff
of one’s life, than the value of what one is a part of? To call this into
question, and doubt its existence, may seem ludicrous, even faintly
sacrilegious.
But there are, for most of us perhaps, other occasions, other
moods, when such doubts press upon us, and we are indeed haunted
by the feeling that it is all, ultimately, pointless and meaningless.
Some people live with black despair for years. One’s own life can
seem a hollow mockery, and the rich, rewarding life of others can
seem fraudulent. The whole vast panoply of the world can seem no
more than a vast, frenzied distraction, an attempt to disguise the
emptiness of it all. There is no value in the world, only at best the
successful creation of the illusion of value. Ultimately there are just
cold hard physical facts, things happening one after the other, all
amounting to no more than a tale told by an idiot.
How can this dreadful possibility be decisively refuted? I am not
sure that it can. All our knowledge, ultimately, is conjectural in
character, as Karl Popper tirelessly argued, including any knowledge
we may have about the existence of what is of value. As I tried to
indicate in point (14) above, the best we can do from an intellectual
standpoint, it may well be, is to grasp at the straw of a pragmatic
argument. We should not attempt to refute scepticism about value
but, on the contrary, should give it free reign to help us unmask
fraudulent claims to value, so that we may learn and improve the
value of our lives. The really valuable life is not the one confidently
immune to doubt about its worth; it is rather, at least, the life that is
always open to the possibility that what seems to be of value is
actually nothing of the kind – and thus a life which is open to the
possibility of learning what really is of value. If we are to live a life
of value, or if we are to give ourselves the best chances of living such
a life (in so far as such a thing is to be had), we need calmly to
sustain doubt about the value of our lives, be open to the possibility
that it is not entirely (or perhaps not at all) what it seems, and not let
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awareness of such possibilities be discouraging. The crucial
intellectual point, both in the realm of value and in the realm of
knowledge about fact (even in science) is that scepticism is not an
enemy to be defeated. It is rather the friend which makes learning
and progress possible – a point that goes all the way back to Socrates.
To this one needs to add that it is important not to be relentlessly
sceptical, unsceptically sceptical as one might say. If we are
relentlessly sceptical about everything, learning and progress become
impossible. Scepticism is rational in so far as it facilitates learning; it
tips into irrationality and neurosis when it negates the very possibility
of learning by doubting everything. To be open to the possibility that
some specific thing which seems charged with value is actually
devoid of it is rational. To doubt seriously that anything at all is of
value is irrational because it destroys the rational function of
scepticism, which is to help us to learn, to make progress, to enhance
the value of our lives. We need to be, not just sceptical, but sceptical
of scepticism itself – so that we appreciate that doubt deserves to be
dismissed when it is such that it cannot help us learn or make
progress.
This argument does not prove that life is of value. Rather, it
provides grounds for holding that it is rational to uphold the
conjecture that life is of value, in the teeth, even, of moods of the
blackest despair (poor comfort, I admit, for those in the grip of
despair).
How can life have any value given that it all ends in death?
We live for a few decades if we are fortunate, and then we die, and
everything that we are, do, have, think, feel, comes to nothing. There
it sits, up ahead in our life, annihilation, the ultimate personal
catastrophe, and we can do nothing to escape. It sits there, grinning
at us, making our life a mockery. What possible value can life have
if everything we are and do ends in nothing?
We may have children, who may survive us, but they too will die,
and their children in turn. We may live on for a while after death in
the memories of those who knew us, but not for very long. We may
make contributions to science, to art, to business, society or sport,
which live on after our death, but this is the preserve of the few, for
most of these few memories of the person does not last long, and in
99
any case, even for the rare Shakespeare, Mozart or Einstein, this
form of immortality hardly seems to compensate for personal death.
As Woody Allen remarked “I want to be immortal in my life, not
through my films”.
And in any case eventually, sooner or later, the human race and
everything it has achieved, done and suffered will come to an end.
We cannot draw sustenance from the value of the lives of others,
from our culture and way of life persisting long after our own death,
for this too will one day die, and come to nothing.
What value, then, can life possibly have if ultimately it all ends in
nothing?
The answer is easy to say, not so easy, always, to live. What is of
value in a life is to be found in the life itself, not in some external,
eternal end-product. It is a common but profound error to hold that
only that which is eternal has real value, or the value of something is
to be measured in its longevity. Put into the cosmic scheme of
things, human life is extremely brief, but that does not deprive it of
value. Ideally, we should live our life calmly aware of the
inevitability of death, and should not allow ourselves to be provoked
into a frenzy of distraction or denial. Ideally, we should be able to
feel that the value of what exists here and now is such that its blaze
outshines black eternity, and we can look at nothingness in the face
and not mind its eventual inevitable arrival.
The real problem, perhaps, is not so much fear of death as fear of
not really living, and then dying. Living and then dying is not as bad
as never really living at all. We fear death because it reminds us that
unless we make a start on our real life soon it will be too late: we will
die before we have begun to live. The time of death sounds the knell
on all those glimpsed but never realized amazing possibilities.
It is not hard to understand why those influenced by modern
western culture should find it especially hard to come to terms
calmly with death. This is hard enough as it is, whoever you may be,
and whatever your cultural background. Death is, near enough, the
ultimate personal catastrophe. Darwinian evolution has planted in us
a fierce desire to survive. The discovery in human pre-history that
this desire must ultimately be defeated, and there is no escape, must
have been traumatic indeed. The archaeological records indicate
that, from the earliest beginnings of culture, attempts were made to
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deny the reality of death by imagining a life after death. Most
religions have some kind of account of life after death – and this is
true, of course, of Christianity as well. Christianity has, of course,
exercised an immense influence over the evolution of western
culture. In particular, that aspect of Christianity, which emphasizes
that the whole point of life lies in what happens afterwards, has been
enormously influential. It has infused into western culture the
attitude that the moral life involves foregoing immediate gratification
for distant goals. This is behind the Protestant work ethic, behind the
drive to devote a life to amassing a fortune, building up a business
empire, establishing a reputation in a profession, leaving behind a
body of great art or science. If the basic tenets of Christianity were
true, this attitude just might be the correct one to adopt. But with the
Christian God cut in half, and prospects of life after death no more
plausible than prospects of Father Christmas paying one a visit down
the chimney, the attitude of foregoing gratification until some distant
time in the future does not make much sense. Life is too short and
precious to be put on hold. We have to live now. If we do not we
may well come to fear death in an especially severe form, because
death demonstrates the disaster of failing to live now, while we still
can. The enormous influence of Christianity on western culture
means, in short, that those of us influenced by this culture are likely
to be especially prone to the disease of foregoing life today for
distant goals and, granted we do not believe in life after death,
especially prone to the severest forms of fear of death, and peculiarly
ill-equipped to come to terms calmly with the inevitability of death.
We will experience the thought of death as an acid that insidiously
eats away all meaning and value from our life and leaves nothing but
an empty shell. It will seem that death annihilates value.
An interesting confirmation of this is that many Christians do
indeed argue that if God does not exist then life must be meaningless.
The value of life, according to this attitude, lies not in life itself, but
elsewhere, in God, and in life after death. Cut God in two and cancel
life after death, and all value in life will seem, inevitably, to drain
away.
I do not mean the above to imply, incidentally, that we should live
only in the present and forego all long-term plans, goals and pursuits.
That would simply be the flip side of the coin. Quite to the contrary,
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it seems to me that the worthwhile life is likely to involve some long-
term goals and pursuits. The vital point is that, in engaging in such
pursuits we should continue to live now, and not forego life now for
some distant dream time in the future. The mistake is to think our
life now hinges on some future occurrence or state of affairs.
We have been considering whether death cancels meaning and
value, and I have answered: No, it does not, although it may well feel
as if it does for those of us who live in a Christian-influenced world,
for thoroughly understandable reasons. Quite different, of course, is
fear of death when we are in danger, or fear for others in danger. On
these occasions, when death is on hand as an immediate possibility,
and is not merely an eventual inevitability, we are likely to find we
are brought face to face with how infinitely precious life is, and thus
with just how much we have to lose.
Additional reasons can be given as to why fear of death – or fear of
only partly living before dying – may have intensified as history has
unfolded. In pre-historical times we lived in small scattered hunting
and gathering tribes. Everyone in the tribe would have known
everyone else, everyone would have taken for granted the same way
of life, the same view of the world, customs and values. No
particular reason exists to fear one has made the wrong choices in life
as only one kind of life is available. Life is what everyone lives.
Then history occurs. Tribes coalesce, cities and nations come into
existence, modern methods of travel and communication develop,
and each one of us, potentially, becomes a citizen of the world. We
are aware, to a greater or lesser extent, of a myriad of different
cultures, ways of life, occupations, values, fortunes and misfortunes.
We are aware, too, of rapid change: life was different fifty years ago,
and will be different again in fifty years time. Everything may seem
arbitrary, temporary, contingent, no more than brief current fashion.
A feast of choices lies before us, some – known via TV and the
movies – being alluringly glamorous, drenched in fame, wealth and
power. Our actual capacity to choose may, however, be strictly
limited: we are born in the wrong place, to the wrong parents, at the
wrong time, with the wrong talents and opportunities. Our situation
is profoundly different from that of the hunter and gatherer. Some of
us today have wealth and opportunities beyond the hunter and
gatherer’s wildest dreams (although hundreds of millions do not).
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But even if we do, these riches and opportunities may seem to turn to
ashes because what seem to be the real prizes are beyond our reach.
We have to choose, but choice itself is fraught with uncertainty,
contradictory guidelines providing contradictory advice. Our
situation is highly conducive to our coming to feel we have failed,
we have been condemned to a shadow of what our life could have
been.2 Or, if we are young and such life choices lie in the future for
us, we may well feel that our chances of having a really worthwhile
life are slim indeed. What is the appropriate response: frantic effort,
or despair and distraction? In any case, our modern circumstances
are such that many people are likely to feel they are only partly
living: death will seal forever those alluring unlived possibilities.
Death shouts not “You die!” but the much more terrifying “You
never lived!”.
Are all individuals of equal value?
People are not of equal value. How could we hold an Albert
Einstein, a Wolfgang Mozart or a Nelson Mandela to be of value
equal to monsters such as Adolf Hitler or Stalin? We are not even
born equal. Biology does not respect justice. What can be said, of
course, on behalf of equality is that we ought all to be equal before
the law, and ought all to have equal civil rights. I would say, too,
that a good society is one in which there is far greater equality of
wealth and power than in the world today. Enforcing equality too
rigorously inevitably undermines freedom, and even equality itself in
that a special class is required, with privileges above the rest, to
enforce the equality of the rest, as in the old Soviet Union. Some
inequality is the price that must be paid for liberty, but that argument
does not justify the extremes of inequality we see in the world today.
2 Karl Popper has argued that the breakdown of tribal society, and the
beginning of the “open society” – a society that tolerates diversity of
views, values and ways of life, induces in people what he calls the strain
of civilization. This is “the strain created by the effort which life in an
open and partially abstract society continually demands from us – by the
endeavour to be rational, to forego at least some of our emotional social
needs, to look after ourselves, and to accept responsibilities”. See
Popper (1969), vol. 1, p. 176.
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We may also hold that individuals blessed with extraordinary
talents should so develop and deploy their gifts that their fruits
become accessible to all, and should not exploit these gifts primarily
for their own benefit, at the expense of others. We can all benefit
from what exceptionally talented individuals may produce, and
hence it is important that we appreciate exceptional talent as
potentially in all our interests, and do not covertly try to suppress its
development because of an anti-elitist attitude which holds that rare
geniuses are an offence to the equal society.
How can justice be done to conflicting values?
In chapter six I will emphasize that basic aims, ideals and values
are liable to be inherently problematic. This, as we shall see, has
profound implications for rationality. It means reason must be such
that it helps us resolve problems – clashes and conflicts – in our basic
aims and ideals as we live. But can we be sure that these clashes and
conflicts can always be resolved, even in principle? One value
system, somewhat right wing in character, might prize individual
initiative and reliance, freedom from government interference,
personal achievement, prosperity and rewards to those who work
hard at the expense of equality. Another somewhat more left-wing
value system might prize equality, solidarity, fraternity, strong
democratic government, even at the expense of liberty. How, even in
principle, can a rational choice be made between these two value
systems? Each will be self-validating. Each will provide its own
criteria for assessing value systems in terms of which each comes out
on top. How then can an objective choice be made?
The answer is to adopt the hierarchical, aim-oriented conception of
rationality to be expounded in chapter six. This stipulates that, in
order to resolve the conflict between these two value systems, we
need to specify the large area of agreement between the two views,
and then seek to assess the relative merits of the areas of
disagreement against (a) the area of agreement, and (b) experience –
what ensues when each view is implemented, or lived. In principle,
as we shall see, this provides the means for resolving such conflicts,
although it may not do so, of course, in practice.
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Are not all value judgements subjective, there being no such
thing as what is of value objectively, or in reality?
If all value judgements are irredeemably subjective3 – so that no
judgement concerning what is of value represents how things really
are better than any other – then in reality nothing is of value.
Objective reality is denuded of value. Value is a subjective illusion
we invent to lull ourselves into the false belief that what is of value
really does exist. The God-of-Cosmic-Value, in short, does not exist.
It is an illusion.
But why should anyone hold that value judgements are
subjective? For many, there are apparently decisive grounds for
holding this view – or the related view of relativism. These come
in three categories, which I shall call moral, metaphysical and
epistemological. In what follows I expound these objections, and
then show what is wrong with them.4
To begin with, we may hold it to be immoral to proclaim the
existence of objective value, and then invoke it in an attempt to
influence the conduct of others. The mother tugs the restless
child's hand and exclaims "Be good!" when what she really means
is: "Do what I want you to do!" The act of telling the child to be
good is an act of manipulation and deceit. The same thing happens
when the authorities tell the public to "cooperate with the
authorities": this does not mean "work in partnership (i.e.
cooperatively) with the authorities"; it means "Do what the
authorities tell you to do". Moral systems can be regarded as
systems of control and exploitation, put about by those in power to
induce others to act in the interests of those who hold power.
Interpreting such moral systems as "objective" further obscures the
3 Subjectivism about values and morality is a widely held and influential
view. It was the dominant view among moral philosophers in the 20th
century. Subjectivist views are to be found in Ayer (1936); Stevenson
(1944); Hare (1952); Nowell-Smith (1952); and Mackie (1977).
4 When I first argued for value realism I thought I was a lone voice
crying in the wilderness: see my (1976a), pp. 138-146 and 242-254 or 2nd
edition (2009), pp. 140-148 and pp. 246-258; (1984) or (2007a), ch 10. I
have subsequently discovered others who have argued for the view: see
Bond (1983); McDowell (1998), Part II; Brink (1989). For an excellent
review article see: Little (1994).
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manipulation and deceit that is involved; it makes it that much
more immoral.
Similarly, it may be argued, those who proclaim the existence of
objective values do violence to liberalism in that, instead of
questions of value being left to individuals to decide for
themselves, such questions are decided by the authorities, the
experts, those who are in a position to "know" what is best for the
rest of us. Objectivism, or realism, it may be argued, is
authoritarian, even totalitarian in spirit, a ploy used to indoctrinate
and enslave. Objectivism provides a ready justification for
imperialists and religious fanatics, for those who know with
certainty what is right, and on that basis strive to gain power over
others by means of force, persuasion or terror.
Yet again, it may be argued, at a milder level, objectivism, in the
field of the arts leads straight to elitism. Those who are in a
position to do so proclaim that those arts that they enjoy are
objectively of greater aesthetic value than those enjoyed by others,
and on that basis ensure that what they enjoy receives much more
patronage and state funding.
In addition to these moral objections, there are also metaphysical
objections. What are these mysterious value facts, in virtue of
which value statements are either true or false? What are value
properties, and how are they related to physical properties? Do
we, with G.E. Moore, think of the Good as an unanalysable
property which cannot be defined?5 Or do we, even more
radically, with Pirsig, think of Quality as the basic stuff of
existence, indefinable, neither objective nor subjective, from which
everything else emerges?6 Are we to suppose that value is some
sort of mysterious invisible fluid, valuable things being soaked in
it, valueless things being bereft of it? Might chemists one day
distil drops of this precious fluid in a flask? The whole idea is
surely preposterous. And even if this mysterious value substance
or property existed, it would remain a mystery how we can come
to know that some things possess it; and even if we could know
5 See Moore (1903).
6 Pirsig (1974).
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this, it would be utterly mysterious why we should especially value
things that are rich in this mysterious property of value.
Finally there is the epistemological objection. If objective value
exists, then it ought to be possible to determine, objectively,
whether something is or is not of value. It ought to be possible to
decide disputes about what is of value by an appeal to the objective
value facts, much as factual disputes can be decided in science.
But notoriously, disputes about what is of value are endless and
seem inherently unresolvable. This, again, seems decisive grounds
for rejecting objectivism.
In order to see what is wrong with these three reasons for
rejecting value realism, it is essential to recognize that a number of
different versions of objectivism can be distinguished; most
succumb to the above moral, metaphysical or epistemological
objections, but one does not.
In order to overcome the moral objections to objectivism we
need to recognize that there are at least three, and not just two,
positions, namely:
1. Dogmatic Objectivism: There are objective values, we know
what they are, and anyone who disagrees must be (a) taught better,
(b) converted, (c) conquered, or (d) assassinated.
2. (Dogmatic) Relativism: What is wrong with Dogmatic
Objectivism is the objectivism. There are no objective values,
there is only what people desire, prefer or value.
3. Conjectural Objectivism: What is wrong with Dogmatic
Objectivism is the dogmatism! Precisely because values exist
objectively, our knowledge of what is of value is conjectural in
character. If two parties disagree about what is of value, the
chances are that each has something to learn from the other.
Dogmatic objectivism is the sort of view upheld (in its milder
forms) by the Victorians when confronted by primitive people.
Victorians not only believed in the existence of objective values,
but "knew", beyond all doubt, that the correct values were those of
Victorian England. Primitive people, with very different systems
of values were, in the eyes of Victorian travellers and
anthropologists, simply wrong, ignorant and primitive. Today it is,
typically, various sorts of religious fundamentalists who uphold
versions of dogmatic objectivism.
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Relativism arises as a result of a reaction against dogmatic
objectivism. It seems appalling that people should be so convinced
of the correctness of their views about what is of value that they
feel justified in converting or conquering everyone else so that they
too come to live by and believe in these views – even to the extent
of feeling justified in eliminating those who refuse. People
proselytize their values, their religion and way of life so
aggressively because they believe they have the might of objective
value behind them, in the form of gods, God, the Tribe, The Race,
the chosen People or Class, the Nation, History, Civilization, or
whatever. These are regarded as objectively existing embodiments
of value, and it is this, so incipient Relativists believe, which leads
to the drive to dominate and convert, to offend basic principles of
morality and liberalism. It is the value-objectivism of dogmatic
objectivism which is the cause of the problem, Relativists argue,
and as a result defend value-subjectivism. The whole idea of value
existing objectively, of value-judgements being objectively true
and false, is a nonsense: there are simply a multiplicity of
preferences of people, some embodied in diverse value-systems, no
one being better or more correct than any other, in any objective
sense. Those who belong to so-called "western civilisation" should
regard so-called "primitive" people as merely different, not
inferior.
But Relativism, despite its good intentions, is hardly an
improvement over Dogmatic Objectivism. Given the latter view, it
is at least possible to hold that the imperialist actions of the
Victorians were objectively wrong. Given Relativism, this
becomes impossible; one can only say that these actions are not to
one’s own personal taste. Relativism seems to defend liberalism
and tolerance against imperialist aggression, but the defence
destroys the very possibility of declaring liberalism and tolerance
to be morally good and imperialist aggression to be morally bad.
The defects of Relativism defeat its own good intentions. And
there are the other adverse consequences to take into account as
well: the annihilation of value, the cancellation of the possibility of
learning in the realm of value. If any view about what is of value
is as good as any other one, then nothing is of value objectively, in
108
reality, and there can be no learning about what is of value (except
learning that nothing, ultimately, is of value).
It is important to note that Relativism objects to the objectivism
of dogmatic objectivism, and not to the dogmatism. There is
indeed a sense in which the transition from dogmatic objectivism
to relativism intensifies the dogmatism. A Dogmatic Objectivist is
convinced that he is right and those who disagree are wrong; at the
same time he holds that this is a significant issue, one worth going
to war and dying for, and thus certainly not meaningless. In other
words, it is definitely meaningful that he might be wrong about
what is of objective value; but he knows he is right. For the
Relativist, however, it is meaningless that one can be wrong about
one's personal preferences: what higher authority than one’s self
could there be? There are of course somewhat trivial senses in
which one can be wrong: one may be wrong about what one’s
actual preferences are; or one’s actual preferences may be the
result, in part, of false purely factual beliefs. Putting these points
on one side, it is, according to the Relativist, meaningless to say
that one person's preferences are right, another's wrong. In this
respect, yet again, Relativism is hardly an improvement over
Dogmatic Objectivism.
Relativism is right to object to Dogmatic Objectivism, but wrong
to object to the objectivism of the view. It is the dogmatism of
Objective Dogmatism that is objectionable, not the objectivism. It
is the dogmatism, the absolute conviction in the correctness of
one’s own position, that makes it possible for one to be convinced
that non-believers should be (a) taught better, (b) converted, (c)
conquered, or (d) assassinated. Not only does Relativism
misallocate what is wrong with Dogmatic Objectivism; it actually
has the effect of intensifying what is wrong, as we have seen.
Relativists may hope that general acceptance of their view would
promote tolerance, but the hope is misplaced. Relativism puts
those who seek to convert, conquer or assassinate on a par with
those seek to live cooperatively and tolerantly with their fellow
human beings. Furthermore, general acceptance of Relativism is
as likely as not to sabotage growth of tolerance, since tolerance is,
by and large, something that needs to be learned and, as we have
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seen, Relativism cancels the very idea of learning in the realm of
value.
Dogmatic Objectivism and Relativism make the same blunder:
both take it for granted that objectivism leads to dogmatism. In
fact precisely the opposite is the case: objectivism demands that we
recognize that we cannot know for certain what is, and what is not,
of value; at best our value judgements must be conjectures. If
there really are value features of things that really do exist whether
we perceive them or not, it becomes all but inevitable that we will,
more or less frequently, get things wrong. Just because the
physical world really does exist, we often make mistakes about it;
we do not have an infallible access to all that there is. On the
contrary, much of the fallible knowledge that we do possess about
the physical universe has only been won as a result of centuries of
effort by science. What possible justification could there be for
supposing that the situation is different as far as value features of
things are concerned? If such features really do exist, then surely
here too we must acknowledge that we cannot hope to be infallible,
that our views about what is of value are all too likely to be more
or less wrong, and hence such views need to be held as
conjectures. Objectivism, in other words, all but implies
conjecturalism, and demands that one rejects dogmatism.
As long as we believe that only the two views of Dogmatic
Objectivism and Relativism are possible, we are forced to choose
between them, even though both, as we have seen, have highly
undesirable consequences. The all important point to appreciate is
that a third view is available, Conjectural Objectivism, which need
have none of the moral and intellectual defects of the other two
views. Dogmatic Objectivism and Relativism, as we have seen,
clash with or undermine liberalism. By contrast, Conjectural
Objectivism, far from clashing with liberalism, may be held to be
necessary for liberalism. For, granted Conjectural Objectivism, we
may conjecture that it is people, and what is of value to people,
that is ultimately of value in existence. In other words, the basic
tenet of liberalism, which one might state as "It is individual
persons that are of supreme value in existence", needs to be
formulated as a conjecture about what is objectively of ultimate
value, and for this one requires Conjectural Objectivism. If
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Relativism is presupposed, the basic tenet of liberalism
disintegrates into nothing more than a personal preference.7
In order to overcome the metaphysical objections to Objectivism
we need to exploit a point made in chapter three: there are two
very different ways of drawing the distinction between objective
and subjective, two meanings that can be given to "objective" and
"subjective". The first distinction has to do with whether
something really exists, or does not exist (but only appears to
exist). The second has to do with whether something is utterly
impersonal, unrelated to human beings, or whether it is in some
way personal, or related to human beings.8 The all important point
is that something may be subjective in the second sense, but
objective in first sense. That is, something may be related to
human concerns, aims or physiology and yet, at the same time,
may really exist out there in the world. Value features are of this
type: like perceptual qualities such as colours, they are related to
human concerns and aims, but really existing for all that.
Let us call the first meanings of "objective" and "subjective",
connected with existence and non-existence, "existential
objectivity" and "existential subjectivity".
If some object or property is existentially objective, then it really
does exist; if it is existentially subjective, then it does not really
exist even though it may appear to do so, or may be thought by
some to exist. Tables, trees and stars are existentially objective;
ghosts, demons and spells are existentially subjective.
Let us call the second meanings of "objective" and "subjective",
connected with being human-unrelated and human-related,
"humanly objective" and "humanly subjective". An object or
property is humanly objective if it is wholly impersonal, unrelated
to human aims, interests, experiences or physiology; it is humanly
subjective if it is related to human aims, interests, experiences or
physiology. Physical entities and properties, such as stars and
atoms, mass and electric charge, may be taken to be humanly
7 For an earlier discussion of these issues see my (1984), pp. 255-258;
and my (2001), ch. 2.
8 For an earlier formulation of this distinction see my (1966), pp. 310-
311.
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objective, in that these objects and properties are entirely unrelated
to human interests, aims or physiology. By contrast, works of art,
constitutions, legal systems and languages are all humanly
subjective in that these objects are all quite essentially related to
human beings. Furthermore, properties such as poisonous, green,
delicious and friendly are humanly subjective in that these
properties are all human-related.
The crucial point in all this is that, even though something is
humanly subjective this does not mean that it is existentially
subjective. On the contrary, it may be existentially objective.
Bach's St. Matthew's Passion, Britain's constitution, legal system
and language all exist (are existentially objective) even though
they are also human-related objects (i.e. humanly subjective).
Arsenic really is poisonous, grass really is green, zabiogne really is
delicious, and Einstein really was friendly (i.e. all these properties
are existentially objective) even though these properties are
human-related (i.e. humanly subjective).
It is into this category of existential objectivity and human
subjectivity that value features fall. Like colours, value features
really do exist out there in the world; but also like colours, value
features are human-related.
If we hold that there is just one distinction between the objective
and the subjective, we thereby make it impossible to declare that
colours, and value-features of things, are existentially objective but
humanly subjective. Declaring value-features to be objective
commits us to declaring them to be human-unrelated, like mass or
electric charge, which is absurd; but also, declaring value-features
to be subjective commits us to declaring that they do not really
exist, which seems equally absurd. The above dilemma, in short,
arises as a result of failing to appreciate that there are two quite
different distinctions between objective and subjective: the
dilemma is readily solved once one appreciates this point, which
permits one to say that value-features are objective in one sense
(really existing) but subjective in another sense (human-related).
Put another way, once we recognize that there are two
distinctions between objective and subjective to be made, then, in
declaring values to be objective there are two possibilities. We
may mean that values are existentially objective and humanly
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objective: let us call this view impersonal conjectural objectivism.
Or we may mean that values are existentially objective but
humanly subjective: let us call this view human-related conjectural
objectivism. The above metaphysical objections to objectivism
apply devastatingly to impersonal conjectural objectivism: it is
indeed absurd to suppose that a value-fluid exists in the universe,
which chemists might one day distil in a flask. But these
metaphysical objections fail completely when directed against the
more modest view of human-related conjectural objectivism. The
value-features of things are as familiar, unmysterious and non-
metaphysical as colours, sounds and smells. In order to perceive
value features we may need to have emotional responses, just as in
order to see colour we need appropriate visual responses: but in
neither case does this mean that the property is existentially
subjective – though it does mean it is humanly subjective.
Typical familiar value-features of people are: friendly, mean,
jolly, stern, witty, courageous, warm-hearted, dull, frivolous,
shifty, kind, spontaneous, strong-willed, earnest, gloomy,
calculating, mischievous, cold, boring, gushing, loyal, ambitious,
argumentative, generous. These are both descriptive and value-
laden, factual and imbued with value. People, like works of art in
a somewhat different way, are essentially value-imbued, morality-
imbued things: we cannot describe a personality, we cannot state
facts about a personality, without employing value-imbued factual
terms of the kind just indicated, any more than we can describe a
work of art as work of art without employing analogous aesthetic
terms, value-imbued factual terms.
Those who wish to maintain the traditional distinction between
fact and value will argue that terms such as the above can always
be interpreted in two ways, first in a purely factual, non-evaluative
way, and second in an evaluative and non-descriptive, non-factual
way. We can describe without evaluating, and in adding an
evaluation we do not provide additional factual information, we do
something quite different, namely evaluate.
It should be noted that I have not argued for the existence of
value-features; I have confined myself to rebutting arguments
against the view that value-features really do exist in the world.
This, in my view, is the crucial task that needs to be performed.
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No one, I believe, would take relativism or subjectivism seriously
if they were not persuaded that value objectivism is untenable.
What needs to be done is not to prove that value features of things
really do exist (a hopeless task in any case), but rather to prove that
arguments against objectivism are invalid.
Continuing in this vein, let us consider what grounds there are
for insisting that the above value-laden factual terms must be split
into two distinct parts, the factual and the evaluative. Consider
"friendly". On the face of it, this is doubly evaluative, first
because friendliness may be deemed to be a desirable quality in a
person, and second because friendliness may be deemed to be such
that a genuinely friendly person, at the very least, acts in a moral
way towards other people. One cannot be friendly and mean,
friendly and cruel, at one and the same time. What obliges us to
split off a purely factual, non-evaluative meaning from the
evaluative, moral meaning?
Doubtless this can be done. We can, for example, render
"friendly" purely factual by specifying some set of values and
interpreting "friendly" in terms of this set, there being no
presumption that this set embodies what is really of value.
But what grounds are there for holding that this must be done,
apart from the mistaken idea that value-features of things cannot
exist?
In my view, a particularly strong reason for holding that value-
features exist, for supporting human-related conjectural
objectivism, arises from the following sort of consideration
(already indicated in (4) above). Think of a friend or relative you
have known personally, neither a saint nor a fiend, who has lived
her life, and has died. A number of people have known this
person, in different contexts, and to differing degrees. The
deceased person will have revealed different aspects of her
personality to these lovers, friends and acquaintances. No one, it is
all too likely, knows all that there is to be known about this person.
No one knows all the good qualities of this person. Even the dead
person, when alive, may not have been aware of her good qualities;
she may have undervalued herself, been too aware of failings and
insufficiently aware of countless acts that have brought pleasure,
delight or happiness to others. No one sees all that is of value in
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this person. But we should not conclude that it therefore does not
exist. To do so would have the dreadful consequence that it is only
those who are widely believed to be of value who really are of
value, and those who have quietly contributed much to the quality
of people's lives, unnoticed and unsung, are nothing, and have
done nothing.
In the realm of value, to believe that to be is to be perceived,
which is what subjectivism and relativism amount to, is to be a
cynic and nihilist of dreadful proportions. Early 21st century life
suffers horribly from these doctrines. Even fanatical
fundamentalism may be seen as a sort of hysterical reaction to the
cynicism and nihilism implicit in value subjectivism and
relativism, widely upheld because philosophical blunders
(indicated above) appear to leave liberalism, and a sane scientific
outlook, no alternative.
So much for my criticisms of the moral and metaphysical
objections to value realism. I turn now to a consideration of the
third, epistemological objection.
The epistemological objection, stated above, is that if value
features of things really exist then it ought to be possible for people
to agree as to what they are. Notoriously, people disagree, and
there appears to be no procedure for achieving agreement, as in
science or mathematics. Hence objective values do not exist.
The lack of universal values is often taken as a strong argument
for Relativism, and Objectivists often assume that, in order to
establish their position they must demonstrate, somehow, that there
is some set of values that arise universally in all cultures. But all
this is a mistake.
The physical universe exists independently of us; here,
unquestionably, there are objective facts.9 But when it comes to
9 Some philosophers and historians of science have questioned whether
there are objective facts about the physical universe. I assume here that
this "cognitive" version of Relativism is untenable. If based on the
anthropological evidence that different societies have held different
views about the universe, cognitive Relativism tends to become
inconsistent in that it recognizes the existence of people, presumably
living on the surface of the earth, these being objective facts, and then
goes on to assert that there are no objective facts. If this is put forward
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cosmological theories concerning the nature of the universe, we do
not find that there is some universal theory, accepted by people in
all cultures at all times. On the contrary, we find an incredible
diversity of views. But this does not mean that there is no such
thing as the true nature of the universe; it just means that this truth
is inaccessible, difficult to get hold of (and hence the need for
science). Science by no means puts an end to diversity of views.
In science, too, one finds a number of conflicting cosmological
views.10
The same point arises in connection with value-features of
things. Long-standing, widespread disagreement about what is of
value does not mean that there is no such thing as that which is of
value objectively; it just means that it is more or less inaccessible,
more or less difficult to determine or establish.
To this it may be objected that there is still a big difference
between the two cases. As far as the physical universe is
concerned, different societies and cultures may have produced
radically different cosmological theories; and even different
physicists may defend different theories: nevertheless in this
domain we possess the means for resolving debates between
conflicting views. In gradually improving knowledge, science
sooner or later decides between diverse conflicting hypotheses.
But in the realm of value, nothing of the kind is discernable.
Notoriously, different people, different societies and cultures
disagree radically about questions of value, and no amount of
argument or experience seems capable of resolving these
conflicting views. There is no science of value; the very idea
seems somehow absurd. Do not these considerations support the
view that in the realm of value we are concerned merely with
various purely subjective tastes or desires, there being no such
thing as an objectively existing value feature?
as a reductio ad absurdum argument, the assumption that people exist on
earth leading to the conclusion that there are no objective facts (because
people disagree as to what these facts are), the straightforward reply is
that disagreement about facts does not establish non-existence of facts.
10 For a searching critique of modern cosmological theories see Penrose
(2004).
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A number of points can be made in reply to this objection. First,
it may be that, even though value features exist, nevertheless
questions of value are inherently more difficult to settle than
scientific questions of fact. Second, it may be much more difficult
and problematic to set up a team of experts to decide value-
questions than it is to set up a team of experts – the scientific
community – to decide questions of scientific fact. Third, apart
from fundamentalists of various persuasions, our modern world is
awash with subjectivism and relativism, doctrines that deny the
very possibility of learning about what is of value. In such a
cultural climate, it is hardly surprising that people fail to learn
about what is of value, and do not know how to resolve conflicting
views about what is of value rationally. Finally, the idea that we
might one day develop, what we do not have at present, something
like a "science" of value is not nearly as absurd as it may at first
seem to be. In chapter six, as I have already indicated, I will
outline a conception of inquiry rationally designed to help us learn
about what is of value, and resolve conflicts in our values and
ideals.
Subjectivism and Relativism about what is of value deserve to
be rejected, I conclude, along with Dogmatic Objectivism. What is
of value does really exist. The God-of-Cosmic-Value does really
exist.
One important question remains. What exactly is the connection
between the existence of value qualities or facts, and the unique
truthfulness of one system of values? Could one not acknowledge
the first, and yet deny the second, and be perfectly consistent
thereby? If we interpret value realism to be the first doctrine, and
value objectivism to be the second, the question amounts to this:
Does value realism imply value objectivism? Or are the two
doctrines logically independent?
Consider the conjecture, indicated above, that living life lovingly
is what is of supreme value. And consider a rival doctrine, one
which most people will hold to be peculiarly obnoxious: the
Nietzschean or fascist doctrine that what is of supreme value is, not
love, but strength, power, leadership, the power of the Nation
invested in the uniquely significant figure of the Great Leader. If
value-features prized by the philosophy of love exist then surely,
117
equally, value features prized by the Nietzschean philosophy must
exist as well: Nietzschean qualities of strength, ruthlessness,
dominance, brutality. Value realism does not, in itself, render the
philosophy of love true and the Nietzschean philosophy false – as
long as both philosophies can be formulated so as not to include
false factual statements.
But can they? Could it not be argued that both philosophies
must include a statement to the effect that what this philosophy
holds to be of supreme value, actually and potentially in existence,
really is of supreme value, but only one of these statements can be
factually true – true to what is, in reality, of supreme value? The
real existence of what is of value does, in other words, render at
least one (and perhaps both) of these clashing philosophies false.
If this argument is valid, it establishes only the falsity of one of
the philosophies of value. It does not establish that we can know
for certain which is false. It provides a rationale for attempting to
improve our ideas about what is of value, but very definitely does
not justify any claim that this or that view about what is of
supreme value is correct.
Does it make sense to talk of what is of value dissociated from
what individuals value?
In considering what is of value in the world, much depends on
whose interests we take into account, and how. Consider, to begin
with, what is of value to one individual, ignoring the interests of
others unless these interests are of value to this one person. There is,
first, what this person would declare to be of value to him were he to
be asked. Second, there is what the person really holds to be of
value. Third, there is what the person actually values (which may
not be the same as what he believes or says he values). And fourth,
there is what really is of value to this person, actually and potentially,
in the circumstances of this person’s life. This is what we should
mean by “what is of value to this person”.
But now we may take what is of value to others into account. Let
us suppose, to begin with, that we consider what is of value to
individuals belonging to a well-defined group, G. We might, to
begin with, consider what is of value to the individuals belonging to
G irrespective of whether these values clash or not. But then,
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second, we might consider what is of value to the members of G with
all clashes resolved in the best possible way, doing the best justice to
what is of value to each of the individual members of G 11. Third, G
might represent some group endeavour, with some aim, and with its
own interests. An example is science given the aim, let us suppose,
of improving knowledge and understanding of aspects of the
universe. What is of value to science need not at all be the same as
what is of value to scientists. Improved knowledge and
understanding are of value to science; these may well be of value to
individual scientists as well, but many scientists will value
recognition, gaining a Nobel prize – of no value whatsoever to
science itself (except perhaps as a means to motivate the servants of
science to serve its interests).
Can G be generalized to become humanity, everyone, all sentient
beings? Perhaps. But at this point, things become a bit hazy. Do we
include unborn children? This is not a merely academic question. In
deciding issues about the environment and global warming, we
certainly take into account the interests of the unborn, those who will
be alive in 50 to 100 years time. But who exactly are these unborn?
How, even in principle, could they be specified – except, perhaps, to
say, simply, they are who they will be. The idea of what is of value,
actually and potentially, to everyone, born and unborn, all conflicts
resolved in the best possible way, clearly faces problems. But it
would seem to be this problematic idea that value realism requires.
Does it make sense to speak of what is of value in a way which is
dissociated from all individuals, all sentient beings? Is there such a
thing as what is of value in itself, as it were, irrespective of whether it
is of value to this or that person? My answer is No. I can allow that
aspects of the natural world might be beautiful, and thus of value,
even though no one exists to experience and appreciate it (perhaps
because the human race has died out); but this appeals to the
possibility of personal experience. What I do not believe is that
something of intrinsic value exists dissociated from all sentient life,
actual or possible. The God-of-Cosmic-Value is absolutely
essentially linked to conscious, or sentient, life.
11 It does not matter if there are many different, equally good, just ways
of supposing conflicts to be resolved, in this way.
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How can we make discoveries in this domain of value, learn
about what is of value?
As I have indicated towards the end of chapter two, and as I shall
spell out in more detail in chapter six, the way to learn about what is
of value is to put wisdom-inquiry into practice as we live.
Is there a realm of higher, spiritual values, glimpsed by some in
rare moments of mystical inspiration, and experienced by seers
and mystics?
Being alive is miraculous. Of course, how miraculous, and how
aware you are of how miraculous it is, may depend on who you are.
A firefly probably does not feel it at all. A mouse might get an
occasional sniff of it. Jane Goodall describes Chimps experiencing
wonder.12 You and I experience the miraculousness of existence
from time to time but possibly not with as much persistent intensity
as William Blake did, or John Keats or the youthful William
Wordsworth. But it is there, available potentially for everyone, the
quite incredible mystery and miraculousness of existence, of being
alive, sentient and conscious. Here, we may think, is the crucible of
value, the fire in which it becomes incandescent.
But is that right? Do intense mystical experiences reveal to us the
inner essence of the value of things? Or can they? Or should all
such experiences be dismissed as wholly uninformative, sometimes
perhaps of great emotional value to the person who has such an
experience, but otherwise signifying nothing?
I am very much in two minds about this question. What is deeply,
profoundly of value in existence has to do, it seems to me, with
loving relationships, with friendship, with kindness, with caring for
others, with artistic and intellectual endeavour, with the experience
of beauty, with joy in being in the world with others, yes, but not
necessarily with mystical excesses. These latter, I am inclined to
believe, may have more to do with prior long-standing repression,
with the sudden volcanic explosion of psychic energy long held in
check. Such psychic explosions are not necessarily a sign of insight,
of perception, maturity and health. They do not reveal a spiritual
reality ordinarily concealed to us.
12 J. Goodall (1971).
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On the other hand I have myself, on a number of occasions, had
extraordinary, apparently revelatory experiences which have had a
major impact on my life, and on my thinking.13 This happened for
the first time like this. A student at University College London doing
mathematics, I had recently been informed my grant had been
stopped because I had not attended enough lectures. After an attempt
to move to philosophy – which failed because I did not have O level
Latin – I decided to leave the University. I was in disgrace, my life,
it seemed, a disaster. I had spent the evening in question with my
sister. We did not then ordinarily communicate very well, but on this
occasion we did. We talked, easily and naturally about all manner of
things. Walking back to Camden Town tube station afterwards, it
occurred to me that I was not entirely the wretch I took myself to be.
My parents and sisters, I began to feel, thought well of me. I was
loved. And then, as I walked along the pavement towards Camden
Town, everything took on a terrifying intensity of significance.
What was happening now, this precise concatenation of particular
circumstances, these shifting vistas of buildings in the evening air,
would never, never, never occur again, in the entire history of the
universe. A woman walked along the pavement in the opposite
direction to me, on the other side of the street, her high heels clicking
as she walked. This infinitely, uniquely precious moment came but
once in all of eternity. Then, as I walked, it seemed to me that the
sky had become a vast lens concentrating all the love, all the energy,
in the universe into me. It began to feel as if an invisible stream of
lightning was tearing silently through my lungs. And instead of
being extraordinarily uplifting, as it had begun, the experience
became terrifying. “What is happening to me?” I asked. I thought it
likely I was about to experience an epileptic fit. I did what I could to
distract my attention from what I was experiencing, and gradually,
over an hour or so, it wore off. One point struck me forcefully
afterwards. If I had had the slightest temptation to believe in the
existence of God, I would have interpreted what I had been through
as direct mystical communion with God – or at least with some
spiritual reality infused into the constitution of things.
13 For brief accounts see www.nick-maxwell.demon.co.uk, “About Me”
and “Life of Value”. See also my (2006a).
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Experiences such as this cannot invariably, I think, be dismissed as
psychotic episodes, hints merely of possible, nascent schizophrenia.
Instead, such experiences can, perhaps, be interpreted much more
positively as vividly reminding us of just how miraculous it is to be
alive and conscious, able to share friendship and love with fellow
human beings.
I cannot debunk such experiences as symptoms, merely, of psychic
illness because, three years later, I had such an experience, not for
three hours, but for six weeks. My life was transformed. All my
work stems from what I thought, felt and experienced during that six
weeks in the summer of 1961, as I have explained elsewhere.14 This
very book ultimately stems from that time. A part of the revelation I
experienced was the shock of being liberated from Cartesian dualism
and encountering for the first time, in the raw as it were, the
experiential God-of-Cosmic-Value, both within and without. But it
also had to do with a radical reassessment of my aims and ideals in
life, and a realization that philosophy should be centrally concerned
with such matters. Both themes run through all my subsequent work,
and are basic to this book.
How can we best go about enhancing our capacity to realize
what is of value, actually and potentially, in our life, as we live,
whatever exactly may be of value, and however it may be
conceived?
This is the really important question, of course. What I have to say
by way of a contribution towards answering it has already been
touched upon towards the end of chapter two, where I argued – in
effect – that we urgently need new institutions of learning rationally
devoted to helping the God-of-Cosmic-Value flourish within the
God-of-Cosmic-Power. This argument will be taken up again in
chapters six and nine.
14 See note 13.
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CHAPTER FIVE
WHAT IS THE GOD OF POWER?
HOW DO WE KNOW IT EXISTS?
In chapter one I declared that the God-of-Cosmic-Power is that
impersonal something that exists everywhere, eternally and
unchanging, throughout all phenomena, and determines (perhaps
probabilistically) the way phenomena unfold. It is what corresponds
physically to the true unified theory of everything that physics seeks
to discover.
But how do we know that the God-of-Cosmic-Power, in this sense,
exists? How do we know that what determines what goes on
everywhere in the universe has this character? My answer is that it is
science that has established that the God-of Cosmic-Power exists. In
so far as physics has established anything theoretical, it has
established this profoundly important point that the God-of-Cosmic-
Power exists. This is more firmly established than the truth of any
physical theory, however well corroborated by evidence. It is a more
firmly established item of scientific knowledge than our very best
physical theories – Newtonian theory, quantum theory, Einstein’s
theories of special and general relativity.
Any scientist reading this book will, at this point, be in a state of
apoplectic outrage. Physics cannot possibly have established that
“the God-of-Cosmic-Power” exists! This is an untestable
proposition, neither verifiable nor falsifiable empirically. It is, in this
respect, like the proposition “every event has a cause”, which cannot
be verified or falsified empirically either. Neither proposition can be
a part of scientific knowledge. In order to be an item of scientific
knowledge, a proposition must be, at the very least, empirically
testable. It must, in addition, have been subjected to empirical
testing, and must have met with sufficient empirical success. In
science, no proposition about the world is accepted as a part of
scientific knowledge independently of evidence. The claim that the
God-of-Cosmic-Power exists has no empirically testable
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consequences, and thus can have no empirical support. It does not
even meet the first requirement for being a scientific statement.1
One day theoretical physicists may formulate a unified theory-of-
everything, a theory which unifies all existing fundamental theories
in physics. This theory might meet with sufficient success when
subjected to empirical tests to be judged to be a part of scientific
knowledge. When, or if, this happens, there might be grounds for
declaring that science has established that the God-of-Cosmic-Power
exists. But this has not yet happened. It may never happen.
Many theoretical physicists believe that string theory will one day
turn out to be the correct theory-of-everything. String theory holds
that fundamental particles – electrons, quarks and the rest – are really
tiny strings vibrating in ten or eleven dimensions of space-time. We
only notice four dimensions of space-time because the other six or
seven or curled up into a minute ball, too small to be observed.
String theorists admit, however, first, that string theory is not yet a
properly formulated physical theory. And they admit that no
successful empirical predictions have been forthcoming. String
theory is in the same category as the statement that the God-of-
Cosmic-Power exits. It is a metaphysical theory – that is, a theory
neither verifiable nor falsifiable empirically. One day it may meet
with empirical success and may become a part of scientific
knowledge. But today it is no more than speculative metaphysics.
A New Conception of Science
This counter-argument of the outraged scientist is entirely valid
– just as long as the conception of science on which it is based is
valid. But it is not. The claim that physics accepts theories on the
basis of evidence, no proposition about the world being accepted as
a part of scientific knowledge independently of evidence, is just plain
false. Physics only ever accepts theories that are unified or
explanatory, even though endlessly many empirically more
successful disunified, non-explanatory rival theories are always
1 Karl Popper is famous for arguing that a statement or theory, in order to
be scientific, must be empirically falsifiable: see K. Popper, 1959, The
Logic of Scientific Discovery, Hutchinson, London. Most scientists
endorse this view (although some would hold that theories can be
verified too, something Popper denies).
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available. This means – as we shall see in greater detail below – that
physics implicitly accepts permanently the very substantial thesis that
the universe is such that no seriously disunified, non-explanatory
theory is true. Physics accepts, in other words, that the universe is
more or less unified, i.e. that it is such that explanations for
phenomena exist to be found. This substantial, metaphysical thesis
is accepted permanently as a part of scientific knowledge
independently of evidence, even, in a certain sense, in violation of
evidence.
What this means is that we need to adopt a whole new conception
of science, very much at odds with current orthodoxy. Natural
science, far from being dissociated from religion and metaphysics is,
on the contrary, at the most fundamental level, a religious and
metaphysical quest in its own right. At the most fundamental level,
science accepts, as a basic tenet of scientific knowledge, a
metaphysical – that is, an empirically untestable – thesis about the
nature of the universe. This metaphysical thesis specifies what it is
in nature that is responsible for events occurring as they do – what it
is, in other words, that is in charge of the universe. A central task of
natural science is to improve this metaphysical thesis – get it to
reflect, more and more accurately, the nature of that which is
ultimately responsible for determining how events unfold. Science
does this by accepting that thesis which seems to be the most
empirically fruitful, in the sense of supporting the most empirically
successful scientific research programme. Viewed from this
standpoint, we engage in empirical scientific research in order to
improve a basic, empirically untestable, metaphysical thesis about
the nature of the universe – one which specifies what it is in
existence that is ultimately responsible for events occurring as they
do. It is in this sense that theoretical physics is an empirical quest for
the nature of God – the nature of the God-of-Cosmic-Power.
Nevertheless, despite its empirical character, the whole enterprise of
natural science rests on an article of faith: that something does exist
which determines how events unfold, and which explains why events
occur as they do – the universe being ultimately comprehensible, in
some way or other.
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Underlying Theoretical Unity in Nature
Despite the above, it may seem quite impossible that we should be
able, today, to capture the ultimate nature of the physical universe in
a metaphysical thesis that stands a reasonable chance of being true.
This is in part because a metaphysical thesis, being empirically
untestable, seems to provide no means for empirical assessment.
(This will be rebutted below.) But a far more serious reason for
doubt arises from the history of physics. Ever since modern science
began, metaphysical ideas about how the universe is physically
comprehensible, associated with physics, have changed dramatically,
again and again. In the 17th century, there was the idea that
everything is made up of minute, rigid corpuscles that interact only
by contact. This gave way, in the 18th and 19th centuries, to the idea
that everything is made up of point-particles that have mass but no
size. These point-particles were thought to interact by means of
forces at a distance, alternatively attractive and repulsive, and
becoming like gravitation at sufficiently large distances. This in turn
gave way, after Faraday and Einstein in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries, to the idea that everything is made up of a unified, classical
field. A physical field is a physical entity, like the magnetic or
electric field, which is spread out smoothly in space. Especially
dense regions of the field appear to be particles. The field interacts
with itself, so that dense regions – which appear to be particles – are
pushed about by the surrounding field.2 This in turn gave way to the
idea that everything is made up of mysterious quantum objects,
exhibiting both wave and particle features, which in turn transmuted
into the idea of current string theory: the universe is made up of
minute quantum strings oscillating in ten or eleven dimensions of
space-time.
2 An influential view, half-way between the point-particle and field views
is the idea that point-particles are embedded in a field, which is created
by, and which acts on, the point-particles. This point-particle/field view,
however, faces the severe problem of an infinitely strong interaction
between point-particle and field, because of the point-like character of
the particles, and because the particles both create, and are acted upon,
by the field. The original point-particle view does not encounter this
problem because each point-particle creates its own field of force which
acts only on other particles.
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Given this dramatically changing sequence of ideas, what hope is
there that any idea formulated today will turn out to be the final truth,
a permanent item of scientific knowledge for the rest of time?
Metaphysical ideas about the ultimate nature of the physical
universe have changed so dramatically because of dramatic
revolutions in theoretical physics. Newton’s theory of gravitation
which, it seems, postulates the existence of a force acting at a
distance (for example between the earth and the sun) makes nonsense
of the corpuscular hypothesis (which holds all interactions are by
contact). The idea of point-particles interacting by means of forces at
a distance arose instead, in response to Newton’s contribution.
Subsequently, Faraday and James Clerk Maxwell developed the
classical theory of the electromagnetic field. This clashes with
Newtonian theory and the idea of the point-particle. It requires the
existence of a new kind physical entity, the classical field. This in
turn became implausible after the advent of quantum theory. This
theory led eventually to the current idea: everything is made up of
minute quantum strings.
It is, in short, these dramatic revolutions in theoretical physics
which have forced physicists to revise their metaphysical ideas about
the nature of the physical universe. That science advances by means
of intermittent revolutions in theory is an idea that has been made
popular by Thomas Kuhn as a result of his book The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions (1962). This Kuhnian view of how science
advances would seem to make it even more implausible to suppose
that we could, today, specify a metaphysical thesis about the ultimate
nature of the physical universe which will stand as true for all time.
How could this be done, when we take into account the dramatic
revolutions that have taken place, in metaphysical ideas, and in
fundamental physical theory, since modern science began? Why
should future physics be any different from past physics?
But these arguments, apparently so persuasive, all fall to the
following consideration. All revolutionary new theories in physics
have one decisive feature in common. The new theory succeeds,
dramatically, in unifying what beforehand appeared to be disparate
phenomena. Before Galileo and, above all, Newton, terrestrial
phenomena were believed to be quite different from astronomical
phenomena, in line with the then prevailing view of Aristotle.
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Newtonian theory (his laws of motion and law of gravitation) apply
equally to terrestrial and astronomical phenomena (the motion of a
thrown stone and the motion of the planets round the sun). Before
Faraday and Maxwell, electricity, magnetism and light seemed to be
three quite distinct phenomena. Maxwell’s theory of the
electromagnetic field unifies electricity and magnetism, and reveals
that light is waves in the electromagnetic field. Before quantum
theory, endlessly many diverse laws were required to specify the
myriad diverse properties of elements and chemical compounds.
After the advent of quantum theory, and the theory of atomic
structure, these myriad diverse laws, corresponding to myriad diverse
properties, become, in principle unified by means of the very few
basic physical properties of sub-atomic particles, electrons, neutrons
and protons, and quantum theory. Likewise, before the advent of
Einstein’s theories of relativity, space, time and gravitation seemed
three quite distinct entities. They are unified by Einstein’s theory of
general relativity, according to which gravitation is a feature of
curved space-time. And yet again, the so-called standard model, the
current quantum theory of fundamental particles and fields, brings
far greater unity to fundamental particles and forces than appeared to
exist before the advent of the theory.
In short, just that which seems to rebut the idea that there is a
permanent metaphysical thesis inherent in the history of physics –
namely a succession of revolutionary new theories which contradict
their predecessors – actually provides dramatic support for the idea.
Every revolutionary physical theory brings greater unity to
theoretical physics. It is precisely the revolutionary theoretical
developments which reveal the persistence of the idea: there is
underlying theoretical unity in nature. The history of physics, despite
its theoretical ruptures, or rather because of them, actually endorses
the point I made above (and will further develop below): physicists
only ever accept unifying theories, even though disunified rivals can
always be concocted which would fit the evidence even better; this
means physics persistently accepts a metaphysical thesis about the
nature of the universe, throughout theoretical revolutions (of past and
future), namely that there is underlying unity in nature. In order to
recognize what persists through revolutions, we need to formulate an
idea more abstract than that of the corpuscle, point-particle, field or
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string – the idea, namely, of some kind of underling theoretical unity
in nature.
At once a number of questions arise. (1) What reason can there
possibly be for holding that this metaphysical thesis is true, or at least
sufficiently likely to be true to be accepted as a fundamental
component of scientific knowledge? (2) Why is it necessary for
science to make this assumption? (3) What precisely does this
metaphysical thesis, that is supposed to be presupposed by science,
assert? (4) How can science set about improving this metaphysical
thesis concerning the comprehensibility of the universe? What
procedures or methods can be adopted by science to give the best
chance of adopting the best available version of this presupposed
metaphysical thesis? (5) How can empirical considerations affect
what metaphysical thesis is accepted given that these theses are
metaphysical, and thus empirically untestable? (6) Does not this
view of science, which holds that science rests on an article of faith,
an untestable, metaphysical assumption, amount to a dreadful
betrayal of scientific rigour and objectivity? (7) What does it mean
to assert that one metaphysical thesis is an improvement over
another, in that it reflects, more accurately, the nature of that which is
ultimately responsible for determining how events unfold? What
does it mean to say of one thesis that it is closer to the truth than
another? (8) How can it be possible for what exists at one instant to
determine what exists next, given David Hume’s decisive arguments
which show that this is not possible? (9) Does “The God-of-Cosmic-
Power exists” really amount to a meaningful, substantial assertion?
(10) Does not quantum theory refute the thesis that only unified
theories are accepted in physics?
In what follows, I shall answer these questions in turn. If what
follows starts to get too technical, read the next section at least, look
at diagram 4, which summarizes the basic point, and go on to chapter
six.
Standard versus Aim-Oriented Empiricism
We have before us two rival views of science which, in past
discussions of these issues I have called standard empiricism and
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aim-oriented empiricism.3
Standard empiricism is the view taken for granted by the outraged
scientist, mentioned above. It holds that in science, no proposition
about the world is accepted as a part of scientific knowledge
independently of evidence. In deciding whether or not to accept a
theory, scientists may legitimately be influenced by the simplicity,
the unity, or the explanatory character of the theory, but this
influence must not operate in such a way that scientists in effect,
surreptitiously perhaps, assume that the universe itself is simple,
unified, or comprehensible. This view of standard empiricism is the
current orthodoxy. It is widely taken for granted, by scientists and
non-scientists alike. It is an explicit or implicit component of many
views about the nature of science, from the views of the logical
positivists to those of Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, and others. 4 If
valid, it makes a nonsense of the claim that science has established
that the God-of-Cosmic-Power exists. But standard empiricism is
not valid. It is, as we shall see in more detail, untenable.
Aim-oriented empiricism is based on the argument that physicists,
in only ever accepting unified, explanatory theories even though
endlessly many empirically more successful disunified rivals are
always available, thereby surreptitiously make a big assumption
about the universe. The universe is such that no seriously disunified
theory is true. It is more or less physically comprehensible. Some
kind of underlying unity in the physical universe – which is what the
God-of-Cosmic-Power is – does actually exist. Natural science is
more rigorous if this substantial, problematic and implicit assumption
is made explicit, so that it can be improved as an integral part of the
scientific enterprise. Given this view of aim-oriented empiricism, it
makes perfect sense to say science has established that the God-of-
Cosmic-Power exists. To this extent, science is a religious
endeavour. It requires, as an article of (rational) faith, that the God-
of-Cosmic-Power exists, and seeks to discover its precise nature.
3 See my (1974); (1976a) or 2nd edition (2009); (1984) or (2007a);
(1998); (2004a), especially the appendix.
4 For the point that Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos all held versions of
standard empiricism see my (2005a). For grounds for holding scientists
accept standard empiricism see my (2004a), ch. 1.
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I now answer in turn the above nine questions. In doing so, I spell
out what aim-oriented empiricism amounts to in more detail, and
give the argument for rejecting standard empiricism and adopting
aim-oriented empiricism in its stead as the new scientific orthodoxy.
(1) What reasons are there for holding that the metaphysical
thesis, supposedly accepted by science, is true?
The answer is that, what reasons there are, are extremely flimsy.
All our knowledge, including all our scientific knowledge, as Karl
Popper for one has tirelessly argued, is conjectural. 5 No scientific
theory can be proved or verified by evidence. All we can hope to do
in science is refute a theory empirically. But it is this which makes
scientific progress possible. As a result of falsifying a theory
empirically, we are forced to try to think up a better theory, one that
successfully predicts everything the refuted theory predicts,
successfully predicts the phenomena that falsified the earlier theory,
and successfully predicts new phenomena. Subjecting our
theoretical scientific guesses to severe empirical testing uncovers
falsity in what we have accepted as scientific knowledge, and forces
us to revise and improve our conjectural scientific knowledge. It is
by means of this process of developing imaginative testable guesses
which are then subjected to severe attempted falsification that
science makes progress.6
And the point can be generalized. In tackling a problem in any
field of human endeavour, in order to give ourselves the best chance
of success we need to make imaginative guesses as to what the
solution to the problem might be; we need then to subject these
5 See Popper (1963); and, at a more technical level, (1959).
6 I am about to argue, I hope it is clear, that this Popperian picture of how
and why science makes progress needs to be revised. Physics only ever
puts forward falsifiable conjectures that are explanatory (even though
empirically more successful non-explanatory conjectures are always
available). This means physics makes the permanent, implicit,
metaphysical assumption that the universe is such that explanations exist
to be found – the universe is more or less physically comprehensible, in
other words. This implicit assumption needs to be made explicit within
science so that it can be critically assessed in an attempt to improve it.
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guesses to severe criticism (especially when we attempt to put them
into practice), in the hope of discovering the best available solution.
The big metaphysical assumption of science – that the universe is
more or less physically comprehensible – is, like our very best
accepted scientific theories, a conjecture. As in the case of our best
scientific theories, there are no arguments which demonstrate that the
assumption is true, or likely to be true.
Despite this, there are quite strong arguments for holding that this
conjecture needs to be accepted as a rather secure item of theoretical
scientific knowledge, an item that is more secure, indeed, than our
best scientific theories. This takes us straight to our next question.
(2) Why is it necessary for science to make this assumption?
I have already indicated why science must assume that the
universe is more or less physically comprehensible, whether this is
acknowledged or not. I now spell out the argument in a little more
detail.7
In physics, two considerations govern acceptance of a theory:
empirical success8, and the unified or explanatory character9 of the
theory in question. A disunified, “patchwork quilt” theory, made
up of a number of different laws which apply to different ranges of
phenomena, would never be accepted in physics however
empirically successful it might prove to be if considered.10 In
7 In what follows I summarize arguments spelled out in greater detail in
the works referred to in notes 3 and 4.
8 What does “empirical success” mean here, given the earlier admission
that no theory can be empirically verified? It means that the theory in
question has been subjected to severe attempted empirical falsification,
and (ideally) has survived, unrefuted. It means, in addition, that the
theory successfully predicts more phenomena than any (unified) rival
theory.
9 We may take “unified” and “explanatory”, in the present context, to be
equivalent. What “unity” of theory means here will be clarified further
in the text below.
10 This is not quite correct. Quantum theory is an accepted theory; but it
is just such a “patchwork quilt” theory, as we shall see in section (10)
below. We shall also see in section (10) that this case of quantum theory
does not refute the general argument.
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short, in physics, unified (or explanatory) theories are only ever
accepted, even though it is always the case that endlessly many
disunified, “patchwork quilt” rival theories can be concocted
which would be even more empirically successful if considered.
(A physical theory is unified if it attributes the same laws to the
range to phenomena to which it applies.)
Now comes the crucial point. In persistently accepting unified
theories only, even though endlessly many empirically more
successful disunified rival theories are always available, physics in
effect makes a big persistent assumption: all seriously disunified
theories are false. Physical laws governing phenomena are unified.
The universe is such that the yet-to-be-discovered true theory of
everything is more or less unified, or explanatory
This means standard empiricism is false. Persistent acceptance
of unified theories only, even though empirically more successful
disunified rivals are available, means that physics does accept one
big assumption about the nature of the universe permanently,
entirely independently of evidence – even, in a sense, at odds with
the evidence. Standard empiricism is untenable, and must be
rejected.
If scientists only accepted theories that postulate atoms, and
persistently rejected theories that postulate different basic physical
entities such as fields – even though many field theories can easily
be, and have been, formulated which are even more empirically
successful than the atomic theories – the implication would surely
be quite clear. Scientists would in effect be assuming that the
world is made up of atoms, all other possibilities being ruled out.
The atomic assumption would be built into the way the scientific
community accepts and rejects theories – built into the implicit
methods of the community, methods which include: reject all
theories that postulate entities other than atoms, whatever their
empirical success might be. The scientific community would
accept the assumption: the universe is such that no non-atomic
theory is true.
Just the same holds for a scientific community which rejects all
disunified rivals to accepted theories, even though these rivals
would be even more empirically successful if they were
considered. Such a community in effect makes the assumption: the
133
universe is such that no disunified theory is true (unless implied by
a true unified theory).
The alert reader may have noted a weak link in this argument.
What grounds do we have for holding that endlessly many
empirically more successful but disunified rivals to any accepted
physical theory can always be concocted? Well, consider any
accepted physical theory, T say. T might be Newtonian theory,
quantum theory, or Einstein’s theory of general relativity.
However empirically successful and well established T may be,
there will always be a range of phenomena, B, that the theory
Diagram 3
Empirically Successful, Disunified Rival Theories
cannot (as yet) predict, a range of phenomena, C, that ostensibly
refute T, and a range of phenomena, D, which lie outside the
predictive range of T altogether: see diagram 3. This means a rival
theory, T* can be concocted which meets with empirical success
throughout the range of phenomena A to D. T* is just like T for
phenomena A, while for phenomena B, C and D, T just
incorporates the empirical laws that describe these phenomena.
Unquestionably, T* is empirically more successful than T. T*
successfully predicts everything T predicts; it predicts phenomena
that T fails to predict (B and D), and is not refuted where T is
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ostensibly refuted (C). Endlessly many horribly disunified but
empirically more successful rivals to T, like T*, may be concocted
along these lines by, for example, modifying T for phenomena for
which it has not yet been tested, and then carrying through a
procedure similar to the one indicated, used to concoct T*.
The conclusion is inescapable. In persistently accepting unified
theories, like T, in preference to endlessly many empirically more
acceptable but disunified rivals, like T*, physics makes a persistent
assumption about the nature of the universe, independent of
empirical considerations, to the effect that it is such that no
seriously disunified theory is true. Standard empiricism,
presupposed by the above argument against the thesis that physics
has established that the God-of-Cosmic-Power exists, really is
untenable and must be rejected.
That physics makes metaphysical or cosmological assumptions
really ought not to be thought surprising or controversial. Even
our most mundane items of common sense knowledge make such
assumptions. In so far as I “know” I can, for the next two minutes,
continue to sit in the chair I am sitting in as I type these words, I
“know” something about the entire cosmos. I know that nowhere
in the cosmos is there a vast conflagration occurring which will
spread almost instantaneously to engulf and destroy the earth, my
chair, and me, in the next two minutes.11 If even meagre, almost
trivial items of common sense knowledge such as this contain
(some) knowledge about the entire cosmos, it should not surprise
us that the theories of physics, embodying vastly greater amounts
of knowledge, should turn out to contain some knowledge about
the entire cosmos too.
11 If I know p, and p implies q (and I know it) then I know q too. Me
continuing to sit in my chair (p) implies no conflagration is occurring
anywhere which will destroy me (q) – and I know p implies q. Hence
knowing I can continue to sit in my chair (p) means I know no
conflagration is occurring anywhere which will destroy me (q). Even our
most trivial common sense knowledge has a cosmological dimension to
it.
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(3) What precisely does the metaphysical thesis that is
presupposed by science, assert?
I have already indicated what the answer to this question is. In
persistently accepting unified theories only, physics implicitly
assumes that the universe is such that no seriously disunified theory
is true. But what exactly does this mean? How seriously disunified
must a theory be to be unacceptable? And if a disunified theory is, in
effect, two or more distinct theories, postulating distinct laws, stuck
artificially together, how do we distinguish the case of one disunified
theory made up of three distinct “patchwork quilt” parts stuck
arbitrarily together, from the case of three unified theories? Cannot
disunified theories be turned into unified theories by the simple
dodge of increasing the number of theories in the way indicated?
The way to avoid this dodge is to consider the degree of disunity
of all fundamental theories in physics. We consider T (let us call it),
made up of all current fundamental physical theories which, together,
suffice to apply to all known possible physical phenomena. (If there
are phenomena which do not, as yet, have a theory that applies to
them, then we include in T the experimental laws governing these
phenomena.) T today consists of Einstein’s theory of general
relativity, and the quantum theory of fundamental particles and the
forces between them – the so-called “standard model”. We can at
once say that T today is disunified at least to degree 2, because it is
made up two very different theories stuck artificially together,
Einstein’s theory of general relativity which applies to gravitation
and to space and time in the large, and the standard model, a
quantum theory which applies to fundamental particles (such as
electrons and quarks) and the forces between them (such as the
electromagnetic force). Actually, T today is much more seriously
disunified than this because the standard model is itself seriously
disunified, in that it is about three different forces, and many
different particles with different properties such as their values of
charge and mass.12
12 T is even more disunified if dark matter, for which there is, at present
no theory, really does exist. Dark matter has revealed its presence so far
only through its gravitational effects. Galaxies rotate so fast that, unless
there is invisible dark matter in addition to the observed matter, the
galaxies would fly apart. There is always the faint possibility, however,
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How, precisely and in general, do we judge how disunified a
physical theory, T, is? The crucial step is to attend, not to the theory
itself (its form, it axiomatic structure, or anything of that kind), but to
what the theory asserts about the world. And for full unity we
require that T asserts that the same laws govern all the phenomena to
which T applies. (For full theoretical unity, it does not matter if the
linguistic form of the laws changes as we move from one range of
phenomena to another, as long as what is asserted remains the same.)
If the range of phenomena to which T applies can be split up into N
sub-domains, different laws governing the phenomena in each of
these sub-domains, then T is disunified to degree N (where N is
some integer). If N = 1, then the theory in question, T, is fully
unified.
If the true “theory of everything”, T, is unified, with N = 1, then
the physical universe is made up of two parts or aspects: V and U.
V stands for that which varies. It is made up of everything in the
universe which varies or changes, from time to time and place to
place. In a universe made up of particles, V would be the variable
positions and velocities of the particles. Or, if the universe is made
up of a physical field, V is the varying intensity of the field, from
moment to moment, and place to place. U, on the other hand, stands
for that which is unchanging – that which is the same everywhere, at
all times and places, throughout all possible phenomena, and
determines the way V does vary. If the universe is made up of a
physical field, then U would be that property or aspect of the field
that is the same, everywhere, throughout all change, and determines
the way the variable aspects of the field do vary, with the passage of
time. It is U that is the physical God-of Cosmic-Power.
The nature of U is specified by the true, unified, physical theory of
everything, T. V is specified by so-called initial conditions: these
specify, at any given instant, the instantaneous, variable physical
state of an isolated bit of the universe.
that Newton’s and Einstein’s theories are seriously wrong at great
distances, and the correct theory of gravitation would predict that the
galaxies hold themselves together without additional unseen dark matter
– dark matter being non-existent.
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U determines the way V varies as follows. Let there be a physical
system isolated from all external influences (which could be the
entire universe). Then, given a precise specification of V at some
definite instant, and given a precise specification of U, by the
physical theory T, subsequent instantaneous, variable states of the
system, V, are logically entailed (as long as the system remains
isolated). Given that the initial variable state at time to is Vto, and the
state at a subsequent time is Vt, then we might write the way in
which U determines the way in which V varies like this:
U + VtoVt.
This presupposes determinism. It may well be, however, that
nature is fundamentally probabilistic, rather than deterministic. In
this case U + Vto would determine many, even perhaps infinitely
many, different possible Vt, and would assign a probability of
occurrence to each. In a fundamentally probabilistic universe, the
present only determines the future probabilistically.
If the universe is disunified to degree N, then there is no one
invariant U running through all phenomena, actual and possible.
Instead, there are N distinct Us – we may call them U1, U2 . . . UN –
each one determining the way V varies for some distinct range of
phenomena. In this case the God-of-Cosmic-Power is U1 + U2 + . . .
+ UN.
But now there is a complication – or rather, a refinement. Given a
theory that is disunified to degree N > 1, the question can arise as to
how different, in what way different, are laws in one range of
phenomena from laws in another range of phenomena – or how
different U1, U2 . . . UN are from one another. Some ways in which
sets of laws can differ, one from the other, can be much more
dramatic, much more serious, than other ways. This gives rise to
different kinds of disunity, some being much more serious than
others.
Here are five different ways in which dynamical laws can differ
for different ranges of phenomena, and thus five different kinds of
disunity.
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Imagine that the physically possible phenomena, to which the
theory T applies, are spread out before us. A phenomenon, here, is a
physical system, a group of interacting particles for example, located
somewhere in space and evolving in time. We are concerned with
physical phenomena that are possible, not just with actual
phenomena. For simplicity, let us assume that N = 2 throughout.
The phenomena to which T applies split up into two regions, one set
of laws applying in one region, a more or less different set of laws
applying in the other region. (N might be any integer, 6 say, or 42,
the bigger it is, so the greater the degree of disunity of T, the theory
in question. We take N = 2 to keep things as simple as possible for
expositional reasons.)
There are now the following possibilities to consider.
(1) The laws specified by T are different in different regions of
space, or different at different times. This is the most serious kind of
disunity. An example would be a “patchwork quilt” version of
Newton’s law of gravitation, which asserts that gravitation is an
attractive force up to midnight tonight, and a repulsive force after
midnight. (Here, T is disunified to degree N = 2 in a type (1) way.)
(2) T differs in N distinct ranges of physical variables other than
position or time. Example: F = Gm1m2/d2 for all bodies except for
those made of gold of mass greater than 1,000 tons in outer space
within a region of 1 mile of each other, in which case F = Gm1m2/d4.
Here, T is disunified to degree N = 2 in a type (2) way.
(3) T is unified except that it postulates N distinct, spatially
localized objects, each with its own unique dynamic properties.
Example: T asserts that everything occurs as Newtonian theory asserts,
except that there is one object in the universe, of mass 8 tons, such that, for
any two bodies both up to 8 miles from the centre of mass of this object,
the force of gravitation between the two bodies is repulsive rather than
attractive. The object only interacts by means of gravitation. Here, T is
disunified to degree N + 1 = 2, in a type (3) way.
(4) T postulates N distinct forces. Example: T postulates particles
that interact by means of Newtonian gravitation; some of these also
interact by means of an electrostatic force F = Kq1q2/d2, this force being
attractive if q1 and q2 are oppositely charged, otherwise being repulsive,
the force being much stronger than gravitation. Here, T is disunified to
degree N = 2 in a type (4) way.
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(5) T postulates one force but N distinct kinds of particle.
Example: T postulates particles that interact by means of Newtonian
gravitation, there being three kinds of particles, of mass m, 2m and 3m.
Here, T is disunified to degree N = 3 in a type (5) way.
(1) to (5) are to be understood as accumulative, so that each
presupposes N = 1 as far as its predecessors are concerned.13
These five facets of disunity all exemplify, it should be noted, the
same basic idea: disunity arises when different dynamical laws
govern the evolution of physical states in different ranges of
possible phenomena to which the theory T applies. Thus, if T
postulates more than one force, or kind of particle, then in different
ranges of possible phenomena, different force laws will operate. In
one range of possible phenomena, one kind of force operates, in
another range, other forces operate. Or in one range of phenomena,
there is only one kind of particle, while in another range there is
only another kind of particle. The five distinct facets of unity, (1) to
(5) arise, as I have said, because of the five different ways in which
content can vary from one range of possible phenomena to another,
some differences being more different than others.
Let me emphasize once again that the above five facets of unity
all concern the content of a theory, and not its form, which may vary
drastically from one formulation to another. One might, for
example, split space up into N regions, and introduce special
terminology for each region so that Newton’s laws look very
different as one goes from one spatial region to another. Thus, for
one spatial region one might choose to write d2 as “d6”, even though
“d6” is interpreted to assert d2. As one goes from region to region,
the form of the theory, what is written down on paper, varies
dramatically. It might seem that this is a theory disunified to degree
N in a type (1) way – the most serious kind of disunity of all. But as
long as what is asserted, the content, is the same in all spatial
regions, the theory is actually unified in a type (1) way, with N = 1.
It deserves to be noted in passing that this solution to the problem
of what it means to say of a theory that it is unified also solves the
problem of what it means to say of a theory that it is explanatory. In
13 Elsewhere I have spelled out further aspects or kinds of disunity that
involve symmetry: see my (1998), ch. 4; (2004a), appendix, section 2;
(2007a), ch. 14, section 2.
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order to be explanatory, a theory must (a) be unified and (b) of high
empirical content.14
The 5 varieties of theoretical unity, encapsulated in (1) to (5) above, can
be collapsed into one basic requirement:
Requirement for Unity: T is disunified to degree N if, given all
phenomena predicted by T to be possible (i.e. such that the phenomena
occur in accordance with T), then there are N regions in which what T
asserts in any one region is different from all the other regions. For
theoretical unity, we require that N = 1.
One proviso needs to be added. As we range through the possible
phenomena predicted by T, we always consider only the least part of T
that is required to predict the phenomena in question. If T postulates two
kinds of particle, A and B, then in all those possible phenomena consisting
only of particles A, only that part of T is specified which predicts how
particles A interact and evolve; the part of T that predict how particles B
interact, and how particles A and B interact, is excluded (if it can be
excluded). We consider, always, the least possible content of T required
to predict the evolution of the phenomenon in question. If the true theory
of everything, T, is disunified to degree N, so that that which determines
how V varies is made up of N distinct parts, U1, U2, . . . UN, then
we require that each distinct part of T, namely T1, T2, . . . TN
specifies precisely the physical nature of each corresponding U1,
U2, . . . UN, no more, and no less.
It deserves to be noted that if T, otherwise unified, fails to unify
matter and space-time, so that one possible physical state is empty
space-time, with all matter removed, then T is not fully unified.
That part of T specifying empty space-time and no more, will be
different from that part of T specifying how matter evolves in space-
time. The above Requirement for Unity demands, for full unity, that
matter and space-time are unified – so that matter is an aspect of
space-time, or space-time is an aspect of matter, or both are aspects
of some third unified entity.15
14 I have sketched an account of what it is for a theory to be unified, but
have not said anything about simplicity. For that, see my (1998), ch. 4,
section 16; (2004a), pp. 172-4. It is a great success of the theory that it
sharply distinguishes the two notions of unity and simplicity.
15 For further details concerning the account of unity of theory given
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(4) What should the metaphysical presupposition of science be?
How can it be improved?
It has been established that science accepts, as a part of scientific
knowledge, that the universe is such that no seriously disunified
physical theory is true. And what it means to say of a physical
theory that it is “disunified” has been clarified. But this still leaves
open the question of precisely what metaphysical thesis science
ought to accept (granted that some metaphysical thesis is inevitably
implicitly accepted as a result of the persistent acceptance of unified
theories only, even though empirically more successful disunified
rivals can always be concocted).
There is a range of options. One possibility would be to say that
physics ought to accept, rather modestly, at any given stage, that
metaphysical thesis which asserts that the universe is such that the
true theory of all physical phenomena is at least somewhat more
unified than the then accepted body of fundamental physical theory
(at present general relativity and the standard model). A much more
immodest possibility is that physics should accept that metaphysical
thesis which asserts that the true theory of all physical phenomena is
wholly unified, with N = 1. There are even more immodest
possibilities, as we have seen, such as string theory.
Science must make some kind of choice. The choice that is made
will have a profound affect on scientific progress, on our success or
failure in discovering what kind of universe this is. This is because
the choice that is made affects what physical theories are sought,
and accepted. Making a bad choice will sabotage scientific
progress. Science only got going in the 17th century because Galileo
(and others) made a rather good choice of basic metaphysics, which
led to the adoption of fruitful methods. But choosing is fraught with
uncertainty, and almost inevitable error. We are almost bound to
make the wrong guess about the ultimate nature of the universe.
Metaphysical theses, being untestable, cannot be subjected to
straightforward empirical assessment. How, then, is science to
choose? And how can it best set about improving its choice?
In order to solve these problems – as I have argued at length
elsewhere – we need to reject the current orthodox conception of
here, see works referred to in notes 13 and 14.
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science of standard empiricism and adopt instead the more rigorous
conception of science, already mentioned, that I have called aim-
oriented empiricism16 The basic idea of aim-oriented empiricism is
that we need to see physics (and natural science more generally) as
making not one, but a hierarchy of assumptions concerning the
unity, comprehensibility and knowability of the universe, these
assumptions becoming less and less substantial as one goes up the
hierarchy and thus becoming more and more likely to be true, and
also becoming such that their truth is increasingly a requirement for
science, or the acquisition of knowledge, to be possible at all: see
diagram 4. The idea is that in this way we separate out what is most
likely to be true, and not in need of revision, at and near the top of
the hierarchy, from what is most likely to be false, and most in need
of criticism and revision, near the bottom of the hierarchy.
Evidence, at level 1, and assumptions high up in the hierarchy, are
rather firmly accepted, as being most likely to be true (although still
open to revision): this is then used to criticize, and to try to improve,
theses at levels 2 and 3 (and perhaps 4), where falsity is most likely
to be located.
At the top there is the relatively insubstantial assumption that the
universe is such that we can acquire some knowledge of our local
circumstances. If this assumption is false, we will not be able to
acquire knowledge whatever we assume. We are justified in
accepting this assumption permanently as a part of our knowledge,
even though we have no grounds for holding it to be true. As we
descend the hierarchy, the assumptions become increasingly
substantial and thus increasingly likely to be false. At level 5 there
is the rather substantial assumption that the universe is
comprehensible in some way or other, the universe being such that
there is just one kind of explanation for all phenomena. At level 4
there is the more specific, and thus more substantial assumption
that the universe is physically comprehensible, it being such that
there is some yet-to-be-discovered, true, unified “theory of
16 For a detailed exposition and defence of aim-oriented empiricism see
my (1998); (2004a), ch. 1 and Appendix; or (2007a), ch. 14). For earlier
accounts of aim-oriented empiricism see my (1974); (1976a); (1984);
and (1993a). See also my (2002b); (2005a); (2010a); and (2010b).
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everything” (with N = 1). This thesis may be called physicalism:
it asserts that the God-of-Cosmic-Power exists. At level 3 there is
the even more specific, and thus even more substantial assumption
that the universe is physically comprehensible in a more or less
specific way, suggested by current accepted fundamental physical
theories. Examples of assumptions made at this level, taken from
the history of physics, include those already mentioned, from the
17th century corpuscular hypothesis to today’s string theory. Given
Diagram 4
Aim-Oriented Empiricism
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this historical record of dramatically changing ideas at this level,
and given the relatively highly specific and substantial character of
successive assumptions made at this level, we can be reasonably
confident that the best assumption available at any stage in the
development of physics at this level will be false, and will need
future revision. At level 2 there are the accepted fundamental
theories of physics, currently Einstein’s theory of general relativity
and the so-called “standard model”, the quantum theory of
fundamental particles and the forces between them. Here, if
anything, we can be even more confident that current theories are
false, despite their immense empirical success. This confidence
comes partly from the vast empirical content of these theories, and
partly from the historical record. The greater the content of a
proposition the more likely it is to be false; the fundamental
theories of physics, general relativity and the standard model, have
such vast empirical content that this in itself almost guarantees
falsity. And the historical record backs this up; Kepler’s laws of
planetary motion, and Galileo’s laws of terrestrial motion are
corrected by Newtonian theory, which is in turn corrected by
special and general relativity; classical physics is corrected by
quantum theory, in turn corrected by relativistic quantum theory,
quantum field theory and the standard model. Each new theory in
physics reveals that predecessors are false. Indeed, if the level 4
assumption of aim-oriented empiricism is correct, then all current
physical theories are false, since this assumption asserts that the
true physical theory of everything is unified, and the totality of
current fundamental physical theory, general relativity plus the
standard model, is notoriously disunified.
Finally, at level 1 there are accepted empirical data, low level,
corroborated, empirical laws.
In order to be acceptable, an assumption at any level from 6 to 3
must (as far as possible) be compatible with, and a special case of,
the assumption above in the hierarchy; at the same time it must be
(or promise to be) empirically fruitful in the sense that successive
accepted physical theories increasingly successfully accord with
(or exemplify) the assumption. At level 2, those physical theories
are accepted which are sufficiently (a) empirically successful and
(b) in accord with the best available assumption at level 3 (or level
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4). Corresponding to each assumption, at any level from 7 to 3,
there is a methodological principle, represented by sloping dotted
lines in diagram 4, requiring that theses lower down in the
hierarchy are compatible with the given assumption.
When theoretical physics has completed its central task, and the
true theory of everything, T, has been discovered, then T will in
principle (not in practice) successfully predict all empirical
phenomena at level 1, and will entail the assumption at level 3,
which will in turn entail the assumption at level 4, and so on up the
hierarchy. As it is, physics has not completed its task, T has not
(yet) been discovered, and we are ignorant of the nature of the
universe. This ignorance is reflected in clashes between theses at
different levels of aim-oriented empiricism. There are clashes
between levels 1 and 2, 2 and 3, and 3 and 4. The attempt to
resolve these clashes drives physics forward.
In seeking to resolve these clashes between levels, influences
can go in both directions. Thus, given a clash between levels 1 and
2, this may lead to the modification, or replacement of the relevant
theory at level 2; but, on the other hand, it may lead to the
discovery that the relevant experimental result is not correct for
any of a number of possible reasons, and needs to be modified. In
general, however, such a clash leads to the rejection of the level 2
theory rather than the level 1 experimental result; the latter are held
onto more firmly than the former, in part because experimental
results have vastly less empirical content than theories, in part
because of our confidence in the results of observation and direct
experimental manipulation (especially after expert critical
examination and repetition). Again, given a clash between levels 2
and 3, this may lead to the rejection of the relevant level 2 theory
(because it is disunified, at odds with the current assumption at
level 3); but, on the other hand, it may lead to the rejection of the
level 3 assumption and the adoption, instead, of a new assumption
(as has happened a number of times in the history of physics, as we
have seen). The rejection of the current level 3 assumption is
likely to take place if the level 2 theory, which clashes with it, is
highly successful empirically, and furthermore has the effect of
increasing unity in the totality of fundamental physical theory
overall, so that clashes between levels 2 and 4 are decreased. In
146
general, however, clashes between levels 2 and 3 are resolved by
the rejection or modification of theories at level 2 rather than the
assumption at level 3, in part because of the vastly greater
empirical content of level 2 theories, in part because of the
empirical fruitfulness of the level 3 assumption (in the sense
indicated above).
It is conceivable that the clash between level 2 theories and the
level 4 assumption might lead to the revision of the latter rather
than the former. This happened when Galileo rejected the then
current level 4 assumption of Aristotelianism,17 and replaced it
with the idea that “the book of nature is written in the language of
mathematics” (an early precursor of our current level 4
assumption). The whole idea of aim-oriented empiricism is,
however, that as we go up the hierarchy of assumptions we are
increasingly unlikely to encounter error, and the need for revision.
The higher up we go, the more firmly assumptions are upheld, the
more resistance there is to modification.
Aim-oriented empiricism is put forward as a framework which
makes explicit metaphysical assumptions implicit in the manner in
which physical theories are accepted and rejected, and which, at
the same time, facilitates the critical assessment and improvement
of these assumptions with the improvement of knowledge,
criticism being concentrated where it is most needed, low down in
the hierarchy. Within a framework of relatively insubstantial,
unproblematic and permanent assumptions and methods (high up
in the hierarchy), much more substantial, problematic assumptions
and associated methods (low down in the hierarchy) can be revised
and improved with improving theoretical knowledge. There is
something like positive feedback between improving knowledge
and improving (low-level) assumptions and methods – that is,
knowledge-about-how-to-improve-knowledge. Science adapts its
nature, its assumptions and methods, to what it discovers about the
nature of the universe. This, I suggest, is the nub of scientific
17 Aristotelianism holds that the earth is at the centre of the universe,
objects fall because they seek to get to the centre of the earth, things
change because they seek to realize an inherent potential, and heavenly
bodies are perfect, unchanging, and move uniformly in circles round the
earth.
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rationality, and the methodological key to the great success of
modern science.
Putting this aim-oriented empiricist methodology into scientific
practice gives us our best hope, I claim, of improving metaphysical
assumptions about the nature of the universe as science proceeds.
It provides, what standard empiricism cannot, a rational, if fallible
and non-mechanical method for the discovery of new theories, and
enables science to improve its methods in the light of what is
discovered about the nature of the universe.18
Once standard empiricism is recognized to be the untenable view
that it is, and aim-oriented empiricism is accepted in its stead, it
becomes clear that physicalism – the thesis that the God-of-
Cosmic-Power exists – is indeed a basic component of current
scientific knowledge. It is more firmly established than any
accepted physical theory. We have good grounds, as we have
seen, that all accepted theories, despite their great empirical
success, are false. Empirically successful theories that clash too
severely with physicalism are rejected, for that reason. All
scientific revolutions in physics since Galileo have brought physics
closer to capturing physicalism as a testable physical theory of all
phenomena, in that they have created greater unity in theoretical
physics. Physicalism might be overthrown in the future, but it
would cause a rupture in science far greater than that brought about
by the advent of Einstein’s theories, or of quantum theory. Not
since Galileo’s break with Aristotelianism some 400 years ago
have ideas at level 4 been radically revised.
There are two versions of physicalism: reductionist physicalism
and experiential physicalism. The first holds that only the physical
exists (everything being in principle reducible to fundamental
physical entities interacting with one another, U + V of the true,
unified physical theory of everything, T. The second holds that the
experiential exists in addition to the physical, and cannot even in
principle be reduced to the physical. In chapter three I spelled out
the case for this latter view of experiential physicalism.
18 For these and other benefits of aim-oriented empiricism see works
referred to in note 16.
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(5) How can empirical considerations affect what metaphysical
thesis is accepted given that these theses are metaphysical, and
thus empirically untestable?
The answer to this enigma is I hope clear, as a result of what I
said briefly above. Even though a metaphysical thesis is not
empirically testable, it may be empirically fruitful in the sense that,
successive attempts to capture the thesis by means of testable
theories – successive testable theories which draw ever closer to
the metaphysical thesis – meet with great empirical success. A
metaphysical thesis may, in other words, lead to an empirically
successful research programme. Given two rival metaphysical
theses, M1 and M2, M1 may be much more empirically fruitful than
M2, successive attempts to develop theories that accord with M1
meeting with much greater empirical success than attempts to
develop theories in accord with M2. Aim-oriented empiricism
provides the methodological framework best able to help the
development of new metaphysical theses likely to be empirically
fruitful, and best able to assess the empirical fruitfulness of these
metaphysical theses, especially those at level 3.
(6) Does not this view of science, which holds that science rests on
an article of faith, an untestable, metaphysical assumption,
amount to a dreadful betrayal of scientific rigour and
objectivity?
The answer is a resounding No! It is all the other way round.
Standard empiricism lacks rigour because it fails to acknowledge
highly problematic and influential metaphysical theses implicit in
the persistent preference of physics for unified, explanatory
theories. Aim-oriented empiricism is more rigorous than standard
empiricism because it makes explicit these problematic, influential
and implicit assumptions, and subjects them to the best possible
critical appraisal, in terms of their empirical fruitfulness.
What is being appealed to here is:
Principle of Intellectual Rigour: An assumption that is
substantial, influential, problematic and implicit needs to be made
explicit so that it can be critically assessed, so that alternatives can
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be considered, in the hope that it can be improved.19
Standard empiricism violates this principle of intellectual rigour.
Aim-oriented empiricism may be regarded as emerging as a result
of a series of applications of this principle – the hierarchy of
metaphysical theses and associated methods emerging as a result.
(7) What does it mean to assert that one metaphysical thesis is an
improvement over another?
A basic aim of science – or of natural philosophy, as aim-oriented
empiricist science should perhaps be called – is to discover what kind
of universe this is. In pursuing physics we hope to accept
metaphysical theses, at levels 3 and 4, which are true. The chances
are, however, that at level 3 (and perhaps at level 4 as well) the
currently accepted thesis is false. Improving this thesis involves
accepting a thesis that is less false, that is closer to the truth, that
captures more accurately the nature of that which ultimately
determines the way events unfold. But what does it mean to say of
two rival metaphysical theses, M1 and M2, both false, that M2 is
“closer to the truth” in this way?
We can make sense of this via the notion of one physical theory,
T2, being closer to the truth, T, than another theory, T1, where T is
the as-yet-undiscovered true theory of all physical phenomena. As
we have seen, physics advances from one false theory to another,
each new theory correcting its predecessor. Thus Newton’s theory
corrects Kepler’s laws. Kepler holds that the planets move in
ellipses round the sun. Newton’s theory predicts that the planets
would move in ellipses if the sun did not move, and the planets did
not attract each other. But the sun does move, as a result of being
attracted by the planets by gravitation; and furthermore the planets
attract each other gravitationally, which makes then deviate from
precise ellipses. But even though Newton’s and Kepler’s theories
contradict each other, there is, nevertheless, a sense in which
Kepler’s theory can be extracted from Newton’s. We can do this
19 “Improved” means “made less false”. What this means is explicated in
the next section; see also Maxwell (2007, chapter 14, section 5, “The
Solution to the Problem of Verisimilitude”).
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in three steps. First, we restrict Newton’s theory to systems
enclosed in a region of space. Second, we let the masses of all the
bodies but one (the most massive) tend to zero. In the limit, the
zero-mass bodies trace out paths that are ellipses around the body –
the sun – that has retained its mass. The form of Kepler’s law has
been extracted from Newton’s theory. We then reinterpret
Kepler’s law to apply to solar systems with planets that have non-
zero mass. It is this final step of reinterpretation that introduces
error (from a Newtonian perspective).
We can now specify what it means to say T2 is closer to the truth,
T, than T1. This is the case if T2 can be extracted from T, and T1 can
be extracted from T2, by means of the kind of steps just indicated in
the case of Newton and Kepler, but not vice versa. That is, T2 cannot
be extracted, in this way, from T1.
Consider, now, the false metaphysical theses M1 and M2. M2 is
closer to the truth, T, than M1 is if there is a theory, T2, compatible
with M2, and a theory T1 compatible with M1 such that T2 is closer to
the truth, T, than T1 is, but not vice versa. (We require, that is, that
there is no T1 compatible with M1 and no T2 compatible with M2
such that T1 is closer to the truth, T, than T2 is.)20
(8) How is it be possible for what exists at one instant to
determine what exists next, given David Hume’s decisive
arguments which show that this is not possible?
The God-of-Cosmic-Power is, in one crucial respect, quite
different from God as conceived by Christianity or Islam. It is
impersonal, a physical entity, utterly indifferent to and unaware of
the suffering of humanity that it causes, and incapable of knowing
anything about it (or anything else). It has no consciousness, no
knowledge, no purpose. Because it is an impersonal physical entity
incapable of knowing about human suffering, or indeed anything, we
can forgive It all the terrible things It does.
In other respects, however, the God-of-Cosmic-Power does have
some of the attributes of the God of traditional Christianity or Islam.
20 This solves a long-standing problem in the philosophy of science
known as the problem of “verisimilitude”. For further details see my
2007a, From Knowledge to Wisdom, chapter 14, section 5).
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It is omnipresent, eternal and unchanging. And It is omnipotent. It
determines the way all events unfold (perhaps probabilistically).
Given the existence of U, the God-of-Cosmic-Power at some instant
in time, and given V, the instantaneous variable state of the universe
at that moment, subsequent states are necessarily determined
(perhaps probabilistically).
But how can this be? A famous argument due to David Hume is
generally held to have demolished this idea that what exists at one
instant necessarily determines what exists at subsequent instants.
Hume argued that we can always imagine a change in the course of
nature, a change in physical laws, which proves that such a change is
always possible.21
As it happens, this argument of Hume was decisively demolished
some forty years ago (at the time of writing) in my second published
paper.22 The counter argument to Hume goes like this. Theoretical
physics needs to be reinterpreted so that theories are understood to
attribute necessitating properties to postulated physical entities. A
necessitating physical property is somewhat like an ordinary,
common sense dispositional property, such as solid, rigid, sticky,
opaque or inflammable. In every case, in attributing such a property
to an object we imply something about how that object would behave
were it to be subjected to such and such conditions. Thus, in
declaring an object to be inflammable, we imply that it will burst into
flames if exposed to a naked flame. If it does not, then it is not
inflammable. In other words, attributing such a common sense
dispositional property to an object implies that that object will exhibit
law-like behaviour in such and such conditions.
The same goes, but with far greater precision and content, for
necessitating physical properties of physical entities. To say of a
particle that it has an electric charge is to say that it will accelerate in
such and such a law-like way in an electric field. If it is electrically
charged, and if it is in the electric field then, of necessity, it will
behave in the prescribed law-like way. If it doesn’t, then either the
21 “We can at least conceive a change in the course of nature; which
sufficiently proves that such a change is not absolutely impossible”,
Hume (1959), p. 91. See also Part III, sections II-VI and XIV-XV.
22 See my (1968a). See also my (1998), pp. 141-155.
152
particle wasn’t charged, or there wasn’t the electric field. But if both
exist then, of necessity, the particle moves in the prescribed law-like
fashion. The necessitating property of what may be called “classical
electric charge” is such that the laws of classical electrodynamics are
implicit in the meaning of the term used to attribute this property to a
particle. As a result, descriptive propositions which do no more than
specify the instantaneous state of an isolated physical system can
imply subsequent states of the system. The descriptive propositions,
in attributing necessitating properties (such as “classical electric
charge”) to physical entities of the system, implicitly specify the laws
these entities must obey, and it is this which enables the descriptive
propositions to imply propositions which describe subsequent states
of the system.23
It is in this way that what exists at one instant can determine what
exists at subsequent instants. Even if such “necessary connections”
exist between successive states of affairs, it doesn’t mean we can
know with certainty that they exist. In order to know that, we would
have to know with certainty that the relevant physical entities exist,
and have the relevant necessitating properties, and that we can never
know with certainty, any more than we can know with certainty that
physical theories are true.
However, if a physical theory, such as classical electrodynamics, is
to attribute such necessitating properties to particles and fields it
must be formulated in a way which, in one respect, differs radically
from the way such a theory would ordinarily be formulated. The
laws of the theory must all be regarded as analytic propositions.
That is, they must be interpreted to be statements like “all bachelors
are unmarried”, true in virtue of the meaning of the constituent terms,
and devoid of factual content. If it is built into the meaning of
“classical electric charge” that a particle with this property obeys the
laws of classical electromagnetism, then a law asserting that a
particle with this property obeys the laws of classical
electrodynamics tells us nothing new. It must of course be true. It is
23 Strictly speaking, it is only a specification of what exists at an instant
throughout the universe that can logically imply subsequent states –
unless, in the case of an isolated system, one adds the assertion “The
system will remain isolated for the period in question”.
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true in virtue of the meaning that has been assigned to “classical
electric charge”. Such a law tells us nothing empirical; it just spells
out explicitly what is implicit in the meaning of “classical electric
charge”.
A physical theory that can be used to attribute necessitating
properties to physical entities such as particles must, then, be
interpreted in such a way that all the laws of the theory merely make
explicit what is implicit in the meaning of constituent terms. All the
laws of such a theory are true analytically, in virtue of the meaning
of the constituent terms, and do not assert anything empirical or
factual.
How then, it will be asked, can the theory make any kind of
factual, empirical assertion? The answer is that the empirical content
of the theory is contained entirely in the factual assertion that such
and such physical entities do actually exist with such and such
necessitating properties. Classical electrodynamics interpreted in this
“conjecturally essentialistic” way is an empirical theory because,
although all the laws are analytic and without factual content, the
theory asserts that particles exist that have the necessitating property
of classical electric charge, and this assertion (when formulated in a
bit more detail) is empirical in character, and capable of being
falsified. When a theory, interpreted in this essentialistic way, is
falsified empirically, and replaced by a better essentialistic theory,
the laws of the first theory are not refuted. Rather, what happens is
that the necessitating properties attributed to physical entities by the
first theory are found not to exist. The new theory attributes new
necessitating properties to physical entities it postulates.
What becomes of Hume’s argument that we can always imagine a
change in the course of nature, and hence there cannot be necessary
connections between successive states of the universe? We can
certainly imagine that phenomena, that appear to be like the
phenomena that surround us, might suddenly start behaving very
differently. But that does not establish that it is, in reality, possible.
For, it may be that the phenomena surrounding us do really possess
physical necessitating properties of the kind I have just indicated. If
they do, and they are of the right kind, then it is logically impossible
for phenomena around us abruptly to start behaving differently.
Hume’s argument collapses.
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What is involved here, as I have indicated above, is a change in the
way physics is interpreted and understood. At least since Newton,
the tendency has been to interpret physics as specifying no more than
regularities in nature, or “the laws of nature”. Even today, physicists
speak of “the rules” of quantum theory, or classical electrodynamics.
But this traditional way of understanding physics is the outcome of
failing to appreciate what the implications are of cutting God in half.
If the traditional Christian God exists, it makes perfect sense to
restrict physics to discovering the rules or laws observed by natural
phenomena. For in this case, it is ultimately God who makes
phenomena conform to the rules or laws, and it would hardly be
possible for physics to discover how God does this. Physics can
describe what goes on, but cannot explain, in the sense of depict
what it is that makes phenomena conform to the rules, for this is
God, and God, presumably, lies beyond the scope of physics.
However, cut God in half, and this traditional conception of
physics leaves us with a profound mystery. What is it, in existence,
that makes physical phenomena conform to the rules? Having got
rid of the traditional Christian God to perform this task, some kind of
substitute must be found. Otherwise one has the utterly unintelligible
state of affairs that phenomena occur in accordance with precise
rules or laws but nothing exists to ensure that this happens. That the
rules continue to be observed would be nothing short of an absolute
miracle. As physical theories are developed which specify rules of
ever wider and wider scope, physics would succeed, not in making
phenomena more and more comprehensible but, quite the contrary,
more and more incomprehensible.
The solution is to reinterpret physics in the way indicated above so
that it seeks to specify the physical nature of what it is in existence
which ensures, which necessarily determines, the way events unfold.
The true unified physical “theory of everything”, if ever we discover
it, will attribute necessitating properties to U; it will thus specify the
physical nature of the God-of-Cosmic-Power. A precise
specification of U + V, at some instant, logically implies
specifications of the states of U + V at subsequent instants.
Genuine, fully fledged physical explanations as to why phenomena
occur as they do become possible, even though the theories we
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employ at present only depict what really makes events occur as they
do in approximate, limited, partial ways.
(9) Does “The God-of-Cosmic-Power exists” really amount to a
meaningful, substantial assertion?
We can get a hint of how substantial a proposition is by
considering what it denies – what it is incompatible with. The
more a proposition denies, the more it asserts. (If nothing is
denied, nothing is asserted.) Consider “the God-of-Cosmic-Power
exists” interpreted to mean merely that the true physical “theory of
everything” is unified to degree 500 (in a type 1 to 5 way). Even
this relatively open-ended, insubstantial version of the assertion
still makes a very substantial assertion about the nature of the
universe. It asserts that nature is physical in character. It denies
that God, gods, devils, ghosts, poltergeists, Cartesian minds or
other non-physical entities exist and interact with anything
physical. It denies that the universe is such that a physical theory
disunified to degree greater than 500 is required to depict the way
phenomena occur. If “the God-of-Cosmic-Power exists” is
interpreted in a much more restrictive way to assert that the
universe is such that the true physical “theory of everything” is
perfectly unified, with N = 1, then the assertion becomes all the
more substantial. It denies that any physical theory can be true
which is not true when interpreted to be about all phenomena, or
which is to any extent disunified.24 It denies, in other words, that
any current theory of physics is true.
(10) Does not Quantum Theory Refute the Thesis that only
Unified Theories are Accepted in Physics?
The argument of this chapter depends crucially on the thesis that,
in physics, only unified theories are accepted. But quantum
theory, given its orthodox interpretation, goes against this thesis.
Orthodox quantum theory (OQT) is about the results of performing
24 One needs to add that only precise disunified theories are being
considered. Given the true unified theory of everything, T, endlessly
many imprecise disunified theories could be concocted which are
implied by T, and which are thus true.
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measurements on quantum systems – electrons, photons, atoms,
etc. It is not about electrons, photons, atoms per se. This means
OQT must include some part of classical physics for a treatment of
measurement. If OQT is applied to the measuring apparatus in
addition to the quantum system being measured, no definite
prediction is forthcoming. A second measuring device would be
required, to be described by means of some part of classical
physics, to measure the first instrument, for a definite experimental
result to emerge. This means that the theory that makes physical
predictions consists of quantum postulates plus postulates of some
part of classical physics for a treatment of measurement. And this
in turn means that OQT is a profoundly disunified theory, in that it
consists of two incompatible parts, a quantum part applicable to
the quantum system, and a classical part applicable to the
measuring instrument.
OQT is severely disunified in this way because of the failure to
solve the quantum wave/particle problem. Quantum entities –
electrons, photons, even atoms – seem to be both particle-like and
wave-like. For example, send an electron through a screen with
two slits in it so that it strikes a photographic plate beyond, and the
electron will be recorded as a dot on the photographic plate which,
along with many other experiments, seems to indicate that the
electron is a particle. Send many such electrons through the two-
slitted screen, all with the same velocity, one at a time, and the
photographic plate records each electrons as a minute dot. But all
the dots together on the photographic plate add up to an
interference pattern – dark bands where many electrons have
arrived, interwoven with light bands where few have arrived. This
interference pattern of dots can be explained if each electron is
assumed to be a wave-like entity when it encounters the two-slitted
screen. This wave-like entity passes through both slits, and travels
towards the photographic plate. In some regions of the plate,
where a crest of the wave arrives from one slit, a trough arrives
from the other slit. The two cancel each other out, there is no
wave, and a light band results. At other regions of the plate, where
a crest arrives from one slit, a crest arrives from the other slit as
well. The two support each other, waves are high, and a dark band
results. OQT makes all this precise. It specifies precisely the
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wave-like character of the electrons in flight, and predicts that high
waves mean that there is a high probability that the electron will be
detected in that region, and low waves mean a low probability of
detection.
OQT successfully predicts the results of the experiment, but only
at the cost of generating a dreadful paradox. The electron is, it
seems, a wave-like entity when it passes through the two-slitted
screen and travels towards the photographic plate, but a particle-
like entity when it hits the plate. How can an electron be both
wave-like (spread continuously throughout a region of space) and
particle-like (concentrated in a tiny region of space) at one and the
same time? This is the quantum wave/particle paradox. The
authors of OQT, Heisenberg, Bohr, Born and others, decided the
problem could not be solved. They evaded it by developing OQT
as a theory about the results of performing measurements on
quantum systems. As a result, OQT did not have to say what a
quantum system is – wave, particle, or something else – when not
being measured.
The drawback in this, however, is the one that we have seen.
OQT is a severely disunified theory.
It might be argued that all physical theories that make
predictions must be disunified in a similar way. Thus, Newtonian
theory, employed to predict the position of a planet in the sky,
would need to call upon additional theory about light and
telescopes to predict what is observed with a telescope. The big
difference between Newtonian theory and OQT, however, is that
Newtonian theory has physical content, and can issue in physical
predictions, without calling upon additional theory, whereas OQT
does not, and cannot. Newtonian theory predicts that the planet
has a certain position at a certain time, whether anyone observes it
or not.25 OQT can make no such physical prediction about the
unobserved electron, precisely because no solution to the
wave/particle problem is forthcoming.
25 Ignore, here, the irrelevant point that additional theory is needed to
predict that the planet holds its shape, and does not implode under its
own gravitational attraction. Strictly speaking, we need to consider
Newtonian theory applied to classical point-particles with mass.
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Despite this, OQT has been widely accepted by the physics
community since its discovery in 1925 and 1926 by Heisenberg,
Schrödinger and Born. Does not this decisively refute the thesis
that physicists only accept unified theories, and thus refute the
entire argument of this chapter?
Not at all. What the long-standing and general acceptance of the
severely disunified theory of OQT shows is just how important the
argument of this chapter is for physics itself. OQT was regarded
as acceptable by a majority of physicists for decades after its
discovery because during this time the entire scientific community
took for granted some version of standard empiricism. Given this
state of affairs, it is not at all surprising that a majority of
physicists should have accepted OQT. For standard empiricism
holds that the decisive factor in deciding what theory should be
accepted or rejected is empirical success. Considerations of unity
and simplicity play a role as well, but not one which over-rides
empirical considerations. And in any case standard empiricism
leaves obscure what the unity or simplicity of a theory is. This
further weakens the role that these considerations play in deciding
what theory is to be accepted or rejected – as long as standard
empiricism is accepted. One very striking feature of OQT is its
astonishing empirical success. No other theory in physics
successfully predicts such a wealth of diverse phenomena –
without, apparently, running into serious experimental difficulties
anywhere. Thus, given standard empiricism, there seem to be
overwhelming grounds for accepting OQT. In these
circumstances, it is not at all surprising that OQT was widely
accepted by the physics community not long after it was put
forward.
But if, from the 1920s onwards, aim-oriented empiricism had
been accepted by most physicists, OQT would have been regarded
as highly problematic, and in urgent need of improvement. For,
despite its great empirical success, OQT fails to satisfy the all-
important requirement of aim-oriented empiricism of unity. OQT
would have been accepted as the best predictive scheme available
in lieu of anything better. It would have been appreciated that, in
order to develop an acceptable theory of the quantum domain, the
quantum wave/particle problem has to be solved, so that quantum
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theory can have its own quantum ontology and can be interpreted
as being about quantum systems per se, measurement being
removed from the basic postulates of the theory altogether.
Solving the quantum wave/particle dilemma would have become a
major concern of theoretical physics – something which did not
actually happen, given general acceptance of standard empiricism.
It is noteworthy that a few of the great theoretical physicists
associated with the creation of quantum theory did take the “aim-
oriented empiricist” attitude towards OQT just described. These
include Einstein, Schrödinger, de Broglie and von Laue. Einstein
remarked in a letter to Schrödinger “You are the only
contemporary physicist, besides Laue, who sees that one cannot
get around the assumption of reality – if only one is honest. Most
of them simply do not see what sort of risky game they are playing
with reality – reality as something independent of what is
experimentally established” (Einstein, 1986, p. 39). It should be
noted that Einstein, after his discovery of general relativity in
1915, held a view close to aim-oriented empiricism, as I have
argued elsewhere.26
Thus, whether OQT is held to be unproblematically acceptable
or not depends crucially on which of standard or aim-oriented
empiricism is accepted. Furthermore, whether the wave/particle
problem is seen as a fundamental problem of theoretical physics or
not depends on which of standard or aim-oriented empiricism is
accepted. All of which highlights the importance of the issue for
theoretical physics.
To all this it may be objected: But the historical fact that OQT
was widely accepted refutes the central argument for aim-oriented
empiricism. For that argument depends on the claim that
physicists only ever accept unified theories. That claim is plainly
false. OQT is a theory that was widely accepted despite being very
seriously disunified.
My answer is: No. In the first place, OQT is a special case. It
was not appreciated for decades after its initial discovery – if it is
appreciated even today – that OQT is unacceptably disunified.
26 See my (1993a), pp. 275-305.
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This is something I sought to point out in the 1970s and later.27
Secondly, if the special case of OQT became the general rule in
physics, and empirically successful theories as disunified as OQT
became acceptable quite generally, this would spell the end of
progress in theoretical physics. For the argument spelled out
above is quite general. Given any accepted unified theory,
endlessly many empirically more successful disunified rivals can
always be concocted. If empirical success became the over-riding
factor in deciding what theories should be accepted and rejected, as
standard empiricism holds, then physicists would be obliged
persistently to choose these empirically successful disunified rivals
– disastrous choices for progress in physics, as every physicist
would acknowledge. Physics makes progress because physicists in
practice, but somewhat surreptitiously, implement a view close to
aim-oriented empiricism (in excluding empirically successful
disunified rival theories from consideration), while all the time
proclaiming standard empiricism. As Einstein again acutely said
“If you want to find out anything from the theoretical physicists
about the methods they use…don’t listen to their words, fix your
attention on their deeds” (Einstein, 1973, p. 270).
To sum up the argument of this section so far, there are decisive
grounds for rejecting standard empiricism and accepting aim-
oriented empiricism instead; furthermore, given the latter, OQT is
at best a defective theory, despite its great empirical success,
because of its disunity.
But are there grounds for holding OQT to be defective that are
quite independent of whether one accepts standard or aim-oriented
empiricism? Would the judgement of a physicist in 1930, who
accepted aim-oriented empiricism, that OQT is defective, have
been correct?
27 In a series of papers I pointed out, again and again, that bringing
measurement into the basic postulates of the theory – as a result of the
failure to solve the quantum wave/particle problem – means that OQT is
a severely ad hoc or non-explanatory theory, being made up of two
incompatible parts, a quantum part and a classical part (for
measurement): see Maxwell (1972, 1973, 1976b, 1982, 1988, 1993b,
1994, 1995, 1998 ch. 7, 2004b, 2010b).
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There are indeed such grounds. The failure of OQT to solve the
wave/particle problem – and the resulting need for the theory to be
formulated as being about the results of performing measurements
on quantum systems (instead of being about quantum systems per
se) – results in the theory having a number of defects in addition to
that of disunity.28 It means the theory lacks precision, it being
impossible to specify precisely the physical conditions for
measurement. It means the theory lacks explanatory power. The
theory ought to be able to predict and explain the approximate
success of classical physics, but this OQT cannot do entirely
successfully since it must presuppose some part of classical
physics to describe measuring instruments, as a matter of
conceptual necessity, and not just practical convenience. It means
OQT resists unification with general relativity, since such a
unification, granted it inherits the measurement-dependence of
OQT, would have to be a theory about performing measurements
on space-time with measuring instruments placed outside space-
time, a difficult measurement to perform.29 For similar reasons,
OQT cannot be applied to the entire cosmos, relevant especially in
considering states of the universe soon after the big bang. Such an
application would require a measuring instrument to be placed
outside the cosmos! Most serious of all, perhaps, OQT fails to
answer two basic questions about the nature of the quantum
domain, namely: Is the quantum domain fundamentally
deterministic or probabilistic? What sort of physical entities are
electrons, photos, atoms? OQT seems to imply that probabilistic
events occur when measurements are made, but the theory is
ambivalent as to whether probabilistic events really do occur in
nature, or whether they only seem to occur, when we intervene and
28 It is sometimes argued that quantum field theory solves the
wave/particle problem. This is not the case at all. Quantum field theory
is just as dependent on measurement for its physical interpretation as
non-relativistic OQT is.
29 General relativity is a theory about space-time and not, in the first
instance, a theory about performing measurements on space-time. There
is thus a basic structural difference between general relativity and OQT
which, along with other problems of course, creates a difficulty for
unification.
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make a measurement. And, of course, as long as no solution to the
wave/particle is forthcoming, OQT fails to say what sort of
physical entities electrons, photons and atoms are.30
When I first began to work on quantum theory around 1970,
OQT was so firmly, or even dogmatically, accepted that calling it
into question could threaten a physicist’s career. Almost all
physicists regarded those few who did question OQT a lunatic
fringe. Since then, the situation has changed dramatically. All
physicists are aware of at least some of the problems OQT faces,
and many find OQT unsatisfactory. Rival interpretations and
versions of quantum theory have been developed. There is the de
Broglie-Bohm interpretation (quantum entities are particles with an
associated wave-like quantum potential). There is the many-
worlds or Everett interpretation (according to which, whenever a
measurement-type interaction occurs with N possible outcomes, all
these occur but the other N-1 worlds become undetectable to us in
our world). There is the stochastic theory of Ghirardi, Rimini and
Weber (according to which quantum systems spontaneously and
probabilistically localize). And there is decoherence theory
(according to which it is the environment, not measurement, which
induces ostensible probabilistic events and “the reduction of the
wave packet”).31 This does not, however, eliminate the disunity of
OQT, nor some of the other defects.
My own view is that quantum theory is trying to tell us that
Nature is fundamentally probabilistic. If electrons, atoms and
other quantum entities interact with one another probabilistically,
it follows at once that they will be very different from any physical
entities of deterministic classical physics. “Is the electron a
(classical) wave or a particle?” is thus the wrong question. The
right question is: “What kind of unproblematic, fundamentally
probabilistic physical entities are there, as possibilities, and can we
see quantum entities as a specific variety of one of these
unproblematic possibilities? I think we can. Elsewhere, I have
30 I have spelled out these defects of OQT at greater length elsewhere:
see works referred to in note 27. See also Bell (1987).
31 For an excellent survey of diverse interpretations and versions of
quantum theory, see Wallace (2008).
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suggested that electrons, atoms, etc. can be construed as
fundamentally probabilistic entities whose deterministic, physical
evolution through space in time is specified by Schrödinger’s time-
dependent wave equation, but whose intermittent, abrupt,
probabilistic changes of physical state are specified by a modified
version of Born’s postulate.32 Macroscopic objects are the
outcome of these two kinds of transitions occurring in rapid
succession. The key problem confronting this “popensiton” view
is to specify the precise quantum theoretic conditions for
probabilistic transitions to occur, no mention being made of
measurement, or some surrogate. My suggestion, here, is that
probabilistic transitions occur, roughly, when new particles, or
bound systems, are created. I argue that this fully micro-realistic,
fundamentally probabilistic version of quantum theory reproduces
all the empirical success of OQT, but nevertheless is also
empirically distinct from OQT for as yet unperformed
experiments.33
In my view, if aim-oriented empiricism had been the orthodox
view in the 1920s, it would have been dazzlingly clear to everyone
that OQT is defective, why it is defective, and what needs to be
done, in general terms, to remove the defects: namely, solve the
wave/particle problem. If this had been generally understood in
the 1920s, we might now have solved the problems of quantum
theory which still remain, at the time of writing, over 80 years
later, with no agreed solution.
The long-standing acceptance of the disunified theory of
quantum theory does not refute the central argument of this
chapter. Indeed, as I have just said, if that argument had been
understood by physicists in the 1920s, we might now possess a
genuinely acceptable, unified version of quantum theory accepted
by everyone – something we still do not have.
32 Born’s postulate, a key ingredient of OQT, specifies what happens, in
general probabilistically, when measurements are made.
33 For details see my (1988, 1994, 2004b, 2010b).
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CHAPTER SIX
WISDOM-INQUIRY
What kind of inquiry can best help humanity sustain and create
what is genuinely of value in life in the physical universe? What
kind of inquiry can best help us make progress towards as good,
civilized, and enlightened a world as possible? Or, in other words,
what kind of inquiry best helps us promote the flourishing of the
God-of-Cosmic-Value, here on earth, within the God-of-Cosmic-
Power?
The answer is wisdom-inquiry. I gave a preliminary sketch of
what wisdom-inquiry is, and why it is needed, towards the end of
chapter two. Here, I spell out a second argument in support of
wisdom-inquiry. This builds on, and further develops, the picture
of wisdom-inquiry I have already given.
Two Great Problems of Learning
Two great problems of learning confront humanity: learning
about the universe and ourselves as a part of the universe; and
learning how to become civilized.1
We solved the first problem in the 17th century, with the
creation of modern science. A method was discovered for
progressively improving knowledge and understanding of the
natural world, the famous empirical method of science. There is of
course much that we still do not know and understand, three or
four centuries after the birth of modern science; nevertheless,
during this time, science has immensely increased our knowledge
and understanding, at an ever accelerating rate. And with this
unprecedented increase in scientific knowledge and understanding
has come a cascade of technological discoveries and developments
which have transformed the human condition.2
1 This nomenclature is a bit misleading. We do not have two distinct
problems of learning here, as the second problem includes the first. We
should construe the task of creating civilization as including the task of
improving knowledge.
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But the second great problem of learning has not yet been
solved. And this puts us in a situation of unprecedented peril.
Solving the first problem without also solving the second is bound
to create a situation of great danger. Indeed, all our current global
problems can be traced back, in one way or another, to this source.
With rapidly increasing scientific knowledge comes rapidly
increasing technological know-how, which brings with it an
immense increase in the power to act. In the absence of a solution
to the second great problem of learning, the increase in the power
to act may have all sorts of good consequences, but will as often as
not have all sorts of harmful consequences as well, whether
intended or not.
Just this is an all too apparent feature of our world. Science and
technology have been used in endless ways for human benefit, but
have also been used to wreak havoc, whether intentionally, in war,
or unintentionally (initially at least), in long-term environmental
damage – a consequence of growth of population, industry and
agriculture, made possible by growth of technology. Global
warming, rapid extinction of species and destruction of natural
habitats such as tropical rain forests, depletion of natural resources,
the threats posed by modern armaments whether conventional,
chemical, biological or nuclear, vast inequalities of wealth and
power across the globe, even the aids epidemic (aids being spread
by modern travel): these have all been made possible by modern
science and technology. As long as humanity's power to act was
limited, lack of wisdom, of enlightenment did not matter too much:
humanity lacked the means to inflict too much damage on the
planet.3 But with the immense increase in our powers to act that
2 There is a long-standing debate as to whether technology emerges from
science, or develops independently, or actually contributes to science (as
in the case of the steam engine leading to the development of
thermodynamics). I sidestep this debate, here, and assume, merely that,
as far as modern science is concerned, science and technology developed
in tandem with each other, each contributing to the development of the
other.
3 Humans have been causing some environmental damage for centuries.
Aldous Huxley cites the ancient destruction of the ceders of Lebanon as
an example; see Huxley (1980), pp. 21-22. For a discussion of the role
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we have achieved in the last century or so, our powers to destroy
have become unprecedented and terrifying: global wisdom has
become, not a luxury, but a necessity. All our distinctively 21st
century global problems, to repeat, have arisen because we have
solved the first great problem of learning without also solving the
second problem. Solving the first great problem of learning
without solving the second is bound to put humanity into a
situation of great danger, and has in fact done just that.
It has become a matter of extreme urgency, for the future of
humanity, that we discover how to solve the second great problem
of learning, not so that we achieve instant global wisdom, but so
that we learn how to make gradual social progress towards a wiser
world.4
Many blame science for our problems. There is a sense in which
they are right to do so. Science is, in an important sense, an
underlying cause of all our current global problems, as I shall show
in chapter nine. Blaming science must not, however, blind us to
the possibility that science contains a vital key to solving the
second great problem of learning. The important point to
appreciate is that our solution to the first great problem of learning
has been astonishingly successful. It is just this immense
intellectual success of science in improving knowledge which has
made possible both a multitude of benefits to humanity and a great
deal of harm.
The crucial question arises: Can we learn from our solution to
the first great problem of learning how to solve the second
problem? Can the progress-achieving methods of science be
generalized so that they become fruitfully applicable to the
of early man in causing extinction of species see Holdgate (1996), pp. 1-
10.
4 We need to solve both great problems of learning in order to solve our
fundamental problem: How can we best help the God-of-Cosmic-Value
to flourish in the God-of-Cosmic-Power? It is clearly not enough to
solve the first problem – the problem of learning about the universe – the
God-of-Cosmic-Power. Wisdom-inquiry – I argue – is the solution to
both great problems of learning, and thus the solution to our fundamental
religious problem of learning.
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immense task of making social progress towards a more civilized
world?
The Enlightenment
The idea of learning from the solution to the first great problem
of learning how to solve the second problem is an old one. It goes
back to the Enlightenment of the 18th century. Indeed, this was
the basic idea of the philosophes of the Enlightenment – Voltaire,
Diderot, Condorcet et al.: to learn from scientific progress how to
achieve social progress towards world enlightenment.
The best of the philosophes did what they could to put this
immensely important idea into practice, in their lives. They fought
dictatorial power, superstition, and injustice with weapons no more
lethal than those of argument and wit. They gave their support to
the virtues of tolerance, openness to doubt, readiness to learn from
criticism and from experience. Courageously and energetically
they laboured to promote rationality in personal and social life.5
Unfortunately – as we saw in chapter two – in developing the
Enlightenment idea intellectually, the philosophes blundered.
They developed the Enlightenment programme in a seriously
defective form, and it is this immensely influential, defective
version of the programme, inherited from the 18th century, which
may be called the "traditional" Enlightenment, that is built into
academic inquiry as carried on in universities today. Our current
traditions and institutions of learning, when judged from the
standpoint of helping us learn how to become more enlightened,
are defective and irrational in a wholesale and structural way, and
it is this which, in the long term, sabotages our efforts to create a
more civilized world, and prevents us from avoiding the kind of
horrors we have been exposed to during the 20th century and the
first years of the 21st century – wars, third-world poverty,
environmental degradation.
The philosophes of the 18th century assumed, understandably
enough, that the proper way to implement the Enlightenment
programme was to develop social science alongside natural
5 As I mentioned in chapter two, the best overall account of the
Enlightenment that I know of is still Gay (1973).
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science. Francis Bacon had already stressed the importance of
improving knowledge of the natural world in order to achieve
social progress.6 The philosophes generalized this, holding that it
is just as important to improve knowledge of the social world.
Thus the philosophes set about creating the social sciences: history,
anthropology, political economy, psychology, sociology.
This had an immense impact. Throughout the 19th century the
diverse social sciences were developed, often by non-academics, in
accordance with the Enlightenment idea.7 Gradually, universities
took notice of these developments until, by the mid 20th century,
all the diverse branches of the social sciences, as conceived of by
the Enlightenment, were built into the institutional structure of
universities as recognized academic disciplines.
But, from the standpoint of creating a kind of inquiry designed
to help humanity learn how to become civilized, all this amounts to
a series of monumental blunders. So severe are these blunders that
many today do not even perceive academia as having, as its basic
goal, to help humanity create a better world.
In order to implement properly the basic Enlightenment idea of
learning from scientific progress how to achieve social progress
towards a civilized world, it is essential to get the following three
things right.
1. The progress-achieving methods of science need to be
correctly identified.
2. These methods need to be correctly generalized so that they
become fruitfully applicable to any worthwhile, problematic
human endeavour, whatever the aims may be, and not just
applicable to the endeavour of improving knowledge.
3. The correctly generalized progress-achieving methods then
need to be exploited correctly in the great human endeavour of
trying to make social progress towards an enlightened, civilized
world.
6 For the importance of Francis Bacon for the Enlightenment see: Gay,
op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 11-12 and p. 322.
7 Mill, Marx, Durkheim and Weber were all in thrall to the traditional
Enlightenment.
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Unfortunately, the philosophes of the Enlightenment got all three
points disastrously wrong. They failed to capture correctly the
progress-achieving methods of natural science; they failed to
generalize these methods properly; and, most disastrously of all,
they failed to apply them properly so that humanity might learn
how to become civilized by rational means. That the philosophes
made these blunders in the 18th century is forgivable; what is
unforgivable is that these blunders still remain unrecognized and
uncorrected today, over two centuries later. Instead of correcting
the blunders, we have allowed our institutions of learning to be
shaped by them as they have developed throughout the 19th and
20th centuries, so that now the blunders are an all-pervasive
feature of our world. Recent developments in Universities,
indicated in chapter 2 (see notes 3 and 18), have not yet gone
nearly far enough to correct the blunders we have inherited from
the philosophes.
The Enlightenment, and what it led to, has long been criticized,
by the Romantic movement, by what Isaiah Berlin has called 'the
counter-Enlightenment', and more recently by the Frankfurt school,
by postmodernists and others.8 My objection to the traditional
Enlightenment is very different. In particular, it is the very
opposite of all those anti-rationalist, romantic and postmodernist
criticisms which object to the way the Enlightenment gives far too
great an importance to natural science and to scientific rationality.
What is wrong with the traditional Enlightenment, and the kind of
academic inquiry we now possess derived from it, is not too much
'scientific rationality' but, on the contrary, not enough. It is the
glaring, wholesale irrationality of contemporary academic inquiry,
when judged from the standpoint of helping humanity learn how to
become more civilized, that is the problem.
8 See Berlin (1999); and Berlin (1980), pp. 1-24. For a clearly written,
recent, sympathetic but critical discussion of criticisms of the
Enlightenment, from Horkheimer and Adorno, via Lyotard, Foucault,
Habermas and Derrida to MacIntyre and Rorty, see Gascardi (1999).
For less sympathetic criticisms of postmodernists' anti-rationalism see:
Sokal and Bricmont (1998); Gross et al. (1996); and Koertge (1998).
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The "New" Enlightenment
What exactly are the three blunders of the traditional
Enlightenment, as embodied in academic inquiry today, and what
needs to be done to put them right? Let us take the three blunders
in turn.
The first blunder was dealt with in the last chapter. It concerns
the nature of the progress-achieving methods of science. By and
large, scientists and philosophers of science today make the
assumption, inherited from the Enlightenment,9 that the basic aim
of science is knowledge of truth, the basic method being to assess
theories impartially with respect to evidence alone, no permanent
assumption being made about the nature of the universe
independent of evidence. Choice of theory in science may be
influenced by such considerations as the relative simplicity, unity
or explanatory power of the theories in question, in addition to
empirical considerations; this is permissible, as long as it does not
involve assuming, permanently, that nature herself is simple,
unified or comprehensible.10
But, as we saw in the last chapter, this orthodox standard
empiricist view concerning the aim and methods of science is
9 The philosophes of the Enlightenment tended to assume that the
triumph of Newtonian science over Cartesian science meant also the
triumph of Newtonian inductivist methodology over Cartesian
rationalism. They tended to espouse the extreme empiricism of Bacon
and Locke, rejecting the rationalism of Descartes. But it is perhaps over
simplistic to interpret all the philosophes of upholding one or other
version of standard empiricism. Kant hardly fits into such a picture.
More to the point, d'Alembert asserted that "The universe, if we may be
permitted to say so, would only be one fact and one great truth for
whoever knew how to embrace it from a single point of view";
D’Alembert (1963), p. 29. This is perhaps compatible with, but hardly
conforms to the spirit of standard empiricism.
10 A classic statement of this widely held view is given by Karl Popper:
"... in science, only observation and experiment may decide upon the
acceptance or rejection of scientific statements, including laws and
theories"; Popper (1963), p. 54. For an indication of just how widely
held standard empiricism is, see my (1998), pp. 38-45.
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untenable.11 Given any unified, accepted theory of physics,
however well verified empirically, there will always be infinitely
many disunified rival theories, equally well or even better
supported by the evidence, which make different predictions, in an
arbitrary way, for phenomena not yet observed. In persistently
rejecting these disunified, empirically more successful rivals,
physics thereby implicitly makes a substantial, highly problematic,
metaphysical (i.e. untestable) assumption about the nature of the
universe, to the effect that it is such that all such disunified theories
are false. Precisely because this assumption that the universe is
more or less physically comprehensible is substantial, influential
and highly problematic, it needs to be made explicit within physics
so that it can be critically assessed and improved, as physics
proceeds.
Standard empiricism seriously misrepresents the basic
intellectual aim of science – of theoretical physics in particular.
The real aim is to improve knowledge, not of truth as such, but
rather truth presupposed to be more or less physically
comprehensible or explanatory in some way. The empirical
method of science cannot get off the ground unless some
substantial, but highly problematic assumption is made about the
universe, to the effect that it is such that explanations for
phenomena exist to be discovered – the universe being
comprehensible in some way, to some extent at least. As we saw
11 It is worth noting that Newton upheld a conception of natural
philosophy (natural science) that is, in important respects, more
sophisticated than standard empiricism, presupposed by so many 20th
century scientists and philosophers of science. Newton formulates three
of his four rules of reasoning in such a way that it is clear that these rules
make assumptions about the nature of the universe. Thus rule 1 asserts:
"We are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both
true and sufficient to explain their appearances." And Newton adds: "To
this purpose the philosophers say that nature does nothing in vain, and
more is in vain when less will serve; for Nature is pleased with
simplicity, and affects not the pomp of superfluous causes." See Newton
(1962), vol. 2, p. 398. Newton understood that persistently preferring
simple theories means that Nature herself is being persistently assumed
to be simple (which violates standard empiricism).
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in the last chapter, we need to adopt and put into scientific practice
a new aim-oriented empiricist conception of science which
construes science as making a hierarchy of assumptions concerning
the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe.
This aim-oriented empiricist methodology, in stark contrast to
current orthodoxy, is the key to the success of modern science.
The basic aim of science of discovering how, and to what extent,
the universe is comprehensible is deeply problematic; it is essential
that we try to improve the aim, and associated methods, as we
proceed, in the light of apparent scientific success and failure. In
order to do this in the best possible way we need to represent our
aim at a number of levels, from the specific and problematic to the
highly unspecific and unproblematic, thus creating a framework of
fixed aims and meta-methods within which the (more or less
specific) aims and methods of science may be progressively
improved in the light of apparent empirical success and failure, as
depicted in diagram 4 of Chapter five. The result is that, as we
improve our knowledge about the world, we are able to improve
our knowledge about how to improve knowledge, the
methodological key to the rapid progress of modern science.
There is something like positive feedback between improving
scientific knowledge, and improving knowledge-about-how-to-
improve-knowledge. All this has long gone on in scientific
practice – science would not have achieved its success if it had not
– but awareness of it has been obscured by the scientific
community’s allegiance to standard empiricism.12
Adoption and explicit implementation of this aim-oriented
empiricist view by the scientific community as the official,
orthodox conception of science would correct the first blunder of
the traditional Enlightenment.
But what of the second blunder? The task, here, is to generalize
the methods of science appropriately so that they become progress-
achieving methods that are, potentially, fruitfully applicable to any
12 For a much more detailed exposition and defence of aim-oriented
empiricism, and an account of the way aim-oriented empiricism solves
long-standing problems in the philosophy of science such as problems of
simplicity, induction and verisimilitude, see my (1998), chs. 1 and 3-6;
and my (2007a), ch. 14.
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worthwhile, problematic human endeavour. The task, in other
words, is to generalize scientific rationality so that it becomes
rationality per se, helping us to achieve what is of value whatever
we may be doing.
Needless to say, scientists and philosophers, having failed to
specify the methods of science properly, have also failed to arrive
at the proper generalization of these methods. The best attempt
known to me is that made by Karl Popper. According to Popper,
science makes progress because it puts into practice the method of
proposing theories as conjectures, which are then subjected to
sustained attempted empirical refutation.13 Popper argues that this
can be generalized to form a conception of rationality – critical
rationalism – according to which one seeks to solve problems quite
generally by putting forward conjectures as to how a given
problem is to be solved, these conjectures then being subjected to
sustained criticism (criticism being a generalization of attempted
empirical refutation in science).14
Popper's ideas about scientific method and how it is to be
generalized are very important, and are a striking improvement
over 18th century notions. In fact the “rational problem-solving”
version of wisdom-inquiry sketched in chapter two depends quite
essentially on Popper’s critical rationalism. The first two rules of
rational problem-solving, formulated in chapter two, are precisely
the rules Popper arrives at as a result of generalizing his
conception of scientific method.15 Any problem-solving endeav-
13 See Popper (1963), and (1959).
14 "inter-subjective testing is merely a very important aspect of the more
general idea of inter-subjective criticism, or in other words, of the idea of
mutual rational control by critical discussion", Popper (1959), op. cit., p.
44, n *1. See also Popper (1963), pp. 193-200; (1976), pp. 115-6; and
(1972), p. 119 and p. 243.
15 Popper was too vehemently opposed to specialization to put forward
rule (3). He failed to appreciate that the evils of rampant specialization
can be corrected by implementing rule (4). Neither is included in
Popper’s problem-solving conception of critical rationalism. A typical
anti-specialist comment of Popper is the following: “If the many, the
specialists, gain the day, it will be the end of science as we know it – of
great science. It will be a spiritual catastrophe comparable in its
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our which persistently violates these two rules cannot hope to be
rational. These two rules are, in other words, necessary conditions
for rationality. (Academia as it is at present constituted, shaped by
knowledge-inquiry, is damagingly irrational because it violates
these two rules.)
Despite these virtues, Popper’s ideas about scientific method and
how it is to be generalized are nevertheless seriously defective.
Popper's conception of scientific method is defective because it is a
version of standard empiricism which, as we have seen, is
untenable. It fails to identify the problematic aim of science
properly, and thus fails to specify the need for science to improve
its aims and methods as it proceeds. Popper's notion of critical
rationalism is defective in an analogous way. It does not make
improving aims and methods, when aims are problematic, an
essential aspect of rationality.
If, however, we take the aim-oriented empiricist conception of
scientific method as our starting point, and generalize that, the
outcome is quite different. It is not just in science that aims are
problematic; this is the case in life too, either because different
aims conflict, or because what we believe to be desirable and
realizable lacks one or other of these features, or both. Above all,
the aim of creating global civilization is inherently and profoundly
problematic (a point to be elaborated in a moment). Quite
generally, then, and not just in science, whenever we pursue a
problematic aim we need to represent the aim as a hierarchy of
aims, from the specific and problematic at the bottom of the
hierarchy, to the general and unproblematic at the top. In this way
we provide ourselves with a framework within which we may
improve more or less specific and problematic aims and methods
as we proceed, learning from our successes and failures in practice
what aims are both of most value and realizable. This conception
of rationality, arrived at by generalizing the progress-achieving
methods of science of aim-oriented empiricism, may be called aim-
oriented rationality. Aim-oriented rationality improves on
Popper’s critical rationality in stressing the vital need, when one’s
consequences to nuclear armament” Popper (1994), p. 72. For more
expressions of Popper’s opposition to specialization, see my (2010c).
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aim is problematic, of representing the aim in the form of a
hierarchy, thereby facilitating the improvement of specific,
problematic aims and methods (low down in the hierarchy) as one
proceeds.
The first step, in putting aim-oriented rationality into practice, is
to try to make explicit both the actual problematic aim of the
enterprise in question, and what the aim ought to be. This first step
may be extraordinarily difficult to achieve. It has not yet been
achieved as far as science is concerned. The official view is still
that the actual and ideal intellectual aim of natural science is
knowledge of truth (nothing being presupposed about the truth).
The decisive refutation of this standard empiricist view, which I
first published long ago in 1974 and developed in many
publications since then,16 and which I spelled out in the last chapter
has, so far, made not the slightest dent in the scientific
community’s views about the aims and methods of science.
Standard empiricism is still taken for granted.
Once this first step has been taken, the next step is to try to
improve the real, problematic aim by solving the problems
associated with this aim. This might involve reducing the gap
between what we take to be the real and ideal aims, by modifying
one or other, or both. (Sometimes what we are actually doing may
be better, in some respects at least, than what we think we ought to
be doing.) Our actual aim may need to be improved because, as it
stands, it is unrealizable, or not as desirable, as valuable to achieve,
as we suppose, or both. An aim may be less desirable than we
suppose because it conflicts with other desirable aims in ways we
did not anticipate, or has all sorts of undesirable, unforeseen
consequences. We need to ask why the endeavour in question has
the aim that it does have, both in the historical sense of how this
aim came to be adopted, and in the rationalistic sense of for what
further aim this aim is being pursued. Answers to these questions
may reveal defects in the aim that is being pursued.
Finally, if aims of the endeavour in question seem to be
permanently problematic, we need to represent the aim, and
associated methods, in the form of a nested hierarchy of aims and
16 See note 16 of the last chapter.
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methods, aims becoming less and less specific and substantial as
we go up the hierarchy, and thus less and less problematic and in
need of revision. In this way, as I have already mentioned, we may
create a framework of relatively unproblematic aims and methods
within which much more specific and problematic aims, and
associated methods, can be improved as we proceed, as we act.
Let me now illustrate these general points by considering the
difficulties, and the potential benefits, of putting aim-oriented
rationality into practice in the specific case of science.
In the case of science, a number of aims need to be considered.
There is the aim of theoretical physics of discovering the
underlying unity inherent in all physical phenomena – this unity
being presupposed to exist. We might call this, not the search for
truth as such, but rather the search for explanatory truth, the truth
being presupposed to be explanatory, or physically
comprehensible, in some way or other. Because of the highly
problematic character of this aim, it needs to be represented in the
form of a hierarchy of increasingly unproblematic aims in the
manner indicated in Diagram 4 of chapter 5.
The aim of discovering explanatory truth is, however, a special
case of the more general aim of discovering, of improving our
knowledge of, valuable truth. This is, if anything, even more
problematic. Of value to whom? In what way? When? Who
decides? Three permanent problems beset this aim of improving
knowledge of valuable truth. First, two very different kinds of
value are involved in science: cultural or intellectual on the one
hand, and practical or technological on the other. Both are vital.
But it is extraordinarily difficult to decide between the value of
enhancing our understanding of the nature of the universe on the
one hand and, let us say, ameliorating suffering and saving lives on
the other. If these two kinds of value are not made explicit
(because of the influence of standard empiricism) there is always
the danger that research is conducted which leads to new
knowledge but which realizes neither value even though much
knowledge of truth is acquired Second, there is always the danger
that scientists, in deciding what scientific aims to pursue, are
governed by considerations internal to science itself (which can
include factors such as scientific kudos and fashion), and ignore
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considerations of human need and suffering – above all the needs
of the poor of the world. Those whose plight is the greatest are
often also those least able to voice their plight. Third, it is
important to appreciate that modern scientific and technological
research can be extraordinarily expensive. He who pays the piper
tends to call the tune. Inevitably, there will be the tendency for the
priorities of research to come to reflect the interests of the wealthy
and powerful rather than the needs of the poor.
But the aim of acquiring knowledge of valuable truth is not an
end in itself. Even though this may not always be appreciated, it is
pursued in order that knowledge and understanding of truth of
value may be used by people – culturally or practically – to
enhance the quality of life. Science, in the end, at its best, has a
humanitarian goal: to contribute towards the enhancement of the
quality of human life (and this is true of both aspects of science,
the cultural and the practical). But this humanitarian or social aim
is even more profoundly problematic. And all sorts of doubts may
be raised about the success of science in achieving this aim.
Much more needs to be said about the diverse and problematic
aims of science. I have said enough, I hope, to indicate just how
important it is to throw the aims of science open to sustained
imaginative and critical exploration in an attempt to improve the
aims of science – how important it is to apply aim-oriented
rationality to science, and how inadequate standard empiricism is
in its characterization of the aims of science. Putting aim-oriented
rationality into scientific practice is doubly important: it is needed
to correct serious defects – intellectual and humanitarian – in
science itself. And it is needed so that science might be what it
should be, a working example of what it is to put aim-oriented
rationality into practice, and of why it is so important to do. Aim-
oriented empiricist science could be taken as a model, a paradigm,
for aim-oriented rationalistic action quite generally.
So much for the second blunder, and how it is to be put right.
We come now to the third blunder.
This is by far the most serious of the three blunders made by the
traditional Enlightenment. The basic Enlightenment idea, after all,
is to learn from our solution to the first great problem of learning
how to solve the second problem – to learn, that is, from scientific
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progress how to make social progress towards an enlightened
world. Putting this idea into practice involves getting
appropriately generalized progress-achieving methods of science
into social life itself! It involves getting progress-achieving
methods into our institutions and ways of life, into government,
industry, agriculture, commerce, international relations, the media,
the arts, education. But in sharp contrast to all this, the traditional
Enlightenment sought to apply generalized scientific method, not
to social life, but merely to social science! Instead of helping
humanity learn how to become more civilized by rational means,
the traditional Enlightenment sought merely to help social
scientists improve knowledge of social phenomena. The outcome
is that today academic inquiry devotes itself to acquiring
knowledge of natural and social phenomena, but does not attempt
to help humanity learn how to become more civilized. This is the
blunder that is at the root of our current failure to have solved the
second great problem of learning.17
In order to correct the third blunder of the traditional
Enlightenment, then, social inquiry and the humanities need to take
up the methodological, social, and even political task of helping to
get into social life itself, into all our other institutions besides
science, the progress-achieving methods of aim-oriented
rationalism arrived at by generalizing the aim-oriented empiricist
methods of natural science. Social inquiry is not primarily social
science. It is not primarily concerned to acquire knowledge of
social phenomena – although this is indeed an important matter of
secondary concern. The intellectually fundamental aim of social
inquiry is to help humanity build into institutions and social life
quite generally the progress-achieving methods of aim-oriented
rationality (arrived at by generalizing the progress-achieving
methods of science as indicated above). Social inquiry (sociology,
economics, anthropology and the rest) is thus social methodology
or social philosophy. Its task is to help diverse valuable human
endeavours and institutions gradually improve aims and methods
17 For a discussion of the extent to which the traditional Enlightenment
dominates academic inquiry see my (2007a), chapters 6 and 12.
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so that they may make more worthwhile contributions to human
life.
Above all, social inquiry and the humanities need to help us
learn how to put aim-oriented rationality into practice in seeking to
make progress towards a genuinely civilized world. As I have
already remarked, the aim of achieving global civilization is
inherently and profoundly problematic. People have very different
ideas as to what does constitute civilization. Most views about
what constitutes an ideally civilized society have been unrealizable
and profoundly undesirable. People's interests, values and ideals
clash. Even values that, one may hold, ought to be a part of
civilization may clash. Thus freedom and equality, even though
inter-related, may nevertheless clash. It would be an odd notion of
individual freedom which held that freedom is for some and not for
others; and yet if equality is pursued too single-mindedly this will
undermine individual freedom, and will even undermine
equality, in that a privileged class will be required to enforce
equality on the rest, as in the old Soviet Union. A basic aim of
legislation for civilization, we may well hold, ought to be increase
freedom by restricting it: this brings out the inherently paradoxical
character of the aim of achieving civilization.
The inherently problematic character of the aim of achieving
world civilization makes it imperative that here, above all, we
proceed in accordance with the edicts of aim-oriented rationality.
This means at least that we represent the aim at a number of levels,
from the specific and highly problematic to the unspecific and
unproblematic. Thus, at a fairly specific level, we might specify
civilization to be a state of affairs in which there is an end to war,
dictatorships, population growth, extreme inequalities of wealth,
and the establishment of democratic, liberal world government and
a sustainable world industry and agriculture. At a rather more
general level we might specify civilization to be a state of affairs in
which everyone shares equally in enjoying, sustaining and creating
what is of value in life in so far as this is possible. At a still more
general level, civilization might be specified simply as that
realizable world order we should seek to attain in the long term:
see diagram 5.
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As a result of building into our institutions and social life such a
hierarchical structure of aims and associated methods, it becomes
possible for us to develop and assess rival philosophies of life as a
part of social life, somewhat as theories are developed and
assessed within science. Such a hierarchical methodology
provides a framework within which competing views about what
our aims and methods in life should be – competing religious,
political and moral views – may be cooperatively assessed and
tested against broadly agreed, unspecific aims (high up in the
Diagram 5
Aim-Oriented Rationality Applied to the Task of Making
Progress towards a Civilized World
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hierarchy of aims) and the experience of personal and social life.
There is the possibility of cooperatively and progressively
improving such philosophies of life (views about what is of value in life
and how it is to be achieved) much as theories are cooperatively and
progressively improved in science. In science, ideally, theories are
critically assessed with respect to each other, with respect to
metaphysical ideas concerning the comprehensibility of the universe,
and with respect to experience (observational and experimental
results). In a somewhat analogous way, diverse philosophies of life
may be critically assessed with respect to each other, with respect to
relatively uncontroversial, agreed ideas about aims and what is of
value, and with respect to experience – what we do, achieve, fail to
achieve, enjoy and suffer – the aim being to improve philosophies of
life (and more specific philosophies of more specific enterprises within
life such as government, education or art) so that they offer greater
help with the realization of what is of value in life. This hierarchical
methodology is especially relevant to the task of resolving conflicts
about aims and ideals, as it helps disentangle agreement (high up in
the hierarchy) and disagreement (more likely to be low down in the
hierarchy). The hope in all this is that, as a consequence of the two-
way interaction between our lives and our philosophies of life (our
policies, our plans, our political programmes), as our philosophies of
life improve, so our lives improve as well.
The upshot of the whole argument – the argument of chapter two,
appealing to problem-solving rationality, and the argument just
indicated, appealing to aim-oriented rationality and correcting the
three mistakes of the 18th century Enlightenment – is that, not just
social inquiry, but the whole academic enterprise needs to change.
The primary task of academia as a whole ought to be to help
humanity solve its problems of living in increasingly rational,
cooperative, enlightened ways, thus helping humanity become
more civilized. This task would be intellectually more
fundamental than the scientific task of acquiring knowledge.
Social inquiry would be intellectually more fundamental than
physics. As I have already remarked, academia would be a kind of
people’s civil service, doing openly for the public what actual civil
services are supposed to do in secret for governments. Academia
would have just sufficient power (but no more) to retain its
182
independence from government, industry, the press, public
opinion, and other centres of power and influence in the social
world. It would seek to learn from, educate, and argue with the
great social world beyond, but would not dictate. Academic
thought would be pursued as a specialized, subordinate part of
what is really important and fundamental: the thinking that goes
on, individually, socially and institutionally, in the social world,
guiding individual, social and institutional actions and life. The
fundamental intellectual and humanitarian aim of inquiry would be
to help humanity acquire wisdom – wisdom being the capacity to
realize (apprehend and create) what is of value in life, for oneself
and others, wisdom thus including knowledge and technological
know-how but much else besides. Scientific and technological
research would be conducted in such a way that knowledge
acquired contributes to wisdom.
Wisdom-inquiry, because of its greater rigour,18 has intellectual
standards that are, in important respects, different from those of
knowledge-inquiry. Whereas knowledge-inquiry demands that
emotions and desires, values, human ideals and aspirations,
philosophies of life be excluded from the intellectual domain of
inquiry, wisdom-inquiry requires that they be included. In order to
discover what is of value in life it is essential that we attend to our
feelings and desires. But not everything we desire is desirable, and
not everything that feels good is good. Feelings, desires and
values need to be subjected to critical scrutiny. And of course
feelings, desires and values must not be permitted to influence
judgements of factual truth and falsity. Wisdom-inquiry embodies
a synthesis of traditional rationalism and romanticism. It includes
elements from both, and it improves on both. It incorporates
romantic ideals of integrity, having to do with motivational and
emotional honesty, honesty about desires and aims; and at the same
time it incorporates traditional rationalist ideals of integrity, having
to do with respect for objective fact, knowledge, and valid
18 Wisdom-inquiry puts the four rules of problem-solving rationality, and
the edicts of aim-pursuing rationality into practice, whereas knowledge-
inquiry, as we have seen, does not. It is this that renders wisdom-inquiry
more rigorous than knowledge-inquiry.
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argument. Traditional rationalism takes its inspiration from science
and method; romanticism takes its inspiration from art, from
imagination, and from passion. Wisdom-inquiry holds art to have
a fundamental rational role in inquiry, in revealing what is of
value, and unmasking false values; but science, too, is of
fundamental importance. What we need, for wisdom, is an
interplay of sceptical rationality and emotion, an interplay of mind
and heart, so that we may develop mindful hearts and heartfelt
minds. It is time we healed the great rift in our culture, so
graphically depicted by C. P. Snow.19
Aim-oriented rationality may seem almost banal in its obvious and
elementary character. This might mislead one into thinking it is an
easy matter to put it into practice in science, in academia, in
education, in politics, industry, commerce, international relations,
and into life quite generally. Nothing could be further from the truth.
Fear of the unfamiliar, rigid habits of thought and of living, prejudice
and, above all vested interests, will make it very difficult indeed to
implement aim-oriented rationality. This is the case even in a field
such as theoretical physics, where it might seem a relatively easy
matter to put it explicitly into practice (especially as it is already put
into practice covertly). My thirty years of trying to get the idea
accepted by the physics community have failed to get it noticed even
by philosophers of physics, let alone physicists themselves. There is
fierce resistance to acknowledging that science as a whole has to
accept, as articles of faith – even if rational faith – untestable,
metaphysical doctrines about the nature of the universe, before the
empirical method of science can get underway. As I have already
indicated, it is important, for rather general reasons, that theoretical
physics does put aim-oriented empiricism into practice. If it did, it
would constitute an exemplary case of aim-oriented rationality being
implemented from which attempts to put aim-oriented rationality into
practice elsewhere, in more challenging contexts, could learn. For
these other contexts – politics, industry, the law, the media,
international relations – pose problems far more intractable than the
particular case of physics, or natural science more generally. Here,
hypocrisy, misrepresentation of aims and ideals, is endemic, a
19 Snow (1964).
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standard strategy for holding onto power, wealth and status. Fierce
opposition to even the most modest proposals for some sustained
scrutiny of aims must be expected.
Cultural Implications of Wisdom-Inquiry
It might seem, from what has been said so far, that wisdom-
inquiry may do better justice than knowledge-inquiry to the
practical aspects of inquiry – its capacity to help people achieve
desirable ends in life – but only at the expense of neglecting the
“pure” or “intellectual” aspects of inquiry, the value of science and
scholarship when pursued for their own sake, in other words.
The actual situation is all the other way round. Wisdom-inquiry
does better justice to both aspects of inquiry, pure and applied.
To begin with, aim-oriented empiricism (an integral part of
wisdom-inquiry) does better justice to theoretical physics pursued
for its own sake than does standard empiricism (an integral part of
knowledge-inquiry). This is because aim-oriented empiricism
emphasizes the search for understanding in a way in which
standard empiricism does not. Physics pursued in accordance with
aim-oriented empiricism becomes much more like natural
philosophy – what physics was for Newton and his
contemporaries, an intermingling of testable physics, metaphysics
and methodology, even philosophy. It is a passionate quest to
understand the nature of the universe. Physics pursued in
accordance with standard empiricism is in danger of becoming
merely the business of predicting more and more phenomena more
and more accurately. This is in part because standard empiricism
banishes metaphysics from physics – and thus banishes explicit
discussion of problems of understanding. It is also because,
whereas aim-oriented empiricism demands that acceptable theories
be sufficiently empirically successful and unified, standard
empiricism demands only sufficient empirical success. There are
additional requirements of simplicity, it is true, but exactly what
these requirements amount to is left obscure, and they are weak in
that they cannot over-ride empirical requirements. Aim-oriented
empiricism, by contrast, makes crystal clear what unified means,
and insists that the demand for unity may well over-ride empirical
considerations. In clarifying and strengthening the demand for
185
theoretical unity in this way, aim-oriented empiricism in effect
insists that acceptable theories must explain and embody
understanding. It is not enough merely to predict.
These differences are strikingly illustrated by the case of
orthodox quantum theory. As we saw in the last chapter, this
theory, notoriously, fails to explain, and enable us to understand
the quantum domain because it fails to solve the quantum
wave/particle problem – and thus fails to say clearly what sort of
entities quantum objects, such as electrons, photons and atoms,
really are. Because of this failure, orthodox quantum theory is a
theory about the results of performing measurements on quantum
entities, not a theory about these entities as such. But this in turn
means that orthodox quantum theory is severely ad hoc. It is made
up of quantum postulates plus some part of classical physics to
describe measurement. This is a severely disunified theory. Its
failure to embody understanding is directly linked to its disunity,
its severely ad hoc character, in turn linked to its failure to solve
the crucial wave/particle problem.
Viewed from the perspective of standard empiricism, orthodox
quantum theory is a supremely acceptable theory because of its
astonishing empirical success. Its disunity, its failure to provide
understanding, does not provide grounds for rejecting the theory.
But viewed from the perspective of aim-oriented empiricism, the
theory is unacceptably ad hoc and disunified. Its failure to embody
understanding does provide grounds for rejection. Furthermore,
the kind of metaphysical reasoning which aim-oriented empiricism
encourages, and standard empiricism fails to encourage, readily
shows how the wave-particle problem can be solved, and a more
unified version of the theory can be developed, as I have shown
elsewhere.20 All this strikingly bears out the point that aim-
oriented empiricism does far better justice than standard
empiricism to the pursuit of understanding in physics, to the value
of physics pursued for its own sake.
There are additional, more general ways in which wisdom-
inquiry does better justice than knowledge-inquiry to inquiry
20 See my (1998), ch. 7, and further references therein. See also my
(2004b) and (2010b).
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pursued for its own sake.
From the standpoint of the intellectual or cultural aspect of
inquiry, what really matters is the desire that people have to see, to
know, to understand, the passionate curiosity that individuals have
about aspects of the world, and the knowledge and understanding
that people acquire and share as a result of actively following up
their curiosity. An important task for academic thought in
universities is to encourage non-professional thought to flourish
outside universities. As Einstein once remarked "Knowledge
exists in two forms – lifeless, stored in books, and alive in the
consciousness of men. The second form of existence is after all
the essential one; the first, indispensable as it may be, occupies
only an inferior position."21
Wisdom-inquiry is designed to promote all this in a number of
ways. It does so as a result of holding thought, at its most
fundamental, to be the personal thinking we engage in as we live.
It does so by recognizing that acquiring knowledge and
understanding involves articulating and solving personal problems
that one encounters in seeking to know and understand. It does so
by recognizing that passion, emotion and desire, have a rational
role to play in inquiry, disinterested research being a myth. Again,
as Einstein has put it "The most beautiful experience we can have
is the mysterious. It is the fundamental emotion which stands at
the cradle of true art and true science. Whoever does not know it
and can no longer wonder, no longer marvel, is as good as dead,
and his eyes are dimmed."22
Knowledge-inquiry, by contrast, all too often fails to nourish
"the holy curiosity of inquiry",23 and may even crush it out
altogether. Knowledge-inquiry gives no rational role to emotion
and desire; passionate curiosity, a sense of mystery, of wonder,
have no place, officially, within the rational pursuit of knowledge.
The intellectual domain becomes impersonal and split off from
personal feelings and desires; it is difficult for "holy curiosity" to
flourish in such circumstances. Knowledge-inquiry hardly
21 Einstein (1973), p. 80.
22 Einstein (1973), p. 11.
23 Einstein (1949), p. 17.
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encourages the view that inquiry at its most fundamental is the
thinking that goes on as a part of life; on the contrary, it upholds
the idea that fundamental research is highly esoteric, conducted by
physicists in contexts remote from ordinary life. Even though the
aim of inquiry may, officially, be human knowledge, the personal
and social dimension of this is all too easily lost sight of, and
progress in knowledge is conceived of in impersonal terms, stored
lifelessly in books and journals. Rare is it for popular books on
science to take seriously the task of exploring the fundamental
problems of a science in as accessible, non-technical and
intellectually responsible a way as possible. 24 Such work is not
highly regarded by knowledge-inquiry, as it does not contribute to
"expert knowledge". The failure of knowledge-inquiry to take
seriously the highly problematic nature of the aims of inquiry leads
to insensitivity as to what aims are being pursued, to a kind of
institutional hypocrisy. Officially, knowledge is being sought "for
its own sake", but actually the goal may be immortality, fame, the
flourishing of one's career or research group, as the existence of
bitter priority disputes in science indicates. Education suffers.
Science students are taught a mass of established scientific
knowledge, but may not be informed of the problems which gave
rise to this knowledge, the problems which scientists grappled with
in creating the knowledge. Even more rarely are students
encouraged themselves to grapple with such problems. And rare,
too, is it for students to be encouraged to articulate their own
problems of understanding that must, inevitably arise in absorbing
all this information, or to articulate their instinctive criticisms of
the received body of knowledge. All this tends to reduce education
to a kind of intellectual indoctrination, and serves to kill "holy
curiosity". Officially, courses in universities divide up into those
that are vocational, like engineering, medicine and law, and those
that are purely educational, like physics, philosophy or history.
What is not noticed, again through insensitivity to problematic
aims, is that the supposedly purely educational are actually
vocational as well: the student is being trained to be an academic
physicist, philosopher or historian, even though only a minute
24 A recent, remarkable exception is Penrose (2004).
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percentage of the students will go on to become academics. Real
education, which must be open-ended, and without any pre-
determined goal, rarely exists in universities, and yet few notice.25
In order to enhance our understanding of persons as beings of
value, potentially and actually, we need to understand them
empathetically, by putting ourselves imaginatively into their shoes,
and experiencing, in imagination, what they feel, think, desire,
fear, plan, see, love and hate. For wisdom-inquiry, this kind of
empathic understanding is rational and intellectually fundamental.
Articulating problems of living, and proposing and assessing
possible solutions is, we have seen, the fundamental intellectual
activity of wisdom-inquiry. But it is just this that we need to do to
acquire empathic understanding. Social inquiry, in tackling
problems of living, is also promoting empathic understanding of
people. Empathic understanding is essential to wisdom.
Elsewhere I have argued, indeed, that empathic understanding
plays an essential role in the evolution of consciousness. It is
required for cooperative action, and even for science.26
Granted knowledge-inquiry, on the other hand, empathic
understanding hardly satisfies basic requirements for being an
intellectually legitimate kind of explanation and understanding.27
It has the status merely of “folk psychology”, on a par with “folk
physics”.
The intellectually fundamental character of empathic or
“personalistic” understanding will turn out to be of great
importance when we come to the question of free will, to be
discussed in the next chapter.
Objections
I now consider, briefly, some objections that may be raised
against my claim that wisdom-inquiry is both more rigorous and
more humanly desirable than knowledge-inquiry.
25 These considerations are developed further in my (1976a), (1984) and
(2004a).
26 For fuller expositions of such an account of empathic understanding
see my (1984), pp. 171-189 and ch. 10; and (2001), chs. 5-7 and 9.
27 See my (1984), pp. 183-185.
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It may be objected that the traditional Enlightenment does not
dominate current academic inquiry to the extent that I have
assumed. But grounds for holding that it does are given in chapter
six of my From Knowledge to Wisdom. There I looked at the
following: (1) books about the modern university; (2) the
philosophy and sociology of science; (3) statements of leading
scientists; (4) Physics Abstracts; (5) Chemistry, Biology, Geo and
Psychology Abstracts; (6) journal titles and contents; (7) books on
economics, sociology and psychology; (8) philosophy. In 1984,
the year From Knowledge to Wisdom was published, there can be
no doubt whatsoever that the traditional Enlightenment (or "the
philosophy of knowledge" as I called it in the book) dominated
academic inquiry.
Have things changed since then? The revolution advocated by
From Knowledge to Wisdom, and argued for here, has not
occurred. There is still, amongst the vast majority of academics
today, no awareness at all that a more intellectually rigorous and
humanly valuable kind of inquiry than that which we have at
present, exists as an option. In particular, social inquiry continues
to be taught and pursued as social science, and not as social
methodology. Recently I undertook an examination, at random, of
thirty-four introductory books on sociology, published between
1985 and 1997. Sociology, typically, is defined as "the scientific
study of human society and social interactions",28 as "the
systematic, sceptical study of human society",29 or as having as its
basic aim "to understand human societies and the forces that have
made them what they are".30 Some books take issue with the idea
that sociology is the scientific study of society, or protest at the
male dominated nature of sociology.31 Nowhere did I find a hint
of the idea that a primary task of sociology, or of social inquiry
more generally, might be to help build into the fabric of social life
progress-achieving methods, generalized from those of science,
28 Tischler (1996), p. 4.
29 Macionis and Plummer (1997), p. 4.
30 Lenski et al. (1995), p. 5.
31 See, for example, Abott and Wallace (1990), p. 3 and p. 1.
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designed to help humanity resolve its conflicts and problems of
living in more cooperatively rational ways than at present.32
The tackling of problems of living rather than problems of
knowledge does of course go on within the academic enterprise as
it is at present constituted, within such disciplines as economics,
development studies, policy studies, peace studies, medicine,
agriculture, engineering, and elsewhere. In chapter nine I will
indicate some recent developments in academia which can perhaps
be interpreted as amounting to the first faltering steps away from
knowledge-inquiry towards wisdom-inquiry. None of this,
however, tells against the point that the primary task of academic
inquiry at present is still, first, to acquire knowledge and
technological know-how, and then, second, to apply it to help
solve problems of living. It does not, in other words, tell against
the point that it is knowledge-inquiry and the traditional
Enlightenment that are still, at the time of writing, the dominant
influence on the nature, the aims and methods, the whole character
and structure of academic inquiry.
It may be objected that it is all to the good that the academic
enterprise today does give priority to the pursuit of knowledge over
the task of promoting wisdom and civilization. Before problems of
living can be tackled rationally, knowledge must first be
acquired.33
I have six replies to this objection.
First, even if the objection were valid, it would still be vital for a
kind of inquiry designed to help us build a better world to include
rational exploration of problems of living, and to ensure that this
guides priorities of scientific research (and is guided by the results
of such research).
Second, the validity of the objection becomes dubious when we
take into account the considerable success people met with in
solving problems of living in a state of extreme ignorance, before
32 See also my (2007a), ch. 6.
33 This is the objection that most academics will wish to raise against my
“from knowledge to wisdom” thesis. It will be made by all those who
hold that academic inquiry quite properly seeks to make a contribution to
human welfare by, first, acquiring knowledge and then, secondarily,
applying it to help solve human problems.
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the advent of science. We still today often arrive at solutions to
problems of living in ignorance of relevant facts.
Third, the objection is not valid. In order to articulate problems
of living and explore imaginatively and critically possible solutions
(in accordance with Popper's conception of rationality) we need to
be able to act in the world, imagine possible actions and share our
imaginings with others: in so far as some common sense
knowledge is implicit in all this, such knowledge is required to
tackle rationally and successfully problems of living. But this does
not mean that we must give intellectual priority to acquiring new
relevant knowledge before we can be in a position to tackle
rationally our problems of living.
Fourth, simply in order to have some idea of what kind of
knowledge or know-how it is relevant for us to try to acquire, we
must first have some provisional ideas as to what our problem of
living is and what we might do to solve it. Articulating our
problem of living and proposing and critically assessing possible
solutions needs to be intellectually prior to acquiring relevant
knowledge simply for this reason: we cannot know what new
knowledge it is relevant for us to acquire until we have at least a
preliminary idea as to what our problem of living is, and what we
propose to do about it. A slight change in the way we construe our
problem may lead to a drastic change in the kind of knowledge it is
relevant to acquire: changing the way we construe problems of
health, to include prevention of disease (and not just curing of
disease) leads to a dramatic change in the kind of knowledge we
need to acquire (importance of exercise, diet etc.). Including the
importance of avoiding pollution in the problem of creating wealth
by means of industrial development leads to the need to develop
entirely new kinds of knowledge.
Fifth, relevant knowledge is often hard to acquire; it would be a
disaster if we suspended life until it had been acquired.
Knowledge of how our brains work is presumably highly relevant
to all that we do but clearly, suspending rational tackling of
problems of living until this relevant knowledge has been acquired
would not be a sensible step to take. It would, in any case, make it
impossible for us to acquire the relevant knowledge (since this
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requires scientists to act in doing research). Scientific research is
itself a kind of action carried on in a state of relative ignorance.
Sixth, the capacity to act, to live, more or less successfully in the
world, is more fundamental than (propositional) knowledge. Put in
Rylean terms, 'knowing how' is more fundamental than 'knowing
that'.34 All our knowledge is but a development of our capacity to
act. Dissociated from life, from action, knowledge stored in
libraries is just paper and ink, devoid of meaning. In this sense,
problems of living are more fundamental than problems of
knowledge (which are but an aspect of problems of living); giving
intellectual priority to problems of living quite properly reflects
this point.35
As I have already stressed, a kind of inquiry that gives priority to
tackling problems of knowledge over problems of living violates
the most elementary requirements of rationality conceivable. If the
basic task is to help humanity create a better world, then the
problems that need to be solved are, primarily, problems of living,
problems of action, not problems of knowledge. This means that
to comply, merely, with Popper's conception of critical rationalism
(or problem-solving rationality) discussed above, the basic
intellectual tasks need to be (1) to articulate problems of living,
and (2) to propose and critically assess possible solutions, possible
more or less cooperative human actions. (1) and (2) are excluded,
or marginalized, by a kind of inquiry that gives priority to the task
of solving problems of knowledge. And the result will be a kind of
inquiry that fails to create a reservoir of imaginative and critically
examined ideas for the resolution of problems of living, and
instead develops knowledge often unrelated to, or even harmful to,
our most basic human needs.
It may be objected that in employing aim-oriented rationality in
an attempt to help create a more civilized world, in the way
indicated above, the new Enlightenment falls foul of Popper's
strictures against what he calls Utopian social engineering. This,
for Popper, “aims at remodelling the ‘whole of society’ in
accordance with a definite plan or blueprint; it aims at ‘seizing the
34 Ryle (1949), ch. II.
35 For a development of this point, see my (1984), pp. 174-181.
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key positions’ and at ‘extending the power of the State . . . until the
State becomes nearly identical with society’, and it aims,
furthermore, at controlling from these ‘key positions’ the historical
forces that mould the future of the developing society”.36 Popper
contrasts Utopian engineering, which he rejects as irrational and
disastrous, with piecemeal social engineering, which he advocates
as rational and humanitarian. This is characterized as follows:
Even though he (the piecemeal engineer) may perhaps
cherish some ideals which concern society 'as a whole'
– its general welfare perhaps – he does not believe in the
method of re-designing it as a whole. Whatever his
ends, he tries to achieve them by small adjustments and
re-adjustments which can be continually improved upon.
His ends may be of diverse kinds, for example, the
accumulation of wealth or of power by certain
individuals, or by certain groups; or the distribution of
wealth and power; or the protection of certain 'rights' of
individuals or groups, etc. Thus public or political
(piecemeal) engineering may have the most diverse
tendencies, totalitarian as well as liberal . . . The
piecemeal engineer knows, like Socrates, how little he
knows. He knows that we can learn from our mistakes.
Accordingly, he will make his way, step by step,
carefully comparing the results expected with the results
achieved, and always on the look-out for the unavoidable
unwanted consequences of any reform; and he will avoid
undertaking reforms of a complexity and scope which
make it impossible for him to disentangle causes and
effects, and to know what he is really doing.37
The New Enlightenment project of endeavouring to make
progress towards a good world by putting aim-oriented rationality
into practice in personal, social, institutional and global life may
36 Popper (1962), p. 67.
37 Ibid, pp. 66-7.
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seem to be somewhat similar to Popper’s Utopian social
engineering, and hence to fall foul of Popper’s criticisms.
I have three replies to this objection. First, to the extent that
piecemeal social engineering, of the kind advocated by Popper, is
indeed the rational way to make progress towards a more civilized
world, this will be advocated by the New Enlightenment. Second,
when we take into account the unprecedented global nature of
many of our most serious problems, indicated above, (the outcome
of solving the first great problem of learning but failing to solve
the second), we may well doubt that piecemeal social engineering
is sufficient. Third, Popper's distinction between piecemeal and
Utopian social engineering is altogether too crude: it overlooks
entirely what has been advocated here, aim-oriented rationalistic
social engineering, with its emphasis on developing increasingly
cooperatively rational resolutions of human conflicts and problems
in full recognition of the inherently problematic nature of the aim
of achieving greater civilization.38
All those to any degree influenced by Romanticism and the
counter-Enlightenment will object strongly to the idea that we
should learn from scientific progress how to achieve social
progress towards civilization; they will object strongly to the idea
of allowing conceptions of rationality, stemming from science, to
dominate in this way, and will object even more strongly to the
idea, inherent in the new Enlightenment, that we need to create a
more aim-oriented rationalistic social world.39
Directed at the traditional Enlightenment, objections of this kind
have some validity; but directed at the new Enlightenment, they
have none. As I have emphasized, aim-oriented rationality
amounts to a synthesis of traditional rationalist and romantic
ideals, and not to the triumph of the first over the second. In
giving priority to the realization of what is of value in life, and in
emphasizing that rationality demands that we seek to improve aims
38 For further discussion see my (1984) pp. 189-198; (2007a), pp. 213-
221 and 338-344.
39 For literature protesting against the influence of scientific rationality in
various contexts and ways, see for example: Berlin (1999); Laing (1965);
Marcuse (1964): Roszak (1973); Berman (1981); Schwartz (1987);
Feyerabend (1978) and (1987); Appleyard (1992).
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as we proceed, the new Enlightenment requires that rationality
integrates traditional Rationalist and Romantic values and ideals of
integrity. Imagination, emotion, desire, art, empathic
understanding of people and culture, the imaginative exploration of
aims and ideals, which tend to be repudiated as irrational by
traditional Rationalism, but which are prized by Romanticism, are
all essential ingredients of aim-oriented rationality. Far from
crushing freedom, spontaneity, creativity and diversity, aim-
oriented rationality is essential for the desirable flourishing of
these things in life.40
Many historians and sociologists of science deny that there is
any such thing as scientific method or scientific progress, and will
thus find the basic idea of this chapter absurd.41 These writers are
encouraged in their views by the long-standing failure of scientists
and philosophers of science to explain clearly what scientific
method is, and how it is to be justified. This excuse for not taking
scientific method and progress seriously is, however, no longer
viable: as I have indicated above, reject standard empiricism, and it
becomes clear how scientific method and progress are to be
characterized and justified, in a way which emphasizes the rational
interplay between evolving knowledge and evolving aims and
methods of science.42 In a world dominated by the products of
scientific progress it is quixotic in the extreme to deny that such
progress has taken place.
Finally, those of a more rationalist persuasion may object that
science is too different from political life for there to be anything
worthwhile to be learnt from scientific success about how to
40 See my (1984) pp. 63-4, pp. 85-91 and pp. 117-118, for further
discussion of this issue. See also my (1976a), especially chs. 1 and 8-10.
41 Bloor (1976); B. Barnes and D. Bloor (1981); Latour (1987);
Feyerabend (1978) and (1987). These authors might protest that they do
not deny scientific knowledge, method, progress or rationality as such,
but deny, merely, that the sociology of knowledge can legitimately
appeal to such things, or deny extravagant claims made on behalf of
these things. See, however, the sparkling criticism by Sokal and
Bricmont (1998), ch. 4.
42 See my (1998), especially chs 1-6; (2004a), especially the appendix;
and my (2007a), ch. 14.
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achieve social progress towards civilization.43 (a) In science there
is a decisive procedure for eliminating ideas, namely, empirical
refutation: nothing comparable obtains, or can obtain, in the
political domain. (b) In science experiments or trials may be
carried out relatively painlessly (except, perhaps, when new drugs
are being given in live trials); in life, social experiments, in that
they involve people, may cause much pain if they go wrong, and
may be difficult to stop once started. (c) Scientific progress
requires a number of highly intelligent and motivated people to
pursue science on the behalf of the rest of us, funded by
government and industry; social progress requires almost everyone
to take part, including the stupid, the criminal, the mad or
otherwise handicapped, the ill, the highly unmotivated; and in
general there is no payment. (d) Scientists, at a certain level, have
an agreed, common objective: to improve knowledge. In life,
people often have quite different or conflicting goals, and there is
no general agreement as to what civilization ought to mean, or
even whether it is desirable to pursue civilization in any sense. (e)
Science is about fact, politics about value, the quality of life. This
difference ensures that science has nothing to teach political action
(for civilization). (f) Science is male-dominated, fiercely
competitive, and at times terrifyingly impersonal;44 this means it is
quite unfit to provide any kind of guide for life.
Here, briefly, are my replies. (a) Some proposals for action can
be shown to be unacceptable quite decisively as a result of
experience acquired through attempting to put the proposal into
action. Where this is not possible, it may still be possible to assess
the merits of the proposal to some extent by means of experience.
If assessing proposals for action by means of experience is much
more indecisive than assessing scientific theories by means of
experiment, then we need, all the more, to devote our care and
attention to the former case. (b) Precisely because experimentation
in life is so much more difficult than in science, it is vital that in
life we endeavour to learn as much as possible from (i)
experiments that we perform in our imagination, and (ii)
43 N. Rescher (personal communication); Durant (1997).
44 Harding (1986).
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experiments that occur as a result of what actually happens. (c)
Because humanity does not have the aptitude or desire for wisdom
that scientists have for knowledge, it is unreasonable to suppose
that progress towards global wisdom could be as explosively rapid
as progress in science. Nevertheless progress in wisdom might go
better than it does at present. (d) Cooperative rationality is only
feasible when there is the common desire of those involved to
resolve conflicts in a cooperatively rational way. (e) Aim-oriented
rationality can help us improve our decisions about what is
desirable or of value, even if it cannot reach decisions for us. (f) In
taking science as a guide for life, it is the progress-achieving
methodology of science to which we need to attend. It is this that
we need to generalize in such a way that it becomes fruitfully
applicable, potentially, to all that we do. That modern science is
male-dominated, fiercely competitive, and at times terrifyingly
impersonal should not deter us from seeing what can be learned
from the progress-achieving methods of science - unless, perhaps,
it should turn out that being male-dominated, fiercely competitive
and impersonal is essential to scientific method and progress. (But
this, I submit, is not the case.)
Conclusion
Having solved the first great problem of learning, it has become
a matter of extreme urgency, as far as the future of humanity is
concerned, that we discover how to solve the second problem. In
order to do this we need to correct the three blunders of the
traditional Enlightenment. This involves changing the nature of
social inquiry, so that social science becomes social methodology
or social philosophy, concerned to help us build into social life the
progress-achieving methods of aim-oriented rationality, arrived at
by generalizing the progress-achieving methods of science. It also
involves, more generally, bringing about a revolution in the nature
of academic inquiry as a whole, so that it takes up its proper task of
helping humanity learn how to become wiser by increasingly
cooperatively rational means. The scientific task of improving
knowledge and understanding of nature becomes a part of the
broader task of improving global wisdom.
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If ever wisdom-inquiry, as sketched here (and as spelled out in
more detail elsewhere45) is put into practice in schools, universities
and research institutions throughout the world, humanity would at
last have what it so urgently needs: a kind of inquiry rationally
designed and devoted to helping the God-of-Cosmic-Value to
flourish within the God-of-Cosmic-Power, in so far as it is able to
do so.
45 See my (1976a); (1984); (2004a); and (2007a). For critical assessments
of wisdom-inquiry see McHenry (2009).
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CHAPTER SEVEN
HOW CAN WE EXIST INSIDE
THE GOD-OF-COSMIC-POWER?
Physics is about only a highly selected aspect of things - the
causally efficacious aspect, that aspect which determines (perhaps
probabilistically) the way events unfold. Physics makes no
mention of the experiential – how things look, feel, smell, or
sound, or how it is to be a bit of the physical universe (this body,
this brain) – first because none of this is needed to predict and
explain any physical phenomena, and secondly because, if physical
theory is extended to include all this experiential stuff, the theory
would become so horrendously complex it would cease to be
explanatory. Omitting all reference to the experiential is the price
that must be paid to have the marvellously explanatory theories of
physics that we do have – Newtonian theory, James Clerk
Maxwell's theory of the electromagnetic field, Einstein's theory of
general relativity, quantum theory, quantum electrodynamics and
the so-called "standard model", the current best theory we have of
fundamental particles and the forces between them. The God-of-
Cosmic-Power is just that aspect, that slice, of all that which exists,
which we must pick out if we are to explain and understand why
events occur as they do. Physics is about the explanatory skeleton
of the world with all the experiential flesh omitted.
This is what I argued for in chapter three. If correct, it goes some
way towards enabling us to understand how the experiential God-
of-Cosmic-Value can coexist with the physical God-of-Cosmic-
Power. The silence of physics about the experiential provides no
grounds whatsoever for holding that the experiential does not
really exist.
But much more than this is required to reconcile the God-of-
Cosmic-Value with the God-of-Cosmic-Power. There is still the
grave problem of showing how it is possible that we exist in the
physical universe. We persons are not merely passively
experiencing beings - vessels for passing sensations of sights and
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sounds and smells. We do things in this world, we act, we initiate
actions and are responsible for what we do. It is of the very
essence of what we are that we act. Even our thinking, our
imagining, our inner world of consciousness, our very identity as a
conscious being, is a kind of action, the product of inner imaginary
action. Bereft of the capacity to do, to act, we are nothing, we
cease to exist altogether.
But if the physical God-of-Cosmic-Power exists, everything that
occurs - or at least the physical aspect of everything that occurs - is
capable (in principle) of being explained and understood in purely
physical terms. Everything that we do, say, think, feel, all our
deeds throughout our life from the most momentous to the smallest
flicker of an eyelid are the inexorable outcome of prior physical
states of the universe. Our entire life is just the outcome of
fundamental physical entities – electrons, quarks, superstrings, or
whatever – interacting with one another in accordance with precise
physical law. We may feel we exist and act; our life certainly
seems charged with human significance, experience, emotion,
struggle, plans, intentions, deeds that sometimes succeed and
sometimes fail. But all this is, it seems, a hollow charade. Behind
the scenes impersonal physics determines everything that goes on,
everything we think, decide and do, permitting us merely the
illusion that we are in charge of our actions. The God-of-Cosmic-
Power triumphs, and the God-of-Cosmic-Value turns out to be
mere shadow-play, a mockery.
We have here a much more severe problem than the one tackled
in chapter two. There, the task was to see how the experiential
could be accommodated alongside the physical. The solution - I
argued - is to appreciate that physics is only about that which
determines how events unfold as they do, physics thus being silent
about everything that does not determine how events unfold, and
hence being silent about the experiential aspect of things. This
solution concedes that the physical is solely and entirely
responsible for the way things occur. It is at once clear that this
solution, this line of thought, cannot solve our present problem.
For what is at issue is our capacity to make things happen. We
must be, it would seem, in direct competition with physics, with
the God-of-Cosmic-Power. Physics cannot be solely responsible
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for what goes on. We must be responsible for at least some of
what happens - namely what we do, what we create, even what we
think, what we imagine and decide. Some power, some
responsibility for making things happen, must be wrested from
physics, it seems, if we are not to be merely the puppets of physics,
our existence as acting beings an illusion.
Philosophers tend to formulate this as the problem of how (or
whether) there can be free will if determinism holds. But this
traditional formulation is inadequate in a number of respects.
First, the problem is generated, not by determinism but by
physics - or rather by the truth of physicalism.1 Physicalism is not
at all the same thing as determinism. Determinism is both too
broad, and too narrow. Determinism might be true, every event
might be strictly determined by prior states of affairs, and yet
physicalism might be false, and the universe might not be
physically comprehensible. The true theory-of-everything of this
universe, capable of predicting events, might be grotesquely
complicated and disunified, and thus non-explanatory. On the other
hand, physicalism may be true, the universe may well be
physically comprehensible, and yet determinism may be false. The
true physical theory-of-everything may be probabilistic, not
deterministic – capable only of predicting events in probabilistic
fashion. Determinism neither implies, nor is implied by,
physicalism.
Second, the traditional formulation of the problem is inadequate
in suggesting that what is at issue is free will. Much more than
that is at stake. It is our very existence as acting persons that is
under threat. We exist as persons only if we do things in this
world, initiate actions. If the physical is solely and entirely
responsible for everything that goes on, including of course
everything going on in our brains, then we can be responsible, it
seems, for nothing. We do not exist. Our existence is an illusion.2
1 Physicalism is the doctrine that the universe is perfectly physically
comprehensible, it being such that there is some yet-to-be-discovered,
true, unified physical “theory of everything” (with N = 1). This is just
the assertion that the God-of-Cosmic-Power exists.
2 Traditionally, discussion about free will takes the form of a debate
between compatibilists, who hold free will and determinism to be
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In the end, the problem is simple and stark. Granted that the
God-of-Cosmic-Power exists, and physics is responsible for
everything that happens, there can be no room for us too. We can
do nothing. Everything we seem to do is really the God-of-
Cosmic-Power, physics, acting through us. We persons, and all
other conscious and sentient beings, key embodiments of the God-
of-Cosmic-Value, shrivel and die before the unchallengeable might
of the God-of-Cosmic-Power.
In tackling this problem, it is a matter of profound importance
whether we adopt the "internalist" theory of perception indicated in
chapter three, and Cartesian dualism so closely associated with it,
or the "externalist" theory, which permits us to hold that our inner
experiences, our states of consciousness, are brain processes.3 If
we uphold Cartesian dualism, we have had it. Reconciling our
compatible, and incompatibilists, who hold they are not. Compatibilists
argue that determinism does not imply compulsion, or lack of
responsibility for one’s actions or decisions, and thus does not imply
there is no free will, and indeterminism can hardly enhance free will
because it would introduce an element of chance or probability into
human action. Incompatibilists argue, in opposition to this, that free will
requires that there are genuinely open possible futures before us, between
which we have the power to choose (not possible if determinism is true),
and struggle to rebut the suggestion that indeterminism must undermine
free will. For an excellent introduction to the debate, construed in these
terms, see Kane (2005). For a lively defence of compatibilism see
Dennett (1984). The best defence of incompatibilism known to me is
Kane (1998). For a critical discussion see my (2001), pp. 151-154. For a
defence of the view that the problem ought to be formulated in such a
way that it is what science tells us about the world, or physicalism, that
poses a threat to free will, not determinism, see my (2005a). In this
chapter I concentrate on those issues that seem most relevant to the free
will/physicalism problem rather than the traditional free
will/determinism problem – although, of course, there is considerable
overlap between these two formulations.
3 The terms “internalism” and “externalism” are widely used in the
philosophical literature to draw distinctions between a wide variety of
views. The distinction I have in mind is the one drawn in chapter 3. It
should not be identified with any distinction current in the philosophical
literature: see note 12 of chapter three.
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existence with the God-of-Cosmic-Power, with the universe being
physically comprehensible, is impossible. In order for our
conscious intentions to affect what goes on in our brains, and what
our bodies do, it is necessary for these non-physical mental states
or events to influence physical processes occurring in our brains,
which means that some physical processes are not fully explicable
physically. But if, on the other hand we hold the brain process
theory, allied to externalism, there is at least a glimmer of hope.
For then conscious intentions that initiate and guide our actions are
themselves physical processes – and these physical processes can
be a part of the cause of our actions without any physical laws
being violated at all. There is just the faintest hint that "free will",
and our existence as acting persons, might be compatible with
physicalism.
In the end this vital point is extremely simple. If Cartesian
dualism is true, then we – our conscious selves – are entirely
distinct and separate from the physical universe. If my Cartesian
conscious self is to be able to make my physical body act, then it
must interact with physical processes going on in my body –
physical processes going in my brain we may presume – thus
violating the sole determination of physics, of the God-of-Cosmic-
Power. But if Cartesian dualism is false, the brain process theory
is true, and all my conscious states, intentions decisions to act are
themselves brain processes, physical processes, then it becomes
possible that my conscious intentions to act cause and guide my
actions without any physical laws being violated at all, everything
occurring in accordance with the as-yet-undiscovered physical
theory of everything, T. In initiating action I have all the power at
my command of the God-of-Cosmic-Power. I am a bit of the God-
of-Cosmic-Power.
But there is still the mystery, of course, of how it can be possible
for me to be in charge of my thoughts and deeds even though the
physical processes that are these thoughts and deeds unfold in a
precisely determined way in accordance with the laws of physics. I
may be a bit of the God-of-Cosmic-Power, but nevertheless I am
doomed, it seems, to think and act precisely as the God-of-Cosmic-
Power dictates. How can I, and the God-of-Cosmic-Power both,
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simultaneously, be in charge, be responsible for what occurs?
How is dual control possible?
In order to explore this question, let us assume that Cartesian
dualism and the "internalist" theory of perception are false. We
directly perceive things external to us, and our inner experiences
are brain processes. Or rather, to state the last point more
carefully, processes going on inside our heads – “head processes”
as we may call them – have both a physical aspect and an
experiential aspect. Head processes are neurological processes
going on in our brains; but some of them are also conscious inner
experiences, thoughts, feelings, desires, decisions to act, sensory
experiences, imaginings – all the contents of our rich inner life.
That head processes have an experiential aspect and a physical
aspect is somewhat analogous to the way honeysuckle, let us say,
has an experiential aspect – its colour, its smell – as well as a
physical aspect. Or, to give another example, it is somewhat
analogous to the way this very sentence has an experiential aspect
– its meaning, what it asserts – and a physical aspect.
Purpose in a Physicalistic Universe
One point deserves to be appreciated straight away. There is no
problem whatsoever in understanding how it is possible for there to
be things able to pursue goals – purposive beings in other words –
in a fully physicalistic universe, even one that is deterministic.
The problem of how this is possible is solved by the feedback
mechanism – the unit of control. Devices, from thermostats to
guided missiles and robots, are able to pursue goals even though
acting wholly in accordance with deterministic physical laws,
because they incorporate feedback mechanisms in their bodily
structure.
One of the simplest examples of a feedback mechanism is the
thermostat. This consists of a heater, a thermometer, and a switch.
The aim of the thermostat, let us suppose, is to keep the room at
the temperature of 200 centigrade. It achieves this by switching the
heater off if the temperature rises above 200 C, and switching it on
if it falls below 200 C.
We can imagine this being done as follows. As the temperature
of the room falls below 200 C, the metal strip, of which the
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thermometer is composed, shrinks in length and, as a result, makes
contact with an electric circuit which turns the heater on. The
room heats up as a result, the metal strip expands, and this breaks
the electric circuit, which turns the heater off. The outcome is that
the thermostat acts so as successfully to attain the goal of keeping
the room more or less at 200 C.
We have here the most elementary kind of negative feedback
mechanism in action conceivable – the atom of control. It can be
elaborated in various ways. First, instead of the action being the
discrete one of ON/OFF, the action may rather be to increase or
decrease something smoothly, for example, to turn the heater up by
degrees or down, or to steer a rocket to the left or to the right to a
greater or lesser extent. The action of the primitive ON/OFF
thermostat could be represented by an arrow which points at one or
other of two positions, ON and OFF. The action of a purposive
device which acts continuously can be represented by an arrow
which points at some point on a line, and moves to the left or right
smoothly, along the line.
This latter continuously operating feedback mechanism can be
elaborated by increasing the number of dimensions of continuous
variability, from one, to two, three, … to 10,000, to N, where N is
any number equal to or greater than one. A guided missile might,
for example, have a three dimensional feedback mechanism for
control system, guiding the missile to change its direction upwards
or downwards, to the left or right, and to change its speed to go
faster or slower. More complex control systems might consist of a
number, M, of distinct control systems, each performing distinct
control tasks, and a master control system which decides which of
these M control systems is to operate at any given moment. One
can even imagine a control system consisting of a hierarchy of
control systems. At the base of the hierarchy, there are a vast
number of control systems. As one goes up the hierarchy, the
number of control systems decreases until, at the top, there is just
one master control system activating and controlling all the others.
It is possible that the brains of animals and humans are hierarchical
control systems of this type. I formulate the intention to go down
stairs and put the kettle on for a cup of tea – and think no more of
the matter, acting more or less on autopilot, my thoughts
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elsewhere. This is the master control system activating subsidiary
control systems to do its bidding. Control systems lower down in
the hierarchy (in my brain) then guide my body to get up, walk out
of the room, go downstairs into the kitchen, pick up the kettle, fill
it from the tap, put it on the stove and light it. These midway
control systems activate control systems still lower down in the
hierarchy (in my brain) to move my legs, arms and hands
appropriately so that these actions are performed; and further
control systems, still lower down in the hierarchy, of which I am
entirely unaware, control individual muscles in my legs, arms and
hands so that the sequence of actions is performed. And this
hierarchical structure of control, which might be true of me, might
also be true of a monkey swinging from branch to branch in the
forest, or of a fox out hunting for rabbits or mice.
This hierarchical hypothesis may, or may not, be true. The
crucial point is that there is no problem whatsoever in
understanding in principle how purposive action is possible in a
physicalistic universe – even complex purposive action of the kind
that mammals, and even humans, perform in life. We are still
profoundly ignorant of the way mammalian brains, and human
brains, produce the complex purposive actions that they do
produce. But purposive action in a physicalistic universe does not
in itself pose a problem of principle. The key to the solution of
this problem is the feedback mechanism. It is worth noting that,
for the feedback mechanism to work properly, to produce the
purposive action that it is designed to produce, it is essential that
deterministic physical laws, on which the feedback mechanism
depends, continue to operate. To return to the atom of control, the
thermostat, if, as the temperature falls, the metal strip began to
expand (and not shrink), this would play havoc with the capacity of
the thermostat to achieve its goal and control the temperature of
the room. Far from purposive action, produced by control systems
(based on elaborations of the feedback mechanism) being in
conflict with physicalism, it is all the other way round: purposive
action of this type actually requires physicalism to be true – at least
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as far as the workings of the control system of the purposive actor
is concerned.4
Free Will in a Physicalistic Universe
What I have said in the previous section solves the problem:-
(1) How is purposive action possible in a physicalistic universe?
It does not, however, solve the problem:-
(2) How is free will possible in a physicalistic universe?
The hypothesis we are exploring is that we are purposive beings
of the kind that we have been considering, but with the utterly
amazing additional features that we are sentient and conscious, our
conscious intentions more often than not guiding our actions, we
ourselves guiding the flow of our consciousness (at least to some
extent). Dual control is possible because a part of the physical
states of affairs that determine what we do are brain states which
4 The notion of purposive action has been bedevilled by intellectual
history, in particular by the lingering influence of Aristotle. It was
Aristotle’s view that the physical universe is to be explained and
understood in terms of the notion of purpose. Physical things have an
inherent purpose built into them, and that is the explanation as to why
they behave as they do. Stones fall because they seek their natural
resting place, the centre of the earth. It was one of Galileo’s great battles
to oppose this purposive metaphysics with the idea that “the book of
nature is written in the language of mathematics” – an early version of
physicalism. One outcome of this battle has been that scientists after
Galileo have tended to take for granted that the Aristotelian notion of
purposiveness is incompatible with modern physics, incompatible indeed
with modern science. Even biologists have made this assumption,
holding that it cannot be correct to attribute purpose to animals, to living
things. The all-important point is to note that there are two notions, the
Aristotelian, incompatibilist one, and a post feedback-mechanism,
compatibilist one. The first holds that purposiveness is incompatible
with physicalism, whereas the second holds that it is compatible. Both
notions are legitimate. The crucial question, however, is: Is there
anything that is purposive in the Aristotelian, incompatibilist sense?
Those who hold that we have free will, and free will is incompatible with
physicalism, in effect hold that we are purposive beings in the
Aristotelian sense. My view, of course, is that we are not Aristotelian
beings, and there are none in existence.
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are also conscious states – our decisions to act. In deciding to act
we have behind us all the might of the God-of-Cosmic-Power. We
are a bit of the God-of-Cosmic-Power. Our amazingly structured
brains and bodies enable us to exploit the bit of the God-of-
Cosmic-Power that we are to do our bidding, do what we wish to
be done, so that It becomes our servant, not our master. Our
decision to act is that bit of the God-of-Cosmic-Power that, in the
context of our brain, body and environment, produces and guides
the actions that we have decided to perform.
Let us call this suggestion the dual control hypothesis.5
The Compatibilist/Incompatibilist Debate
I now subject this suggestion to a debate between an
Incompatibilist and a Combatibilist.6
Incompatibilist: But how can we really be in charge of, and
responsible for, our thoughts, decisions and actions if all these
unfold precisely in accordance with iron physical law? It may feel
as if we are in charge, free to choose what we think, decide and do,
but really this is all prescribed with absolute precision by physics.
We are held in the vice-like grip of physicalism, not a twitch or
momentary thought possible that is not predetermined by physics.
5 “Dual control” is perhaps somewhat of a misnomer. The God-of-
Cosmic-Power may, with variable instantaneous states of affairs,
determine what happens next, but It does not really control anything.
Only feedback mechanisms, control systems, do that. Still, one could
think of the God-of-Cosmic-Power as having a hand in control whenever
a control system does exist, via the particular, persisting and variable
states of the control system. “Dual control” could be thought of as
referring to the brain conceived of purely as a physical system, and the
brain conceived of as the seat of consciousness. Nevertheless, “dual
determination” might be a better title for the view than “dual control”.
6 Compatibilist and Incompatibilist, here, differ as to whether or not free
will is compatible with physicalism, and not, as in note 2, with
determinism. Physicalism may be either deterministic or probabilistic
(the former being a special case of the latter). My own view, as I made
clear in the last section of chapter 5, is that we should interpret quantum
theory as trying to tell us that nature is probabilistic, the interpretative
problems of the theory arising from the failure to take probabilism
seriously: see my (1988); (1994); (2004b); and (2010b).
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Compatibilist: But this just ignores that, even though physicalism
is true, nevertheless a person’s brain, body and environment may
well be such that conscious decisions to act really do produce and
control the actions that are performed – these conscious decisions
being neurological processes that produce and control the person’s
body to do what the person has decided to do. And likewise, in
pondering, day-dreaming, imaginatively exploring some issue, or
thinking about what to do, the person’s brain, body and
environment may well be such that the person is indeed in control
of what he or she is thinking, the state of mind being a brain state
which produces and controls neurological processes that are the
ponderings, day-dreams, imaginings or thoughts of the person in
question.
In the Autumn of 2007, at the time of writing, Gordon Brown,
then the prime minister of Britain, agonized about whether or not
he should call a general election. Here, let us suppose, are his
thoughts. Winning a general election would give his premiership a
legitimacy it does not otherwise quite have [since he took over
without one when Tony Blair (the previous prime minister)
resigned]. Unofficially, the Labour party has prepared for a
general election, and all the news media have declared that a
general election will be called – strong reasons for calling an
election. On the other hand, the polls are not too good, and he
might lose, after having been prime minister for only a few
months. So far he has managed to avoid saying anything in public
to indicate that he is even contemplating calling an election.
Weighing up the pros and cons, he decides not to make the call for
an election (the decision he did, in fact, make).
It is possible, of course, that Gordon Brown is acting
compulsively, driven by an irresistible fear of failure not to risk an
election. But let us suppose this is not the case. He thinks, feels,
ponders, decides and acts freely. Now suppose experiential
physicalism is true.7 Gordon’s brain is such that his conscious
thoughts, feelings, ponderings and decisions are neurological
7 Experiential physicalism, as I explained in chapter 5, section (4), is
physicalism plus the thesis that the experiential exists in addition to the
physical, and cannot even in principle be reduced to the physical.
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processes – ultimately physical processes – that guide and control
other conscious states in just the right way for them to be Gordon’s
freely chosen thoughts, conscious states of mind, decisions, even
though they all occur precisely in accordance with physical law.
Why does this supposition of experiential physicalism deprive
Gordon of free will? What is it about free will that makes it
impossible to be compatible with experiential physicalism?
Incompatibilist: Physicalism makes it impossible for Gordon to be
thinking and acting freely because it makes it impossible for him to
think and do otherwise than what he did think and do. An essential
requirement for free will is that, even though everything is
precisely the same, one could have done otherwise. Physicalism
makes this impossible.
Compatibilist: First, if this requirement is conceded, it only renders
free will incompatible with deterministic physicalism, not with
probabilistic physicalism. But second, is it sensible in any case to
demand, for free will, that even though everything is the same, one
might have done otherwise? If this condition is satisfied, does it
not rather undermine free will instead of strengthen it? It would
mean that our decisions to act are sometimes subverted by the
outcome being other than what we had intended. This hardly
seems to support, to strengthen free will.
There are those occasions, it is true, when we act in a wholly
spontaneous fashion, on impulse, without prior deliberation, even
in a way which takes us by surprise, and yet – we may hold – at
such moments we seem to be at our freest, most ourselves, least
restricted by conforming to conventions which constrain our
freedom. Such spontaneous, impulsive action may even be
associated with creativity of the highest order. It may feel as if we
might have performed any number of different actions, this range
of possibilities being open to us having everything to do with the
fact that we acted with a high degree of free will.
It may be conceded that spontaneity and impulsiveness are
integral to free action. He who can never act spontaneously, but
must always deliberate consciously before acting, never allows
himself to act in an unconstrained way. Such a person is an
obsessive, compulsive deliberator and, to that extent, somewhat
lacking in free will. What matters is that we are able to ponder and
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deliberate when it is necessary, when action becomes problematic
– as it undoubtedly is for Gordon Brown in deciding whether or
not to call an election. None of this means, however, that when we
act spontaneously it really is the case that, even if everything had
been precisely the same, we might have done otherwise.
Spontaneity is perfectly compatible with (experiential)
physicalism, and compatible, too, with the fact that we could not
have done otherwise if everything had been exactly the same.
An explanation can, however, be given as to why it might seem
plausible to hold that this requirement for free will 8 is a reasonable
one to make. Suppose one upholds some version of dualism. The
conscious mind is distinct from the brain. This means that, for free
will, the conscious mind must be able to effect changes in the
physical brain. It must be the case, in other words, on at least
some occasions that, given a definite physical state of the brain
(and the rest of the universe), the conscious mind can get the brain,
and hence the body, to do a number of different things, depending
on what it decides it wants to do. If this is never possible, the
conscious mind cannot affect the brain in any way whatsoever –
and there can be no free will. In short, given dualism, it is
inevitable that one demands for free will that one could have done
otherwise even if everything physical had been precisely the same.
But if dualism is rejected, experiential physicalism and the
externalist account of perception is accepted, and inner experiences
are held to be brain processes, all this looks very different. To
demand that, for free will, it must be the case that one could have
done otherwise even though everything physical is precisely the
same, is to demand that one could have done otherwise even
though one’s entire mental state was precisely the same. In
demanding everything physical is the same one thereby demands
that everything mental is the same as well (since, granted the brain
process theory, it is not possible for the brain and the rest of the
universe to be the same but the mind to be different). But it is not
reasonable to require, for free will, that we could have done
otherwise even though one’s entire mental state is precisely the
8 The requirement, that is, that we could have done otherwise even
though absolutely everything is the same.
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same. This makes our actions – or perhaps our decision-making –
unpredictable and, to that extent, out of our control. As I have
already said, that would undermine rather than support free will.9
Granted the truth of the conjecture that our conscious inner
processes are brain processes, what we require for free will is that,
if things had been different in a range of possible ways, we would
have been able to act in appropriately different ways so as to
achieve our goals. Consider Gordon Brown again. If he was
pathologically incapable of calling an election, whatever the
circumstances, then we would have to say that he was, to that
extent, acting compulsively, and not freely. For free will we
require that Gordon would have acted differently in different
circumstances. We require, for example, that he would have called
an election if the Labour party had been higher in the polls, or if he
had known just how dire his unpopularity would become if he did
not call an election (as it did become). He might have called an
election if it had been leaked to the press that he had ordered the
Labour party to prepare for an election, since then it would have
seemed wholly unacceptable for him to change his mind.
Acting differently, in appropriate ways, if things had been
different is of the essence of the dual control hypothesis that we are
considering. For this is basic to the very idea of a purposive being,
whether it be robot, insect, bacterium, plant or animal.10 If a thing
is to pursue a goal, then it must be able, in its given environment,
to vary its actions appropriately, as the environment varies, so that
the goal is achieved in a range of circumstances. The very idea of
purpose, of pursuing a goal, disappears if this is not the case. The
goal-pursuing thing must be able to respond appropriately to some
9 This is the case even if dualism is true. If everything is the same, both
physical state of the brain and environment, and mental state of the mind,
but one could nevertheless have done otherwise, this means that one’s
mental states do not always determine one’s actions. The link between
intentions and actions is sometimes at most probabilistic. This does not
enhance free will.
10 All living things are purposive (a point to be discussed in the next
chapter). Darwinian theory tells us that they have, as their basic goals,
survival and reproductive success. Plants pursue these goals, in the
main, by means of growth.
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range of different possible circumstances so as to attain its goal in
all of them, even if, outside this range, the thing fails, and the goal
is not achieved. It is just this appropriately varied action,
responding to different circumstances so that the goal is achieved
in all of them, which the feedback mechanism contrives to
produce. In the case of a guided missile, for example, the feedback
mechanism is able to guide the missile back onto its predetermined
course when it is blown off course by winds – of any direction and
a range of strengths. What applies to guided missiles, robots,
insects and plants applies to sentient and conscious dual control
beings as well, mammals and people.
Incompatibilist: Here is a rather different consideration. If
deterministic physicalism is true, then the entire history of
humanity was determined by the state of the universe just after the
big bang. Given an instantaneous state of the universe at or soon
after the big bang, and given the basic physical laws, all future
states of the universe follow necessarily. But we can’t alter the
past, we can’t alter the laws of nature, and we can’t alter what
follows necessarily from these two either. Hence, we cannot alter
the future now. We are devoid of free will.11
Compatibilist: It is the third step in this argument that must be
challenged. We can’t alter (1) the past, and we can’t alter (2) the
laws of nature, but we can alter what follows necessarily from (1)
and (2) if we are a part of what follows, in that we have the power,
now, in a compatibilist sense, to alter what will happen in the
future. Having the power to alter what will happen in the future, in
a compatibilist sense, means having the power to do otherwise, in
relevant ways, if the circumstances had been, in various ways,
somewhat different. Determinism does not deprive us of this
compatibilist power to do otherwise. Even though we have no
power to alter the past or the laws of nature (even in the
compatibilist sense) we do have the power, given determinism, to
alter (in a compatibilist sense) what would follow necessarily from
a complete specification of the distant past plus the laws of nature
– namely, some of what lies in our future.
11 For a more detailed version of this argument see van Inwagen (1986).
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Admittedly, orthodox incompatibilists (those who hold free will
and determinism are incompatible) find this compatibilist power
“to do otherwise” insufficient for genuine free will. They hold that
free will requires that two or more possible futures lie before us,
and we have the power to decide which one occurs. But this faces
the difficulty, already mentioned, that probabilistic physicalism,
far from enhancing free will, can only serve to undermine it in that,
if probabilistic jumps occur during the process of decision making,
or during the execution of decisions already made, a decision is
formed other than what we intended, or an action executed other
than what we decided – none of which strengthens free will. This
is the problem that faces orthodox incompatibilism: how can
moving from deterministic to probabilistic physicalism do
anything other than undermine free will?
There is a possible way to solve this problem, to some extent at
least, but it is a line of thought that seems to be of little interest to
orthodox incompatibilists. It involves concentrating on
probabilistic events that occur outside rather than inside people.
The view might be called environmental probabilism. In people’s
brains, let us suppose, probabilistic events, if they occur, do so in
such a way that free will is not thereby undermined. External to
people’s bodies probabilistic events occur which are such that
distinct macroscopic states of affairs result, depending on which
way each probabilistic event went. People would have to respond
to different circumstances thrown up by these probabilistic events.
The unpredictability in principle of some aspects of the
environment creates in general, we may suppose, no special
problems for the successful exercise of free will. The probabilistic
events are, in practice, indistinguishable from deterministic but
unpredictable events – unpredictable, like the weather, because of
lack of information and predictive power. We have here, then,
probabilistic physicalism but no undermining of free will. The
universe is such that (1) the state of the universe just after the big
bang, and (2) the basic laws of nature do not determine human
history. The future might be determined probabilistically in such a
weak fashion that, given (1) and (2), our present is but one of
infinitely many alternative possibilities, most, perhaps, having no
human history at all. There is a genuinely open future, only
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probabilistically, and perhaps very weakly, determined; and yet
this move from determinism to probabilism involves no loss of free
will. The net result may be regarded as a strengthening of the free
will that is possible in such a version of physicalism.
Incompatibilist: There is another way to strengthen the kind of free
will that is possible in moving from deterministic to probabilistic
physicalism. We live, let us suppose, in a probabilistic universe.
Gordon Brown has to decide between going ahead with the general
election or calling it off and, just before he makes the decision, the
physical state of the universe is such that each option has a
probability of a half. Gordon Brown makes his decision, but the
decision is not made in a manner analogous to tossing a coin. On
the contrary, cogent reasons emerge in Brown’s mind as to why
calling an election is not sensible: the way he makes the decision
makes human sense, and is a free action, a free decision. All this is
reflected in what goes on in Brown’s brain. Nevertheless, from the
standpoint of physics, before the decision is made there is merely a
probability of one half that the election will be declared, a
probability of a half that it will be called off. At the human level,
what went on satisfies all the conditions required for a freely
chosen decision, but at the level of physics there is merely the
probabilistic prediction. In these circumstances, probabilism
enhances free will.12
Compatibilist: What is being proposed here, I take it, is that
probabilism enhances free will in the sense that there is a kind of
free will, incompatible with deterministic physicalism, which is
nevertheless compatible with probabilistic physicalism, where the
probabilistic transitions occur, not in the environment, but in the
brain.13
I find this suggestion implausible. As I have already said, some
brain events being probabilistic – as opposed to all being
12 For expositions of arguments along these lines, see Kane (1998),
especially pp. 72-101 and 124-195. For criticism see my (2001), pp.
153-154. See also Hodgson (2005) and my criticism (2005b).
13 Kane defends a version of this view. Hodgson, however, defends
incompatibilism, and the reality of free will, whether physicalism is
deterministic or probabilistic. See, in both cases, works referred to in the
previous note.
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deterministic – can only, so it would seem, undermine free will.
For it would mean that sometimes decisions to act do not result in
the action decided on, because a probabilistic event intervenes. Or
it would mean that our meaningful flow of mental life is disrupted
by probabilistic events. Even if the idea is that a person, choosing
between two actions, is freer if the choice is determined only
probabilistically and not deterministically, this still suffers from
the defect that it reduces decision-making to the equivalent of
tossing a coin (which would not ordinarily be thought to amount to
an exercise of free will).
The suggestion may be, however, that probabilism allows for
states of mind (to which correspond states of the brain) to
determine subsequent mental states, decisions to act, or actions, in
a way which is more definite and specific than that determined by
the underlying probabilistic physics. Whereas deterministic
physicalism leaves no room for this kind of psychological
determination to operate in addition to the physics, probabilistic
physicalism does provide room for it to happen, without basic
physical laws being violated.
But this suggestion seems implausible for two reasons.14 First,
the suggestion requires brain states to determine subsequent brain
states (or bodily actions) in a way which is entirely in addition to
what is determined by fundamental (probabilistic) physics.
Somehow, evolution has led to new physics – new physical laws –
which operate, however, only in connection with conscious brains
(or perhaps the brains of living things more generally). This is
hardly plausible when viewed from a scientific standpoint. It is a
version of vitalism – the discredited doctrine that special physical
laws operate in connection with life. Second, it is difficult to see
how this psychological or personal determination of subsequent
states of affairs could operate in a way which is compatible with
14 It might be objected that this view threatens to undermine
incompatibilism by introducing a new kind of psychological
determinism. But such an objection would amount to little more than a
cheap debating point. What the incompatibilist has in mind, here, is not
psychological laws constraining how mental states evolve, but rather
intentions, decisions to act, reliably producing what is intended or what
has been decided.
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the basic probabilistic physics. If mental states, and thus brain
states, can determine subsequent mental states (brain states)
repeatedly in a more definite way than basic probabilistic physics
can then, so it would seem, the basic physical laws must be
violated. No doubt it would be all but impossible to demonstrate
this violation experimentally, because of the extraordinary
complexity of the brain. But it is difficult to see how complex
brain states can determine what subsequent brain states occur in a
way which is wholly in addition to what basic probabilistic physics
can determine, without basic physics being violated. The move
from deterministic to probabilistic physics, in short, does not seem
to make it any easier to have mental determination that is wholly in
addition to physical determination and that is, at the same time,
compatible with fundamental physical law.
Incompatibilist: If, whenever we act, we could not have done
otherwise even though everything had been the same, as
deterministic physicalism implies, then there can be no such thing
as choice. Choosing involves deciding which of two or more
possible actions to take. This in turn requires that these options are
real options, which might indeed have been selected. But if we
could not have acted in a way other than the way we did act, then
choice, alternative options, is an illusion. Choice is an illusion.
And that means that free will is an illusion, for free will requires
choice.
Compatibilist: It is not at all clear that having a genuine choice
does require that many outcomes are possible, any one of which
could have happened given the state of affairs before the choice is
made. For this may make choice an arbitrary matter, not a matter
of goals, reasons, desires. If, before Gordon Brown makes his
choice, the two possibilities are equally balanced and it is a purely
probabilistic matter which is made, equivalent to tossing a coin,
this does not seem to amount to choice in any very significant
sense (as I have already remarked). What matters, for choice to be
an authentic exercise of free will, is that there are reasons for the
choice, some kind of personal explanation for it, couched in terms
of the goals, desires, feelings, personality, context, beliefs, hopes
and fears of the person in question. The all important point, from
the standpoint of free choice, is that the person in question would
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have chosen differently, in appropriate ways, if the goals, desires,
feelings, context, beliefs, hopes and fears had been different. For
Gordon Brown’s choice to be a genuine choice, an expression of
free will, what is required is that his choice would have been
different, in appropriate ways, if the situation had been different.
Incompatibilist: This conception of choice makes humans no freer
than animals.
Compatibilist: Human choice has undoubtedly evolved out of
animal choice. Animals often act in contexts of extreme conflict.
A mouse must leave the safety of its burrow to forage for food, but
in doing so risks its life from preying owls and foxes. The mouse
must persistently decide whether it is safe to keep snuffling around
for food, or whether the rustling this entails risks death, and it must
freeze, or scuttle back to safety. The choice between two radically
different lines of action that lie before the mouse is far more
extreme and agonizing than choices that most of us humans have
to make for most of our lives. Darwinian evolution designs the
brains of mice, and of other mammals, to be good at making such
choices, good at learning how to make such choices. To put it
brutally, those mice that are not good at making such choices die
(and thus fail to breed), falling victim either to predators or to
starvation. Choosing well is vital for survival and reproductive
success.
Our human capacity to choose has undoubtedly evolved from
earlier mammalian capacity to choose well. But our human
capacity to choose is massively enriched and enhanced by the
massively enriched range of choices that lie before us – if we are
fortunate – and our massively enriched human consciousness,
founded on imagination and language (to be discussed in the next
chapter). Human choosing has evolved from animal choosing, but
is such a profound enrichment of animal choosing that free will
may well seem to apply only to humans, and not to animals.
In both animal and human cases, however, the kind of choosing
we have just considered is entirely compatible with physicalism,
even deterministic physicalism. What matters, for free choice in
this compatibilist sense, is the capacity to act differently in
appropriate ways (so as to achieve desirable aims) if the
circumstances had been different in a variety of ways.
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Incompatibilist: If a person is to have free will, it must be the case
that that person’s authentic self initiates and controls the actions
that that person performs. (It must be the authentic self, because if
an inauthentic self is in control, a product, perhaps, of
brainwashing, hypnosis or indoctrination, we should hold that the
person is not in charge, not acting freely, or at least acting with
severely diminished freedom.) But if physicalism is true, this
cannot be the case. It is purely physical states of affairs, plus
physical laws, which determine what occurs, not the person’s
authentic self at all. Free will is impossible.
Combatibilist: What is the self? Is it reasonable to hold, for the
sake of this debate, that the self is that which enables the person to
be what he or she most distinctively is, prompting or guiding the
person to act in his or her characteristic ways, compounded of
basic desires, fears, hopes, goals, a reservoir of basic memories,
skills, knowledge, beliefs, values, temperament, likes and dislikes?
Incompatibilist: For the sake of the discussion, let it be conceded
that the self is something that is roughly along these lines.
Compatibilist: Excellent. For, granted that we conceive of the self
along some such lines, and granted the brain process theory of the
mind, we can hold that the self is a basic part of the control aspect
of the brain – that persisting part of the brain crucially involved in
guiding the person to be what he or she most characteristically is,
do the kind of things he or she does. According to the dual control
theory, the self, so construed, does really guide and control what
the person thinks, imagines and does. Experiential aspects of the
self are control aspects of the brain which, in turn, are physical
states and processes of the brain which physicalism itself declares
to play a crucial role in determining what occurs. The task of
distinguishing the authentic from the inauthentic self poses no
special problem for this view. It may be that the distinction
ultimately has to do with values, in that it depends on what is of
most value in the person’s character and life.
Incompatibilist: According to the brain process theory and dual
control hypothesis, our conscious inner life is made up of the
experiential aspects of brain processes. When we decide to do
something, and we initiate the action, what we know about what
goes on inside our head is the experiential aspect of the decision.
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But it is the physical, not the experiential aspect of the brain
process which plays a role in producing and guiding the action.
The experiential aspect is causally impotent. It plays no role
whatsoever. Thus our inner conscious life has no role whatsoever
in initiating and guiding action.15 It is at most merely a wholly
impotent witness to what goes on. Hence, if experiential
physicalism is true, there can be no free will.
Compatibilist: But the decision to act, as experienced by the person
in question, is the brain process, the physical state of affairs, that
plays a crucial role in initiating and guiding the action performed.
The experiential decision is contingently identical to the physical
process going on in the brain just as the morning star is
contingently identical to the evening star, both, as a matter of fact,
being the planet Venus.16
Incompatibilist: Even if this is the case, nevertheless it is still only
the experiential, the mental, aspect of brain processes that the
person knows about, and this aspect plays no role in initiating and
guiding the actions performed. Hence, what the person knows
about – in a sense, what the person is – plays no role in initiating
and guiding action. The person is condemned to impotency.
Compatibilist: This criticism is valid when directed against a well-
known view in the history of thought about the mind-brain
problem, namely epiphenomenalism. It is not valid, however,
when directed against the view being defended here (brain process
theory plus dual control hypothesis). Epiphenomenalism is a
version, a modification, of Cartesian dualism. According to
epiphenomenalism, the mind, consciousness, is distinct from the
brain. Brain processes cause distinct mental phenomena to occur
in the conscious mind, but these mental phenomena have no causal
impact on the brain whatsoever. The causal influence is in one
15 There is considerable discussion of this issue in the philosophical
literature: see, for example, Robb and Heil (2008), and references therein
cited.
16 A famous – or infamous – argument by Saul Kripke claims to show
that contingent identity of the kind involved here (with “rigid
designators”) is not possible: see Kripke (1981). Elsewhere, I have
demolished this argument; or rather, shown that there really is no
argument: see my (2001), Appendix Two.
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direction only, from brain to mind (whereas Cartesian dualism
asserts that the causal influence goes in both directions).
Your criticisms are entirely valid when directed against
epiphenomenalism: conscious decisions to act can, given this view,
play no role whatsoever in producing and controlling the action
decided upon. They are not valid, however, when directed against
the very different view of the dual control hypothesis. Granted this
view, conscious decisions to act are (contingently identical to)
brain processes that play a crucial role in producing and controlling
the actions decided upon – not, as epiphenomenalism would have
it, distinct from such brain processes, and having no causal impact
on these brain processes.
Furthermore, in being aware of the experiential aspect of a
decision to act – get up from one’s chair and greet a friend, let us
say – the person in question is aware of precisely that aspect of the
brain process that the person needs to be aware of in order to be in
control of his actions, namely the control aspect of the brain
process. We are ordinarily blithely ignorant of the physical aspects
of our inner experiences. That it is why it is such a shock when we
first learn that our inner experiences, our thoughts, feelings,
perceptions, imaginings, states of awareness, are all neurological
processes – complex patterns of neurons firing, waves of
potassium and sodium ions being exchanged through the semi-
permeable membranes of neurons plus parcels of chemicals
leaping the gaps of synaptic junctions. How can this delicious
scent of honeysuckle, this vision of leaves and sun and blue sky,
this murmuring voice, these feelings of joy, sorrow, weariness,
anxiety, these aches of longing and desire, this whole world of
rich, subtle, ever-varying awareness, all actually be intricate waves
of potassium and sodium ions chasing down complex arrays of
neurons in the brain? So absurd does this seem that it is no wonder
there is this strong tendency to believe that our inner experiences
are quite distinct from anything going on in the brain.
But what we ordinarily know about what goes in our brain is, as
I have said, what we need to know about to be in control, namely
the control aspects of brain processes. A person sees a chair in
front of him and decides to sit down. In seeing the chair, the
person is in effect aware of a brain process going on in his brain.
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He is aware, first and foremost, of the chair, but secondarily, of his
perception of the chair. But what the person is aware of is not the
neurological or physical aspects of this process – the neurons, the
potassium and sodium ions, etc. – but the control aspect, that
aspect relevant to action, to the successful realization of goals.
The eye and brain of the person function in such a way that the
brain process in question contains information about the nature of
the object before him: it is a chair. It is this vital control feature of
the brain process that the person becomes aware of (in an
incidental way) in seeing the chair. The decision to sit down is
another complex neurological process. In being aware of the
experiential features of this process, the person knows nothing of
the neurological or physical aspects of the process, but instead
knows what the control aspect is: this, and just this, neurological
process, occurring in this brain, will lead to the body moving,
turning, and, as arms reach out for the arms of the chair, the
sinking down so as to be sitting in the chair. We all have, in short,
quite incredibly sophisticated knowledge of the control features of
neurological processes going on in our brains. We would not be
able to perform the actions that we do perform were this not the
case. This wonderfully intricate and sophisticated knowledge that
we possess of the control aspects of our brain processes is
something that we have to learn. Young babies do not have it.
One can sense, sometimes, that a baby does not know how to grab
a foot to suck a toe: the arms and legs thrash about in frustration.
We learn about the control aspects of processes that go on in our
brains, and as we learn we no doubt also create; we no doubt
develop our brains to have increasingly sophisticated control
structures and functions. Our brains come to reflect what we have
experienced and struggled to do in the past. We make our brains
up, to some extent, as we live.
In short, what we know about neurological processes going on in
our brains is just what we need to know in order to see, hear,
touch, speak and act, namely the control aspect of these processes.
It would be a disaster if we knew about the neurological aspect,
and an even greater disaster if we knew about the physical aspect.
We would be paralysed with irrelevant information overload, lost
for ever among our neurons and synaptic junctions. Our inner
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experiences are, nevertheless, neurological processes, physical
processes. In being aware of the control aspect of these processes,
we are aware of what we need to be aware of in order to be able to
act more or less successfully in the world, and it is these processes
that play a crucial role in initiating and guiding what we do. If this
were not the case, we would not be aware of the control aspect
after all.
None of this means, of course, that we have anything like a
complete or infallible knowledge of the control aspects of
processes going on in the brain. People misconstrue what they see.
They deceive themselves about their motives, desires, feelings and
beliefs. They misconstrue what it is they are doing, and why they
are doing it. And no doubt much that goes on in the brain has no
experiential aspect at all, but instead makes the occurrence of other
brain processes possible which do have experiential aspects.17 We
all have an incredibly detailed and sophisticated knowledge of the
control aspects of neurological processes going on in our brains,
but some of us have a more detailed, sophisticated and accurate
knowledge than others.
An important, additional point needs to be appreciated. It is not
just that we have incredibly sophisticated knowledge of the control
aspects of processes going on inside our heads. In addition, we
have an incredibly sophisticated capacity for creating head
processes subtly and brilliantly designed to have just those control
17 A basic task for psycho-neurology is to discover how to correlate
control or functional aspects of brain processes with neurological
aspects, it being especially important to pin-point those functional
aspects that are experiential or conscious. A basic task, in short, is to
locate consciousness in the brain. For a discussion of this problem, and a
proposed outline of a solution, see my (2001), ch. 8. I there suggest that
consciousness is to be located in the limbic system plus whatever other
part of the brain the limbic system is in strong, two-way interaction with
at that moment. This suggestion does justice to the idea that
consciousness should have some kind of fixed location in the brain
(centrally placed, if possible) and at the same time does justice to the
idea that consciousness flits about the brain as we become aware of, and
think about, different things – the visual, the auditory, motor control,
abstract thought, remembering past events.
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features required to enable us to do what we have decided to do. I
decide to get up and greet a friend. This decision is the
neurological process going on in my brain responsible for
activating my brain to control my body to get up, walk towards my
friend and greet him. Even though I ordinarily know nothing about
the neurological or physical aspects of the brain state that guides
my actions, I nevertheless have this extraordinary capacity to
create just the neurological process required to execute my
intention, the neurological process in question being conceived of,
by me, in control terms. I have the power, the capacity, to do
endlessly many different things, and thus the capacity to create
endlessly many different neurological processes or states in my
brain all precisely and brilliantly crafted, in control terms, to do the
endlessly many different things that I can do.18
This view has the great merit of doing justice to two apparently
mutually contradictory features of the situation simultaneously. It
does justice to our ordinary complete ignorance about processes
going on inside our head while at the same time doing justice to
our highly detailed and sophisticated knowledge of these very
same processes. We ordinarily know next to nothing about head
processes conceived of as physical or neurological processes, but
know a great deal about these same head processes conceived of in
control terms. It is, in part, this duality of absolute ignorance and
detailed knowledge that leads some to uphold dualism: there are
two kinds of processes, physical processes (of which we are
ordinarily ignorant) and mind processes (about which we know a
great deal). There is, however, another option: there is just one
kind of process, the head process: this may be conceived of and
specified, either as a physical (or neurological) process, or as a
control process. That there are these two kinds of specifications
does not mean that there are two kinds of process.
Incompatibilist: But in the end it is not this so-called “control
aspect” of brain states or processes that initiates and controls
actions performed, but the physical aspect of these states or
18 This knowledge of, and control over, the brain by the brain, is a key
feature that psycho-neurology will need to depict and comprehend in
order to understand the workings of the mammalian and human brain.
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processes, and of that aspect of processes going on inside our
heads we ordinarily know nothing. Thus, what really determines
what we do – the physical features of what goes on inside our
heads (plus of course physical features of our bodies and
environment) – is something we ordinarily know nothing about.
That in turn means that we are not in charge. We cannot be
responsible for what we do. If experiential physicalism is true,
there can be no free will.
Compatibilist: The key step we need to take, I think, to see that
experiential physicalism does make free will possible is to specify,
in general terms, the physical structure a brain would have to have
to possess what we may call “perfect free will”. It goes like this.
A conscious brain with perfect free will has a neurological, and
ultimately physical structure such that the physical aspect of any
conscious head process behaves in just the way required for the
conscious content to be what it purports to be, or do what it
purports to do, acting so as to promote conscious free will. In such
a brain, the neurological process that is the conscious perception of
a rose has been caused to occur by a rose-like image being
projected onto the retina of the eye; furthermore, the neurological
process is such that it leads to other physical processes occurring in
the brain, which constitute such things as awareness of the rose,
knowledge of the rose, and even, perhaps, if it is wished, the
conscious decision to move forward and smell the rose. This
conscious decision, in turn, is such that its physical aspect causes
muscles to contract in precisely the way required for the decision
to be enacted, in just the way the decision determined. If
circumstances had been different, in a range of possible ways, then
conscious processes, and the actions they control, would also have
been different in precisely the ways required for the person
consciously and freely to attain her goals, the same or modified as
the occasion would have required. In the conscious brain with
perfect free will, in short, physical processes occur and evolve in
precisely the way required by free, conscious action. The physical
aspect of a conscious thought, perception, desire, feeling, or
decision to act, is caused, evolves, and has causal effects precisely
as required by the perception, feeling or decision that it also is.
Physical processes in the brain conform to what consciousness
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requires, not because consciousness intervenes and bends a law of
nature or two, but because the particular, remarkable architecture
of the brain arranges for this outcome to occur. Granted
physicalism, two factors determine what occurs: (1) the laws of
nature, and (2) particular, instantaneous states of affairs. It is the
particular, instant by instant – and highly remarkable – states of the
perfectly free conscious brain that ensure that physical processes,
evolving in the brain in accordance with the laws of nature, do so
in such a way as to serve the interests of conscious free control.
Thus, in the brain with perfect free will, physics is enslaved to
consciousness, to the authentic self, and the God-of-Cosmic-Power
is the slave of the God-of-Cosmic-Value. (Although, for the latter,
we require in addition, perhaps, that the brain with perfect free will
also has perfect wisdom.)
Given that a conscious brain satisfies this remarkable
requirement of having perfect free will, it makes perfect sense to
say that consciousness is in control, conscious decisions to act
initiating and controlling the actions decided upon. In the brain
with perfect free will physics, we might say, is the means by which
consciousness exercises its control.
Our human, partial free will exists because our brains satisfy
partially, but no doubt rarely fully, this requirement of perfect free
will.
For my argument to succeed, it should be noted, all we require is
that conscious brains with perfect free will are possible granted
experiential physicalism. And this we have. There is nothing in
physicalism as such which precludes the possibility of the perfectly
free brain, as I have characterized it.
Incompatibilist: But the conscious brain with “perfect free will” as
you have described it, has no free will at all because everything is
precisely determined by physics.
Compatibilist: But don’t you see? What I have just said wipes out
any reason you may have for holding that, granted experiential
physicalism, physics must over-ride consciousness. In the brain
with perfect free will, physics is wholly commandeered to serve
the interests of conscious free action, and does not obstruct the
freedom-producing actions of consciousness at all. What I have
given is an account of how consciousness can dominate, guide and
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control physics in the brain within the framework of experiential
physicalism. There is not a whiff, here, of the impotence of
epiphenomenalism.
Incompatibilist: But even in the brain “with perfect free will” it is
still physics that determines what goes on, not consciousness.
Compatibilist: I despair. What you fail to appreciate is that, in the
brain with perfect free will, physical processes invariably occur in
such a way as to enable the person to think her thoughts, reach her
decisions, and do what she decides to do. The structure and
working of the brain is such that physical processes going on it
occur persistently in just the way required for the person to be in
control of her consciousness, her decisions, her actions.
Let me, however, respond to what may lie behind your
objection. In describing head processes in terms of their control
aspect – as perceptions, desires, feelings, beliefs, intentions,
decisions and so on – we are in effect referring to those head
processes and states, whatever their nature may be, that play the
relevant role in controlling action. Given physicalism, this means
that references to head processes described in terms of their control
aspects, are in fact references to those physical processes going on
in the brain that are in fact playing the crucial role in determining
what actions are performed (in the given environment). It is just
that this reference is somewhat opaque, left open as a result of
ignorance of the real nature our inner mental states. (By contrast,
if Cartesian dualism were true, then descriptions of perceptions,
decisions to act and so on would be references to and descriptions
of non-physical, mental states and processes, not brain processes.)
Granted that physicalism is accepted, we can give just a little
more theoretical precision to descriptions of our inner experiences.
In referring to my decision to get up and greet my friend I can say I
am referring to that physical process that occurred in my brain
which played the crucial role in initiating and guiding my action,
whatever precisely it might be.
Incompatibilist: This reply just might be acceptable given a
functionalist account of consciousness. It does not work, however,
given the view of experiential physicalism.
Functionalism is the view that mental aspects of brain processes
are nothing more than control aspects – or functional aspects, as
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functionalists call control aspects. Given that a computer is
playing chess, let us suppose, and is pondering its next move, what
is going on inside the computer may be described in two different
ways. On the one hand, there is the description of the physical
processes occurring – electricity flowing through a complex
network of transistors. On the other hand, there is the description
of the functional or control aspects of these physical processes –
that aspect that has to do with the task the computer has been set:
to win the game of chess. Thus, in terms of this latter kind of
description, the computer might be said to be “exploring the
consequences of sacrificing a knight”, or “thinking about moving
the king’s pawn up one square”. According to functionalism, there
is no essential difference between functional descriptions of
computer processing, where there is no question of consciousness
or sentience being involved, and functional descriptions of
person’s inner mental states and acts, where consciousness very
definitely is involved. According to functionalism, when a control
system becomes sufficiently sophisticated, sufficiently capable of
representing its own inner functional states and processes, it
becomes “conscious”. The difference between a non-conscious
and a conscious control system is one of degree, according to
functionalism, not of kind. There are no extra, non-physical,
experiential features of brain processes – or rather, if there are,
they can, in principle, be fully understood in purely functionalist or
control terms.
Granted functionalism, your account, Compatibilist, as to how
the mental aspects of brain processes really can initiate and control
action makes sense. For, according to functionalism, the mental
aspects of brain processes are nothing more than functional or
control aspects of those processes. Thus, in referring to mental
aspects of decisions to act, we are, indeed, referring to the physical
processes going on in the brain that initiate and control the relevant
actions, but we are doing so in an opaque way, so that the
decisions are not specified to be brain processes. But all this
changes the moment functionalism is rejected, experiential
physicalism is accepted, and it is accepted that (some) brain
processes have an experiential aspect which cannot, even in
principle, be reduced to, or explained in terms of, physical
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description. In referring to a decision to act as an inner mental act
we refer to the experiential aspect of the brain process, and not to
the physical aspect. And the experiential aspect is impotent to
effect change. It is exclusively the physical aspects of our inner
experiences that can play a role in determining what we do; the
experiential aspects play no role whatsoever. Thus, granted
experiential physicalism, we have no free will.
There is a paradox here. It might seem that experiential
physicalism and the dual control hypothesis make free will
possible, whereas functionalism does not, in that it reduces us to
the status of robots. (We are, according to functionalism, no more
than soft robots.) But actually, as we have seen, just the reverse is
the case. Functionalism gives a real role to decisions in initiating
and controlling action, whereas experiential physicalism does not.
Being conscious in a way which cannot be fully explicated
functionally, seems actually to undermine, rather than enhance, the
possibility of free will.
Compatibilist: According to experiential physicalism, the mental
or experiential aspect of a brain process is the control aspect of that
process, and hence no special difficulty confronts the view that, in
referring to conscious decisions to act, we are referring, somewhat
opaquely, to physical processes involved in initiating and
controlling our actions. A conscious decision to act is a brain
process which, in turn, is a physical process that plays a decisive
role in bringing about the bodily movements that constitute the
action the person has decided to perform.19
Incompatibilist: This doesn’t really meet my objection. Let me put
it like this. Consider two purposive beings, Karl, a conscious
human being, and Robot – a robot built and programmed to act just
like Karl, but without a whiff of inner consciousness or sentience.
Robot can do all the sorts of things that Karl can do, and
furthermore, like Karl, can “think”, “ponder”, “imagine”, “plan”,
“desire” “feel”, have “hopes” and “fears”, and “make decisions”.
The only difference is that, whereas Karl’s thoughts, feelings,
desires and decisions are (mostly) conscious, Robot’s are not. But,
according to the dual control hypothesis, this difference cannot
19 See notes 16 and 17.
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mean that Robot has less free will than Karl. All the “control”
requirements for free will satisfied by Karl, are also satisfied by
Robot. Even though entirely lacking in consciousness, Robot
must, it seems, have just as much free will as Karl, according to the
dual control view. This, on the face of it, seems like a reductio ad
absurdum of that view. Consciousness must, after all, be an
essential requirement for free will.
Compatibilist: Agreed: no free will without consciousness. The
flaw in the above argument is the assumption that Robot is not
conscious. According to the version of the brain process theory
presupposed by the dual control hypothesis, what matters, for
sentience and consciousness, is the control or functional features of
a brain, not the substances out of which the brain is made. If the
control features of Robot’s brain are, in the relevant respects,
similar to those of Karl, then this means, as a matter of fact, that
Robot is conscious too.20 The fact that Robot’s brain is made of
transistors or micro chips, while Karl’s is made of neurons, does
not deprive Robot of any consciousness of the kind that Karl
possesses – as long as the control features of Robot’s brain are
similar to Karl’s, and thus adequate to support consciousness, and
conscious action.21
20 It may be that, for a brain to become conscious, it is necessary that the
brain grows, the growth of the brain being influenced by the way it
functions. It may be, in other words, that we grow into full human
consciousness. This may mean robots cannot in practice be conscious –
unless a way is found for a being made of silicon microchips to grow.
21 This is not the same as behaviourism – the doctrine that one is
conscious if one behaves as if conscious (as we saw on pages 81-2).
Suppose there is a robot that behaves as if conscious. Instead of a brain,
however, the robot’s motor and sensory impulses are transmitted to a
nearby computer, which has, in it, a model of a possible conscious brain
for the robot. The computer receives radio signals from the robot
concerning sensory information; the computer then calculates how the
robot’s brain would have responded, if it existed, and then transmits the
results to the robot, which then acts on the information received. As a
result, the robot acts as if conscious. Nevertheless, it is not conscious
because it does not have a brain, not even in the computer, where only a
model of a brain exists. Calculations as to how a conscious brain would
act if it existed are not the same as the workings of an actual conscious
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Incompatibilist: There is still a difficulty. Given your view,
consciousness seems to add nothing to freedom, and may even
detract from it. In the case of a hypothetical non-conscious Robot,
with a brain functionally similar to that of a conscious, freely
acting human being, the Robot would seem, according to
compatibilism, to be every bit as free as Karl, the human being.
Indeed freer, because in the case of Robot, there is nothing in the
brain other than physical processes guiding Robot’s actions. His
functional “desires”, “intentions” and “decisions” really do play a
crucial role in producing Robot’s actions. In the case of Karl, it is
not at all clear that his conscious, experienced desires, intentions
and decisions play a similar role. These experiential processes
cannot just be identified with functionally described neurological
processes going on in Karl’s brain. In principle, a second party,
Jennifer, might know that such and such a complex neurological
process occurring in Karl’s brain is – functionally speaking – the
decision to walk out of the room, but Jennifer cannot know what
Karl knows in experiencing this decision, making the decision.
What Karl experiences is thus extra to the functional aspect of the
decision, the brain process, and thus not implicated directly in
producing the action of walking out of the room. Whereas Robot’s
functional features of his brain processes are directly involved in
producing his actions – as Karl’s functional features of his brain
processes are too – Karl’s experiential features seem to play no
role. There is no role for them to play. Compatibilist experiential
functionalism is, in other words, in the same boat as
epiphenomenalism: it can give no real role to conscious,
experienced desires, intentions and decisions in producing actions.
This role is completely filled by brain processes functionally
construed and described – according to the compatibilist view
under consideration.
Compatibilist: But what would it be for us to be more directly
aware of the control or functional aspect of our brain processes
than we ordinarily are? It would be no good to be directly aware
of the neurological aspect. In that case, as I have already
remarked, we would become hopelessly lost among the neurons
brain, even if the behaviour that results is the same.
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and synaptic junctions of our brain. We would not know what we
need to know: the control aspect of our head processes. Would we
be more directly aware of the control aspect if we became directly
aware of the content of perception without any sensory experience
whatsoever, so that we posses consciousness but no sentience?
The phenomenon of blindsight might indicate what this would
be like. Some blind people are able to guess correctly about the
nature of objects placed before them, even though they see
nothing, and have no visual experience whatsoever. These people
are blind because the primary visual cortex, at the back of the head,
has been damaged. Information from the eyes is able to reach the
brain via the optic nerves by another route, and it is this which
enables the person to know, without perceptual experience, what
has been placed before him.
Would we be more directly aware of the control aspect of our
brain processes if all our perceptual knowledge was analogous to
blindsight? We know directly what is before us, what is said, how
we are related to our environment, but see nothing, hear nothing,
feel nothing. Such a mode of existence would surely be an
absolute nightmare. One would have knowledge of one’s
surroundings, knowledge of one’s body in one’s surroundings, but
one would, it seems, be bereft of any idea as to how one has
acquired this knowledge. Initiate certain impulses –
corresponding, for example, to turning the head – and, abruptly
and mysteriously, one’s knowledge of one’s surroundings is
transformed.22 It may well be that consciousness devoid of
sentience is physiologically and psychologically impossible.23 But
if it is possible, it would not seem to involve a more direct
knowledge of the control aspects of brain processes than we
ordinarily have.
The attempt to devise a kind of knowledge of control aspects of
our brain processes more direct and accurate than our ordinary
knowledge seems to fail. The outcome of the attempt is, indeed, to
22 I wonder whether such a horrifying existence could be made the
subject of a short story.
23 It might even be logically impossible (in that the very idea of
consciousness presupposes some sentience).
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impress on one just how direct and accurate our ordinary
knowledge of the control aspects of our brain processes is. It
seems impossible to devise anything more direct and accurate.
And this is, perhaps, not surprising. Natural selection might be
expected to design brains good at acquiring this kind of self-
knowledge, vital for survival. An animal does not need to know
anything about the neurological workings of its brain, but it does
need to know what this perception of danger, or of food, betokens.
Much depends, in this context, on whether one adopts the
“internalist” or “externalist” account of perception, mentioned
above and discussed in chapter three. The internalist account
depicts perceptual sensations as deceptive about the nature of
external reality and, at the same time, utterly distinct from
associated brain processes. This is all but indistinguishable from
epiphenomenalism. The externalist account, by contrast, depicts
perceptual experiences (which are not illusions or hallucinations)
as accurately representing external reality. Grass really is green,
and honeysuckle really is yellow and sweet smelling.
Furthermore, what we know about the process occurring in our
head is precisely the control or functional aspect of that process:
what we need to know in order to know how to act in response to
what we perceive. In experiencing the visual sensation of yellow
honeysuckle when blindfold, induced perhaps by a probe to the
visual part of my brain, all I know about what is going on inside
me is: “this is the sort of process that would occurs inside me if I
really was seeing yellow honeysuckle”. Externalism holds, in
short, that our knowledge of our inner perceptual sensations is
based on our perceptual knowledge of things external to us – what
we require in order to know how to act, the control aspect in other
words.
Incompatibilist: I remain entirely unconvinced. Let me try again.
If it is logically possible to have Robot acting like a conscious,
freely acting person, with a brain functionally similar to such a
person, but Robot is nevertheless devoid of consciousness, then it
would seem purely functional descriptions of Robot’s brain states
would suffice to explain his actions. If this is the case, adding on
consciousness can make no addition to free will whatsoever. The
conscious aspect of brain processes can play no role in producing
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actions in addition to that of brain processes conceived of
functionally, with conscious aspects ignored. Experiential
physicalism does seem, in this respect, indistinguishable from
epiphenomenalism.
In order to avoid this conclusion, it seems obligatory to hold that
Robot, as just conceived, is not possible, even in principle. If
Robot acts as a conscious, free person, and has a brain functionally
similar to the brain of such a person, then Robot is conscious and
free. Robot must, in other words, in these circumstances, be
conscious and free – at least, as conscious and free as the
corresponding person. But this means that, from a purely
functional, non-experiential description of Robot, of his actions
and brain processes, an experience-laden description can be
deduced. It is not logically possible to have the one without the
other. And that would seem to go against the whole idea of
experiential physicalism, which holds that the experiential cannot
be deduced from the non-experiential.24
Is Robot a logical possibility? Then there seems to be no role
for consciousness in free will. Is Robot not a logical possibility?
Then, from a purely functional description of Robot it must be
possible to deduce that Robot is conscious. But this goes against a
basic premise of experiential physicalism. Either way, experiential
physicalism fails to explain how consciousness can contribute to
free will.
Your only reply, Compatibilist, to this criticism is to argue that
Robot is a logical possibility, but not a possibility in fact, in
practice. Robot may exist in a logically possible world, but cannot
exist, as a matter of fact, in our world. But this reply is inadequate,
in at least two respects. First, the mere logical possibility of Robot
is enough to establish that consciousness plays no active role in
free will. It may be that, in our world, whenever a being acts as if
conscious, and has a brain like that of a conscious person, then that
being is, as a matter of fact, conscious. Nevertheless,
consciousness is not logically necessary for free action, and that
24 In chapter 3 indeed we had something like a proof of this proposition,
with the argument that physics cannot predict that ripe tomatoes (for
example) are (experientially) red.
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suffices to show experiential physicalism cannot assign an active
role to consciousness in producing free action. Secondly, if beings
like Robot are invariably conscious as a matter of fact, in our
world, then there must be some reason for this, some explanation.
It cannot be a mere accident. Brain function must be linked to
consciousness in a way that is somewhat analogous to the way
releasing stones near the earth’s surface is linked to the stones
falling to the ground. In this latter case, there is an explanation:
Newton’s law of gravitation. So, in the case of Robot-like beings
always in fact being conscious, there must be some kind of
explanation. But what explanation could there be? What theory of
consciousness could predict and explain that a brain operating in
such and such a way is invariably conscious?
Compatibilist: You have almost convinced me that you are right,
and my dual-control, experiential physicalist account of free will is
untenable. Almost, but not quite. Let me try to reply to your
criticisms.
To begin with, beings like Robot, acting as if conscious, and
with brains functionally similar to those of conscious persons, but
not conscious, are called zombies in the philosophical literature –
so let’s adopt that terminology here.
A preliminary point to note is that it would not be logically
possible for a zombie to do much of what we conscious human
beings do. Much that we do presupposes consciousness. I cannot
share a joke with you, praise or scold you, or even ponder a
question, if I am a zombie. But this is a rather trivial, verbal point.
It suffices for the incompatibilist criticism that the zombie can
imitate these actions.25 We do not require that the zombie can
actually do them.
Is there a knock down argument that establishes that zombies
must be logically possible? The point that physics cannot predict
experiential features of things, like redness, does not suffice. For
what has to be demonstrated is that a purely functional description
of a potential zombie – his actions and brain processes – cannot
imply consciousness. A functional description is not the same as a
physical description. And implying that this being is conscious is
25 In a sense of “imitate” which does not itself presuppose consciousness.
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not at all the same as implying that the being has these specific
experiences (the visual sensation of redness, etc.) Delicate
questions arise, too, in connection with how the functional
description is to be formulated. Does the functional description
include experiential terms, or not? If we assume that it does not,
then we must conclude, in my view, that no purely functional
description of the potential zombie can imply that he is conscious.
The zombie must be a logical possibility.
The only remaining hope, it seems, is to hold that the zombie,
though logically possible, is not in fact possible. Consciousness
being what it is, in this world, if you have a brain that functions
like that of a conscious person’s brain then, as a matter of fact, you
are conscious. And it is this fact about consciousness in our world
that ensures that consciousness plays a vital active role in free
action. All those astonishing free actions we perform, all those
things we freely do and create, demand consciousness. Zombies
cannot, as a matter of fact, in this world, do them, or “imitate”
doing them, even though it is logically possible to have zombies
that do such things.
Incompatibilist: But what about my point that there must be some
explanation as to why a brain that functions as if conscious, must
in fact be conscious?
Compatibilist: It is tempting to shelter behind our ignorance about
how the brain works, how it enables us to be conscious. When we
know and understand more neuroscience, we may think, all will
become clear. There are many examples in the history of science
of agonizing philosophical or conceptual problems dissolving with
the advance of scientific knowledge.26 But this is not very
convincing. It is not clear how advances in the neurosciences
could conceivably come up with the kind of explanatory theory we
require.
Let us suppose there is a theory, H, which explains why any
potential zombie, Z, is sentient and conscious. H, together with a
26 Here is an example. At the time of Newton and Leibniz, there was a
major dispute as to whether “quantity of motion” should be defined as
mv, or mv2/2 (where m is the mass of a body, and v is its velocity).
Gradually it was realized that both are important, the first being
momentum, the second kinetic energy.
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neurological and purely functional description of the brain
processes and actions of Z, logically imply that Z is sentient and
conscious. Two questions immediately arise about H.
First, it is difficult to see how H can be tested. We have a
potential zombie, Z, before us. H predicts that Z is conscious. If Z
is conscious, he knows he is. But how can he communicate this
information to the rest of us? Whether he is or not makes no
difference. Either way, he will tell us he is conscious. The rest of
us have no way of checking up on the correctness, or falsity, of this
prediction of H. In a sense, indeed, we have no way of bringing
into the public domain knowledge of how consciousness is
distributed among humanity. I cannot refute the hypothesis that I
alone am conscious, and the rest of you are zombies – anymore
than you can refute the hypothesis that you alone are conscious.
Quite apart from this epistemological problem facing H, there is
the argument of chapter three of this book (which I, a character in
this book mysteriously seem to know all about) which seems to
show that H, if it exists, must be so horrendously complex that it
would not be explanatory. An explanatory H, in other words, is
impossible. And indeed no one has, it seems, been able to think up
even a possible H that might explain why brain processes and
conscious inner experiences are correlated in the way that they are.
As it happens, our author has put forward just such an
explanatory H.27 The idea can be put like this. Our various kinds
of sensation – visual, auditory, olfactory, tactile – seem entirely
different, one from the other, entirely arbitrary. It seems
impossible to guess, from having experienced one sensory mode,
the nature of others. Consider a person who hears a specific kind
of sound, played on a violin say, of specific timbre and loudness.
Suppose now that the pitch of the note is continuously increased.
It would be easy for the person correctly to conceive what note
comes next. But nothing comparable is possible if one has to
conceive, from auditory sensations, what visual sensations are like,
never having had experience of them before. Indeed, even within
one sensory mode, visual say, or auditory, it would be all but
impossible to conceive, on the basis of limited experience, what
27 See my (2001), pp. 126-129; and my (2006b).
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hitherto unexperienced sensations are like. If one has only seen
red, orange and yellow, what basis does one have for imagining
and anticipating blue?
But let us now think of all possible sensations – sensations
experienced not just by all human beings, and not just by all
sentient animals, but sensations experienced by all sentient beings
that are in fact possible, whether they will ever exist or not. It
could be that this vast universe of possible sensations can be
ordered into a multi-dimensional space in such a way that, as one
goes through the space, sensations vary smoothly and predictably,
like the violin note increasing in pitch. It might be that all possible
sensations can only be ordered smoothly in this fashion in one
possible way. The sensations we experience come from widely
separated patches in this vast, uniform space of possible
sensations: that is why they seem, relative to each other, so
arbitrary and unpredictable.
Consider now all possible brain processes and structures
corresponding to these sensations, one functionally described brain
process corresponding to each sensation. Let us suppose these can
be arranged in a space of all possible, functionally described,
sentient brain processes in such a way that brain processes vary
smoothly as one moves through the space – it being possible to do
this in only one way. Now suppose that these two spaces are
matched up (i.e. put into one-to-one correspondence) in such a way
that if two brain processes are close together in the one space, then
the corresponding sensations are close together in the other space.
Let us suppose that this “distance preserving” mapping can be
done in only one way. The spaces cannot be rotated with respect
to each other, and brain processes in the one space cannot be
moved with respect to the corresponding sensations in the other
space, without the “distance preserving” mapping being violated.
The “distance preserving” mapping is, in short, unique.
And now suppose that this unique mapping, between all possible
sentient brain processes and all possible sensations, is precisely the
one which allocates, to each sensation, the brain process that is the
sensation. If the brain process occurs in an appropriate brain, then
the person experiences the corresponding sensation. At once we
have an explanation as to why brain processes and sensations are
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correlated in the specific, fixed way that (we are presuming) they
are. If brain processes and sensations were to be correlated
differently, the unique “distance preserving” mapping between the
two spaces would be violated. Brain process-sensation correlat-
ions are fixed rigidly.
A “unique matching” hypothesis, H, along these lines could
conceivably be true.28 If true, it would explain why brain
processes and sensations are correlated in the way that they are.
Even if H is false, it is still significant, because it indicates it is
possible, after all, to have a theory that explains brain process-
sensation correlations, and thus predicts that potential zombies are
sentient and conscious.
One may doubt, however, that any such H is really necessary.
The moment we put the zombie problem into the context of the
broader problem of why brain processes and sensations are
correlated in the fixed way they seem to be, doubts begin to arise
as to whether it even makes sense to think of such correlations
changing. For, suppose they do change, in any way one pleases.
Everything physical remains the same, but for some people, or for
everyone, the spectrum of colours is inverted, let us say (so that
what was red is now blue, and vice versa), or what was visual is
now auditory and vice versa, or pain and pleasure are inter-
changed. Nevertheless, granted experiential physicalism and the
persistence of everything physical, everything would proceed
exactly as before. No one would say anything about these
remarkable changes, or react in such a way as to indicate that they
had even noticed them. People would smile with pleasure when in
agony, and howl with pain when experiencing delight. At no point
would anyone say or do anything to indicate that the experiential
world had been turned upside down.
If this really did occur, the utter incapacity of experience to
influence action would become all too apparent. It would be very
clear indeed that we are wholly in the grip of physics, experience
no more than a sideshow, entirely impotent. This is the
epiphenomenalist nightmare.
28 It would be very difficult to test.
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The problem posed by the logical possibility of the zombie is, it
seems, just a special case of the much more general problem posed
by the logical possibility that the relationship between the physical
and the experiential changes and yet, in a certain sense, everything
remains the same. No one can say anything about the changes, or
respond to the changes, in any way whatsoever (because
everything physical remains the same), even though the changes
are as radical as one cares to imagine. The special case of the
zombie restricts these changes to the zombie: there are no inner
experiences associated with his brain processes.
If such changes in the customary relationships between the
physical and the experiential are logically possible then, so it
would seem, our inner experiences can play no role in influencing
action. For, in that case, we would do exactly what we in fact do
even if our inner experiences were entirely different. Some way
must be found to declare that the nightmare of arbitrary changes in
the relationship between the physical and the experiential
(everything physical remaining the same) to be impossible. If it is
impossible, then the relationship between the physical and the
experiential could not be other than they are, and the argument for
the impotence of the experiential breaks down.
There seem to be just two ways of arranging for this
impossibility.29 The first holds that such arbitrary changes in
correlations between the physical and experiential are logically
possible, but not possible in fact. They are possible in some
imaginary, logically possible world, but they are not possible in
fact in our world, this world. The second option is more radical. It
declares such arbitrary changes to be not even logically possible.
Here, now, are two views of the first kind, and then two views of
the second kind.
1. Accept experiential physicalism, the idea that inner
experiences are contingently identical to brain processes, and the
view that there is a hypothesis H – like the one indicated above –
which explains why physics and the experiential are correlated in
the way that they are. Given the truth of the explanatory
29 Throughout we are assuming physicalism, and thus ignoring such
options as that a distinct mind interacts with the physical brain.
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hypothesis H, it can be argued that, even though it is logically
possible that physics and the experiential might be correlated
differently from the way they are, this is not in fact possible. It is
denied by H, which explains why the physical and the experiential
are correlated in the way they are. In a logically possible world,
physics and the experiential might be differently correlated, but in
this world, this is not in fact possible. This in turn means it is not
in fact possible for physics and the experiential to be correlated
differently: the argument for the impotence of the experiential
collapses. This is especially so if inner experiences and decisions
to act are contingently identical to brain processes – these
processes nevertheless having experiential or mental features
which we can only become aware of by having these processes
occur in our own brain.
2. Accept experiential physicalism but reject H. That is, deny
that any such H exists. Instead, hold that the true physical theory
of everything, T, can be supplemented with a vast number of
additional postulates (perhaps infinitely many) linking the physical
and the experiential to form a true theory T*. T* is too complex to
be explanatory. However, T*, like T, can correctly make
hypothetical or counterfactual predictions of the form: a person
with such and such a brain in which such and such a process
occurs would experience such and such a sensation. The truth of
T* suffices to ensure that arbitrary changes in physical/experiential
correlations are not in fact possible, in our world. This in turn
ensures that our conscious decisions to act really can play a
substantial role in bringing about our actions.
3. Accept functionalism – the doctrine that inner experiences and
states of awareness are nothing more than certain sorts of processes
occurring in certain sorts of brains functionally specified (i.e.
specified in control terms). If functionalism is true, then keeping
the physics intact but changing the way the physics is related to the
experiential becomes impossible because any such change would
require a change in brain processes functionally described, which
would require a change in the physics of these processes. Put
another way, functionalism denies that there is any such thing as
inner experience over and above brain processes, so of course a
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change in the relationship between the experiential and the
physical is logically impossible.
4. Accept experiential functionalism, but hold that the
experiential aspect of a brain process is nothing more than what we
learn when we have the process occur for the first time in our own
brain. Thus the visual sensation of blue just is a specific kind of
brain process, specified in functional or control terms, X let us say.
A person blind from birth who has her sight restored learns
something new when she first experiences the visual sensation of
blue, namely “what it is to have X occur in your own brain”. Of
course she doesn’t know that this is what she knows. (What we
would ordinarily know about what is going on inside us when we
experience blueness is that this is the sort of thing that happens to
us when we see blue things – the sky in the day, for example, when
there are no clouds.) Nevertheless, even though she doesn’t know
that she knows this, it remains true that this is what she knows:
what it is to have X occur in her brain. But if this is what the
visual experience of blueness is – having X occur in your brain –
then there is no possibility of the experience of blueness being
associated with a different kind of brain process, Y say (the visual
sensation of redness). The blue visual experience is not like a
layer of blue paint on X, which might be stripped off X and applied
to Y instead. “What it is to have X occur in your own brain” can
only be learnt by having X occur in your own brain. It cannot be
learnt from a description of the physical or functional features of
X, or from an examination of X as an external process (in someone
else’s brain), however exhaustive. X must occur in one’s own
brain. Only then does one know what it is to have X in one’s brain
– that extraordinary blue visual sensation one associates with sky,
sea, bluebells and forget-me-nots. But this blue sensation could
not be associated with a different process, Y, because it is just
“what it is to have X occur in your own brain”.
This view is not functionalism (3 above): it holds that one really
does learn new things in having certain kinds of processes occur
for the first time in one’s own brain. Inner experiences, inner
states of awareness, are brain processes, but what we learn from
having these processes occur in our own brains cannot be derived
from physical or functional descriptions of these processes,
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however complete. On the other hand, this view does not need to
appeal to the explanatory hypothesis H (1 above) or the non-
explanatory theory T* (2 above): what we learn when we have X
occur in our brain for the first time is what the sensation of
blueness is, but this sensation cannot be associated with a different
process, Y say, because it is just “what it is to have X occur in your
own brain”. To assert that the sensation of blueness might be
correlated with Y would be equivalent to saying “having X occur
in your brain might be having Y occur in your brain”, a logical
contradiction. Thus it is not possible for the sensation of blueness
to be anything other than X – and no explanatory H is required to
establish this impossibility. H is not required.
Option 3 deserves to be rejected. It is equivalent to denying the
reality of inner experience, the experiential world. Option 1 is
dubious, because H is dubious. It is not just that H is wholly
hypothetical. It remains doubtful that any such H can be given a
coherent formulation. Option 2 is perhaps the best bet, in that
places the least strain on our credulity. But option 4 is an
intriguing possibility.
Incompatibilist: Option 4 is pure sophistry. No logical
contradiction is involved in the assertion “X may be occurring in
my brain, but it is, for me, just as if Y is occurring” – where Y, let
us assume, is ordinarily the visual sensation of redness. Granted
this fourth view, in other words, it is entirely possible logically for
correlations between the physical and experiential to be changed
arbitrarily.
Compatibilist: But is it? If experiencing the visual sensation of
blueness just is having X occur in your brain, and nothing more
than that, how could it possibly be having Y occur in your brain?
That would be equivalent to saying what it is to have X occur is
what it is to have Y occur, when these are quite distinct, and
distinguishable.
Incompatibilist: Sophistry! My objection is very simple. Given
experiential physicalism, the visual sensation of blueness is either
necessarily identical to X, or contingently identical to X. If
necessarily identical, then it is not logically possible for the
sensation of blueness to be anything other than X, which must be
wrong since it could be some brain process other than X. It is not a
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logical contradiction to say the sensation of blueness is Y. If, on
the other hand, the sensation of blueness is contingently identical
to X, then it follows, immediately, that this sensation might be
identical to something other than X. Option 4 is untenable.
Compatibilist: You may be right. But could one not say that it all
depends on what one takes “the visual sensation of blueness” to
be? If it is taken to be “what one knows about what is going on
inside one’s head whenever one sees something blue” the identity
is contingent. The visual sensation of blueness, so construed, is X
but might be something else. If, on the other hand, it is taken to be
“what one knows about what is going on inside one’s head
whenever X occurs in one’s head” the identity is necessary. The
sensation, construed in this way, is necessarily X.
Incompatibilist: Sophistry! Sophistry! I can’t bear it. My head is
hurting. Stop!
I want to turn to another difficulty. Granted experiential
physicalism, everything that occurs can in principle be predicted
and explained physically.30 This includes everything to do with
human life. Thus the real explanation as to why we do what we do
has nothing to do with us, with our intentions, desires or decisions.
It is just physics. And that means we are the playthings of physics,
free will nothing but an illusion.
Compatibilist: A full physical description and explanation of a
person’s actions – supposing that such a thing is possible – would
include a precise specification of that person’s evolving intentions,
desires and decisions to act. These would be described as physical
processes, not as the inner experiences, intentions or decisions of
the person in question. Nevertheless, these physical processes,
occurring in the brain of the person in question, would be his
thoughts, intentions, decisions.
Incompatibilist: But, for free will, this is not enough. What is
required is that the person – Gordon Brown let us suppose – can be
understood as a person, acting freely, in charge of what he does,
responsible for his actions and for his decision-making. Any such
explanation or understanding of Brown as a free agent becomes
30 Not of course in practice, as we saw in chapter three, note 2.
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redundant if physics in principle explains everything that goes on.
Physics cancels free will.
Compatibilist: But this just assumes that if physics in principle
provides an explanation for everything that occurs, there cannot
also be a true personalistic explanation – as we may call it – which
explains what goes on in terms of the desires, beliefs, intentions,
decisions of the person in question – and the human context in
which he acts. But this assumption is false! Corresponding to the
dual control hypothesis there is a dual explanation hypothesis.
Human beings are such that they are amenable to being explained
and understood simultaneously in two very different ways:
physically and personalistically. People exhibit what may be
called double comprehensibility.31 A person can be understood
correctly as acting freely even though, in principle, everything that
occurs in connection with that person’s actions could in principle
simultaneously be explained and understood physically. The latter
does not cancel the possibility of the former.
Double Comprehensibility
At this point I, the author, need to take over from our two
disputants. Double comprehensibility needs a bit of background
exposition to be understood properly. This is something that I, the
author, ought to try to provide. In what follows, we shall see that
reformulating the dual control hypothesis as the dual explanation
hypothesis – or the thesis of double comprehensibility –
strengthens the argument for compatibilism in two important ways.
A key feature of explanation, quite generally, is that it tells us,
not just what actually occurs, but also what would occur if
conditions had been different in a variety of specified ways.
Physical explanation achieves this by being compounded of two
distinct parts: (a) a theory, and (b) initial conditions. These, taken
together, imply subsequent states of affairs. The theory predicts
that one instantaneous state of affairs – the instantaneous state of
the solar system perhaps – is followed, some time later, by a
different instantaneous state of affairs. This prediction is
31 See Maxwell (2001), ch. 5.
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explanatory because the same theory predicts that if the initial
conditions had been different, in a wide range of ways, then the
outcomes would have been different, in a wide range of ways.
Newtonian theory does not just tell us how stones that are actually
thrown travel through the air. It tells us how stones would travel
were they to be thrown with any possible initial velocity, even
though they have in fact not been thrown at all. It is this which
makes Newtonian theory explanatory – together with the unity of
the theory (the same laws applying to the wide diversity of
phenomena to which the theory applies).
Something analogous holds for what may be called purposive
and personalistic explanations. As we have already seen, anything
that pursues goals, whether person, animal, robot or guided
missile, must be able to respond in a variety of ways, to a variety
of circumstances. Only then can the thing in question achieve its
goal in a variety of conditions. This means that the actions of any
goal-pursuing thing are comprehensible and explainable in a
distinctively purposive kind of way. A factually correct
specification of the nature of the purposive thing in question – its
goals and capacities – plus a specification of what occurs in its
environment, will imply what the thing does in pursuit of its goal.
Even if the purposive thing fails to achieve its goal, nevertheless a
prediction may still be forthcoming concerning what the thing
attempts to do in pursuit of its goal. In addition – and this is what
makes it an explanation and not just a description – the
specification of the nature of the goal-pursuing thing carries
implications about a variety of things this thing would have done in
a variety of different circumstances. If the purposive thing in
question happens to be Gordon Brown trying to decide whether or
not to call an election, a knowledge of Gordon Brown’s
psychological make-up, goals and priorities makes it possible to
predict what Gordon Brown would do in a variety of different
circumstances. (If he had been ahead in the polls by a big margin,
then he would have called an election; if the polls made it clear
that he would lose, then he would not call an election; etc.)
We need to distinguish personalistic and purposive explanations.
A personalistic explanation is the kind we ordinarily employ in
understanding others – and ourselves. It involves imagining you are
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the other person, with that person’s desires, beliefs, feelings, values,
goals, situation, problems, plans, activities, relationships, and so on.
In seeking to explain and understand another personalistically, you
imagine you are that other person, with that person’s problems, aims,
temperament, and so on, and you then work out what you would do,
how you would feel, what you would want, as that other person, just
as you would do that for yourself, but taking into account all the
differences between yourself and the other person.32
Understanding others personalistically, and understanding yourself
– knowing yourself, your desires, plans, hopes, fears, etc. – are, on
this view, in a sense, two sides of the same coin. We become self-
conscious persons, aware of what we desire, feel, believe, etc., in part
because we have interacted with others from babyhood onwards,
becoming aware of the intentions and emotions of others. We are
capable of understanding ourselves – we have a self-conscious self to
be understood – in part because, from an early age, we have
understood others; and in understanding others we do so as we
understand, or know, ourselves.33
Personalistic explanation is often called “empathic understanding”
and, among psychologists and philosophers, goes by the name of
“folk psychology” and “theory of mind” – although what is usually
meant by these terms differs in important respects from what I take
personalistic explanation to be, as we shall see shortly.
A purposive explanation applies to any goal-pursuing entity,
whether sentient, conscious, or not. It explains what the entity
32 For more detailed accounts of personalistic understanding see Maxwell
(1984, pp. 174-81, 183-9, 264-75; 2001, pp. 103-112, 188-9.)
33 Elsewhere (2001), pp. 188-9, I have argued that we acquire self-
consciousness as a result of becoming aware of others’ personalistic
understanding of ourselves. Seeing ourselves from outside, in this way,
compels us to take note of what is left out – our own inner experiences
and consciousness. Thus consciousness of our own consciousness is
born. But this view faces a problem. Those who are autistic lack the
capacity to acquire personalistic understanding of others, and so gain
knowledge of what others think of them. Does this mean that severely
autistic people are not self-conscious? Or should one rather hold that the
self-consciousness of the autistic refutes the above account of the genesis
of self-consciousness?
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does by characterizing the actions of the entity as being designed
to achieve the entity’s goals in the given environment. But it does
this without any hint that the entity in question is sentient or
conscious – even if it is. Purposive explanations treat human
beings as if they are zombies. If a purposive explanation employs
terms that ostensibly presuppose sentience or consciousness,
quotation marks must be used to indicate that neither are being
assumed. Thus a purposive explanation may assert that an entity is
‘trying’ to achieve such and such a goal, ‘believes’, ‘knows’,
‘desires’, ‘values’, or ‘fears’ such and such an eventuality, or is
‘struggling to solve’ such and such a problem. These terms are to
be understood in just the way they would be understood if applied
to a thermostat or guided missile, where there is no question of
sentience or consciousness whatsoever.
The big distinction between a personalistic and purposive
explanation, then, is that a personalistic explanation tells you what
it would be for you to be the thing explained, whereas a purposive
explanation does nothing of the kind. A personalistic explanation
relates the thing explained to yourself, and is, to that extent,
inherently anthropomorphic. All personalistic explanations are
also purposive explanations, whereas no purposive explanation is
personalistic.
We can now indicate what it is to act freely like this: A person
acts freely if there is a true, freedom ascribing personalistic
explanation of the person’s inner and outer actions. This in turn
requires, at least, that the kind of conditions, already discussed, are
satisfied. The person’s authentic self must be in control, decisions
to act must actively guide or control actions decided upon, and
these decisions must be the person’s own, not foisted onto him by
external agents (by means of brainwashing, manipulation, or
chemical or neurological disorders).34
So far everything is even handed between compatibilism and
incompatibilism. But at this point the two views clash.
34 It is important that the true, freedom ascribing personalistic
explanation specifies the real reasons and motives for the action in
question, and does not merely specify declared or official reasons or
motives (which may be hypocritical, mere rationalization). This is part
of the requirement for the personalistic explanation to be true.
249
Incompatibilism demands, for free will that, in addition to the
above, it must not be the case that everything the person thinks and
does could, in principle, be predicted and explained physically –
even if only probabilistically, and even if only when described in
purely physical terms. Compatibilism, by contrast, holds that free
will is entirely compatible with everything being capable, in
principle, of being predicted and explained in purely physical
terms.35
What is to be gained by reformulating the dual control
hypothesis as the dual explanation hypothesis? There are two. (1)
We can demand of the dual explanation thesis that, for free will,
the true, freedom-ascribing personalistic explanation of the
person’s actions is not reducible, even in principle, to the physical
explanation of these actions. (2) We can demand that, for free
will, personalistic explanations are intellectually authentic and
fundamental. These are two quite challenging demands that we
may require compatibilism to satisfy that cannot even be
formulated in terms of the dual control hypothesis. Let us consider
them in turn.
(1) A basic incompatibilist objection to the dual explanation
thesis is likely to be that, if physics can, in principle, explain
everything a person thinks and does, then the existence of a true
personalistic explanation of what he thinks and does can hardly
provide grounds for holding the person acts freely. For everything
explained personalistically can, it seems, be explained in a far
more powerful and universal way by physics. Any personalistic
explanation would apply only to a highly restricted range of
circumstances that include both the continuing existence of the
person, and the environment in which the person acts. The true
fundamental physical explanation would include all this plus a
vastly wider range of circumstances as well. In addition, whereas
any personalistic explanation could hardly predict what happens
with certainty (since something from beyond the given
environment – a meteor, for example – might unexpectedly crash
35 I defend compatibilism appealing to the idea of dual explanation in my
(2001), ch. 6. This has been criticized by David Hodgson: see McHenry
(2009), pp. 199-216. For my reply, see McHenry (2009), pp. 259-65.
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in and kill the person), the true physical explanation would predict
and explain, without exception. Personalistic explanations, being
much more restricted and weaker than physical explanations, seem
redundant.
This objection fails, however, if personalistic explanations are
not reducible, even in principle, to physical explanations. For then
personalistic explanations would not be redundant. Compatibilism
is only valid, let us demand, if this is the case. But it clearly is the
case. Personalistic explanations are massively and inherently
experiential in character. In explaining the actions of another
person experientially, we relate that person’s thoughts, feelings,
sensations, motives to our own. We understand the other as if we
are ourselves the other, experiencing what the other experiences.
But, as we saw in chapter 3, the experiential cannot, even in
principle, be reduced to the physical. Hence, personalistic
explanations cannot be reduced to physical explanations; they are
not redundant. They tell us what even a complete physical
explanation could not tell us, even in principle. The additional
requirement for compatibilism to be valid is met.
A case can be made out for holding that even some purposive
explanations are not reducible to physical explanations. A true
purposive explanation of the actions of a purposive being might
predict what the being would do in possible circumstances which
are not physically possible. Thus, a purposive explanation of a
devout person might predict what the person would do if he “saw”
an angel descend from the sky in a manner which contradicts the
laws of physics. Or a purposive explanation of the actions of a
missile with an on-board computer guiding its actions might
predict what the missile would do in response to another missile
attacking it whose actions violate the laws of physics (because it
travels faster than light, for example). In both cases, such
counterfactual predictions would not, it may be argued, come
within the province of the physical explanation, because the states
of affairs in question contradict physics.
If purposive explanations are not reducible to physics, then this
strengthens the case for holding that personalistic explanations are
not so reducible (although the latter case holds even if the former
one does not).
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I conclude, in any case, that the additional requirement for
compatibilism to be valid holds.
(2) Incompatibilists may well argue that personalistic
explanations, even if not reducible to the physical, are nevertheless
not intellectually authentic and fundamental in the way that
physical explanations, couched in terms of fundamental physical
theory, are. As a consequence, defending compatibilism by
appealing to personalistic explanation fails.
Let us accept this argument, and hold that compatibilism is only
valid if personalistic explanations can be shown to be intellectually
authentic and fundamental – in some legitimate sense of
“authentic” and “fundamental”. We have here an additional
demand that compatibilism must satisfy to be valid. I now argue
that this demand cannot be met if knowledge-inquiry is accepted,
but is met once wisdom-inquiry is adopted.
Granted knowledge-inquiry, personalistic explanations seem
intellectually inauthentic, and certainly not fundamental. A
genuine scientific explanation owes its authenticity to being (a)
objective (b) impersonal (c) factual (d) rational (e) predictive (f)
testable (g) empirically corroborated and (h) scientific, in that there
is an objective, impersonal, factual scientific theory which predicts
the phenomena to be explained, and is empirically testable and
corroborated, and so scientifically and rationally appraised. But a
personalistic explanation, amounting to one person understanding
another by imagining she is that other, lacks all these features. It is
(a) subjective (b) personal (c) emotional and evaluative and so not
factual (d) intuitive, and thus non-rational (e) untestable (f) not
corroborated empirically and (g) not scientific. No wonder
psychologists and cognitive scientists, presupposing knowledge-
inquiry, call personalistic understanding “folk psychology”, and
seek to replace it with authentic scientific explanation.36
Granted wisdom-inquiry, however, the intellectual status and
authenticity of personalistic explanation is very different. For,
according to wisdom-inquiry, articulating problems of living and
36 Thus Paul Churchland declares “The term ‘folk psychology’ is …
intended to portray a parallel with what might be called ‘folk physics’,
‘folk chemistry’, ‘folk biology’, and so forth”. See Churchland (1994).
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proposing and critically assessing possible solutions (possible
actions) is intellectually fundamental – in a sense more
fundamental than the search for scientific knowledge and
explanation. But it is just this intellectually fundamental activity
that we need to engage in, in order to develop personalistic
understanding of others. If I am to have personalistic
understanding of you I need to know (1) what your problems of
living are, (2) what can be done to solve them (3) what you take
your problems of living to be, (4) what you will do in an attempt to
solve them, and (5) what your capacities are to perform the
relevant actions. All this is intellectually fundamental within the
framework of wisdom-inquiry. Personalistic understanding is,
according to wisdom-inquiry, (a) objective (b) personal (c)
emotional and evaluative, but also factual (d) both intuitive and
rational (e) fallibly predictive (f) capable of being assessed
rationally, perhaps even empirically, and (g) not scientific but
nevertheless presupposed by science.
The transition from knowledge-inquiry to wisdom-inquiry, in
short, transforms the intellectual status of personalistic
understanding: it ceases to be mere folk psychology, waiting to be
replaced by proper scientific explanation, and becomes
intellectually central, authentic and fundamental – or at least not
eliminatable, even in principle.37 Advances in psychology,
cognitive science and neuroscience will undoubtedly enable us to
improve our personalistic understanding of each other and
ourselves, but will not replace it.
Scientific explanation of natural phenomena enable us to
manipulate nature, mainly by providing the means to create
technology. Personalistic understanding can be used to manipulate
too, but its proper, primary use is to facilitate cooperation. If two
or more people are to engage in a common endeavour
cooperatively they must be able to understand each other’s ideas,
37 Within wisdom-inquiry, personalistic explanation is fundamental but
not more fundamental than physical explanation. Each presupposes the
other. Any personalistic explanation must make factual presuppositions
about the environment in which the person acts. And, as I go on to
explain in the text, any scientific explanation rests upon, presupposes,
and is the product of, personalistic understanding between scientists.
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aims, desires, objections, beliefs, problems, which means they
must be able to acquire personalistic understanding of each other,
as required for the matter in hand. This point is quite general; it
applies to any cooperative endeavour, including the cooperative
endeavour of science.
There are at least two very different reasons why I may seek to
acquire personalistic understanding of you. First, I may be
interested in improving my knowledge and understanding of you.
But secondly, I may be interested in your beliefs about aspects of
the world, not because I am interested in you, but because I am
interested in the world, and I think your beliefs may contribute to
or correct mine. Scientific knowledge emerges in this way, the
product of scientists acquiring personalistic understanding of each
other with the emphasis on ideas about the world, interest in the
personal being suppressed, diverse theories and hypotheses
becoming common currency in this way, and so open to
cooperative criticism, empirical testing and improvement. The
mere act of understanding a new theory put forward by another
scientist, or the report of a new experiment or observation,
implicitly involves and presupposes personalistic understanding,
whether this is recognized or not. If natural science were pursued
within the framework of wisdom-inquiry it would be obvious that
it presupposed personalistic understanding in this way, its
cooperative aspects being inconceivable without it. In fact science
has long been pursued presupposing standard empiricism and
knowledge-inquiry; this has rendered the personalistic dimension
of science invisible, and has even led to the idea that personalistic
understanding is no more than folk psychology, to be replaced by
good scientific explanation.
This concludes my case for holding that free will, in a
worthwhile sense, is possible within an experientially physicalistic
universe. Our experiential beings are in part physical beings, an
integral part of the physical universe, conscious decisions to act
being neurological processes that do indeed control and guide our
actions. Our apparently frail conscious decisions to act have all the
potency of the God-of-Cosmic-Power invested in them. But we
are not just physics. We exhibit the miracle of double
comprehensibility, in that we can (in principle) be explained and
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understood personalistically, as well as physically. Personalistic
explanation (1) cannot be reduced, even in principle, to physical
explanation and (2) is intellectually fundamental. It is these two
factors which give substance to the claim that we can be in control
– it not being the case that ultimately it is just physics which
decides. We exist. We possess the power to act, to create, to
“disturb the universe”, even though experiential physicalism is
true. I have shown, at least, that this is possible.
Free Will and Wisdom
Instead of tackling the free will/physicalism problem, perhaps
we ought to be tackling the wisdom/physicalism problem.38 For
wisdom presupposes free will, but free will does not presuppose
wisdom. Hence the wisdom/physicalism problem is more general,
more fundamental, than the free will/physicalism problem. The
solution to the former automatically solves the latter, but not vice
versa.
And there is another reason why we should, here, give priority to
the wisdom/physicalism problem. Our fundamental problem in
life, I have emphasized, is to help the God-of-Cosmic-Value to
flourish within the God-of-Cosmic-Power – to help life of value to
flourish in the real world. In so far as we have a role in this, what
we require is wisdom, in the sense indicated in note 38. It better be
possible, then, for us to have wisdom in the physicalistic universe,
or our fundamental life problem becomes insoluble. How wisdom
is possible granted physicalism is merely a preliminary to the
problem that really matters: How can we improve what wisdom we
already have? This preliminary problem is nevertheless more
important and fundamental than the orthodox free will/physicalism
problem.
But is the above right? Does wisdom presuppose free will?
Someone might be wise in that they have the capacity and active
desire to realize what is of value in life, and yet they might not
have free will in that they pursue this aim in an obsessive,
38 Remember, I am taking wisdom to be the capacity and active desire to
realize what is of value in life for oneself and others: see note 1 of
chapter 2.
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compulsive way, helplessly in the grip of the pursuit of value,
unable to do otherwise, imprisoned within the pursuit of this goal.
A scientist, artist or politician might, for example, relentlessly and
compulsively pursue a goal unquestionably of great value to
humanity, achieve great success, and yet be lacking in free will
because they cannot, in any circumstances, do other than pursue
this narrow (but immensely valuable) goal.
But then we can also argue that this does not constitute authentic
wisdom – or constitutes only imperfect wisdom. The authentic
article would be such that one can adapt what one pursues in a
wide range of circumstances, so much so that, even if what is of
value is transformed by circumstances, one can adapt to these new
conditions. Wisdom, in this sense, it may be argued, is a genuinely
stronger notion than free will, in that anyone fully wise has free
will, but plenty of people who have free will are not wise.
To spell this out in a little more detail, wisdom is a multi-
dimensional notion. Our wisdom may be inadequate in many
different ways. Our capacity to realize what is of value may be
fragile or robust, restricted to one special kind of value, or broad in
scope. It may be more, or less, selfish. It may be more, or less,
skilful, knowledgeable, intelligent. It may have more, or less,
desirable human qualities, such as humanity, friendliness, integrity,
courage, sense of humour, empathy for others, creativity,
originality. If a person who is actively realizing what is of value in
life exhibits inflexibility, compulsiveness, lack of self-control, and
thus lack of free will then, so the argument goes, this just reveals
that the person is only inadequately wise. A person who can realize
what is genuinely of value in a wide range of circumstances – to
himself and others – cannot, to that extent, be lacking in free will.
Any imaginary circumstance invented to reveal this person’s lack
of free will would, if successful, also reveal that, in these
circumstances, the person cannot realize what is of value, and
would thus demonstrate that person’s lack of wisdom.39
39 One could argue, of course, that free will is a value in its own right,
and hence a person who does not have it cannot be wise. This is one way
of arguing that one is only wise if one has free will. The argument in the
text is rather different. It is that lack of free will implies inadequacy in
the capacity to realize what is of value in life, and hence inadequate
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Perhaps free will needs to be viewed in a new light, as a minimal
requirement for, or specification of, wisdom. On the other hand,
one may be inclined to dismiss this idea out of hand. Consider two
brutal criminals, one who acts with full possession of free will, and
the other who acts with much diminished free will. We would
surely not want to say the former is wiser than the latter; if
anything, we might be inclined to put the matter the other way
round. But if free will is a step towards wisdom, we are, it seems,
obliged to say the criminal who acts freely is wiser than the
criminal who does not.
Perhaps the multi-dimensional character of wisdom can be
invoked here. One way in which wisdom can be degraded is for
“what is deemed to be of value” to be degraded. Another way is
for one’s self control to become degraded. The first criminal has
become unwise in the first way, the second in the second way.
Be that as it may, it is worth noting that the notion of free will is
linked to notions of value. First, free will is, surely, of value in
itself, and not merely of value as a means to other things of value.
Secondly, a person who pursues goals in life that have no
conceivable meaning or value whatsoever would hardly be
regarded as exhibiting free will. They would rather be regarded as
mad. Thirdly, whether one holds a person to be pursuing a goal
freely or obsessively (i.e. with diminished free will) may well
depend on the value that is assigned to the goal. A person who
devotes his entire life to surfing ceases to be obsessive if surfing is
indeed taken to be the be and end of all life, and everything else is
deemed pointless or irrelevant (unless subservient to surfing). Free
will, like wisdom, in other words, is impregnated with value.
Furthermore, in order for a person to have free will it is necessary,
we may hold, that he can pursue goals of some minimal value to
him to some minimal degree of success in a minimal range of
circumstances. Put like that, free will begins to look like a
minimal version of wisdom.
Reformulating the free will/physicalism problem as the
wisdom/physicalism problem could be construed as favouring
compatibilism. Free will puts the emphasis on responsibility,
wisdom.
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choice, being able to do otherwise. The compatibilist account of
these things seems to many to be seriously inadequate. By
contrast, wisdom (as understood here) puts the emphasis on the
pursuit of a goal – that which is of value. Goal pursuing in general
– and this goal pursuing in particular – are much easier to
understand as something that can go on in a physicalistic universe,
as I have indicated above. What matters, granted that goal-
pursuing is the issue – in particular pursuing the goal of what is of
value in life – is responsibility, the power to choose, to do
otherwise, in precisely the compatibilist’s senses, since it is this we
need in order successfully to realize our goal in a wide range of
possible circumstances. It is not at all obvious that responsibility,
choice, the power to do otherwise, in incompatibilist senses, are
required for, or help with, successfully realizing a goal.
Consider moral responsibility – sometimes invoked in
philosophical discussions of free will. A man dives into a
dangerously fast-flowing river and saves a child from drowning.
Was he acting in a morally responsible way? On this occasion TV
cameras happened to be on the river bank recording the rescue.
Did the man act out of vanity, in order to become a national hero,
or did he act morally? In order to know the answer we need to
know how we would have acted if there had been no TV cameras,
and no possibility of becoming a hero. The crucial question, in
other words, is how we would have acted in relevant, different
circumstances. But this invokes the compatibilist notion of
responsibility, of “could have done otherwise” (or, in this case,
“could have done the same”), not the incompatibilist notion, which
is hardly the issue. Compatibilism does better justice to moral
responsibility than does incompatibilism.
Will Power
Free will is sometimes thought of in terms of will power. If our
will is powerful, we have a lot of free will; if it is weak, we don’t.
I have myself flirted with this notion when I have declared that we
have all the power of the God-of-Cosmic-Power with us when we
decide upon and initiate our actions. But this traditional way of
thinking of free will has perhaps become nowadays (among the
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non-religious) somewhat discredited, because of its past
associations with Christianity.
Granted Christianity, the big problem in life is to do the will of
God and resist temptations of the devil. This can degenerate into
the problem of pursuing long-term interests (admittance to
Heaven) and resisting short-term pleasures of the flesh – food,
drink, and above all, of course, sex. Free will thus becomes the
power to resist short-term desires in the interest of pursuing and
realizing long-term aims. The very idea of the power of the will
may have arisen in this way. We have a powerful will if we can
resist short-term temptations and pursue successfully long-term
aims, and we have a weak will if we pathetically give in to short-
term temptations.
This idea of will power is, however, by no means restricted to
Christianity. It is meaningful in many other contexts. For many
other doctrines and philosophies of life hold that goals of value are
long-term ones, a fundamental problem of life being not to give in
to short-term temptations, thus allowing long-term goals to be
compromised or lost. This is true of other religions, such as
Judaism and Islam. It is true of the capitalist idea that what is of
supreme value in life is wealth, virtue residing in the life-long
pursuit of wealth, short-term pleasures and distractions being
ignored. It is true of the idea that what matters in life is long-term
reputation, whether moral, scientific, literary, artistic, or political.
Some may even hold that wisdom itself constitutes such a goal,
wisdom being acquired gradually over a life-time, but only if
short-term distractions are resisted. All such doctrines hold that a
fundamental problem is to hold onto long-term goals of value, and
to resist short-term temptations: all these doctrines find a role for
will power, even if somewhat differently interpreted in detail.
We may, however, hold that all such philosophies of life, which
insist that short-term temptations must be resisted for the sake of
long-term goals of value, have got it wrong. Much of the value of
life resides in what is immediate and ephemeral – in just those
short-term pleasures and joys that Christians and other Puritans
condemn. We may even hold that those who successfully exercise
“will power”, in the interests of achieving long-term goals, are
actually very seriously lacking in free will. Such people are
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obsessed, imprisoned in a false philosophy of life that condemns
them to an impoverished way of life and abjure much that is of
value in life. They are in thrall to the “power” of the will,
imprisoned in it. From this perspective, will power seems very
different from free will.
We can, however, I think, reinterpret the notion of will power so
that it does not have these unfortunate connotations. At the same
time we can, I think, learn something important from what has
emerged from the discussion above, namely that there may be a
link between how we conceive of free will, and what we take to be
the fundamental problems of life.
It is clearly wrong to think that will power invariably involves
overcoming short-term temptations in the interests of long-term
goals. The exercise of free will, and therefore will power, may
well involve, on occasions, allowing short-term temptations to
supplant, or defer, long-term goals. For free will in the best sense,
what we need to be able to do is resolve conflicts between clashing
desires, aims, interests, so that what is genuinely of value,
genuinely in our best interests, is achieved. Will power needs to be
reinterpreted to mean: the power to resolve conflicts so that what is
genuinely of value may be achieved. This fits in well, of course,
with the idea that free will should be interpreted as the capacity to
realize what is of value in life – i.e. that it should be interpreted to
mean “wisdom”.
The traditional notion of will power, associated with
Christianity, is thus correct to interpret will power to be the power
to resolve life’s fundamental conflicts, but wrong in its Christian
view as to what these conflicts are, and wrong in its view as to
what constitutes a good resolution of these conflicts. Granted that
the Christian view on these matters needs to be rejected, the
question arises: what do we put in its place? What are life’s
fundamental problems and conflicts, and what constitutes a good
resolution of them? What we take will power to be will depend, to
some extent, on how we answer this question.
At the most fundamental level of all, the answer of this book is
quite clear. Our fundamental problem in life is to realize what is of
value, potentially and actually, in the circumstances of our life. It
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is to realize what is of value, enmeshed as we are in the physical
universe.
The next chapter on evolution will suggest some rather more
specific conflicts we all inherit because of our evolutionary past.
First, as I have indicated above, animal life is riven with conflict,
often involving life and death decisions. The mouse must leave the
security of its nest to look for something to eat, but in doing so
risks itself becoming a meal for an owl. Survival and reproductive
success depends crucially on having the power to resolve such
conflicts successfully. That mouse survives and reproduces which
can successfully resolve the conflict between the need for safety,
and the need for food. Granted we interpret will power to be the
power to resolve conflicts in life, it is clear that Darwinian theory
can account for the evolution of will power.
Second, what Darwinian theory accounts for is the power to
resolve conflicts and problems of living so that survival and
reproduction may be achieved. This is what we inherit, as it were,
from our evolutionary past. But what we require for our human
will power is the power to resolve conflicts and problems of living
so as to realize what is of value – which may include, but is not the
same as, survival and reproduction. A fundamental life problem,
then, is to convert the Darwinian aims (as we may call them) of
survival and reproduction into aims of realizing what is of value. I
will have more to say about this in the next chapter.
Third, a basic conflict we inherit from our evolutionary past can
be conceived in the following terms. We attempt consciously to
plan our way of life, but animals do not. Animals may be said to
plan consciously what they do from moment to moment, but a
master control system of hormones determines the way of life by
prompting the animal to hunt, sleep, mate, fight, care for young,
etc., at appropriate times and in appropriate contexts. This “master
control system” exists in us too but, because our conscious
awareness has enormously increased over that possessed by
animals (as a result, I shall argue, of the development of language
and the ability to imagine), we try to plan consciously our way of
life. This puts our conscious planning in direct conflict with our
evolutionary “master control system”. Here is the source of a
conflict likely to be fundamental for all human beings – a distorted
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echo of which is to be found in the Christian view as to what our
basic life conflict is. I shall say more about this conflict in the next
chapter.
Human life provides far more conflicts than does animal life
(even if they do not usually involve the life and death decisions of
animal life). This is because of the far greater range of choices of
value that arise in the human context. A more detailed discussion
of will power might explore some of the myriad conflicts and
problems of living we encounter in life, and how they are to be
best resolved.
In conclusion, then, we can say this. We need to rescue the
notion of will power from its past Christian or Protestant
associations. If we do so, and interpret it as the power to resolve
conflicts, it becomes an entirely legitimate notion. Will power in
this sense can readily be seen to be something that will evolve as a
result of the twin Darwinian mechanisms of inheritable variations
and natural selection. In order to clarify and give substance to
what we mean by will power, we need to specify what our
fundamental conflicts and problems of living are, and how they are
best to be resolved.
The Miracle of Free Will
I have argued that free will is possible even though physicalism
is true. But one has to add that this argument renders free will
little short of a miracle. For what is required is that the God-of-
Cosmic-power – the minute bit of It that is us – must be so
extraordinarily and intricately organized that successive physical
states, unfolding in time in accordance with iron physical law, just
happen to be us consciously acting in the world, deciding what we
are going to do and then doing it, actually producing and guiding
our actions. The God-of-Cosmic-Power becomes our servant,
doing our bidding, evolving in time so as to be us, we coherently in
charge with the flow of our thinking and acting. We are doubly
comprehensible – simultaneously comprehensible physically, and
personalistically. It is this double comprehensibility that is the
miracle. How can it have come into existence? How can we
explain and understand its existence? It is this crucial question that
I tackle in the next chapter.
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Do We Have Free Will?
All this intricate philosophising is all very well – the cry may go
up – but the all important question is: Do we have free will? A
famous experiment by B. Libet (1985) has been taken by many to
establish that we do not. Subjects of the experiment were asked to
move their hand at an arbitrary moment decided by them, and to
say when they made the decision, determined by noticing the
position of a dot going round a clock face. Monitoring of the
electrical activity of the subjects’ brains established that the
Readiness Potential – a pattern of electrical activity known to
precede voluntary action – occurred some tenths of a second before
the conscious decision to move the hand. This has been taken to
demonstrate the illusory nature of free will, since it is the brain that
causes both the hand to move and the subsequent conscious
“decision”. For free will, we would require that the conscious
decision causes the Readiness Potential to occur subsequently in
the brain which in turn causes the hand to move.
But the conclusion does not follow. The free action here, we
may argue, is the decision to move the hand at some future
arbitrary moment, as required by the experiment, which is, in
effect, the decision to put the brain into a special state such that
fluctuations in brain activity of a sufficient size lead to the hand
moving. That the subsequent decision to move the hand now, at
this arbitrarily chosen moment, is not free does not undermine the
reality of free will in general, nor the freedom of the decision to
take part in the experiment, and put one’s brain into the special
state required. Most real-life decision-making takes time, and
rarely involves picking some moment instantaneously and
arbitrarily.
Elsewhere,40 I have put forward the following argument in
support of the reality free will. Accept that, in order to achieve
what is genuinely of value, we must have free will. If physics has
made real progress in revealing to us the nature of the physical
universe, then we have achieved something genuinely of value,
and hence, by our assumption, we have free will. If, on the other
hand, physics has not made real progress, then the only reason for
40 See my (1984), p. 274, or (2007a), p. 295.
263
doubting the reality of free will collapses – for that stems from the
conception of the universe that has emerged from physics which,
in this case, is false. Either way, we should conclude free will is
real (or at least that there are no good reasons to doubt its
existence).
When it comes down to it, perhaps we should invoke a revised
version of Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am” to establish the
reality of free will – or at least that we are entitled to accept that
free will is a reality. What is at issue, as I said at the beginning of
this chapter, is our existence. If we do not have free will, we do
not exist. We are rationally entitled to hold that we do have some
free will because in making this assumption we have nothing to
lose and everything to gain. We should not allow ourselves to be
bamboozled into thinking we do not exist. I exist, therefore I have
free will.
There is an analogy, here, perhaps, with the problem of
knowledge. Traditionally, this has been taken to be the problem of
how we can acquire any knowledge at all. Popper, in my view
correctly, transformed this fundamental problem of epistemology
so that it becomes “How can we acquire more knowledge?” or
“How can we improve our knowledge?”. It may seem illegitimate
just to presuppose at the outset that we do already have some
knowledge, but without that presupposition we are lost. We are
rationally entitled to assume that we do have some knowledge, and
the fundamental task is to improve what we have, because if we
have no knowledge we have no basis for acquiring it. I suggest
something similar holds for the problem of free will. The
fundamental problem is not “Do we have free will?” or “Can we
have free will in a physicalistic universe?”. Rather it ought to be
“How can we best go about increasing or improving what free will
we do already possess?”. An important part of the answer is to put
aim-oriented rationality and wisdom-inquiry into practice in our
lives.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
EVOLUTION OF LIFE OF VALUE
We saw in the last chapter that free will is possible but wildly
implausible granted physicalism. Whatever else we may be, we
are at least a bit of the physical universe – a fragment of the God-
of-Cosmic-Power. It is just about possible that this bit of the
physical universe in which we have our being – our brains, bodies
and environment – is so beautifully and intricately convoluted,
structured, organized and designed that physical law, unfolding in
its remorseless, unthinking way, just happens to be also us, freely
deciding what to do, and then making what we have decided
happen. It is just conceivable that we, and the God-of-Cosmic-
Power, have dual control – what we are being doubly
comprehensible. We just about could have all the might of the
God-of-Cosmic-Power within us, so utterly devoted to our interests
as to empower us to initiate and guide our actions.
But if so, this state of affairs really is wildly, incredibly
implausible, little short of the utterly miraculous. Why should the
fragment of the utterly impersonal physical universe we inhabit be
so intricately and conveniently designed and organized so as to
facilitate us being in charge of our thoughts, decisions, and actions
(at least some of the time, to some extent)? This seems utterly
inexplicable. It cries out for explanation.1
This profound problem of explanation and understanding has
been solved, in outline at least, by Charles Darwin. The solution is
his theory of evolution. The blind, purposeless mechanisms of
random inherited variations and natural selection, operating
initially on some elementary, initial life form have, during the
course of some three and a half billion years, produced the millions
of diverse living things that inhabit the earth today, including
ourselves, all incredibly well-adapted to their conditions of life,
1 Incompatibilists may hold their view in part because they see
compatibilism as being untenable because, at best, it has this apparently
inexplicable, absurd consequence.
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and so able to survive and reproduce. The blind mechanisms of
evolution design both bodies and brains. As a result of designing
brains, these mechanisms of evolution build into brains the
capacity successfully to pursue those goals in the given
environment that are conducive to survival and reproduction, plus
the capacity to learn. The eventual outcome has been us human
beings, imbued with the capacity to decide for ourselves (some of
the time, to some extent) what we want, what we will do, plus the
capacity to do it. The miracle of free will is, in other words, the
outcome of Darwinian evolution.
However, if Darwinian evolution is to explain the miracle of the
existence of free will in this physicalistic universe, it is essential
that we adopt that version of Darwinian theory able to perform this
task. In what follows, I shall distinguish eight versions of
Darwinian theory. Only the final, eighth version is able to explain
free will, as we shall see.
Actually, the task before us is broader than to account for free
will in the universe. Our fundamental problem is to understand
how the God-of-Cosmic-Value has evolved within the God-of-
Cosmic-Power. How has all that is of value emerged within the
physical universe? I concentrate on a key component of this
problem, namely the evolution of the capacity to realize what is of
value. This capacity may be called wisdom, and wisdom, as we
saw in the last chapter includes, but goes beyond, free will. I set
out to answer two key questions: (1) What version of Darwinian
theory is able to explain the evolution of wisdom? (2) How good,
how adequate, is this explanation? What are its limits, its
inadequacies? Understanding how wisdom (in the sense indicated)
has evolved is crucial to understanding how the God-of-Value has
evolved within the God-of-Cosmic-Power.
Nine Versions of Darwinian Theory
The task before us is to specify a version of Darwinian theory
which provides the best available explanation for the existence of
human beings who are doubly comprehensible – comprehensible
physically, and comprehensible personalistically. We want to
understand how beings have come into existence in the physical
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universe who are able freely to realize what is of value in life (at
least some of the time, to some extent).
Formulating the problem in this way, as understanding how
beings that are double comprehensible have come into existence,
makes it clear that the sought for explanation must itself take
account of both kinds of explanation – physical and personalistic.
Darwinian theory is a very special kind of historical theory. All
historical explanations – including Darwinian ones – make use of
other modes of explanation, such as the three discussed in the
previous chapter: physical, purposive, and personalistic. But in the
case of Darwinian theory, the appeal to these other modes of
explanation arises for a much more basic reason. The theory seeks
to understand how and why things exist – living beings – that are
amenable to being explained and understood simultaneously in two
(or even three) different ways: physically, purposively and, in
some cases, personalistically. This can hardly be achieved if these
modes of explanation are ignored.
Darwinian theory is thus, on this view, quite different from
Newtonian theory say, or most other scientific theories, which
seek to predict and explain a range of phenomena, but which do
not seek to explain why some things are doubly (or in some cases
trebly) comprehensible. Unlike other scientific theories, the
problem for Darwinian theory is not the incomprehensibility of a
range of phenomena, but rather that some phenomena – having to
do with life – are, as it were, much too comprehensible, in being
doubly or even trebly comprehensible. It is the excessive
comprehensibility of life that is the problem.
Darwinian theory solves this problem historically, by explaining
how and why increasingly diverse and rich double (and eventually
treble) comprehensibility has come gradually into existence over
billions of years in an initially purposeless, singly comprehensible
universe. This problem can only be solved in this way, however, if
Darwinian theory observes the following principle:
Principle of Non-Circularity: The theory must not presuppose
what it seeks to explain. If, at some stage in evolution, Darwinian
theory itself employs purposive explanations, the theory must
explain how purposiveness of this type has come into existence at
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this stage of evolution without using the very notion of
purposiveness that is being explained. And just the same applies
to the personalistic.
This Principle must be observed if Darwinian explanations are to
avoid becoming trivially circular – presupposing the very thing to
be explained. Darwinian accounts of evolution may employ
purposiveness and personalistic explanations, at certain stages of
evolution, but if so, Darwinian theory must explain how things that
exemplify these notions of the purposive or personalistic have
come into existence in a way which makes no appeal to these
explanatory notions whatsoever. Thus, if an appeal is made to
empathy in order to explain some evolutionary development, an
explanation for the prior evolution of empathy must be given
which does not itself employ empathy as an explanatory notion.
Or, if parental care is employed to explain some evolutionary
development, the existence of parental care must itself be
explained without this explanation itself invoking parental care.
And likewise for purpose, sentience, consciousness, free will,
cooperativeness, and so on.
If this Principle is observed, we have a theory which may be able
to explain the emergence of the purposive and personalistic in a
purposeless universe; if it is violated, the whole programme
collapses. Darwinian theory merely presupposes what it sets out to
explain.
We shall see that Darwinian theory is at present only partially
successful in conforming to this Principle of Non-Circularity. One
difficulty arises in connection with the unsolved problem of the
origin of life.
I now consider eight versions of Darwinian theory which,
progressively, give increasingly important roles to purposive and
personalistic modes of explanation.2 I begin with an extreme
2 The account of Darwinian theory developed here, stressing that the
theory needs to be interpreted as explaining double (or treble)
comprehensibility, this requiring that the theory itself appeals to
purposive and personalistic modes of explanation, the mechanisms of
evolution themselves evolving, is based on a much more detailed
exposition of all this in my (2001), ch. 7.
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version of the theory that banishes “purpose” from the theory (and
from life) altogether. I do this so that we may have before us the
full range options, from the extreme mechanistic and purposeless
on the one hand, to the fully personalistic on the other. The first,
purposeless version might be attributed to Jacques Monot and
Richard Dawkins. Let us call it:
Darwin(1) The theory is about the evolution, not primarily of
living things, but rather of entities that may be called replicators.
These are genes, encoded in DNA molecules. Replicators replicate
themselves by manipulating the “survival machines”, or bodies,
they inhabit. Evolution of replicators occurs as a result, in essence,
of (1) random inherited variation (mistakes in the process of
replication), and (2) the natural selection of those replicators best
able to survive and replicate.
Comments. This seems to invoke purpose, in that replicators are
described as performing such purposive actions as replicating
themselves by manipulating their survival machines. Upholders of
this view would insist, however, that this is just convenient
metaphor. All reference to purposive action can be eliminated
from the theory.
Does anyone defend Darwin(1)? Dawkins certainly seems to, in
his The Selfish Gene.3 At one point he says “[The genes] are the
replicators and we are their survival machines” (p. 37), and this
theme is spelled out at some length in the book. “… the
fundamental unit of selection, and therefore of self-interest, is not
the species, nor the group, nor even, strictly, the individual. It is
the gene, the unit of heredity” (p. 12). He even says at one point
that these replicators “are in you and me; they created us, body and
mind; and their preservation is the ultimate rationale for our
existence” (p. 21). And Dawkins states explicitly that it is quite
wrong to invoke purpose. He says “natural selection favours
replicators which are good at building survival machines, genes
which are skilled in the art of controlling embryonic development.
In this, the replicators are no more conscious or purposeful than
they ever were. The same old processes of automatic selection
3 Dawkins (1978).
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between rival molecules by reason of their longevity, fecundity,
and copying-fidelity, still goes on as blindly and inevitably as they
did in the far-off days. Genes have no foresight. They do not plan
ahead. Genes just are, some genes more or so than others, and that
is all there is to it” (p. 25).4
It is possible to interpret Darwinian evolution in this way, but it
seems bizarre and perverse to do so in the extreme. It is as if what
one finds utterly amazing and in need of explanation is not life on
earth – plants, fish, birds, mammals, human beings, in all their
extraordinary diversity, living their extraordinarily diverse ways of
life – but DNA molecules. (I once heard Richard Dawkins begin a
4 The gene-centred view is very clearly expressed and defended by
Helena Cronin (1991). She writes “Modern Darwinian theory is about
genes and their phenotypic effects. Genes do not present themselves
naked to the scrutiny of natural selection. They present tails, fur,
muscles, shells; they present the ability to run fast, to be well
camouflaged, to attract a mate, to build a good nest. Differences in genes
give rise to differences in these phenotypic effects. Natural selection acts
on the phenotypic differences and thereby on genes. Thus genes come to
be represented in successive generations in proportion to the selective
value of their phenotypic effects” (p. 60). And she adds “We have
travelled far from the organism-centred view of classical Darwinism –
from a Darwinism that is about the survival and reproduction of
individuals” (p. 64). She goes on to stress the importance of strategic
thinking in modern Darwinism, and adds “The development of strategic
thinking has involved two major shifts from classical Darwinism: first, a
view of adaptations that is more conscious of their costs and less
sanguine about their benefits, and, second, a greater emphasis on
behaviour, particularly social behaviour. The strategists, of course, are
not runners – not even robins or rats: they are genes” (p. 66). At first it
almost sounds as if modern Darwinism takes purposiveness very
seriously indeed, in emphasizing strategy and behaviour, especially
social behaviour. But then all this is removed with the declaration that
the strategists are genes! For of course genes can only be said to be
selfish, strategists or, more generally, purposive, in a metaphorical, not in
a literal sense. Only living things are purposive. In re-interpreting the
theory of evolution to be about genes rather than living things, modern
Darwinism, almost incidentally, perhaps entirely unintentionally,
removes purposiveness from the theory altogether – or, at the very least,
downplays its role in evolution.
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lecture at University College London with the words “My vision is
a world full of replicators”!)
Why does Dawkins take the unit of selection to be the gene, the
replicator, and not the individual living thing – the “survival
machine” to use his term? Because genes endure thousands, even
millions of years, individual exemplifications of a given gene are
precisely replicated, and the gene is invariably selfish. Individuals,
by contrast, have a short life; they are all different, do not
reproduce precisely, and are not invariably selfish (in that they are
sometimes altruistic, as when bees sting animals after honey, and
so die to save the hive). But these differences do not seem to me to
constitute any argument at all against:
Darwin(2) The theory is about the evolution of individual living
things – bacteria, viruses, fish, insects, birds, reptiles, mammals,
plants, fungi and the rest. These have evolved, and continue to
evolve, as a result, in essence, of the twin mechanisms of random
inherited variations and natural selection. Living things appear to
pursue goals, but they don’t really. What the theory does is to
explain away the illusion of purposiveness in nature. Life is just a
combination of chance and necessity, devoid of purpose.
Comments. Many biologists do, or have, accepted Darwin(2),
although many others reject it. Dawkins’ reasons for preferring
Darwin(1) to Darwin(2) do not seem to amount to very much.
Why should the unit of selection persist for thousands of years?
Why should reproduction precisely replicate what is reproduced?
Darwinian theory is about reproduction with variation. Even the
argument that only genes are always selfish does not seem to
amount to much. Altruistic action undertaken to save close kin
may be thought of as engaging in a kind of reproduction. One
reproduces, not by having offspring oneself, but by protecting the
lives of close relatives likely to have offspring of their own. Thus,
all that needs to be done in order to make such altruistic action in
no way exceptional, but a standard part of action designed to
promote survival and reproductive success, is to broaden the
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meaning of “reproduction” a bit. This is something one needs to
do for other reasons in any case, as we shall see below.5
The substantial reasons for preferring Darwin(2) to Darwin(1)
only really arise, however, when we come to consider versions of
Darwinian theory that attribute genuine purposes to living things.
Whereas it makes sense to hold that living things pursue goals, it
does not make quite so much sense to think of genes, stretches of
DNA molecules, as genuinely engaged in purposive activity. It
may well be that a part of Dawkins’ reason for preferring
Darwin(1) to Darwin(2) lies in just this feature of the former view
– its clear mechanistic, purposeless character, as his talk of
replicators and survival machines suggests.
But does Dawkins’ really deny that purpose has anything to do
with evolution? It is an awkward denial, for two reasons. First, it
creates a wholly artificial division between humanity, authentically
purposive in character, and the rest of the living world, devoid of
purposiveness according to Darwin(1) and Darwin(2). This
problem – this gulf between humanity and the rest of the living
world – so much against the whole spirit of Darwinianism, which
is all about gradual evolution – is merely an artefact of the above
5 The worker bee or ant, sacrificing itself in order to save the hive or its
close kin, is an extreme case of something less extreme and much more
widespread, namely parental care. This involves some self-sacrifice in
order to promote the survival of one’s offspring, even if not the supreme
self-sacrifice of one’s own death – although parental care may go to that
extreme, when predators are fought or distracted to preserve the lives of
offspring, for example. Parental care involves acting so as to promote
the survival of one’s own offspring, whereas the sacrifice of worker bees
or ants promotes the survival of offspring of near relatives: somewhat
different, but not fundamentally different. In this context, one should
perhaps remember that there are many others cases of living things
participating in reproduction even though their own genes are not
reproduced. One might think, for example, of bees fertilizing flowers
and blossom by distributing pollen, or birds and mammals eating fruit
and thus distributing seeds. In these cases, of course, the bees, birds and
mammals are after food; they are induced by the reward to serve,
unknowingly, the reproductive needs of another species. Nevertheless, it
is worth keeping in mind the wonderful variety of activities associated
with reproduction.
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two versions of Darwinian theory, perversely denying
purposiveness to non-human living things. Second, Dawkins, like
other biologists, is prepared to talk of design. But the notion of
design presupposes the notion of purpose. Whether something is
well or ill designed may well depend crucially on what purpose it
is being considered for. A chair that is well-designed as an object
to be sat in is appallingly designed if considered to have the
purpose of a teaspoon – to scoop up jam or stir sugar into one’s
tea.
But Dawkins’ denial of purpose is perhaps a somewhat trivial
semantic matter, rather than a matter of substance. In The Selfish
Gene, Dawkins makes clear that he takes purposiveness to mean
“conscious purposiveness”, and he goes on to say that machines,
such as guided missiles and computers playing chess, can be made
to act as if pursuing goals by means of feedback mechanisms and
computer programmes (p. 53-6). If one restricts oneself to a
narrow notion of purposiveness – one that requires all purposes to
be conscious, or one that insists the actions of the thing in question
cannot even in principle be explained physically – then one will be
forced to deny purpose (in these narrow senses) to living things.
Broaden the meaning of “purpose” so that it becomes free of these
restrictions, and becomes such that it includes the compatibilist
notion explicated in the last chapter, and it becomes utterly absurd
to deny purposiveness to living things. Dawkins himself, indeed,
would agree (although, perversely, purposes are attributed by him
in the first instance to genes, to sections of DNA molecules, rather
than to living things themselves). This brings us to:
Darwin(3). Living things are inherently purposive beings. Their
fundamental goal in life is survival and reproductive success, and
all their other goals contribute, in one way or another, more or less
successfully, to this fixed, fundamental goal. The mechanisms of
evolution are, however, blind and purposeless.
Comments. On this view, Darwinian theory does not explain
purpose away. On the contrary, it explains how purposiveness has
gradually crept into Nature.6
6 See Maxwell (1984), pp. 174-181 and 269-275; or Maxwell (2007a),
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It is probable that most biologists uphold Darwin(3). Those who
reject the idea that living things are purposive probably do so for
reasons similar to Dawkins’; they interpret “purpose” much too
narrowly, to mean either “conscious purpose”, or “purposiveness
that is incompatible with physics”.
Darwin(3) is however untenable because, once it is admitted that
animals pursue goals, it becomes impossible to keep the
mechanisms of evolution free of all elements of purposiveness, as
we shall now see.
Darwin(4). Not only are living things purposive. The
mechanisms of evolution, inherited variation and natural selection,
themselves evolve, incorporating, as they do so, elements of
purposiveness – so that these mechanisms can no longer be
described as purpose-free. Animals in effect breed other species,
or even their own species, by their purposive actions, even though
they are not aware, of course, of what they are doing. To say this
does not mean, however, that evolution itself has a purpose.
Comments. There are at least four ways in which purposiveness
insinuates itself into the mechanisms of evolution.
(a) What has survival value may depend on how the animal is
living. A change in the way of life may be due to a change of
habitat, or a change in the climate. Animals may even create their
habitat, as beavers do when they build dams and create lakes. In
order to explain subsequent evolutionary developments it will be
necessary to refer to prior purposive action, and prior changes in
purposive action, among other factors. Whether a mutation has
survival value or not will depend on how the animal is living. For
a dog-like creature running about on land, a mutation which turns
legs into flippers would be a disaster. But if the creature is already
swimming in rivers, catching fish, this mutation would have
immense survival value.
(b) Sexual selection. One sex – typically females – may prefer
to mate with those who possess certain characteristic features, and
as a result, those features will tend to become more prevalent and
pp. 197-205 and 290-296. This “purposive” version of Darwinian theory
is further elaborated in Maxwell (2001), ch. 7. See also Maxwell (1985).
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exaggerated in the population. Thus, peahens, choosing to mate
with those peacocks with the most splendid tails, inadvertently
partly cause peacocks to have absurdly splendid tails. In order to
explain the peacock tails, it is necessary to refer to the purposive
actions of peahens, amongst other factors.
(c) Offspring selection. Parents, in choosing preferentially to
feed offspring with certain characteristics – allowing offspring who
do not have these characteristics to die – may thereby be a part of
the cause of these characteristics to become more prevalent in the
population. Likewise, some offspring may be better at
manipulating parents to feed them than others, thus increasing the
likelihood of their survival, and the spread, through the population,
of these genetically determined manipulative techniques.
(d) Predator-prey selection. The fox, in hunting rabbits, kills
those rabbits not so good at evading capture and death. In this way
the fox helps breed rabbits better and better at evading foxes. And
likewise, rabbits, in escaping from those foxes not so good at
hunting, help breed foxes better and better at hunting (since foxes
not so good at hunting tend not to survive and reproduce).
Similarly, birds breed caterpillars and butterflies good at
camouflage, and the latter, in getting better and better at
camouflage, may help breed more perceptive birds able to see
through it. Yet again, plant eating animals may help breed plants
better able to resist the destructive attention of the animal in
question. And the plant may help breed animals better able to eat
the plant.
If we grant that plants engage in purposive action in the main by
means of growth, then we may extend the idea that purposive
action influences evolution from animals to plants. Plant growth
creates soil, and creates shade, both of which have had
consequences for subsequent evolution. Shade in tropical rain
forests creates selective pressures for young plants, in a clearing
where there is sunlight, to grow quickly so as not to fall into the
shade of more quickly growing plants. It also creates selective
pressures for plants that can do photosynthesis in shady conditions.
Genes that generate these traits will be selected for. And of course
those cells, early on in evolution which, as a result of growth and
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photosynthesis, generated oxygen in the atmosphere made possible
all of animal life.
In the above four kinds of cases, actions of animals (or growth of
plants, in itself a kind of purposive action), has an impact, along
with other factors such as mutations, on subsequent evolution. In
all four cases, what is involved may be called breeding, analogous
to what pigeon fanciers and dog owners do when they breed new
varieties of pigeon or dog, with the crucial difference that the
animals, or plants, have no idea whatsoever of what they are doing.
Their purposive actions have the effects of breeding without there
being anything like the conscious purpose of breeding. But then
human beings may engage in breeding without being aware of
what they are doing. In the case of (a) and (c), the animal
unconsciously self-breeds; that is, it breeds its own offspring, its
own species.
In The Human World in the Physical Universe I suggested
another slogan for evolution, to take into account these
phenomena: life breeds itself into existence!7
All this, it should be noted, is wholly orthodox Darwinian
theory. Selection still acts on individuals. It is just that how it acts
depends to some extent on how the animal acts, what kind of goals
it pursues; and the environment in which an animal lives consists
in part of other living things whose actions impact on the given
animal. Selection is not entirely blind; there is a purposive
element, even if no foreseeing of what the outcome will be.
Nevertheless, the transition from Darwin(3) to Darwin(4) makes
a profound difference, in my opinion, to the way one should view
evolution. For the latter version of the theory, unlike the former,
makes the actions of animals, our ancestors, a vital part of the
explanation of our existence. Evolution is not just blind chance
and necessity. Our animal ancestors, striving to live, to eat, to
avoid being eaten, to mate, to rear young, are a vital part of the
reason for our existence. They did not, of course, intend us to
exist. Nevertheless, without their striving, we would not be here.
We owe them a debt of gratitude.
7 See Maxwell (2001), p. 174.
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Darwin(5). Once individual learning, and the capacity to imitate,
have come into existence, evolution by cultural means8 becomes
possible – a kind of evolution that mimics Lamarckism, in that
acquired characteristics are (culturally) inherited. An individual
learns to do something new, others imitate the action, and it
becomes a persistent activity of the group, even though no genetic
changes have taken place. Purposiveness has become a part of the
mechanisms of evolution in a much more radical way. These
mechanisms have themselves evolved in a much more substantial
fashion.
Comments. As an example of evolution by cultural means, one
might take the very well-known case of chimpanzees eating
termites. An individual chimpanzee discovered that, by pushing a
stick into a termite nest, leaving it there for a bit and then
withdrawing it, termites, clinging to the stick, can be eaten off it.
(Chimpanzees may have started by sticking fingers into termite
nests, and then learnt that sticks serve better.) Other chimpanzees,
imitating what this one chimpanzee does, learn to do likewise. The
trick is then passed on, via imitation, to offspring (and others).
This is known to have emerged as a result of evolution by cultural
means, and not as a result of some genetic change.
Evolution by cultural means is best understood as the
development of a new method of reproduction. The characteristic
way of life is reproduced, in part by the standard genetic means of
sex, embryological development, birth and growth, but also, in
part, by means of imitation. Reproduction by imitation makes
possible quasi-Lamarckian evolution. An acquired characteristic –
a new kind of action conducive to survival, learnt by an individual
– can be passed on, by imitative reproduction, to offspring (and of
course to others and their offspring).
8 I employ the somewhat clumsy phrase “evolution by cultural means”,
and not “cultural evolution”, because of the ambiguity of the latter.
“Cultural evolution” might mean “evolution by cultural means”, but in
the relevant literature is generally taken to mean “the evolution of
culture”. Whereas “the evolution of culture” is about the evolution of a
specific kind of thing – culture – “evolution by cultural means” refers to
a specific manner in which evolution can proceed – by means of
individual learning and imitation (or learning from others).
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In order to construe evolution by cultural means as involving a
new, or additional, method of reproduction, it is essential to
interpret the theory of evolution as being about life, ways of living,
and not as being just about bodies – let alone genes or DNA
molecules. But this is, I maintain, the proper way to construe the
theory in any case. Certainly if the concern is to understand how
human life has come to exist, this is the proper way to interpret the
theory. Once Darwinian theory is interpreted as being about
evolving characteristic ways of life (including bodies and genes as
an integral part of a way of life), it becomes inevitable that
evolution by cultural means is to be construed as the development
of an additional method of reproduction (superimposed upon
genetic reproduction). For it is just that: a new way in which a bit
of a characteristic way of life (eating termites off a stick) can be
passed onto offspring and others.
Evolution by cultural means requires that individual learning,
and the instinct to imitate, already exist. If the Principle of Non-
Circularity is to be observed, an evolutionary account of the
development of these capacities must be forthcoming which does
not presuppose these capacities, let alone evolution by cultural
means itself. Why, then, should the capacity to learn, and to
imitate, have survival value (and therefore be selected when
appropriate mutations arise)? The capacity to learn quite clearly
has survival value. Even a primitive organism such as a sea
anemone, with only a simple neuronal net for a brain, can learn.
But what of the instinct to imitate? I suggest this has survival
value, and is likely to have evolved, when there is parental care.
Parents, just because they are parents, are likely to be good at
survival and reproduction. Therefore, what they do is likely to
have survival value. Hence, offspring imitating what they do is
likely to have survival value. Thus, whenever there is parental
care, and successful parents are around to be imitated, the instinct
to imitate is likely to have survival value, as far as offspring are
concerned.
Parental care is very ancient. Crocodiles, ancient beasts, engage
in a form of parental care. It seems likely that dinosaurs did as
well. So it may be that evolution by cultural means has its roots
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deep into our evolutionary past, well over 65 million years ago,
and long before human beings existed.
Evolution by cultural means introduces an even more substantial
element of purposiveness into the mechanisms of evolution. These
mechanisms consist, in essence, as I have said, of two elements: (i)
reproduction, with some inherited variation, and (ii) natural
selection. The transition from Darwin(3) to Darwin(4) affects
these mechanisms in affecting (ii), natural selection. This acquires
some elements of purposiveness, as we have seen, even if it is not
itself purposive, in that the outcome is not sought for, planned or
intended. Evolution by cultural means introduces a more radical
kind of purposiveness into the mechanisms of evolution by
affecting (i) reproduction. The way of life is reproduced (with
variation) in part by means of individual discovery and imitation.
Both discovery, and imitation, are purposive (as understood in this
context).
It may even be that the outcome is in part purposively intended.
Cats and tigers teach offspring to hunt. Their actions may have the
purpose of getting offspring to learn how to hunt skilfully and
successfully.9 Even in the pre-human, animal world, the outcome
of elements of cultural reproduction may be purposively intended.
If so, purposiveness here becomes an integral part of the
mechanisms of evolution in a really substantial way.
Even though evolution by cultural means began long before
human beings came into existence, it is above all with human
beings that this form of evolution really comes into its own. As a
species, we are very similar to others in all sorts of ways. We
share 98.4% of our genes with chimpanzees. But in one dramatic
way we are utterly unique. We are the product of evolution by
cultural means to an extent far, far beyond anything found in any
other species. It is this which accounts for the multitude of
differences between us and all other species. Above all, of course,
language is a product of evolution by cultural means. And
language then makes endless other things possible, inaccessible to
9 What is at issue, here, is not whether the mother cat consciously knows
what she is doing, but whether her actions have as their goal (whether
consciously or not) to teach the kittens to hunt well.
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all other species. Art, science, democracy, justice, elaborate
technology, planned social progress, even wisdom: these all
become possible once there is language.
It is important to appreciate that evolution by cultural means,
even though not itself involving genetic changes, may have an
important impact on subsequent genetically determined changes.
Consider again the dog-like creature running around, and hunting,
on land. Suppose now that one individual, perhaps by accident,
discovers that fish can be caught in a river, which are good to eat.
Others learn by imitation. Many dogs spend time in the river
hunting fish. Now a mutation appears making legs somewhat
flipper-like. Given the new way of life, which has evolved
culturally, flippers have great survival value, even though they
would have been disastrous before the evolution by cultural means
took place. The dog-like creature becomes a beaver-like creature,
and evolution by cultural means led the way. It is a part of the
reason for the evolution, from dog to beaver.
In reality, of course, such an evolutionary change would happen
gradually, as a result of a combination of cultural and genetic
changes, interacting with one another, over a long period of time.
The really important point is that evolution by cultural means can
have an impact on, can be an integral part of, genetically based
evolution, the one intertwined with the other.
Almost certainly this took place in connection with the evolution
of language. It seems reasonable to suppose that an elemental
language came into existence first, perhaps by evolution by
cultural means. Chimpanzees have three words in their
vocabulary, one for snake, another for tiger. Once a primitive
language exists, one can easily imagine that selective pressures
exist for being good at speaking and understanding language.
Perhaps this is required to mate, and have offspring. Perhaps men
have more mates if they are good at speaking. Random genetic
changes that produced brains, muscles and larynxes good at
speaking would, in these circumstances, be selected for. Our
human capacity for language would have evolved by means of an
intricate interweaving of cultural and genetic developments, often
called gene-culture coevolution.
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A small but telling example of such coevolution in humans is
cited Boyd and Richerson (2005), pp. 191-192. Most of the
world’s adults can’t digest milk. Infants can but adults cannot.
They lack an enzyme required to digest lactose, the sugar in milk.
However, in those regions that have long had a history of keeping
cows and dairying – Europe, parts of Africa and Asia – most adults
can digest milk. The ability to drink milk is due to a single gene,
widespread in those areas that have a history of dairying. As a
result of learning to keep cows – an example of cultural evolution
– the gene for digesting milk has survival value, and spreads in
dairying populations, something it does not do in populations
which do not keep cows.
Evolution by cultural means has been construed in a very
different way by Richard Dawkins, not as a new mechanism of
evolution, but as the creation and replication of a new kind of
entity – the meme. A meme is a scrap of culture – a slogan, a song,
an idea. Memes inhabit brains, and replicate themselves by being
transmitted from one brain to another, somewhat analogously to
the way genes inhabit bodies.
It is not surprising that Dawkins should construe evolution by
cultural means in these terms. His gene-centred, purpose-depleted
vision of evolution obstructs thinking of evolution by cultural
means as the development of a new, quasi-Lamarckian method for
the reproduction of purposive ways of life, grafted onto genetic
reproduction. Meme replication and evolution seem to mimic gene
replication and evolution; it is understandable, therefore, that
Dawkins should want to construe evolution by cultural means in
these terms.
How do the two versions of evolution by cultural means
compare? Darwin(5) is broader in scope, in that new actions that
have evolved by cultural means, such as the chimpanzee trick for
getting termites to eat, need not constitute memes. Darwin(5),
because of its emphasis on the evolution of purposive action,
brings to the fore, and renders explicable, the way in which
evolution by cultural means can have an impact on subsequent
evolution of bodily changes determined genetically, in a way in
which Dawkins’ meme view cannot. In other words, Darwin(5)
brings to the fore the fact that non-genetic evolution of behaviour
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can help bring about subsequent evolution brought about by
genetic changes. Finally, and following on from the last point,
Darwin(5) very strikingly reveals how elements of purposiveness
can be incorporated into the mechanisms of evolution themselves.
The view helps us understand how Darwinian evolution of animal
life can, seamlessly, become purposive human history. The meme
view does not do this.
Do those concerned with evolution – biologists, anthropologists,
archaeologists, psychologists and others – appreciate just how
fundamentally evolution by cultural means transforms the
orthodox conception of Darwinian evolution? I am not at all sure
that they do.
For the first six or seven decades of the 20th century, social
scientists treated cultural or social evolution of humans as if this
were quite distinct from Darwinian evolution.10 But then,
associated with an explosion of interest in Darwinian theory, social
scientists began to appreciate that Darwinism has far-reaching
implications for the social sciences, and for social or cultural
evolution in particular. Around 1980, a number of evolutionary
thinkers realized that cultural evolution cannot be dissociated from
Darwinian evolution because genetic and cultural evolution
interact with one another. Works began to appear that recognized
this interplay of genetic and cultural evolution, or coevolution.
There is, for example, Culture and the Evolutionary Process by
Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson (1980), and their subsequent Not
By Genes Alone (2005); there is Human Culture: A Moment in
Evolution by Theodosius Dobzhansky11 and Ernest Boesiger
(1983); there is Coevolution: Genes, Culture, and Human Diversity
by William Durham (1991); and there is The Evolution of Culture
10 Donald Campbell put the matter like this. Having referred to a body of
work by social scientists on social evolution published between 1950 and
1970, he remarks “In all of this, social evolution is seen as a separate
process from biological evolution, although made possible by it”
(Campbell, 1975, p. 1104-5).
11 In this book the interaction of cultural and gene-based evolution is at
least acknowledged, although earlier, as we shall see, Dobzhansky
dismissed the so-called “Baldwin effect”: see Dobzhansky (1970, p.
211).
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edited by Robin Dunbar et al. (1999). Then there are a number of
works that propound some specific theory concerning some aspect
of human evolution, but in a way which presupposes gene-culture
coevolution, such as The Scars of Evolution by Elaine Morgan
(1990), Grooming, Gossip and the Evolution of Language by
Robin Dunbar (1996), and The Mating Mind by Geoffrey Miller
(2001). Social scientists, as one might expect, tend to concentrate
on evolution by cultural means as it affects human evolution.
Others have, however, studied evolution by cultural means in
animals: see, for example, The Evolution of Culture in Animals by
John Bonner (1980). A book that covers both is Social Evolution
by Robert Trivers (1985).
In view of the extensive literature on gene-culture coevolution
(of which the above is but a glimpse), what grounds can I possibly
have for declaring that evolutionary biologists do not sufficiently
emphasize the fundamental role of purposive action, of behaviour,
learning and culture in evolution? What I find lacking is an
awareness of just how widespread and fundamental is the role that
goal-pursuing action plays in evolution, and how dramatically the
theory needs to be reformulated to take this role fully into account.
It means that the theory needs to be reformulated to take into
account that the mechanisms of evolution themselves evolve as
purposive action, learning, imitation, culture and evolution by
cultural means come to play increasingly significant roles.
Darwinians are scornful of the idea that the actions of the
giraffe’s ancestors, in stretching to eat leaves high up in trees, had
any causal role in producing the present-day giraffe’s long neck.
This, it is claimed, is utterly discredited Lamarckism. Thus do
Darwinians reveal their failure to appreciate just how fundamental
is the role of purposive action in evolution. For, of course,
Lamarck is right – or partly right. The stretching of the neck of the
giraffe’s ancestors does play a vital causal role in the subsequent
development of the giraffe’s long neck. Stretching does not
directly cause offspring to have longer necks. There is here no
inheritance of acquired characteristics. But if ancestors had not
stretched their necks, the modern giraffe would not possess its long
neck. Ancestors stretching their necks to reach leaves good to eat
is not sufficient for offspring to develop long necks. But it is
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necessary. Only then do mutations that lead to longer necks have
survival value, and thus spread through the population. It is
reasonable to hold that, throughout the animal kingdom, purposive
action leads the way. Beaks, teeth, tusks, camouflage, claws,
muscles, horns, hooves, digestive systems, and other bodily
characteristics only develop because animals are living in a certain
way in a certain environment and, relative to these, the bodily
characteristics in question have value from the standpoint of
survival and reproductive success. As I have said life
unknowingly breeds itself into existence.
Thus, how an animal lives crucially affects what has survival
value, and this in turn crucially affects the animal’s evolution. In
particular, changes in the way a kind of animal lives, which may
come about because of genetic changes, environmental changes, or
evolution by cultural means, can have dramatic consequences for
that animal’s subsequent evolution. It may well be that changes in
ways of life play the leading role in evolution.12
I remember well the way in which my whole perception of
evolution changed dramatically as a result of becoming aware of
the all-pervasive influence of purposive action on evolution, some
time in the late 1960s. This came about as a result of three events.
First, there was a stray remark of J. Z. Young during a lecture at
University College London on the brain. He remarked that the
way an animal’s memory worked would depend on how it lived.
With a shock I realized the obvious: evolution designs brains, and
12 To the demand that evidence is required to substantiate this thesis, my
response would be that the thesis is an all-but straightforward implication
of Darwinism. Changes in ways of life are bound to change what has
value for survival and reproductive success, and this in turn over time is
bound to have consequences for gene-based evolution in a majority of
cases. Furthermore, changes in ways of life are bound to occur, as a
result of environmental changes, changes of habitat, changes in
predators, food supply, or competitors, or changes brought about by
learning. The boot is on the other foot. What requires establishing is
that changes in ways of life only rarely affects subsequent gene-based
evolution. In the absence of evidence for this thesis, we should adopt the
Darwinian view that changes in purposive action widely, even generally,
lead the way in subsequent gene-based evolution.
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therefore minds. And how an animal lives affects how it evolves.
The second event was a remark of Karl Popper during a lecture at
the London School of Economics. He made the point that fish
acquired the capacity to emerge from the sea and live on land only
because certain fish took to living in shallow water near beaches,
thus becoming stranded in pools every now and again as the tide
retreated. Living in this way, developing the capacity to breathe
air, and move across land, would have had great survival value,
something which would not have been the case for fish living in
the deep ocean. How the animal lives, in short, crucially affects its
subsequent evolution. Purposive action, and changes in purposive
action, may well be at the leading edge of animal evolution quite
generally. The third event was reading Alister Hardy’s The Living
Stream (1965), of which more in a moment.
The outcome was a profound shift in the whole way in which, it
seemed to me – and still seems – evolution needs to be understood.
The actions of animals, our ancestors, in the past, for millions of
years, have had a vital role to play in bringing about our existence.
Evolution is not just blind chance and necessity, to quote the title
of a book by Jacque Monod (1974). Our animal ancestors, striving
to live, to eat, to avoid being eaten, to mate, to rear young, are a
vital part of the reason for our existence. They did not, of course,
intend us to exist. Nevertheless, without their striving, we would
not be here. We really do owe them a debt of gratitude.13
Major development in Darwinian theory took place around 1930
with the rediscovery of the work of Mendel on genetics, and its
incorporation into the theory of evolution, and associated with the
work of R. A. Fisher (1930), J. B. S. Haldane (1932) and Julian
Huxley (1942). We ought to recognize that a similarly dramatic
development in Darwinian theory took place some time in the
1980s with the incorporation of elements of Lamarckism into the
theory. Lamarck was wrong to hold that acquired physical
characteristics are inherited. He was right, however, in his view
that purposive action plays a vital role in subsequent evolution of
physical characteristics. And he was right to hold that acquired
13 For my earlier accounts of this purposive version of Darwinism see the
references given in note 6.
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characteristics are inherited: this occurs in evolution by cultural
means, the acquired characteristics being learned purposive actions
that are passed on by imitation. Lamarck did not get everything
right, but who does? Even Darwin made mistakes.
Why has the vital role that purposive action plays in Darwinian
evolution not received the proper emphasis it deserves in modern
accounts of the theory? A part of the reason may be that
discredited Lamarckism has formed an intellectual barrier in the
minds of evolutionists to recognizing the Lamarckian character of
Darwinian evolution.14 Another, possibly related reason, has to do
with a failure of evolutionary biologists to get the history of the
idea right. The idea that evolution by cultural means can have an
impact on subsequent gene-based evolution is usually attributed to
Mark Baldwin, and is usually known as “the Baldwin effect”.
Baldwin did indeed publish a version of the idea long ago in
1896.15 G. G. Simpson appears to have introduced the phrase “The
Baldwin Effect” (Simpson, 1953). It is extensively discussed in
Daniel Dennett’s Darwin’s Dangerous Idea.16 There is even an
entire book devoted to the subject, the outcome of a conference,
with the title Evolution and Learning: The Baldwin Effect
Reconsidered (Weber and Depew, 2003). But the idea did not
come, originally, from Baldwin. And in so far as Baldwin
expresses the idea, he does so badly. Some of the modern accounts
of the idea are even worse.17 As expressed by Simpson, and by
many since who have followed him, “the Baldwin effect” amounts
14 Orthodox Darwinians do, it is true, acknowledge the Lamarckian, or
“quasi-Lamarckian”, character of evolution by cultural means: see, for
example, Cronin (1991, p. 373). Boyd and Recherson (1985) are
prepared to say that cultural evolution creates “a kind of ‘Lamarckian’
effect” (p. 9). But the Lamarckian character of Darwinian evolution per
se is not acknowledged. On the contrary, it is fiercely resisted. This
further substantiates my point that orthodox Darwinians do not fully
recognize and acknowledge the vital and general role that purposive
action plays in evolution.
15 See Baldwin (1896a; 1986b).
16 Dennett (1996), pp. 77-80, 190, 300, 322-3, 338, 374, 403n, 463.
17 Dennett’s characterization of “the Baldwin effect” is peculiarly opaque
for an author usually so lucid: for the reference, see previous note.
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to this. A new kind of action in a group of animals that comes
about as a result of learning, is eventually determined genetically.
But this falls to the obvious objection: if an animal has learnt to act
in a certain way, what possible value for survival and reproductive
success can there be in having this learnt action become such that it
is determined genetically? There would be no selective pressure
for this to occur. And “the Baldwin effect” has been dismissed on
just these grounds, by Simpson (1952), by Mayr (1963, pp. 610-2),
by Dobzhansky (1970, p. 211), and others. Depew, for example,
puts the objection like this: “If learned behaviors are so effective in
getting a useful trait passed from generation to generation at the
cultural level, there will presumably be no selection pressure for
the spread of genetic factors favoring that trait” (Weber and
Depew, 2003, p. 15).
But all this represents a catalogue of errors. Evolution by
cultural means was first put forward independently by Lloyd
Morgan (1896) and Fairfield Osborn (1896). Baldwin took the
idea from Lloyd Morgan, subsequently took the credit for it, and
then failed to do the idea justice.18 Lloyd Morgan’s idea, of
course, is not that a new kind of purposive action, passed on by
imitation, eventually becomes determined genetically, but rather
that new purposive actions generate new selective pressures, and
mutations which create traits which facilitate the new actions will
be selected for. Thus, if a dog-like creature takes to catching fish
in rivers, it is not this new action which will become genetically
determined: rather, mutations which tend to transform legs into
flippers will be selected for, given the new way of life. Evolution
by cultural means has not been given the importance it deserves in
part because it has so often been understood in a peculiarly
bungled form, which renders the idea untenable. Finally, as we
have seen, it is reasonable to hold that purposive action plays a
vital and widespread role in evolution even when evolution by
cultural means is not involved. Cultural evolution may not have
been involved in the giraffe acquiring its long neck, but purposive
action was involved.19
18 See Hardy (1965), pp. 164-9 and Bateson (2004), pp. 286-9 and 290-1.
19 Darwin(4) incorporates purposive action into the mechanisms of
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There is one book that does do justice to the idea that purposive
action is at the leading edge of Darwinian evolution – and to the
history of the idea: Alister Hardy’s The Living Stream (1965).
Hardy sums up the idea as follows:
If a population of animals should change their habits (no
doubt, often on account of changes in their surroundings
such as food supply, breeding sites, etc., but also
sometimes due to their exploratory curiosity discovering
new ways of life, such as new sources of food or new
methods of exploitation) then, sooner or later, variations
in the gene complex will turn up in the population to
produce small alternations in the animals structure which
will make them more efficient in relation to their new
behaviour pattern; these more efficient individuals will
tend to survive rather than the less efficient, and so the
composition of the population will gradually change.
This evolutionary change is one caused initially by a
change in behaviour (Hardy, 1965, p. 170).
Hardy begins with the evolution of camouflage, the effectiveness
and cleverness of which is the outcome of perceptive predators
seeing through early ineffective efforts – a clear case of unknowing
breeding. He then goes on to expound and illustrate the way in
which Lamarckian evolution by cultural means has consequences
for subsequent gene-based evolution. And he discusses the history
of the idea: the contributions of Lloyd Morgan, Osborn and
Baldwin, and the subsequent contributions, of one kind or another,
by Simpson (1953), Huxley (1942), C. H. Waddington (1957) and
others. He quotes E. S. Russell (1916) as declaring “We need to
look at living things with new eyes and a truer sympathy. We shall
then see them as active, living, passionate beings like ourselves,
and we shall seek in our morphology20 to interpret as may be their
form in terms of their activity” (Hardy, 1965, p. 181). He quotes
E. Schrödinger (1958) as asserting that “Without changing
evolution but does not involve evolution by cultural means.
20 The study of the form of living things.
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anything in the basic assumptions of Darwinism we can see that
the behaviour of the individual , the way it makes use of its innate
faculties, plays a relevant part, nay, plays the most relevant part in
evolution” (Hardy, 1965, p. 189).21 Hardy also quotes a passage
from James Hutton which beautifully expresses a version of the
idea, written “a hundred years before Lloyd Morgan and Baldwin
put forward their versions of the theory…eleven years before
Charles Darwin was born and twelve years before Lamarck first
published his evolutionary views” (Hardy, 1965, p. 179).
Given all this, one might suppose that Alister Hardy is, today,
hailed as a major figure in launching the idea that purposive action
plays a key role in evolution – the key idea of what I have called
Darwin(4) and Darwin(5). Not at all. He is rarely mentioned.
Boyd and Richerson (1980) and (2005); Durham (1991); Dunbar
(1996) Dunbar et al (1999), Miller (2001), Bonner (1980), and
Trivers (1985) make no mention of Hardy whatsoever. Dennett
(1996) does refer to Hardy, but only as the author of the aquatic
ape hypothesis, and in connection with Elaine Morgan’s long-
standing and brilliant championing and development of the idea.
Even Morgan does not refer to Hardy’s The Living Stream,
although much of her work illustrates the key idea of that book.22
Peter Bowler’s Evolution: the History of an Idea (2009) does
mention Hardy, but only to say “Hardy (1965) openly endorsed the
Baldwin effect” (p. 367). Furthermore, this is in the context of
discussing Arthur Koestler’s anti-Darwinian ideas.23 Of the 14
contributors to Evolution and Learning: The Baldwin Effect
Reconsidered (Weber and Depew, 2003), only one mentions
21 Unfortunately, as Hardy points out, Schrödinger goes on to retract
much of the content of this splendid brief statement of the basic idea.
22 The aquatic ape hypothesis holds that pre-human ancestors lived on the
shores of rivers, lakes and the sea, and spent time in the water, many of
our bodily characteristics stemming from that way of life. This
illustrates the general idea that a way of life has consequences for gene-
based evolution.
23 But to be fair to Bowler, he gives a good brief formulation of the
misnamed Baldwin effect: “new habits are supposed to determine which
genetic variations are most useful” (Bowler, 2009, p. 367). The word
“supposed” here does not, however, exactly inspire confidence.
289
Hardy, and only very briefly and obliquely, in connection with a
letter of Waddington to Hardy (p. 146). There is, however, a
critical essay review of the book by Patrick Bateson (2004) which
emphasizes the importance of Hardy’s contribution, and refers to
the work of others along similar lines as well.
Alister Hardy’s own explanation for the neglect of his thesis and
book was that, in the penultimate chapter he went on to defend
telepathy. This may well have played a role. In any case, the
continuing neglect of Hardy’s work is symptomatic, I claim, of a
continuing failure, on the part of evolutionary biologists and social
scientists, to do justice to the profound transformation in
Darwinism that is brought about when one acknowledges the vital
and general role that purposive action plays in evolution. Only
then does one recognize that the mechanisms of evolution
themselves evolve, as they assign increasingly important roles to
purposive action, and become Lamarckian in character, as we have
seen.
So far nothing has been said about sentience or consciousness. I
now repair that omission with the next version of Darwinism.
Darwin(6). Sentience. Purposive explanation becomes increase-
ingly important as we move from Darwin(3) to Darwin(5). At a
certain time (or perhaps independently at a number of different
times) living creatures became sentient, and what may be called
sentient explanation became relevant to evolution, in Darwin(3) to
Darwin(5) ways. (Sentient explanations take the inner sensations
of the creatures in question into account. All sentient explanations
are purposive, but not vice versa.)
We saw in chapter 3 that the experiential cannot be derived from
science that is reducible (in principle) to physics. We can take this
to imply that sentient explanations cannot be derived from
purposive ones. This means Darwinian evolution cannot, even in
principle, explain how the sentient has emerged or evolved from
the non-sentient, purposive, neurological and physical. Necessary
and sufficient neurological conditions for sentience do however,
presumably, exist, and we can speculate as to what these may be.
Elsewhere I have suggested that sentience emerges with the
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transition from what may be called sequential to motivational
control.24
There is a wasp that lays its egg and then flies around, clutching
the egg, looking for a suitable hole in the ground in which to bury
it. When it finds a candidate, it puts the egg down at a fixed
distance from the hole, goes into it to see if it is suitable and, if it
is, comes out, fetches the egg and buries it. All this looks as if the
wasp knows what it is doing. However, if the egg is moved a bit
further away while the wasp is investigating the hole, the wasp will
emerge, pick up the egg, place it at the fixed distance from the
hole, and then investigate the hole again for suitability. This can
be repeated many times. Evidently, the wasp is led by its brain to
do one specific kind of action (fly around looking for a hole, or put
the egg down at a fixed distance from the hole, etc.) until, it is
triggered to move onto the next specific action in the sequence of
actions. The wasp has no idea of its overall goal (to bury the egg
in the ground). It achieves this goal by achieving a sequence of
precisely specified intermediate goals, the completion of one
triggering pursuit of the next in the sequence. This is what I mean
by “sequential control”.
It is very different, I surmise, from the way tigers are controlled
by their brains to go hunting. The overall goal – eating food – is
actively represented in the tiger’s brain, and the brain has to work
out what actions have to be performed if the goal is to be realized.
This means the tiger may, on different occasions, perform different
actions in order to attain the final goal of eating. This is what I
mean by “motivational control”.
I conjecture that it is the transition from sequential to
motivational control which leads to the emergence of sentience.
The goal of eating, represented in the brain by means of
characteristic neurological activity is, for the tiger, the feeling of
hunger, the desire for food.
From the standpoint of survival value, motivational control has
the great advantage over sequential control that it is flexible. It is
open to leading to a variety of different actions in different
circumstances, in ways in which the rigid sequence of specific
24 See Maxwell (2001), ch. 7, and especially pp. 180-185.
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actions of sequential control is not. Motivational control makes
learning possible, in ways in which sequential control does not.
On this view, then, feeling and desire are at the core of sentience,
and sentience evolves so that actions of animals can be specified in
an open-ended, flexible way, allowing for learning, and for actions
to be adapted to circumstances.
It is often remarked that what matters, from a Darwinian
perspective, is what you do, how you act, not what your inner
feelings and desires are. Darwinian evolution thus seems
peculiarly ill-equipped to help explain how and why sentience and
consciousness have come into existence. From a Darwinian
perspective, acting as if sentient or conscious is just as good as
actually being sentient or conscious (assuming that sentience and
consciousness confer some selective advantage). From a
Darwinian perspective, it seems, we might as well all have been
zombies.
This echoes the problem we encountered in the last chapter, in
connection with free will. The solution put forward there must be
employed here. In our world, zombies are not possible. Brains
that perform sufficiently sophisticated motivational control are
automatically sentient.
It may be asked: Which comes first, evolution by cultural means
or sentience? Does learning and imitation, of the kind required for
evolution by cultural means, presuppose sentience? My guess is
that it does (although it would seem to me possible to design non-
sentient robots able to participate in evolution by cultural means).
Darwin(7). From sentience there emerges consciousness.
Conscious action begins to play a role in evolution, in ways
specified by Darwin(3) to Darwin(5) for purposive action. That is,
conscious action replaces unconscious - even insentient - purposive
action. Conscious beings choose mates, rear offspring, make
discoveries and imitate the discoveries of others, aware of what
they are doing.
Comments. What factors are behind sentience evolving into
consciousness, as we human beings know it? I suggest three: (a)
imagination, (b) personalistic understanding of others (and so of
oneself), and (c) language. Let us take these in turn.
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(a) To imagine you are climbing a mountain (when you are not
doing anything of the kind) is to give yourself experiences
somewhat like what you would have were you actually to be
climbing a mountain. It is, in other words, to make occur in your
brain neurological processes somewhat like those that would occur
if you were actually to be climbing a mountain. Being able to
imagine clearly has potential survival value. It means you can try
things out in the imagination, thus learning from imaginative
failure and success, far less risky, far less time and energy
consuming, than trying things out in reality. Better to die in the
imagination, than die in reality. I have suggested that it may be the
function of dreaming to develop the capacity to imagine in the
individual who dreams. Imagination makes possible a vast
increase in the arena of action. As a result of imagining one is at
other places, other times, it becomes possible to become aware of
distant places and times – both the distant past and future. The
discovery of the inevitability death becomes possible – something
likely to have had a big impact on human evolution and history. It
may well be that it is the development of the capacity to imagine
that is the crucial step from sentience towards human
consciousness. For it is this that makes inner action possible –
doing things in the imagination. This would seem to be the crucial
distinction between consciousness and sentience – whether one can
do things internally, in imagination – act, explore, think, ponder,
question – or whether one is condemned merely to feel, to desire,
to experience sensations. We can perhaps see, however, how
imagination could develop from motivational control. To have
actively present in your mind the goal you seek to achieve – food,
a mate – is already close to imagining you are doing what you are
not: eating freshly killed prey, mating. On this view, motivational
control first spawns sentience, then imagination, then
consciousness.
(b) Being able to imagine you are doing things that you are not
doing makes it possible to imagine that you are a person that you
are not. It makes personalistic understanding possible, in other
words.25 Being good at understanding others can clearly have
25 One might think that personalistic understanding of others is a
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survival value when animals or humans are living socially. It is
needed to divine the intentions of others, to form alliances and
friendships, and perhaps to mate and reproduce. As a result of
understanding others, one understand that others understand one’s
self, which in turn can create an awareness of discrepancies
between how others see one, and one’s own experiences of one’s
self. It is this awareness of this discrepancy, I suggest, which
creates self-consciousness. As a result of becoming aware of
others’ awareness of oneself, one becomes are of what those others
are not aware of and do not experience: one’s own experiences.
Thus one acquires self-consciousness.
(c) It has been shown by Paul Grice26 that human
communication involves, quite essentially, multi-layers of
mutually understood intentions. If I am to communicate with you
by means of language, I must intend this, you must understand that
I intend it, and I must understand that you understand. These
multi-layers of implicitly understood intentions will have evolved
gradually from their beginnings in primate, one layered animal
communication. Let us suppose A communicates to B. Human
communication, I conjecture, has evolved by means of the
following steps:
(i) A acts in its own interests, for example goes rapidly into
flight to avoid a predator; B takes this behaviour as an indication of
something (in this case danger), for him, and acts accordingly.
straightforward specific use of imagination. It may be, however, that
understanding others develops separately from the development of the
ability to imagine, and uses different parts of the brain. The discovery of
so-called “mirror” neurons, used to understand others “empathically” or
personalistically, would seem to suggest that this is the case – although
this role of mirror neurons has been called into question. That being able
to imagine is distinct neurologically from being able to understand others
is further suggested by autistic people, who may have vivid imaginations,
and yet be poor at understanding others (imagining they are other
people).
26. Grice (1957), reprinted in Grice (1989), ch. 14. Grice makes no attempt,
however, to indicate, as I have done here, the manner in which the multi-
layered character of human communication can be seen as having emerged
gradually as a result of Darwinian evolution.
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(ii) In addition, A does something which is such that the sole
purpose of it is to communicate to B, even though A has no such
conscious intention. Here A might squawk as it goes into flight in
a manner characteristic for that species in such circumstances; B
reacts accordingly.
(iii) In addition, A has the purpose of signalling to B since, if A
knows that it is on its own it will not signal (e.g. squawk).
(iv) In addition, A has the purpose of communicating the
message of the action to B, so that, in the case of the squawk, the
bird squawks in order to warn B. If B is present but in no danger
then the bird does not squawk.
(v) B understands the message, the meaning of the squawk.
(vi) A has the purpose of B understanding the meaning of the
message.
(vi) B understands this too.
(vii) A intends B to understand this.
And so on (the multi-layers of mutual understanding, initially
profoundly significant, as one goes on further, becoming
increasingly insignificant).
Communication and language evolve in tandem with the
evolution of consciousness and personalistic understanding (or
empathy), each requiring, but also enriching, the other two.
Communication up to (iii), or perhaps (iv), does not require
conscious intention and personalistic understanding, but from (iv)
or perhaps (v) onwards, the kind of communication involved does
require consciousness and personalistic understanding.
One profoundly significant consequence of imagination is that it
enables the imagining creature vastly to increase the arena of its
actions. As a result of imagining one is doing what one is not
doing, it becomes possible to imagine one is doing things at other
places and times: one can become aware of distant places, the
distant past and future. The discovery of the inevitability of death
becomes possible. Long term conscious planning becomes
possible. All this will be further strengthened and enriched by the
associated development of personalistic understanding, language
and communication and, with these, the development of a
common, shared public world. These developments make
possible:
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Darwin(8). Ways of life evolve as the outcome, in part, of
conscious actions. Darwinian evolution gives rise to history.
Comments. In order to understand how and why human affairs
evolve as they do, one must take note of the conscious intentions
and actions of people. This is not to say that what happens is
invariably the outcome of what people intend. People’s intentions
and plans conflict: there are winners and losers. Often there are no
winners, and the outcome is intended by no one. And quite apart
from conscious intentions and actions, natural phenomena also
play their part: storms, droughts, plagues, earthquakes. There are
also the unintended consequences of human actions to be taken
into account as well: traffic congestion, depletion of natural
resources, extinction of species and environmental degradation,
climate change.
There is a tendency to think that history is associated exclusively
with human beings. There are grounds for holding, however, that
this is not quite correct. Even chimpanzees produce history, to a
limited extent. Groups of chimpanzees engage in power struggles,
alliances, long-standing disputes, and even war.
Among the dramatic consequences that the emergence of
consciousness has for the evolution of ways of life, two that
deserve to be highlighted are (1) the discovery of the inevitability
of death, and (2) conflict over control of way of life. Let me take
these in turn.
(1) The discovery of the inevitability of death. It seems likely
that most mammals, being confined to the here and now, do not
realize that their eventual death is inevitable. Once our
imagination has roamed far and wide, however, we can foresee a
time in the distant future when we will grow old and die.
Imagination has expanded the arena in which we act and live
sufficiently to encompass our future death. Granted that evolution
assigns to us survival and reproductive success as our fundamental
goals in life, all other gaols being means to these ends, the
discovery of our inevitable death must be traumatic indeed.
Imagination, which made the discovery, quickly steps in and seeks
to find ways to evade the grim news. It is our imagination that
creates the possibility that death is but the beginning of a journey
to another, and possibly happier, place. Anthropologists take
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burial remains as a good indication of early human culture. Often,
burial remains include pots of food to help the traveller on his or
her way to life after death. As history has unfolded, people have
found other ways to try to cheat death, besides having children:
memorials, pyramids, enduring art, contributions to science,
thought and literature, fame, conquest, institutions and
corporations. Death remains a potent problem in human life.
Discovering how to cope with its inevitability is no doubt
important if one is to achieve a happy, mature way of life.
(2) It is reasonable to hold that most mammals do not
consciously plan their way of life. They consciously27 plan what
they do from minute to minute, but the way of life is planned by an
unconscious master control system, which directs consciousness to
seek appropriate goals – food, shelter, mating, fighting, rearing of
young – by planting into consciousness relevant desires and
feelings of hunger, fear, desire, by means of hormones, sugar
content in the blood, etc. The master control system pulls the
strings, and consciousness leaps to obey. Consciousness is the
slave of the master control system, and remains so as long as
imagination is not sufficiently developed to enable consciousness
to become aware of what lies beyond the immediate here and now.
But the moment imagination, helped out by personalistic
understanding and language, becomes aware of the distant past and
future, and other places, it becomes possible for consciousness to
attempt something evolution has not equipped it to do: take charge
of, and plan, the way of life. As long as people lived in hunting
and gathering tribes, living from day to day more or less as
27 I am employing “consciously plan” somewhat ambiguously here. I
assume sentient animals may, in some sense, be said to “consciously
plan” actions, from moment to moment, even if these animals are not
fully self-conscious in the way we human beings are. I also assume that
animal moment-to-moment “conscious acting” is a precursor of our
“conscious acting”, ours having evolved from the more primitive version
to be found in animals. This is, perhaps, the key to consciousness. At its
most primitive, it is what controls action, in ordinary circumstances,
from moment to moment, in sentient animals. It is this that is enriched
with the evolution of (a) imagination, (b) personalistic understanding and
(c) language, to become human self-consciousness.
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chimpanzees do, the potential conflict between the master control
system and consciousness would not have been too pronounced. It
is when humanity departed from the hunting and gathering way of
life by taking to agriculture, which requires conscious action
directed towards long-term goals (planting, weeding, growing and
harvesting of crops), that the conflict would have become active,
consciousness grappling with and seeking to over-ride the master
control system, and all too often failing in the attempt. This
conflict lies at the heart of our existence today. The master control
system is especially good at tricking consciousness into thinking it
is in charge when actually it is the master system which controls
the action. Rationalization, in other words, is rife in human affairs.
Distorted versions of the conflict emerge in religions, and in
psychoanalytic theory. We have still failed to get it properly into
perspective. What is required, of course, is that we acknowledge
the existence and nature of the conflict, and find the best way to
resolve the conflicts that will inevitably arise as we live.28
Darwin(9). History is under conscious control in pursuit of life of
greater value, in so far as such a thing is possible.
Comments. For this to come about, it is essential that humanity
adopts and implements wisdom-inquiry and its methodology, aim-
oriented rationality. Seen in this light, wisdom-inquiry and aim-
oriented rationality complement and complete Darwinian theory.
Darwinian theory, properly understood, brings graphically to the
fore that the fundamental task that lies before humanity is (1) to get
conscious control of history, and (2) to discover how life-aims,
bequeathed to us by evolution and history, can be transformed into
the aim of discovering and realizing what is of value in life.
Crudely put, our fundamental problem is to transform the
Darwinian life-aims of survival and reproductive success into the
life-aims of survival, reproduction and enrichment of life of value.
Our evolutionary and historical past has ill-equipped us for this
task. Evolution manufactures species in great abundance able to
adopt a great variety of means to realize a fixed aim: survival and
28 My comments on Darwin (4) to Darwin(8) are based on, and develop,
earlier remarks of mine on evolution: see works referred to in note 6.
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reproduction. Nothing in evolution has equipped us to transform
our basic life aim. Our culture, inherited from the past, is not
designed to help. Far from helping us progressively improve our
life aims towards promoting life of value, all too often it disguises
from us the real nature of our aims. This is true even of one of our
most successful endeavours, science – as we saw in chapter 5. As
yet, we have not even appreciated the nature of our problem: to
transform our basic life aims – personal, institutional, global. We
have failed to grasp what we require to help solve this fundamental
problem, namely wisdom-inquiry, and aim-oriented rationality.
Even philosophers ignore the fundamental problem: What kind of
inquiry can best help us make progress towards as good a world as
possible?. What kind of inquiry can best help the God-of-Cosmic-
Value to flourish within the God-of-Cosmic-Power?29
During the time that it has taken me to write this book, three
global issues have demonstrated graphically just how disastrous is
our failure to put aim-oriented rationality and wisdom-inquiry into
practice – our failure, indeed, even to have the idea that this is
what we need to do!
The first is George Bush’s disastrous “war against terrorism”, a
war fought in such a way that it has all-but transformed the USA
into a terrorist nation itself, and has acted as a magnificent
29 In other words, Darwinian theory, properly appreciated, powerfully
endorses the point, at present almost universally ignored, that it is of
fundamental importance for us to build wisdom-inquiry and aim-oriented
rationality into our social world and culture, if we are to enhance our
capacity to realize what is of value in life. But this point is also
powerfully endorsed by the compatibilist view of free will I argued for in
chapter 7. According to that compatibilist view, any free will we possess
in excess of that possessed by chimpanzees, let us say, is due in large
part to our language and culture, our technology and social institutions.
Brought up without these, like Truffaut’s wild child, our free will – our
capacity to realize what is of value – would not amount to much more
than that of a chimpanzee. In order to enhance our free will – and
enhance free will in the sense of the capacity to realize what is of value
in life – it is vital that our social world and culture is designed to
facilitate their flourishing. Darwinian theory, wisdom-inquiry and
compatibilism form a kind of interlocked trinity, each component
powerfully reinforcing the other two.
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recruiting agent for terrorists. The failure even to consider that the
aims being pursued might have almost the opposite consequences
to genuinely desirable ends could hardly be more obvious.30
The second is the global financial crisis of 2008. It should have
been obvious, some years before that date, that international
banking was being conducted in an unsustainable way. All that
would be required to bring the financial system crashing down was
a fall in property values, a crisis of confidence. A few voices did
indeed cry out that we were heading towards disaster, but they
were ignored. There was the most elementary failure to consider
the likely dire consequences of pursuing the then current aims of
banks a mere ten years into the future. Nothing could demonstrate
more graphically our failure to understand the need for, let alone
implement, basic ingredients of aim-oriented rationality.
The third global issue I have in mind is global warming. This
again illustrates the profoundly problematic character of basic
aims. At one time it seemed that the aim of developing modern
industry, transport and agriculture on a world-wide basis could
only be good. Unfortunately, among other undesirable
consequences, it leads to an increase in carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere which, in turn, leads to a rise in average global
temperatures, the melting of glaciers and polar icecaps and the
rising of sea levels. If we continue as we are, we face catastrophe.
What once seemed so desirable now threatens our existence. We
have known about impending global warming since 1960, if not
earlier, but it has taken a very long time for those with the power to
determine what we do – politicians, industrialists, entrepreneurs –
to begin to consider what needs to be done to cut CO2 emissions
down. A perceived threat from a neighbouring country could
galvanize a nation to prepare for war in a matter of months. Global
warming, which threatens the very future of humanity is, it seems,
too impersonal or unfamiliar to provoke a similar response. So far
we have failed to change our lives in the ways required to avoid
disaster. If wisdom-inquiry and aim-oriented rationality had been
in place since 1960, academia would have been shouting from the
rooftops for the need to change. Our world would long ago have
30 See, for example, my (2007b).
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been alerted to the urgent need to change its ways. Without them,
it has taken decades for news of the seriousness of our situation to
filter through to those able to take action.
Put our human world into the context of Darwinian evolution
and what cries out is the urgent need to put into place, in our
human world, strategies and modes of thought designed to help us
improve our problematic aims, personal, institutional, global, in the
direction of promoting long-term life of value, as we live. First of
all, Darwinian evolution selects for the capacity to survive and
reproduce in the short term. As Steve Jones has wittily put it,
evolution has tactics but no strategy. It does not bequeath to us the
life aim of long-term life of value. This is an aim we must
painfully acquire through modifying progressively what we have
inherited from evolution and history. Secondly, Darwinian
evolution leaves us peculiarly ill-equipped to transform our life
aims in the way we require for, throughout evolution, there is one
fixed fundamental aim: survival and reproduction. The basic
Darwinian lesson is: we both must, and are peculiarly ill-equipped
to, transform our basic life aims. How striking it is that the
volumes of print produced on the social implications of Darwin
have so rarely come up with this simple, stark, vital Darwinian
lesson.
There is also, however, a more hopeful message that emerges
from a consideration of our human world in the context of
Darwinian evolution. What distinguishes us from all other species
is the massive extent to which we are the product of evolution by
cultural means. We have this unique capacity to learn. There is
hope. We may be able to learn how to improve our problematic –
even destructive – aims as we live, even though evolution ill-
equips us for this task.
In the next, and final chapter, I shall spell out in a bit more detail
what in my view we need to do if we are to do better at making
progress towards as good a world as possible, thus helping the
God-of-Cosmic-Value to flourish less painfully and somewhat
more luxuriantly within the cold, remorseless embrace of the God-
of-Cosmic-Power.
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CHAPTER NINE
OUR GLOBAL PROBLEMS
AND WHAT WE NEED TO DO
ABOUT THEM
Global Problems
The Role of Modern Science and Technology
What Do We Need to Do?
How Could Wisdom-Inquiry Help?
Objections
Is the Academic Revolution Underway?
Conclusion
Global Problems
Can humanity help the God-of-Cosmic-Value to flourish,
ensnarled as it is within the remorseless grip of the Cosmic-God-
of-Power? Can we, in other words, successfully realize what is
genuinely of value to us in the real world – more successfully, at
least, than we have managed to do so far, up to the first decade of
the 21st century? Much depends, I will argue in this final chapter,
on whether we succeed in putting wisdom-inquiry and aim-
oriented rationality into practice in academia, and in life.
As I have already stressed, we are confronted by grave global
problems. There is the problem of vast differences in wealth
around the globe, something like a third of the world's population
living in conditions of dire poverty, without enough to eat, safe
water, proper shelter, health care, education, employment. Over 9
million children die every year from preventable causes – some
25,000 every day.1 There is the problem of war, over 100 million
people having died in wars during the 20th century, which
compares unfavourably with the 12 million or so who died in wars
in the 19th century. And we have not been doing very well in the
first decade of the 21st century (I am writing in July 2009). There is
1 See www.unicef.org/media/media_45485.html.
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the problem of the spread and stockpiling of deadly modern
armaments, even in poor countries, and the ever-present threat of
their use by terrorists or in war, whether the arms be conventional,
chemical, biological or nuclear. Nuclear proliferation is an
especially grave problem, India, Pakistan and north Korea having
recently acquired the bomb, and other nations, such as Iran, likely
to acquire the bomb soon. There is the long-standing problem of
the rapid growth of the world's population, especially pronounced
in the poorest parts of the world, adversely affecting efforts at
development. There is the problem of the progressive destruction
of tropical rain forests and other natural habitats, with its
concomitant devastating extinction of species. And there is the
horror of the aids epidemic, again far more terrible in the poorest
parts of the world, devastating millions of lives, destroying
families, and crippling economies.
And, in addition to these stark global crises, there are problems
of a more diffuse, intangible character, signs of a general cultural
or spiritual malaise. There is the phenomenon of political apathy:
the problems of humanity seem so immense, so remorseless, so
utterly beyond human control, and each one of us, a mere
individual, seems wholly impotent before the juggernaut of history.
The new global economy can seem like a monster out of control,
with human beings having to adapt their lives to its demands,
rather than gaining support from it. There is the phenomenon of the
trivialization of culture, as a result, perhaps, of technological
innovation such as TV and the internet. Once, people created and
participated in their own live music, theatre, art, poetry. Now this
is pumped into our homes and into our ears by our technology, a
mass-produced culture for mass consumption; we have become
passive consumers, and the product becomes ever more trivial in
content. And finally, there is the phenomenon of the rise of
religious and political fanaticism and terrorism opposed, it can
seem, either in a faint-hearted and self-doubting way, or brutally
by war and the suspension of justice, apparently confirming
Yeats's lines "The best lack all conviction, while the worst are full
of passionate intensity".
Most serious of all, there is the impending crisis of global
warming. There is the real possibility that average global
303
temperature will rise by 3 to 6 or even 10 degrees centigrade by the
end of the century, rendering vast tracts of the earth's surface, at
present densely populated, uninhabitable, sea levels rising by a
meter or so, flooding many great cities of the world. Reports from
experts about the pace of global warming – shrinking of ice at the
poles, contraction of glaciers – grow steadily more alarming year
by year.
We have known about global warming for a long time. John
Tyndall discovered that carbon dioxide is a greenhouse gas as long
ago as 1859, and Svante Arrhenius realized in 1896 that we would
cause global warming. Living in Sweden, he thought it would be a
good thing. But the first person really to discover that we are
causing global warming was Guy Callendar, who gave a lecture to
the Meteorological Society in London on the subject in 1938. He
was not believed. Of course, 1938 was not the best time to make
the announcement! Any lingering doubts should have been
removed, however when, in the early 1960s, Charles Keeling made
extremely accurate measurements of the increase in carbon dioxide
in the atmosphere.2
What is so shocking is that it has taken so long – several
decades – for humanity to begin to take the impending threat
seriously; let alone work out what needs to be done; let alone do
it.
Global warming threatens to intensify all our other global
problems – apart, perhaps, from that of rapid population growth
(which might be curtailed by starvation, floods, drought, and war,
all provoked by global warming).
If we are to realize what is genuinely of value to us in life more
successfully than we have in the past we must, at the very least,
discover how to resolve these immense global problems in very
much more humane, intelligent, and effective ways than we have
managed to do so far.
The Role of Modern Science and Technology
Modern science and technology have made immense
contributions to the enrichment of human life. The modern world
2 Weart (2003).
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is inconceivable without them. But they have also made possible
all our current global problems. Modern science and technology
make possible modern medicine and hygiene, modern agriculture
and industry which, in turn, have led to population growth,
destruction of natural habitats and rapid extinction of species.
Modern science, technology and industry being developed in some
countries, but not in others, have led to immense differences in
wealth around the world. Science and technology have made
modern armaments possible, and the lethal character of modern
warfare. As a result, the more scientifically advanced countries
have been able to impose their will on those without modern
science. Even aids is spread by modern methods of travel, made
possible by modern technology. And of course global warming is
a product of modern industry and agriculture, made possible by
modern science and technology.
It is not just that modern science has made these things possible.
In a perfectly respectable sense of “cause”, all our global problems
have been caused by modern science and technology.
It may be objected that it is not science that is the cause of these
global problems but rather the things that we do, made possible by
science and technology. This is obviously correct. But it is also
correct to say that scientific and technological progress is the
cause. The meaning of "cause" is ambiguous. By "the cause" of
event E we may mean something like "the most obvious
observable events preceding E that figure in the common sense
explanation for the occurrence of E". In this sense, human actions
(made possible by science) are the cause of such things as people
being killed in war, destruction of tropical rain forests. On the
other hand, by the "cause" of E we may mean "that prior change in
the environment of E which led to the occurrence of E, and without
which E would not have occurred". If we put the 20th century into
the context of human history, then it is entirely correct to say that,
in this sense, scientific-and-technological progress is the cause of
our distinctive current global disasters: what has changed, what is
new, is scientific knowledge and technological know-how, not
human nature. Give a group of chimpanzees rifles and teach them
how to use them and in one sense, of course, the cause of the
subsequent demise of the group would be the actions of the
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chimpanzees. But in another obvious sense, the cause would be
the sudden availability and use of rifles – the new, lethal
technology. Yet again, from the standpoint of theoretical physics,
"the cause" of E might be interpreted to mean something like "the
physical state of affairs prior to E, throughout a sufficiently large
spatial region surrounding the place where E occurs". In this third
sense, the sun continuing to shine is as much a part of the cause of
war and pollution as human action or human science and
technology.
In short, if by the cause of an event we mean that prior change
which led to that event occurring (the second of the above three
senses), then it is the advent of modern science and technology that
has caused all our current global crises. It is not that people
became greedier or more wicked in the 19th and 20th centuries; nor
is it that the new economic system of capitalism is responsible, as
some historians and economists would have us believe.3 The
crucial factor is the creation and immense success of modern
science and technology. This has led to modern medicine and
hygiene, to population growth, to modern agriculture and industry,
to habitat loss and rapid extinction of species, to pollution of land,
sea and air, to world wide travel (which spreads diseases such as
aids), to global warming, and to the destructive might of the
technology of modern war and terrorism, conventional, chemical,
biological and nuclear.
It is tempting to blame modern science and technology for our
troubles. But that misses the point. We need modern science and
technology, to help us know what our problems are, and to help us
solve them. We would not know we were causing global warming
without modern science (even if there would be no global warming
if there were no science). The fault lies, not with science per se,
but rather with scientific and technological research dissociated
from the more fundamental quest to discover how to help humanity
solve its global problems and make progress towards as good a
3 Science plus communism would have done the trick just as well – even
better, in fact, as the record of the Soviet Union reveals (in connection
with environmental degradation, for example).
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world as possible. The fault lies with our long-standing failure to
pursue science within the framework of wisdom-inquiry.4
As I argued in chapter 6, we face two great problems of learning:
learning about the universe, and ourselves as a part of the universe;
and learning how to create civilization.5 We have solved the first
problem. The solution is science. But we have failed to solve the
second problem. And that, inevitably, puts us into a situation of
unprecedented danger. For the solution to the first problem –
science – bequeaths to us unprecedented power to act which,
without civilization or wisdom, is almost bound to do as much
harm as good. Just this has been the outcome.
The crisis of all crises, in short – the crisis behind all the others –
is science without wisdom or, more accurately, science without
wisdom-inquiry.
As a matter of supreme urgency, we need to bring about a
revolution in academia so that it takes up its proper task of
devoting reason – the genuine article – to the pursuit of wisdom, to
helping us tackle and solve our immense, intractable global
problems.
4 Or, put in the terms of this book, the fault lies with our long-standing
failure to take, as our fundamental problem, to help the God-of-Cosmic-
Value to flourish in the God-of-Cosmic-Power. This is our fundamental
problem of living, and also our fundamental intellectual problem. If this
were understood, it would be obvious that wisdom-inquiry is what we
require to help us improve our attempts at solving this fundamental
problem. It is our failure to appreciate that this is our fundamental
problem which has made it possible to dissociate science from religion,
from concern with what is of value in existence, and in turn made it
possible to develop social inquiry as social science (the pursuit of
knowledge of social phenomena), and not as the endeavour to help
humanity realize what is of value in life.
5 Both are subordinate aspects of our fundamental problem of helping the
God-of-Cosmic-Value to flourish within the God-of-Cosmic-Power. In
the last analysis, our current global problems are the outcome of our
failure to understand that this is our fundamental problem – our failure to
give it priority in personal, social, economic and political life.
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What Do We Need to Do?
What do we need to do to solve our global problems? I now
indicate very briefly what in my view needs to be done, taking the
main problems in turn.
Global Warming. This would seem to be the most serious of our
problems. Let me state the obvious. In order to come to grips with
this problem, the industrially advanced world needs to cut back on
its emissions of CO2 as rapidly as possible. We must stop burning
oil and coal, and rapidly develop alternative sources of power:
wind, hydro-electric, wave, tidal, sunlight via photoelectric cells,
biomass fuels and, perhaps, nuclear power. Vehicles powered by
petrol must be replaced by vehicles powered by batteries (charged
by electricity in turn produced by sustainable means that do not
emit CO2). Energy saving devices need to be installed in homes,
offices, factories and other buildings. Street lighting needs to be
made more energy efficient. At the same time, global cooperation
is required to put an end to the destruction of tropical rain forests,
which significantly contributes to global warming.
Many of these measures are highly problematic, for both
technical and social reasons. Wind power, hydro-electric power,
and tidal power all tend to have adverse environmental
consequences. Growing biomass fuels takes land away from the
production of crops for much needed food. Nuclear power is, of
course, notoriously problematic, in part because of the long-
lasting, highly radioactive material that it produces, in part because
of the link with nuclear weapons. Electric vehicles at present have
nothing like the range or power of petrol or diesel fuelled vehicles.
It is not clear what is to replace oil when it comes to ships, and
aeroplanes
It may prove possible to harvest sunlight on an industrial scale
by means of photo-electric panels spread over square miles in
deserts. But photo-electric panels are expensive, and there are
problems of transporting electricity to cities and densely populated
areas – which tend to be far away from deserts.
There are speculative ideas about how it might be possible to
extract CO2 from the atmosphere in sufficient quantities to make a
difference, or to cut down on the amount of sunlight reaching the
earth, for example by sending mirrors into space between us and
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the sun. All these ideas seem at present impractical, because of
expense or adverse consequences or, quite simply, because they
would not work.
The world needs to cooperate on putting a stop to the destruction
of tropical rain forests. Countries such as Brazil and Indonesia
need financial and other assistance from the industrially advanced
world. Tropical rain forests require international policing to stop
destructive logging.
The planet will continue to grow warmer even if we stopped all
emissions of CO2 overnight. This is because there is a delay in the
planetary system. The CO2 we have already put into the
atmosphere will continue to turn up the heat for some time to
come. As it is, of course, it will at best take decades for the world
to reduce substantially its emissions of CO2. Global warming will
continue for decades to come. Low lying islands and coastal
regions will have to be abandoned, as sea levels rise, and other
regions will have to be abandoned because of heat and drought.
As populations rise, land available for habitation and agriculture
will shrink, not a good prospect for peace. World-wide
cooperation will be needed to take care of refugees who come from
regions made uninhabitable by global warming.
War. The world needs an international peace-keeping force which
can be deployed swiftly anywhere on earth to intervene if violent
conflict seems likely, or has already broken out, whether internal to
a country, or between nations. At present, the UN is supposed to
perform this function, but does so ineffectually, partly because it
cannot intervene in civil war, partly because the UN security
council must reach agreement, and this is either not forthcoming at
all, or only after a protracted period of wheeling and dealing.
Sometimes the UN supports military intervention it ought not to
support, as in the case of the Afghanistan war6 after 9/11, while on
6 9/11 was a monstrous crime, not an act of war, and could not
conceivably justify war in retaliation. The UN issued a resolution which
in effect supported the USA in its subsequent invasion of Afghanistan. It
did so, in my view, because the aggrieved nation was the USA. If,
instead, France had been the victim, the Louvre being destroyed in an
analogous terrorist attack with, we may suppose, a similar loss of life
(around 3,000 people), I feel sure the UN would not have supported
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other occasions it fails to support intervention it clearly ought to
support, as in cases of conflict in Africa, in the former Yugoslavia,
and in Rwanda.
In order to have an international peace-keeping force that does
the job properly, we probably first need to establish a democratic,
enlightened world government. That, it might be argued, rather
puts the cart before the horse. We will only be able to establish a
democratic world government if we have already established world
peace. It seems reasonable to hold, however, that efforts to
establish world peace should work in tandem with efforts to
establish democratic world government.
More than an effective, humanitarian peace-keeping force is
required to establish world peace, as the case of Europe graphically
illustrates. For centuries, Europe suffered war after war,
culminating in the horrors of the first and second world wars, both
of which had their source in Europe. After the second world war, a
number politicians and others worked hard to develop trade and
other interconnections between European states such that all future
European wars would be unthinkable. This hope has been fully
realized. Yugoslavia does not really constitute an exception since
that country was never a part of the efforts to create the Common
Market, or the European Union. We have here something like a
model for what we should try to create world-wide. For this to
succeed, though, it will probably be necessary for there to be
democracies in all the counties of the world, and far greater
equality of wealth than at present around the world. (This proposal
is very definitely not the view that the rest of the world should
become European in character and culture; it is rather the view that
something important is to be learned from the manner in which
European peace has been established after centuries of war, for the
establishment of peace throughout the rest of the world. We have
here a particular example of what can be accomplished.)
We require, too, a massive reduction in armaments and the
military, all over the world, and especially in the USA and UK.
All nuclear weapons need to be destroyed, and the arms industry
needs to be massively curtailed.
France in a retaliatory invasion of Afghanistan.
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Population Growth. The world’s population is predicted to rise
to over 9 billion by 2050. Population growth adds to global
warming, increases likelihood of war, undermines economic
growth, and tends to speed up destruction of natural habitats,
extinction of species, and over fishing of the sea. One relatively
cheap and practical measure that could be taken to slow down
population growth would be to ensure that every woman on the
planet of child bearing age has access to reliable birth control
methods: the pill, the condom, the coil. It does not help that this is
opposed by the Catholic Church, and was opposed by the Bush
administration in the USA. One view is that population growth
tends to level off as countries become wealthier. Parents tend not
to have so many children – the argument goes – because the need
to provide them with an education makes children more expensive,
parents do not need to have children to care for them in old age
because they can rely on state care, and falling death rates among
children mean that it is no longer seen as essential to have lots of
children to ensure that some survive. It is foolish to rely on these
mechanisms, however, to slow down population growth. What is
required is an effective programme world wide to ensure that every
woman of child bearing age has access to reliable contraception.
World Poverty. The debt of the poor countries of the world needs
to be cancelled. There needs to be a change in world trading
agreements, to ensure that it is the poor countries that are favoured,
and not the rich. It must be permitted for poor countries to
implement protectionism, to protect fledging industries against
international competition.
A new global Marshall Plan needs to be created, funded by the
wealthy countries of the world – the USA, Canada, Europe, Japan,
Australia, New Zealand, and perhaps others – to help poor
countries develop in as sustainable a way as possible, the emphasis
being on education and the development of appropriate industry
and agriculture. This needs to be allied to efforts to promote
democracy, and to put a stop to political corruption. More
scientific and technological research needs to be devoted to the
problems of the poor: problems of health, agriculture,
communications, education, appropriate industrial development.
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Destruction of Natural Habitats and Extinction of Species. As
an integral part of the global Marshall plan, indicated above,
wealthy countries need to collaborate with poor and developing
countries to take those measures required to stop the destruction of
tropical rain forests and other natural habitats. This involves both
deploying and adequately financing and equipping environmental
police to put a stop to logging and hunting. It also involves
providing aid for alternative, more sustainable methods of
development. Agriculture needs to be developed in such a way
that habitats remain for wild life to flourish. There needs to be
enhanced protection for endangered species.
I put these global policy proposals forward, not because I think
they make a startlingly original contribution to thought about how
we are to solve our global problems, but rather to indicate the kind
of things we need to do to solve these problems. We need this as
background to help answer the crucial question of the next section:
“How would wisdom-inquiry help us put global policies such as
these successfully into practice?”
I am well aware that some governments, many NGOs, the UN,
social businesses, countless individual and officials are already
working hard to implement many aspects of these policies.
Despite all these efforts, progress towards implementing the
policies I have indicated (or better versions of these policies)
remains agonizingly slow. Some of our global problems are
intensifying – most notably global warming.
Some may complain that not enough detail has been given to
assess these policy proposals. I have, however, I think, said
enough for the purposes of the argument of the next section.
Others may complain that some, or even all, of what I have
proposed is wrong-headed, and such that, if put into practice,
would have dire consequences, the very opposite of what is
intended. Those who believe in the universal efficacy of the free
market to solve our problems are likely, in particular, to object to
much of the above. My reply is that even if the above policies are
misguided, in part or in total, this will not substantially affect the
argument of the next section. It must be remembered that a basic
task of wisdom-inquiry is (a) to articulate global problems, and (b)
312
propose and critically assess possible solutions. Nothing is
presupposed about what our problems are, and what we need to do
about them: wisdom-inquiry is intended to help enlighten us about
these matters. Furthermore, even if we do need different policies
from the above to solve our problems, nevertheless the argument
of the next section goes through – as long as it is agreed that we
need to tackle our problems democratically.
How Could Wisdom-Inquiry Help?
How exactly, it may be asked, could wisdom-inquiry help
humanity implement these policies – if that is what is required –
and thus help solve our global problems in a way which is so much
more effective than knowledge-inquiry? Let us suppose that the
academic revolution has occurred. Universities everywhere put
wisdom-inquiry into practice. How could this make such a
substantial difference to our capacity to solve global problems
humanely and effectively, thus making progress towards as good a
world as possible?
In essence, the answer is extremely simple. Our only hope of
solving our global problems successfully lies with tackling these
problems democratically. Benevolent, enlightened dictatorships or
autocracies will not meet with success. But if democratic tackling
of global problems is to succeed, we first need democracy to be
established around the world, and second we need electorates – the
world’s population – to have an enlightened understanding of what
our global problems are, and what we need to do about them. If
this is lacking, democratic governments will not be able to
implement the policies that are required. If, on the other hand, a
majority of the world’s people do have a good understanding of
what our problems are, and what needs to be done about them,
there is a good chance governments will respond to what this
majority demands. This assumes, of course, that it is in the
interests of the majority that global problems be solved. If this is
not the case, then many might see clearly what needs to be done,
but might nevertheless oppose the doing of it. I shall discuss this
possibility in the next but one section.
A crucial requirement for tackling global problems successfully,
then, is that a majority of the world’s people have a good
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understanding of what these problems are, and what needs to be
done about them. This is quite drastically lacking at present.
Indeed, it may seem quite absurdly utopian to think it would ever
be possible for most people on earth to agree about what our
problems are, and what we need to do about them.
Step forward wisdom-inquiry. It is just here that wisdom-
inquiry makes a dramatic difference. A basic task of wisdom-
inquiry is (a) to articulate problems of living, including global
problems, and (b) to propose and critically assess possible
solutions – actual and possible actions, policies, political
programmes, economic strategies, philosophies of life.7
A university that puts wisdom-inquiry into practice would hold a
big Seminar once a month (let us say) devoted to discussing what
our global problems are, and how they are to be solved. Everyone
at the university would be invited to attend and participate, from
undergraduate to professor and vice-chancellor. The Seminar
might sometimes be big affairs, involving the media, with well-
known speakers, while on other occasions it might be smaller,
more private, an affair for a group of specialists, devoted to some
specific issue. The aim would be, not just to highlight existing
problems, or criticize existing policies, but to come up with
workable, realistic, effective new policies. The constitution of the
university would be such that good ideas developed in the Seminar
would be capable of influencing more specialized research in the
university, and would be critically assessed by such research. One
result of the Seminar would be that all those associated with, and
educated in, universities, from professor to undergraduate, would
acquire a good understanding of what our global problems are,
what is and is not being done about them, what could be done, and
what kind of research and education is required to help solve them.
A long-term task of social inquiry would be to help build aim-
oriented rationality into our diverse institutions – government,
industry, finance, agriculture, international trade, the military, the
7 Even if the policies I have outlined are the best available, they need to
be developed in far greater detail before they qualify even for serious
consideration. The chances are, of course, that what I have proposed
deserves to be rejected, because it is unworkable, undesirable, or both.
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media, the law, education – so that problematic aims may be
transformed to become those that help solve global problems. A
fundamental task for universities implementing wisdom-inquiry is
to educate the public about what our global problems are, and what
we need to do about them. This would be done, not by instruction,
but by lively discussion and debate, ideas, arguments and
information flowing in both directions. There would be powerful
inducements for academics to engage in public education by means
of public discussion and lectures, articles in newspapers, popular
books, broadcasts, blogs on the internet, even novels and plays.
All academics want to make a contribution to academic thought,
not only for its own sake, but also because this leads to academic
status and prestige, academic prizes, and career advancement.
Granted wisdom-inquiry, contributions are judged in terms of their
capacity to help people realize what is of value in life. Working
within the framework of wisdom-inquiry, academics would, in
other words, be highly motivated to engage in the kind of public
education I have indicated (since this is integral to what counts as
an academic contribution). A central purpose of academia would
be to promote cooperatively rational tackling of problems of living
in the social world, and put aim-oriented rationality into practice in
personal and social life. The problematic aims and priorities of
scientific and technological research would be subjected to
sustained, imaginative exploration and criticism, by academics and
non-academics alike, this feeding into, and making use of, the
discussion of problems of living going on within and without
academia. Wisdom-inquiry is designed to engage in rational
discussion of political policies and programmes, and to promote
this as well. Universities would have just sufficient power to retain
their independence from pressures of government, public opinion,
industry, and the media, but no more. It would be standard for a
nation’s universities to include a shadow government. If the actual
government does not permit such a thing, universities would
clamour to be free to create it and, in doing so, and would receive
international support. The nation’s university shadow government
would be entirely without power, but would also be free of all the
constraints and pressures that actual power is subject to, which
tend to distort and corrupt what actual governments do. The
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shadow university government would seek to develop and publish
ideal possible actions, policies and legislative programmes which
the nation’s actual government ought to be developing and
enacting. The idea would be that learning would go on in both
directions, the ideal university shadow government learning about
the realities of power, the nation’s actual government learning to
distinguish what is merely politically expedient from what is in the
interests of the nation and humanity, a fund of good ideas for
policies and legislation being readily available from the shadow
government. Finally, the world’s universities would contain a
shadow university world government which would do, for the
world, what national shadow governments do for nations. A basic
task would be to work out how an actual world government might
be created, what form this should take, what its desirable and
undesirable consequences would be likely to be.
In brief, the whole character, structure, activity, aims and ideals
of wisdom-inquiry universities would be such as to be devoted to
helping humanity learn how to resolve global problems in
increasingly cooperatively rational ways, thus making increasingly
assured progress towards as good a world as possible. Universities
would be humanity’s means to learn how to create a genuinely
civilized world
The contrast with knowledge-inquiry is devastating.
Knowledge-inquiry fails to do almost everything that needs to be
done to help humanity make progress in tackling global problems.
Knowledge-inquiry does, it is true, acquire knowledge and
technological know-how, and make this available, primarily to
government agencies and industry, to be used to solve practical
problems. This can undeniably be of great value and, as we have
seen, has made possible the creation of the modern world. But
almost everything else that needs to be done is rigorously excluded
from the intellectual domain of academia under the misguided idea
that this is necessary to preserve the objectivity and reliability, the
authentically factual character, of the knowledge that is acquired.
Far from giving priority to (a) articulating global problems, and (b)
proposing and critically assessing possible solutions, these vital
intellectual activities are excluded from knowledge-inquiry
altogether, on the grounds that they involve politics, values, action,
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human suffering, morality, and can only undermine, and not
contribute to, the pursuit of factual knowledge. Again, far from
giving priority to the task of introducing aim-oriented rationality
into the social world, knowledge-inquiry does not even put aim-
oriented rationality into practice itself, in science, social inquiry or
the humanities. There is no place for the Seminar devoted to
tackling global problems. Social science and the humanities seek
to improve knowledge and understanding of social and cultural
phenomena, but do not actively try to transform social life.
Individual academics may take it upon themselves to contribute to
public education but this is, as it were, an extra-curriculum
activity, not a part of the official business of professional academic
life – which is to contribute to the growth of knowledge. Far from
academia encouraging discussion and debate with the public, ideas
being encouraged to flow in both directions, knowledge-inquiry,
quite to the contrary, demands that the intellectual domain of
inquiry be sealed off from the corrupting influence of the social
world, so that only those considerations relevant to the acquisition
of knowledge of truth may influence what is accepted and rejected
– such as evidence and valid argument. Knowledge-inquiry
provides every inducement to academics to seek to contribute to
knowledge, but no inducement whatsoever to engage in the extra-
curriculum activity of public education (since this does not
contribute to knowledge). What matters is how well-established
and significant a contribution to knowledge is, not whether it does,
or does not, help enhance the quality of human life. The
intellectual standards of knowledge-inquiry are almost exclusively
concerned with the problem of distinguishing authentic
contributions to knowledge from would-be contributions that fail
to pass master, in one way or another. These standards are not
concerned to help improve the aims and priorities of research.
Choosing what research aims receive financial support, and what
do not, is left to research funding bodies to decide: it is not thrown
open to sustained scientific and public discussion and debate.
Inevitably, as a result, research priorities come to reflect the
interests of those who do science, and those who pay for it –
government and industry – rather than the interests of those whose
needs are the greatest, the poor of the earth who, being poor, do not
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have the means to pay for scientific research. Vast sums are spent
on military research, very little in comparison on research related
to the diseases and problems of the poor of Africa, south America
and Asia. Finally, there can be no place for a shadow government
in the university, granted knowledge-inquiry. Politics is to be
excluded altogether from the intellectual domain of inquiry; only
the pursuit of knowledge about political life is permitted.
The outcome of this wholesale failure to do what most needs to
be done, apart from acquire knowledge, is just what might be
expected. Much knowledge is acquired but this, in the absence of
a more fundamental concern to help humanity solve global
problems, does as much harm as good. Knowledge-inquiry,
instead of helping to solve global problems, helps to create and
intensify them, as we have seen.
I have concentrated on universities. But if the revolution were to
occur in universities, it would have an impact throughout the
whole educational and research world, as well as influencing
dramatically, as I have tried to indicate, the media, government, the
arts, the law, industry, agriculture, international relations, and
personal and social life quite generally.
Changing knowledge-inquiry into wisdom-inquiry in universities
throughout the civilized world would make a dramatic difference
to the capacity of humanity to tackle global problems successfully.
Objections
Objection 1: Academics would never agree to put wisdom-inquiry
into practice.
Reply: The arguments for the greater rationality, intellectual
integrity and potential human value of wisdom-inquiry are
overwhelming. Once these arguments have been understood by a
sufficient number of influential academics, funding bodies and
university administrators, universities will begin to move
piecemeal towards wisdom-inquiry. Indeed, as I shall show in the
next section, this academic transformation is, to some extent,
already underway.
Objection 2: Governments, industry, public opinion would never
permit the required academic revolution to take place.
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Reply: Undoubtedly in some parts of the world today it would
indeed be impossible. There would be difficulties in North Korea,
Burma, Zimbabwe, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and even China and Russia.
Even in the 30 full democracies of the world,8 serious attempts to
instigate wisdom-inquiry would meet with opposition. Even
democratically elected governments are unlikely to take kindly to
academic criticism of their policies, and to the creation of
academic shadow governments. Those universities that took a lead
in implementing wisdom-inquiry might find they were being
penalized by having government funding decreased. Industry
might withdraw funds as well. Academia would have an
incredibly powerful argument in its hands to combat such
manoeuvres: the changes are needed in the interests of rationality,
intellectual integrity, and the future of humanity. The public could
be alerted to the scandal of government attempting to suppress
academic thought devoted to helping humanity make progress
towards as good a world as possible. This objection does not look
very plausible when one takes into account that the academic
revolution, from knowledge to wisdom, is already underway to
some extent, in the UK and elsewhere, as we shall see in the next
section.
Objection 3: Even if the academic revolution occurred, it would
have little impact, either because academics failed to agree among
themselves, or because they are ignored by centres of power and
influence.
Reply: A nightmare possibility is that wisdom-inquiry academics
simply reproduce all the standard ideas, prejudices and
disagreements of the social world around them. In the US,
academics supporting the Democrats might slug it out with those
supporting the Republicans, and no one learns anything. I
acknowledge that this is a possibility, but it would betray the
fundamental intellectual ideals of wisdom-inquiry. Those engaged
in social inquiry need to treat policy ideas in a way that is
8 The Economist has recently assessed the democratic character of the
countries of the world: see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_
Index There are 51 dictatorships, with North Korea at the bottom of the
list.
319
analogous, in important respects, to the way natural scientists treat
scientific theories: some such ideas may be hopeless, others may
be partly good, partly bad, none is likely to be entirely good and
sound, the all-important point is to pick out the best idea from its
rivals, and subject it and its rivals to sustained critical examination,
taking experience into account where possible, and if a better idea
emerges from the pool of rivals, that should be adopted instead. It
is of course just this that aim-oriented rationality is designed to
facilitate, in the field of ideas for solutions to problems of living,
on analogy with what aim-oriented empiricism facilitates within
natural science. It will, for many reasons, be more difficult to
protect wisdom-inquiry social thought from subversion than it is to
protect natural science from subversion. Policy ideas implicate our
lives, passions, ideals and values directly, and are much harder to
assess rationally and by means of experience, than are scientific
ideas. Experiments in the social world cannot be conducted freely
in the way in which scientific experiments can.
As for academia being ignored even if it comes up with
excellent, agreed ideas this, to some extent, is almost bound to
occur. But only to some extent, and for a time. It took scientists
decades to get governments, industry, the media and the public to
take global warming seriously. The long-standing failure to get the
message across has finally led scientists to make changes to the
nature of science – nudging things towards wisdom-inquiry, as we
shall see in the next section. But finally, at the time of writing
(2009), the message has been delivered although there are few
signs, as yet, that much is being done to reduce CO2 emissions, in
response to this message. In my view, the global warming
message would have been communicated two or three decades
earlier if wisdom-inquiry had been in place by 1945, let us say.
The academic revolution we are considering would undoubtedly
have a major impact, in the ways I have indicated, even if this
impact would not be felt overnight, but would take a decade or so
to filter through the intricacies of the social world.
Objection 4: Even if the academic revolution occurred, even if it
came up with excellent policies and technologies, and even if these
were appreciated and understood by governments and public alike,
still this would not make much difference because the barrier to
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solving global problems is not lack of knowledge and understand,
but the unwillingness of the wealthy to make the necessary
sacrifices. Too many wealthy, powerful people do not want to do
what needs to be done.
Reply: The policies I have indicated above would undoubtedly
meet with resistance, were they ever to be seriously on the political
agenda. In the USA, for example, business corporations are very
good at protecting what they see as their interests by lobbying, by
funding sympathetic politicians and political parties, and by
manipulating the media. Even here, however, wisdom-inquiry
could be effective, in that the public needs to become more
enlightened about what these strategies are, and what needs to be
done to combat them. This assumes that it is primarily the
business and financial world which would want to oppose the
policies we require. It could be argued that a majority of people
living in wealthy countries do not want to support measures
required to deal with global warming, or world poverty, because of
the sacrifices that would have to be made. This, I believe,
overestimates the sacrifices that are required, and underestimates
concern people have for the future of the world. If policies are
widely understood to be necessary, and likely to be effective, in
tackling global warming, for example, or world poverty, and then I
believe a majority of people in wealthy countries would be willing
to endorse these policies, even if some sacrifice is required. Why
should a global Marshall plan today meet with so much more
resistance than the original Marshall plan encountered when first
instigated after the second world war, when the USA was not as
wealthy as it is today?
Is the Academic Revolution Underway?
So far I have drawn a stark contrast between knowledge-inquiry
and wisdom-inquiry, and have suggested that knowledge-inquiry is
at present dominant in universities all over the world. But is this
really the case?
I have no doubt that it was the case 25 years ago. In 1983, for
the first edition of my book From Knowledge to Wisdom I
investigated six relevant aspects of academia to see which
conception of inquiry prevailed, and found that knowledge-inquiry
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was overwhelmingly dominant.9 However, more recently, in 2003,
I repeated the survey for the second edition of the book, and found
that some changes had taken place in the direction of wisdom-
inquiry, although knowledge-inquiry still dominated.10 Since
2003, there have been further developments that have nudged some
universities in the direction of wisdom-inquiry.
It is possible that the academic revolution really is underway,
and we are in the middle of a dramatic transition from knowledge-
inquiry to wisdom-inquiry. I now indicate some developments that
have taken place in universities in the UK during the last twenty
years which can, perhaps, be interpreted as constituting steps
towards wisdom-inquiry.11
Perhaps the most significant steps towards wisdom-inquiry that
have taken place during the last twenty years are the creation of
departments, institutions and research centres concerned with
social policy, with problems of environmental degradation, climate
change, poverty, injustice and war, and with such matters as
medical ethics and community health. For example, a number of
departments and research centres concerned in one way or another
with policy issues have been created at my own university of
University College London during the last 20 years.
At Cambridge University, there is a more interesting
development. One can see the first hints of the institutional
structure of wisdom-inquiry being superimposed upon the existing
structure of knowledge-inquiry. As I have indicated, wisdom-
inquiry puts the intellectual tackling of problems of living at the
heart of academic inquiry, this activity being conducted in such a
way that it both influences, and is influenced by, more specialized
research. Knowledge-inquiry, by contrast, organizes intellectual
activity into the conventional departments of knowledge: physics,
chemistry, biology, history and the rest, in turn subdivided, again
and again, into ever more narrow, specialized research disciplines.
But this knowledge-inquiry structure of ever more specialized
research is hopelessly inappropriate when it comes to tackling our
9 See my (1984), ch. 6.
10 See my (2007a), ch. 6.
11 What follows is adapted from my (2009).
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major problems of living. In order to tackle environmental
problems, for example, in a rational and effective way, specialized
research into a multitude of different fields, from geology,
engineering and economics to climate science, biology,
architecture and metallurgy, needs to be connected to, and
coordinated with, the different aspects of environmental problems.
The sheer urgency of environmental problems has, it seems, forced
Cambridge University to create the beginnings of wisdom-inquiry
organization to deal with the issue. The “Cambridge
Environmental Initiative” (CEI), launched in December 2004,
distinguishes seven fields associated with environmental problems:
conservation, climate change, energy, society, water waste built
environment and industry, natural hazards, society, and
technology, and under these headings, coordinates some 102
research groups working on specialized aspects of environmental
issues in some 25 different (knowledge-inquiry) departments: see
http://www.cei.group.cam.ac.uk/ . The CEI holds seminars,
workshops and public lectures to put specialized research workers
in diverse fields in touch with one another, and to inform the
public. There is also a CEI newsletter.
A similar coordinating, interdisciplinary initiative exists at
Oxford University. This is the School of Geography and the
Environment, founded in 2005 under another name. This is made
up of five research “clusters”, two previously established research
centres, the Environmental Change Institute (founded in 1991) and
the Transport Studies Institute, and three inter-departmental
research programmes, the African Environments Programme the
Oxford Centre for Water Research, and the Oxford branch of the
Tyndall Centre (see below). The School has links with other such
research centres, for example the UK Climate Impact Programme
and the UK Energy Research Centre.
At Oxford University there is also the James Martin 21st Century
School, founded in 2005 to “formulate new concepts, policies and
technologies that will make the future a better place to be”. It is
made up of fifteen Institutes devoted to research that ranges from
ageing, armed conflict, cancer therapy and carbon reduction to
nanoscience, oceans, science innovation and society, the future of
the mind, and the future of humanity. At Oxford there is also the
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Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment, founded in 2008
to help government and industry tackle the challenges of the 21st
century, especially those associated with climate change.
Somewhat similar developments have taken place recently at my
own university, University College London. Not only are there
141 research institutes and centres at UCL, some only recently
founded, many interdisciplinary in character, devoted to such
themes as ageing, cancer, cities, culture, public policy, the
environment, global health, governance, migration, neuroscience,
and security. In addition, very recently, the attempt has been made
to organize research at UCL around a few broad themes that
include: global health, sustainable cities, intercultural interactions,
and human wellbeing. This is being done so that UCL may all the
better contribute to solving the immense global problems that
confront humanity.
All these developments, surely echoed in many universities all
over the world, can be regarded as first steps towards
implementing wisdom-inquiry.
Equally impressive is the John Tyndall Centre for Climate
Change Research, founded by 28 scientists from 10 different
universities or institutions in 2000. It is based in six British
universities, has links with six others, and is funded by three
research councils, NERC, EPSRC and ESRC (environment,
engineering and social economic research). It “brings together
scientists, economists, engineers and social scientists, who together
are working to develop sustainable responses to climate change
through trans-disciplinary research and dialogue on both a national
and international level – not just within the research community,
but also with business leaders, policy advisors, the media and the
public in general” (www.tyndall.ac.uk/general/about.shtml). All
this is strikingly in accordance with basic features of wisdom-
inquiry.12 We have here, perhaps, the real beginnings of wisdom-
inquiry being put into academic practice.
A similar organization, modelled on the Tyndall Centre, is the
UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC), launched in 2004, and also
funded by the three research councils, NERC, EPSRC and ESRC.
12 Tyndall Centre (2006).
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Its mission is to be a “centre of research, and source of
authoritative information and leadership, on sustainable energy
systems” (www.ukerc.ac.uk/). It coordinates research in some
twelve British universities or research institutions. UKERC has
created the National Energy Research Network (NERN), which
seeks to link up the entire energy community, including people
from academia, government, NGOs and business.
Another possible indication of a modest step towards wisdom-
inquiry is the growth of peace studies and conflict resolution
research. In Britain, the Peace Studies Department at Bradford
University has “quadrupled in size” since 1984 (Professor Paul
Rogers, personal communication), and is now the largest university
department in this field in the world. INCORE, an International
Conflict Research project, was established in 1993 at the
University of Ulster, in Northern Ireland, in conjunction with the
United Nations University. It develops conflict resolution
strategies, and aims to influence policymakers and others involved
in conflict resolution. Like the newly created environmental
institutions just considered, it is highly interdisciplinary in
character, in that it coordinates work done in history, policy
studies, politics, international affairs, sociology, geography,
architecture, communications, and social work as well as in peace
and conflict studies. The Oxford Research Group, established in
1982, is an independent think tank which “seeks to develop
effective methods whereby people can bring about positive change
on issues of national and international security by non-violent
means” (www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/). It has links with a
number of universities in Britain. Peace studies have also grown
during the period we are considering at Sussex University, Kings
College London, Leeds University, Coventry University and
London Metropolitan University. Centres in the field in Britain
created since 1984 include: the Centre for Peace and
Reconciliation Studies at Warwick University founded in 1999, the
Desmond Tutu Centre for War and Peace, established in 2004 at
Liverpool Hope University; the Praxis Centre at Leeds
Metropolitan University, launched in 2004; the Crime and Conflict
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Centre at Middlesex University; and the International Boundaries
Research Unit, founded in 1989 at Durham University.13
Additional indications of a general movement towards aspects of
wisdom-inquiry are the following. Demos, a British independent
think tank has, in recent years, convened conferences on the need
for more public participation in discussion about aims and
priorities of scientific research, and greater openness of science to
the public.14 This has been taken up by The Royal Society which,
in 2004, published a report on potential benefits and hazards of
nanotechnology produced by a group consisting of both scientists
and non-scientists. The Royal Society has also created a “Science
in Society Programme” in 2000, with the aims of promoting
“dialogue with society”, of involving “society positively in
influencing and sharing responsibility for policy on scientific
matters”, and of embracing “a culture of openness in decision-
making” which takes into account “the values and attitudes of the
public”. A similar initiative is the “science in society” research
programme funded by the Economic and Social Research Council
which has, in the Autumn of 2007, come up with six booklets
reporting on various aspects of the relationship between science
and society. Many scientists now appreciate that non-scientists
ought to contribute to discussion concerning science policy. There
is a growing awareness among scientists and others of the role that
values play in science policy, and the importance of subjecting
medical and other scientific research to ethical assessment. That
universities are becoming increasingly concerned about these
issues is indicated by the creation, in recent years, of many
departments of “science, technology and society”, in the UK, the
USA and elsewhere, the intention being that these departments will
concern themselves with interactions between science and society.
Even though academia is not organized in such a way as to give
intellectual priority to helping humanity tackle its current global
problems, academics do nevertheless publish books that tackle
these issues, for experts and non-experts alike. For example, in
13 For an account of the birth and growth of peace studies in universities
see Rogers (2006).
14 See Wilsdon and Willis (2004).
326
recent years many books have been published on global warming
and what to do about it: see: www.kings.cam.ac.uk/assets/d/da/
Global _Warming_bibliography.pdf
Here are a few further scattered hints that the revolution, from
knowledge to wisdom, may be underway – as yet unrecognized
and unorganized. In recent years, research in psychology into the
nature of wisdom has flourished, in the USA, Canada, Germany
and elsewhere.15 Emerging out of this, and associated in part with
Robert Sternberg, there is, in the USA, a “teaching for wisdom”
initiative, the idea being that, whatever else is taught – science,
history or mathematics – the teaching should be conducted in such
a way that wisdom is also acquired.16 There is the Arete Initiative
at Chicago University which has “launched a $2 million research
programme on the nature and benefits of wisdom”: see
http://wisdomresearch.org/. There are two initiatives that I have
been involved with personally. The first is a new international
group of over 200 scholars and educationalists called Friends of
Wisdom, “an association of people sympathetic to the idea that
academic inquiry should help humanity acquire more wisdom by
rational means”: see www.knowledgetowisdom.org. The second is
a special issue of the journal London Review of Education; of
which I was guest editor, devoted to the theme “wisdom in the
university”. This duly appeared in June 2007 (vol. 5, no.2). It
contains seven articles on various aspects of the basic theme.
Rather strikingly, another academic journal brought out a special
issue on a similar theme in the same month. The April-June 2007
issue of Social Epistemology is devoted to the theme “wisdom in
management” (vol. 21, no. 2). On the 5th December 2007, History
and Policy was launched, a new initiative that seeks to bring
together historians, politicians and the media, and “works for better
public policy through an understanding of history”: see
www.historyandpolicy.org/.
Out of curiosity, on 18 May 2009, I consulted Google to see
whether it gives any indications of the revolution that may be
underway. Here are the number of web pages that came up for
15 See, for example, Sternberg (1990).
16 See Sternberg et al., (2007).
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various relevant topics: “Environmental Studies” 9,910,000;
“Development Studies” 7,210,000; “Peace Studies” 529,000;
“Policy Studies” 2,160,000; “Science, Technology and Society”
297,000; “Wisdom Studies” 5,510; “From Knowledge to Wisdom”
18,100; “Wisdom-Inquiry” 625. These figures do not, perhaps, in
themselves tell us very much. There is probably a great deal of
repetition – and Google gives us no idea of the intellectual quality
of the departments or studies that are being referred to. One of the
items that comes up in Google is Copthorne Macdonald’s
“Wisdom Page” – a compilation of “various on-line texts
concerning wisdom, references to books about wisdom,
information about organizations that promote wisdom”, and
including a bibliography of more than 800 works on wisdom
prepared by Richard Trowbridge.
None of these developments quite amounts to advocating or
implementing wisdom-inquiry (apart from the two I am associated
with). One has to remember that “wisdom studies” is not the same
thing as “wisdom-inquiry”. The new environmental research
organizations, and the new emphasis on policy studies of various
kinds, do not in themselves add up to wisdom-inquiry. In order to
put wisdom-inquiry fully into academic practice, it would be
essential for social inquiry and the humanities to give far greater
emphasis to the task of helping humanity learn how to tackle its
immense global problems in more cooperatively rational ways than
at present. The imaginative and critical exploration of problems of
living would need to proceed at the heart of academia, in such a
way that it influences science policy, and is in turn influenced by
the results of scientific and technological research. Academia
would need to give much more emphasis to the task of public
education by means of discussion and debate. As I have stressed,
our only hope of tackling global problems of climate change,
poverty, war and terrorism humanely and effectively is to tackle
them democratically. But democratic governments are not likely
to be all that much more enlightened than their electorates. This in
turn means that electorates of democracies must have a good
understanding of what our global problems are, and what needs to
be done about them. Without that there is little hope of humanity
making progress towards a better world. A vital task for
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universities is to help educate the public about what we need to do
to avoid – at the least – the worst of future possible disasters.
Wisdom-inquiry would undertake such a task of public education
to an extent that is far beyond anything attempted or imagined by
academics today. There is still a long way to go before we have
what we so urgently need, a kind of academic inquiry rationally
devoted to helping humanity learn how to create a better world
Nevertheless, the developments I have indicated can be regarded
as signs that there is a growing awareness of the need for our
universities to change so as to help individuals learn how to realize
what is genuinely of value in life – and help humanity learn how to
tackle its immense global problems in wiser, more cooperatively
rational ways than we seem to be doing at present. My own calls
for this intellectual and institutional revolution may have been in
vain. But what I have been calling for, all these years, is perhaps,
at last, beginning to happen. If so, it is happening with agonizing
slowness, in a dreadfully muddled and piecemeal way. It urgently
needs academics and non-academics to wake up to what is going
on – or what needs to go on – to help give direction, coherence and
a rationale to this nascent revolution from knowledge to wisdom.
Conclusion
The basic point is extremely simple. If we are to make better
progress towards as good a world as possible, we need to learn
how to do it. That in turn requires that we have in our hands
institutions of learning rationally devoted to that task. It is just this
that we do not have at present – although there are hints that such
institutions might be struggling to be born. What we have at
present is academic inquiry devoted to the pursuit of knowledge
which, as we have seen, helps create as many problems as it
solves. We urgently need to transform our universities so that they
come to put wisdom-inquiry into practice. Only then will the God-
of-Cosmic-Value, as it is represented on earth, flourish, embedded
as it is within the God-of-Cosmic-Power.
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COMMENTS ON WORK BY
NICHOLAS MAXWELL
From Knowledge to Wisdom (1984, Blackwell; 2nd ed.,
2007, Pentire Press)
"The essential idea is really so simple, so transparently right ... It is
a profound book, refreshingly unpretentious, and deserves to be
read, refined and implemented."
Dr. Stewart Richards, Annals of Science
"Maxwell's book is a major contribution to current work on the
intellectual status and social functions of science ... [It] comes as
an enormous breath of fresh air, for here is a philosopher of
science with enough backbone to offer root and branch criticism of
scientific practices and to call for their reform."
Dr. David Collingridge, Social Studies of Science
"Maxwell has, I believe, written a very important book which will
resonate in the years to come. For those who are not inextricably
and cynically locked into the power and career structure of
academia with its government-industrial-military connections, this
is a book to read, think about, and act on."
Dr. Brian Easlea, Journal of Applied Philosophy
“In this book, Nicholas Maxwell argues powerfully for an
intellectual “revolution” transforming all branches of science and
technology. Unlike such revolutions as those described by Thomas
Kuhn, which affect knowledge about some aspect of the physical
world, Maxwell’s revolution involves radical changes in the aims,
methods, and products of scientific inquiry, changes that will give
priority to the personal and social problems that people face in
their efforts to achieve what is valuable and desirable.”
Professor George Kneller, Canadian Journal of Education
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“Any philosopher or other person who seeks wisdom should read
this book. Any educator who loves education – especially those in
leadership positions – should read this book. Anyone who wants to
understand an important source of modern human malaise should
read this book. And anyone trying to figure out why, in a world
that produces so many technical wonders, there is such an
immense "wisdom gap" should read this book. In From Knowledge
to Wisdom: A Revolution for Science and the Humanities….
Nicholas Maxwell presents a compelling, wise, humane, and
timely argument for a shift in our fundamental "aim of inquiry"
from that of knowledge to that of wisdom.”
Jeff Huggins Metapsychology
“This book is the work of an unashamed idealist; but it is none the
worse for that. The author is a philosopher of science who holds
the plain man’s view that philosophy should be a guide to life, not
just a cure for intellectual headaches. He believes, and argues with
passion and conviction, that the abysmal failure of science to free
society from poverty, hunger and fear is due to a fatal flaw in the
accepted aim of scientific endeavour – the acquisition and
extension of knowledge. It is impossible to do Maxwell’s argument
justice in a few sentences, but, essentially, it is this. At the present
time the pursuit of science – indeed the whole of academic inquiry
– is largely dominated by ‘the philosophy of knowledge’. At the
heart of this philosophy is the assumption that knowledge is to be
pursued for its own sake. But the pursuit of objective truth must
not be distorted by human wishes and desires, so scientific
research becomes divorced from human needs, and a well-
intentioned impartiality gives way to a deplorable indifference to
the human condition. The only escape is to reformulate the goals of
science within a ‘philosophy of wisdom’, which puts human life
first and gives ‘absolute priority to the intellectual tasks of
articulating our problems of living, proposing and criticizing
possible solutions, possible and actual human actions’. The
philosophy of wisdom commends itself, furthermore, not only to
the heart but to the head: it gives science and scholarship a proper
place in the human social order. . . Nicholas Maxwell has breached
the conventions of philosophical writing by using, with intent, such
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loaded words as ‘wisdom’, ‘suffering’ and ‘love’. ‘That which is of
value in existence, associated with human life, is inconceivably,
unimaginably, richly diverse in character.’ What an un-academic
proposition to flow from the pen of a lecturer in the philosophy of
science; but what a condemnation of the academic outlook, that
this should be so
Professor Christopher Longuet-Higgins, Nature
“Wisdom, as Maxwell's own experience shows, has been outlawed
from the western academic and intellectual system ... In such a
climate, Maxwell's effort to get a hearing on behalf of wisdom is
indeed praiseworthy.”
Dr. Ziauddin Sardar, Inquiry
“This book is a provocative and sustained argument for a
'revolution', a call for a 'sweeping, holistic change in the overall
aims and methods of institutionalized inquiry and education, from
knowledge to wisdom' ... Maxwell offers solid and convincing
arguments for the exciting and important thesis that rational
research and debate among professionals concerning values and
their realization is both possible and ought to be undertaken.”
Professor Jeff Foss, Canadian Philosophical Review
“Maxwell's argument ... is a powerful one. His critique of the
underlying empiricism of the philosophy of knowledge is coherent
and well argued, as is his defence of the philosophy of wisdom.
Most interesting, perhaps, from a philosophical viewpoint, is his
analysis of the social and human sciences and the humanities,
which have always posed problems to more orthodox philosophers,
wishing to reconcile them with the natural sciences. In Maxwell's
schema they pose no such problems, featuring primarily ... as
methodologies, aiding our pursuit of our diverse social and
personal endeavours. This is an exciting and important work,
which should be read by all students of the philosophy of science.
It also provides a framework for historical analysis and should be
of interest to all but the most blinkered of historians of science and
philosophy.”
Dr. John Hendry, British Journal for the History of Science
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“… a major source of priorities, funds and graduates’ jobs in ‘pure
science’ is military … this aspect of science is deemed irrelevant
by the overwhelming majority of those who research, teach,
sociologize, philosophise or moralize about science. What are we
to make of such a phenomenon? It is in part a political situation, in
its causes and effects; but it is also philosophical, and this is Nick
Maxwell’s point of focus. Such a gigantic co-operative endeavour
of concealment, amounting to a huge deception, could be
accomplished naturally by all educated, humane participants, a
‘conspiracy needing no conspirators’, only because their
‘philosophy of knowledge’ envelops them in the assurance that
their directors, paymasters and employers have nothing to do with
the real thing – the research. This, to me, is the heart of Maxwell’s
message.”
Dr. Jerry Ravetz, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
“This book is written in simple straightforward language … The
style is passionate, committed, serious; it communicates Maxwell’s
conviction that we are in deep trouble, that there is a remedy
available, and that it is ingrained bad intellectual habits that
prevent us from improving our lot … Maxwell is raising an
important and fundamental question and things are not going so
well for us that we should afford the luxury of listening only to
well-tempered answers.”
Professor John Kekes, Inquiry
“Because Maxwell so obviously understands and loves science as
practiced, say, by an Einstein, his criticisms of current science
seem to arise out of a sadness at missed opportunities rather than
hostility … I found Maxwell’s exposition and critique of the
current state of establishment science to be clear and convincing …
Maxwell is right to remind us that in an age of Star Wars and
impending ecological disaster, talk of the positive potential of
means-oriented science can easily become an escapist fantasy.”
Professor Noretta Koertge, Isis
“In an admirable book called From Knowledge to Wisdom,
Nicholas Maxwell has argued that the radical, wasteful
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misdirection of our whole academic effort is actually a central
cause of the sorrows and dangers of our age . . .Thinking out how
to live is a more basic and urgent use of the human intellect than
the discovery of any fact whatsoever, and the considerations it
reveals ought to guide us in our search for knowledge. . . In
arguing this point . . . Maxwell proposes that we should replace the
notion of aiming at knowledge by that of aiming at wisdom. I think
this is basically the right proposal. . . Maxwell is surely right in
saying that [the distorted pursuit of knowledge], because it wastes
our intellectual powers, has played a serious part in distorting our
lives.”
Mary Midgley, Wisdom, Information and Wonder
“[T]here is...much of interest and, yes, much of value in this
book...Maxwell is one of those rare professional philosophers who
sees a problem in the divorce between thought and life which has
characterized much of modern philosophy (and on both sides of the
English channel, not merely in the so-called ‘analytic’ tradition’);
he wishes to see thought applied to life and used to improve it. As
a result, many of the issues he raises are of the first importance …
He has . . produced a work which should give all philosophers and
philosophically-minded scientists cause for reflection on their
various endeavors; in particular, it should give philosophers who
are content to be specialists a few sleepless nights.”
Professor Steven Yates, Metaphilosophy
“Maxwell [argues for] an “intellectual revolution” that will affect
the fundamental methods of inquiry of science, technology,
scholarship and education, looking not for knowledge for
knowledge’s sake, but for wisdom, which he says is more rational
and of greater human value and holds the potential to alleviate
human problems and institute social change. A humanist and
philosopher, Maxwell presents his ideas with eloquence and
conviction. This book will appeal to persons in many different
disciplines – from science to social studies.”
American Library Association
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“Maxwell’s thesis is that the evident failure of science to free
society from poverty, hunger and the threat of extinction results
from a ‘fatal flaw in the accepted aim of scientific endeavour’. . . It
is precisely because of ‘the accepted aim’ that acquisition of
knowledge, which presumably originated as an essential strategy
for survival, has given rise to the relentless pursuit of new and
better ways of achieving the exact opposite. . . For Maxwell, the
solution is obvious – a radically new approach to the whole
business of intellectual inquiry. . . It is hard to argue with these
aims . . . If we could only change the way people feel, Maxwell’s
solution would be easier, if not easy.”
Professor Norman F. Dixon, Our Own Worst Enemy
“a sustained piece of philosophical reasoning which makes a real
contribution to the reinstatement of philosophy as a central
concern. We need to follow Maxwell’s lead in constructing a
philosophy of wisdom.”
P. Eichman, Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith
"Nicholas Maxwell (1984) defines freedom as 'the capacity to
achieve what is of value in a range of circumstances'. I think this
is about as good a short definition of freedom as could be. In
particular, it appropriately leaves wide open the question of just
what is of value. Our unique ability to reconsider our deepest
convictions about what makes life worth living obliges us to take
seriously the discovery that there is no palpable constraint on what
we can consider."
Professor Daniel Dennett, Freedom Evolving
“The Rationality of Scientific Discovery”, Philosophy of
Science (1974)
“Maxwell's theory of aim-oriented empiricism is the outstanding
work on scientific change since Lakatos, and his thesis is surely
correct. Scientific growth should be rationally directed through the
discussion, choice, and modification of aim-incorporating
blueprints rather than left to haphazard competition among
research traditions seeking empirical success alone. . . Of the
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theories of scientific change and rationality that I know, Maxwell's
is my first choice. It is broad in scope, closely and powerfully
argued, and is in keeping with the purpose of this book, which is to
see science in its totality. No other theory provides, as Maxwell's
does in principle, for the rational direction of the overall growth of
science.”
Professor George F. Kneller, Science as a Human Endeavor
“As Nicholas Maxwell has suggested, if we make one crucial
assumption about the purpose of science, then the possibility arises
that some paradigms and theories can be evaluated even prior to
the examination of their substantive products. This one crucial
assumption is that the overall aim of science is to discover the
maximum amount of order inherent in the universe or in any field
of inquiry. Maxwell calls this ‘aim-oriented empiricism’. . . I
agree with Maxwell’s evaluation of the importance of coherent
aim-oriented paradigms as a criterion of science. . . The time is
ripe, therefore, to replace the incoherent and unconscious
paradigms under whose auspices most anthropologists conduct
their research with explicit descriptions of basic objectives, rules,
and assumptions. That is why I have written this book.”
Professor Marvin Harris, Cultural Materialism
The Comprehensibility of the Universe: A New
Conception of Science (1998, paperback 2003, Oxford
University Press)
“Nicholas Maxwell's ambitious aim is to reform not only our
philosophical understanding of science but the methodology of
scientists themselves ... Maxwell's aim-oriented empiricism [is]
intelligible and persuasive ... the main ideas are important and
appealing ... an important contribution to the philosophy of
physics.”
J. J. C. Smart, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
“Maxwell has clearly spent a lifetime thinking about these matters
and passionately seeks a philosophical conception of science that
will aid in the development of an intelligible physical worldview.
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He has much of interest to say about the development of physical
thought since Newton. His comprehensive coverage and
sophisticated treatment of basic problems within the philosophy of
science make the book well worth studying for philosophers of
science as well as for scientists interested in philosophical and
methodological matters pertaining to science.”
Professor Cory F. Juhl, International Philosophical Quarterly
“Maxwell performs a heroic feat in making the physics accessible
to the non-physicist ... Philosophically, there is much here to
stimulate and provoke . . . there are rewarding comparisons to be
made between the functional roles assigned to Maxwell's
metaphysical "blueprints" and Thomas Kuhn's paradigms, as well
as between Maxwell's description of theoretical development and
Imre Lakatos's methodology of scientific research programmes.”
Dr.Anjan Chakravartty, Times Higher Education Supplement
“some of [Maxwell’s] insights are of everlasting importance to the
philosophy of science, the fact that he stands on the shoulders of
giants (Hume, Popper) notwithstanding . . . My overall conclusion
is that Universe is an ideal book for a reading group in philosophy
of science or in philosophy of physics. Many of the pressing
problems of the philosophy of science are discussed in a lively
manner, controversial solutions are passionately defended and
some new insights are provided; in particular the chapter on
simplicity in physics deserves to be read by all philosophers of
physics.”
Dr. F. A. Muller, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern
Physics
“Maxwell ... has shown that it is absurd to believe that science can
proceed without some basic assumptions about the
comprehensibility of the universe . . . Throughout this book,
Maxwell has meticulously argued for the superiority of his view by
providing detailed examples from the history of physics and
mathematics . . . The Comprehensibility of the Universe attempts
to resurrect an ideal of modern philosophy: to make rational sense
of science by offering a philosophical program for improving our
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knowledge and understanding of the universe. It is a consistent
plea for articulating the metaphysical presuppositions of modern
science and offers a cure for the theoretical schizophrenia resulting
from acceptance of incoherent principles at the base of scientific
theory.”
Professor Leemon McHenry, Mind
“This admirably ambitious book contains more thought-provoking
material than can even be mentioned here. Maxwell's treatment of
the descriptive problem of simplicity, and his novel proposals
about quantum mechanics deserve special note. In his view the
simplicity of a theory is (and should be) judged by the degree to
which it exemplifies the current blueprint of physicalism, that
blueprint determining the terminology in which the theory and its
rivals should be compared. This means that the simplicity of a
theory amounts to the unity of its ontology, a view that allows
Maxwell to offer an explanation of our conflicting intuitions that
terminology matters to simplicity, and that it is utterly irrelevant.
Maxwell's distinctive views about what is wrong with quantum
mechanics grow out of his adherence to aim-oriented empiricism:
the much-discussed problem of measurement is for him a
superficial consequence of the deeper problem that the ontology of
the theory is not unified, in that no one understands how one entity
could be both a wave and a particle. In response to this problem
Maxwell finds between the metaphysical cracks a way to fuse
micro-realism and probabilism, which leads him to a proposal to
solve the measurement problem by supplementing quantum
mechanics with a collapse theory distinct from the recent and
popular one of Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber. Maxwell's highly
informed discussions of the changing ontologies of various modern
physical theories are enjoyable, and the physical and mathematical
appendix of the book should be a great help to the beginner.”
Professor Sherrilyn Roush, The Philosophical Review
“Nicholas Maxwell has struck an excellent balance between
science and philosophy . . . The detailed discussions of theoretical
unification in physics - from Newton, Maxwell and Einstein to
Feynman, Weinberg and Salam - form some of the best material
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in the book. Maxwell is good at explaining physics . . . Through
the interplay of metaphysical assumptions, at varying distances
from the empirical evidence Maxwell shows, rather convincingly,
that in the pursuit of rational science the inference from the
evidence to a small number of acceptable theories, out of the pool
of rival ones, is justifiable . . . Its greatest virtue is the detailed
programme for a modern version of natural philosophy. Along the
way, Maxwell homes in on the notion of comprehensibility by the
exclusion of less attractive alternatives. In an age of excessive
specialization the book offers a timely reminder of the close link
between science and philosophy. There is a beautiful balance
between concrete science and abstract philosophy . . . In the
"excellently written Appendix some of the basic mathematical
technicalities, including the principles of quantum mechanics, are
very well explained . . . Einstein held that 'epistemology without
science becomes an empty scheme' while 'science without
epistemology is primitive and muddled'. Maxwell's new book is a
long-running commentary on this aphorism.”
Dr. Friedel Weinert, Philosophy
“In The Comprehensibility of the Universe, Nicholas Maxwell
develops a bold, new conception of the relationship between
philosophy and science…Maxwell has a metaphysically rich,
evolutionary vision of the self-correcting nature of science…The
work is important…An added benefit of Maxwell’s analysis…is
the possibility of a positive, fruitful relationship to emerge between
science and the philosophy of science…his important and timely
critique of the reigning empiricist orthodoxy…what does it mean
to say simplicity is a theoretical virtue? And why should we prefer
simple to complex theories? Maxwell provides an admirable
discussion of these issues. He also provides a useful discussion of
simplicity in the context of theory unification – simple theories are
unifying theories – and illustrates his points with examples drawn
from Newtonian physics and Maxwellian electrodynamics…It is
hard to do justice to the richness of Maxwell’s discussion in this
chapter. I can only say that this is a chapter that will repay serious
study…Maxwell turns his attention to issues surrounding the
theoretical character of evidence, the idea of scientific progress and
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the question as to whether there is a method of discovery….The
discussion of these matters – as with the other topics covered in
this book – is conceptually rich and technically sophisticated. A
useful antidote, in fact, to the settled orthodoxy surrounding these
philosophical issues…Maxwell has written a book that aims to put
the metaphysics back in physics. It is ambitious in scope, well-
argued, and deserves to be seriously studied.”
Professor Niall Shanks, Metascience
The Human World in the Physical Universe:
Consciousness, Free Will and Evolution (2001, Rowman
and Littlefield)
“Ambitious and carefully-argued...I strongly recommend this book.
It presents a version of compatibilism that attempts to do real
justice to common sense ideas of free will, value, and meaning,
and...it deals with many aspects of the most fundamental problems
of existence.”
Dr. David Hodgson, Journal of Consciousness Studies
“Maxwell has not only succeeded in bringing together the various
different subjects that make up the human world/physical universe
problem in a single volume, he has done so in a comprehensive,
lucid and, above all, readable way.”
Dr. M. Iredale, Trends in Cognitive Sciences
“...a bald summary of this interesting and passionately-argued
book does insufficient justice to the subtlety of many of the
detailed arguments it contains.”
Professor Bernard Harrison, Mind
“Nicholas Maxwell takes on the ambitious project of explaining,
both epistemologically and metaphysically, the physical universe
and human existence within it. His vision is appealing; he unites
the physical and the personal by means of the concepts of aim and
value, which he sees as the keys to explaining traditional physical
puzzles. Given the current popularity of theories of goal-oriented
dynamical systems in biology and cognitive science, this approach
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is timely. . . The most admirable aspect of this book is the
willingness to confront every important aspect of human existence
in the physical universe, and the recognition that in a complete
explanation, all these aspects must be covered. Maxwell lays out
the whole field, and thus provides a valuable map of the problem
space that any philosopher must understand in order to resolve it in
whole or in part.”
Professor Natika Newton, Philosophical Psychology
“This is a very complex and rich book. Maxwell convincingly
explains why we should and how we can overcome the ‘unnatural’
segregation of science and philosophy that is the legacy of analytic
philosophy. His critique of standard empiricism and defence of
aim-oriented empiricism are especially stimulating”
Professor Thomas Bittner, Philosophical Books
“I recommend reading The Human World in the Physical Universe
… for a number of reasons. First, [it] … provides the best entrance
to Maxwell’s world of thought. Secondly, [it] contains a succinct
but certainly not too-detailed overview of the various problems and
positions in the currently flourishing philosophy of mind. Thirdly,
it shows that despite the fact that many philosophers have declared
Cartesian Dualism dead time and again, with some adjustments,
the Cartesian view remains powerful and can compete effortlessly
with other extant views.”
Dr. F. A. Muller, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern
Physics
“Some philosophers like neat arguments that address small
questions comprehensively. Maxwell’s book is not for them. The
Human World in the Physical Universe instead addresses big
problems with broad brushstrokes.”
Dr. Rachel Cooper, Metascience
"A solid work of original thinking."
Professor L. McHenry, Choice
366
Is Science Neurotic? (2004, Imperial College Press)
“This book is bursting with intellectual energy and ambition...[It]
provides a good account of issues needing debate. In accessible
language, Maxwell articulates many of today's key scientific and
social issues...his methodical analysis of topics such as induction
and unity, his historical perspective on the Enlightenment, his
opinions on string theory and his identification of the most
important problems of living are absorbing and insightful.”
Clare McNiven, Journal of Consciousness Studies
“Is science neurotic? Yes, says Nicholas Maxwell, and the sooner
we acknowledge it and understand the reasons why, the better it
will be for academic inquiry generally and, indeed, for the whole
of humankind. This is a bold claim … But it is also realistic and
deserves to be taken very seriously … My summary in no way
does justice to the strength and detail of Maxwell's well crafted
arguments … I found the book fascinating, stimulating and
convincing … after reading this book, I have come to see the
profound importance of its central message.”
Dr. Mathew Iredale, The Philosopher's Magazine
“… the title Is Science Neurotic? could be rewritten to read Is
Academe Neurotic? since this book goes far beyond the science
wars to condemn, in large, sweeping gestures, all of modern
academic inquiry. The sweeping gestures are refreshing and
exciting to read in the current climate of specialised, technical,
philosophical writing. Stylistically, Maxwell writes like someone
following Popper or Feyerabend, who understood the philosopher
to be improving the World, rather than contributing to a small
piece of one of many debates, each of which can be understood
only by the small number of its participants…. In spite of this, the
argument is complex, graceful, and its finer points are quite
subtle…. The book's final chapter calls for nothing less than
revolution in academia, including the very meaning of academic
life and work, as well as a list of the nine most serious problems
facing the contemporary world - problems which it is the task of
academia to articulate, analyse, and attempt to solve. This chapter
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sums up what the reader has felt all along: that this is not really a
work of philosophy of science, but a work of 'Philosophy', which
addresses 'Big Questions' and answers them without hesitation…. I
enjoyed the book as a whole for its intelligence, courageous spirit,
and refusal to participate in the specialisation and elitism of the
current academic climate…. it is a book that can be enjoyed by any
intelligent lay-reader. It is a good book to assign to students for
these reasons, as well - it will get them thinking about questions
like: What is science for? What is philosophy for? Why should we
think? Why should we learn? How can academia contribute of the
welfare of people? … the feeling with which this book leaves the
reader [is] that these are the questions in which philosophy is
grounded and which it ought never to attempt to leave behind."
Margret Grebowicz, Metascience
“Maxwell's fundamental idea is so obvious that it has escaped
notice. But acceptance of the idea requires nothing short of a
complete revolution for the disciplines. Science should become
more intellectually honest about its metaphysical presuppositions
and its involvement in contributing to human value. Following this
first step it cures itself of its irrational repressed aims and is
empowered to progress to a more civilized world.”
Professor Leemon McHenry, Review of Metaphysics
“Maxwell argues that the metaphysical assumptions underlying
present-day scientific inquiry, referred to as standard empiricism or
SE, have led to ominous irrationality. Hence the alarmingly
provocative title; hence also-the argument carries this far-the sad
state of the world today. Nor is Maxwell above invoking, as a
parallel example to science's besetting "neurosis," the irrational
behavior of Oedipus as Freud saw him: unintentionally yet
intentionally slaying his father for love of his mother (Mother
Earth?). Maxwell proposes replacing SE with his own
metaphysical remedy, aim-oriented empiricism, or AOE. Since
science does not acknowledge metaphysical presumptions and
therefore disallows questioning them – they are, by definition,
outside the realm of scientific investigation – Maxwell has
experienced, over the 30-plus years of his professional life,
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scholarly rejection, which perhaps explains his occasional shrill
tone. But he is a passionate and, despite everything, optimistic
idealist. Maxwell claims that AOE, if adopted, will help deal with
major survival problems such as global warming, Third World
poverty, and nuclear disarmament, and science itself will become
wisdom-oriented rather than knowledge-oriented – a good thing. A
large appendix, about a third of the book, fleshes the argument out
in technical, epistemological terms. Summing Up: Recommended.
General readers; graduate students; faculty.”
Professor M. Schiff, Choice
“Is Science Neurotic? … is a rare and refreshing text that
convincingly argues for a new conception of scientific empiricism
that demands a re-evaluation of what [science and philosophy] can
contribute to one another and of what they, and all academia, can
contribute to humanity… Is Science Neurotic? is primarily a
philosophy of science text, but it is clear that Maxwell is also
appealing to scientists. The clear and concise style of the text's four
main chapters make them accessible to anyone even vaguely
familiar with philosophical writing and physics… it is quite
inspiring to read a sound critique of the fragmented state of
academia and an appeal to academia to promote and contribute to
social change.”
Sarah Smellie, Canadian Undergraduate Physics Journal
“Maxwell's aspirations are extraordinarily and admirably
ambitious. He intends to contribute towards articulating and
bringing about a form of social progress that embodies rationality
and wisdom... by raising the question of how to integrate science
into wisdom-inquiry and constructing novel and challenging
arguments in answer to it, Maxwell is drawing attention to issues
that need urgent attention in the philosophy of science.”
Professor Hugh Lacey, Mind
“Maxwell has written a very important book … Maxwell
eloquently discusses the astonishing advances and the terrifying
realities of science without global wisdom. While science has
brought forth significant advancements for society, it has also
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unleashed the potential for annihilation. Wisdom is now, as he puts
it, not a luxury but a necessity … Maxwell’s book is first-rate. It
demonstrates his erudition and devotion to his ideal of developing
wisdom in students. Maxwell expertly discusses basic problems in
our intellectual goals and methods of inquiry.”
Professor Joseph Davidow, Learning for Democracy
"My judgement of this book is favourable...[Maxwell's] heart is in
the right place, as he casts a friendly but highly critical eye on the
Enlightenment Movement. 'We suffer, not from too much
scientific rationality, but from not enough' he says...recommending
a massive cooperation between science and the humanities...The
book's style is refreshingly simple, clear".
Joseph Agassi, Philosophy of Science
“Nicholas Maxwell's book passionately embraces Francis Bacon's
dictum that '[t]he true and legitimate goal of the sciences is to
endow human life with new discoveries and resources'. The book's
scope is commendable. It offers a thorough critique of the
contemporary philosophy and practice of both natural (Chapters 1
& 2) and social science (Chapter 3), and suggests a remedy for
what the author believes is the neurotic repression of the
aforementioned Baconian aims.”
Slobadan Perovic, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
What’s Wrong With Science? (1976, Bran’s Head Books;
2nd ed., 2009, Pentire Press)
“Nicholas Maxwell believes that science (and also philosophy of
science) should be humane and adventurous. In What’s Wrong
With Science? he boldly practises what he preaches. The argument
is presented as a dialogue; and (rare among philosophers) Maxwell
makes the debate lively and well-balanced…as a modern
philosophical dialogue, the book is both instructive and great fun.”
Jerry Ravetz, New Scientist
“how to be compassionate should be, on Maxwell’s view, part of
the process of our rational inquiry. Through compassion,
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technology and applied science become humane. How this inquiry
can be conducted with the desired result is by no means clear, but
that its mastery is required for our survival in the technological age
is certain.”
Alan Drengson, Philosophical Investigations
“This is an unusual book…an unusually refreshing one.”
T. A. Goudge, Philosophy of Social Science
‘This rather peculiar and extremely provocative book…. is just
"throwing open new possibilities, entertainingly indicating
Weltanschauung that may not have occurred to people", and what a
possibility he's (really entertainingly) opening! ……. [T]he whole
dialogue did work – the reading was pleasant and seemed almost
real (rare events are those when philosophers actually do write in
an attractive way)….. [I]t cannot be ignored that science has, at
least in an indirect way, brought along not just prosperity but also
grave global problems (global warming, arms of mass destruction,
etc.). If our author is correct, which he probably is, that they are
the "almost inevitable outcome" of science's failure to get rid of the
philosophical idea of standard empiricism then he just might have
a very good point. And even though this book, notwithstanding the
hopes of our author, will probably not save the world, it will
definitely not contribute to destroying it!’
Kristof K.P. Vanhoutte, Metapsychology
Science and the Pursuit of Wisdom: Studies in the
Philosophy of Nicholas Maxwell (ed. L. McHenry, 2009,
Ontos Verlag)
The name of Nicholas Maxwell for those who know him is tied to
an original and revolutionary vision, and for those who do not
know him it could be regarded as a token of a treasure to be
discovered. Nicholas Maxwell is the man of his era; he observes
the problems of his time and suggests a pervasive thought to solve
them.
R. Ramezanivarzaneh, Metapsychology
